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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia
On May 12, 2005, the Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia was 
passed by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. The TRC was tasked with investigating the 
truth about the human rights violations that had occurred during the nation’s civil war. In late 2005, 
following a widespread consultative process and public nominations, nine national Commissioners 
were selected to make up the TRC panel. 
The TRC of Liberia was mandated to promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation by:
a. Investigating gross human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law as well 
as abuses that occurred, including massacres, sexual violations, murder, extra-judicial killings and 
economic crimes, such as the exploitation of natural or public resources to perpetuate armed conflicts, 
during the period January 1979 to October 14, 2003; determining whether these were isolated incidents 
or part of a systematic pattern; establishing the antecedents, circumstances factors and context of such 
violations and abuses; and determining those responsible for the commission of the violations and 
abuses and their motives as well as their impact on victims.
Notwithstanding the period specified herein, the Commission may, on an application by any person 
or group of persons, pursue the objectives set out in this Article IV (Mandate of the Commission) in 
respect of any other period preceding 1979.
b. Providing a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences in order to create a clear picture 
of the past so as to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation;
c. Investigating the antecedents of the crises which gave rise to and impacted the violent conflict in 
Liberia;
d. Conducting a critical review of Liberia’s historical past in order to address falsehoods and 
misconceptions about the nation’s past socioeconomic and political development.
e. Adopting specific mechanisms and procedures to address the experiences of women, children and 
vulnerable groups, paying particular attention to gender-based violations, as well as to the issue of 
child soldiers, providing opportunities for them to relate their experiences. Addressing concerns and 
recommending measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of such violations in the spirit 
of national reconciliation and healing.
f. Compiling a report that includes a comprehensive account of the activities of the Commission and 
its findings.
The TRC of Liberia concluded its work on June 30, 2009. It has presented its final report containing 
findings, determinations and recommendations made by the Commission to the National Legislature. 
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The Advocates for Human Rights 
The Advocates for Human Rights is a non-governmental, 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to the 
promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. The Advocates works with 
volunteers to document human rights abuses, advocate on behalf of individual victims, educate on 
human rights issues, and provide training and technical assistance to address and prevent human 
rights violations. 
Mission Statement
The mission of The Advocates for Human Rights is to implement international human rights 
standards in order to promote civil society and reinforce the rule of law. By involving volunteers in 
research, education, and advocacy, we build broad constituencies in the United States and select global 
communities.
Operating Principles
The success of The Advocates for Human Rights is based upon: 
•	 A commitment to work impartially and independently to promote and protect international 
human rights; 
•	 Innovative and flexible programs that include investigation, representation, training and 
education, to offer concrete opportunities to promote international human rights; 
•	 Dedicated volunteers who devote their skills and energy to projects that support human 
rights; 
•	 Cooperative relationships with the United Nations as well as other non-governmental 
organizations working to protect human rights; 
•	 Strategic alliances with local, national and international agencies whose work complements 
and supports our mission; 
•	 Partnership building with local groups to build relationships in order to educate the 
community about and protect human rights; 
•	 A generous and receptive community that is the basis of the organization’s volunteer and 
financial support; 
•	 Talented and committed employees, board members and interns who represent the 
organization with clients, colleagues, donors and the public. 
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DRI Press
From June 9 – 14, 2008, Hamline University in St Paul, Minnesota served as host site to the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) diaspora public hearings. DRI Press, an Imprint of 
the Dispute Resolution Institute at Hamline University School of Law, published the TRC Diaspora 
Project final report to further support the important work of the TRC and The Advocates for Human 
Rights. 
Hamline University School of Law educates students to become competent, professional, and ethical 
lawyers who apply legal knowledge with disciplined imagination and a global perspective that enables 
them to strengthen society. The law school’s Dispute Resolution Institute, consistently ranked by 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT in the top five among U.S. dispute resolution programs, offers 
more than 30 alternative dispute resolution courses in a wide variety of domestic and international 
programs each year, including certificate programs in arbitration law and practice, problem-solving 
and dispute resolution. Mirroring the reality that contemporary lawyers work in multi-disciplinary 
and cross-cultural settings, DRI classes intentionally bring together law and other graduate students, 
human resources and business personnel, practicing lawyers and other professionals from around the 
world www.hamline.edu/law/adr.
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Preface
From 1979 to 2003, more than 1.5 million Liberians were forced from their homes to escape from 
the violence and destruction of a protracted civil conflict. Hundreds of thousands became refugees 
and many eventually made their way to countries of resettlement including the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Most of their stories have never been told. This report on the experience of the 
Liberian diaspora, entitled A House with Two Rooms, is the culmination of three years of work in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana. The report 
has been submitted to the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the body charged 
by the Liberian government with determining the facts of the human rights violations that occurred 
during the civil war. The Liberian TRC officially completed its mandate June 30, 2009. 
A House with Two Rooms documents the experience of human rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law that forced Liberians to leave the country. It is based on an analysis of 
more than 1600 statements, fact-finding interviews, and witness testimony at public hearings held in 
the U.S. The report also tells the story of the “triple trauma” experienced by members of the diaspora 
during their flight through Liberia and across international borders, while living in refugee camps in 
West Africa, and in resettlement in the U.S. and U.K. In addition, the report summarizes the views of 
Liberians in the diaspora on the root causes of the conflict and their recommendations for systemic 
reform and reconciliation.
xv
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Chapter One
Executive Summary
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Chapter One. Executive Summary
All my family started to flee to different places. One brother fled to 
neighboring Guinea…My brother who stayed in Bomi County saw people 
in my brother’s house and told them to leave and they just shot him. I had 
nine siblings. One brother was a diplomat in Sierra Leone. Another brother 
lived in New York. Another brother fled to Guinea – I think he is still there. 
My oldest brother has not been heard from up to today. He just disappeared 
from the face of the earth. We believe he is most likely dead. One brother 
fled to Ghana. He is still there today. My sister came here too…I have two 
siblings still in Liberia.1
The West African nation of Liberia is recovering from years of conflict characterized by egregious 
violations of human rights that dramatically increased the Liberian diaspora. From 1979 until 2003, 
the Liberian people survived a bloody coup d’état, years of military rule, and two violent civil wars. 
The atrocities were the result of complex historical and geopolitical factors. The slave trade, U.S. 
efforts to return slaves and free African Americans to Africa, the abuse of the indigenous population 
by a ruling oligarchy, the looting of the country’s natural resources by its own corrupt government 
and by foreign interests, and the political ambitions of other African leaders all contributed to the 
conflict. Using inhuman tactics, key individuals and their supporters seized upon the chaos and strife 
in Liberia to gain power and to amass wealth. The international community, including the United 
States, failed to take effective action to limit the bloodshed.
Out of a pre-war population of three million, an estimated 250,000 people were killed, and as many 
as 1.5 million people were displaced. A mass exodus fleeing the fighting created Liberian diaspora 
communities in many countries around the world, including the United States. Tens of thousands of 
Liberians live in the United States (reportedly more than 30,000 in Minnesota alone), in the United 
Kingdom, and in refugee settlements in the West African sub-region.
The violence finally ended in 2003, but the peace remains fragile. The conflict’s impact is evident in the 
streets of Monrovia, the homes of villagers in the Liberian countryside, and Liberian gathering places 
in London, Philadelphia, Staten Island, and elsewhere. Many Liberians were forced from their homes 
and deprived of their education and livelihood.  They are suffering from physical and psychological 
trauma and are separated from their families by death or distance. Deeply felt conflicts continue to 
divide the Liberian people at home and abroad. Corruption, both real and perceived, continues to 
pervade the society. Liberia’s infrastructure was destroyed and remains badly damaged; security is a 
very real concern. The many Liberians who lack the most basic means of subsistence seek food, work, 
health care, education, and a future. Increasingly, Liberians also are calling for justice. These demands 
are made to a government that struggles with few resources and an unstable security situation.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) was originally agreed upon in the 
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August 2003 Accra Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and was established 
by legislative act in 2005. The TRC was 
created to “promote national peace, 
security, unity and reconciliation,” and 
at the same time make it possible to hold 
perpetrators accountable for the gross 
human rights violations and violations 
of international humanitarian law that 
occurred in Liberia between January 
1979 and October 2003. 
While more than 30 countries have 
implemented some form of truth 
commission process, the Liberian TRC is the first such body to involve diaspora2 Liberians in every 
aspect of the truth seeking process. Diaspora Liberians provided advisory input on the operation 
of the project, participated in outreach, gave statements, and testified in public hearings held in the 
diaspora. This groundbreaking effort gave Liberians in the diaspora a voice in the truth-seeking, 
accountability, and reconciliation processes in Liberia. 
At the request of the TRC, The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates) coordinated the work 
of the TRC in the diaspora. Since January 2007, The Advocates has documented statements from 
Liberians in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in the Buduburam Refugee Settlement in 
Ghana, West Africa. The TRC held public hearings in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA in June 2008 to gather 
public testimony from Liberians in the U.S. diaspora. This work could not have been undertaken 
without the more than $10 million in in-kind contributions and pro bono hours donated over two years 
to the TRC Diaspora Project by individuals, partner law firms, and institutions around the United 
States and in the United Kingdom. This report presents an analysis of TRC statements and public 
hearing testimony as well as extensive background interviews and secondary source research by The 
Advocates and its pro bono partners.
Background
Liberia is located on the Atlantic coast of West Africa and encompasses a territory of 43,000 square 
miles. The country shares borders with Sierra Leone to the northwest, Guinea to the northeast, and 
Côte d’Ivoire to the southeast. Liberia’s 15 counties generally correspond to territories historically 
claimed by particular Liberian indigenous ethnic groups. English is the official language of Liberia, 
although more than 20 indigenous languages and a form of English known as Liberian English are 
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also spoken.
Liberia was partly shaped by the transatlantic slave trade. In the early eighteen hundreds, a group of 
prominent white Americans developed a plan to return freed blacks to Africa. Beginning in 1822, 
free-born black Americans, freed slaves of African descent, and Africans freed from captured slave 
ships were settled by the American Colonization Society on lands that later became Liberia. This 
group of a few thousand settlers, never more than 5 percent of the Liberian population, became 
known as Americo-Liberians. 
While Liberia has often been hailed as one of the only African nations never to be colonized, the 
historical facts are more complex. Although Liberia was not colonized by a Western power, the 
Americo-Liberian-dominated government administered the country in ways reminiscent of colonial 
governments across the continent. The settlements of repatriated Africans were in fact governed 
by white American agents of the American Colonization Society for the first several years of their 
existence. Although the U.S. government funded much of the American Colonization Society efforts, 
it never sought to formally establish itself as a colonial power in Liberia. Liberia became a sovereign 
nation under Americo-Liberian rule in 1847. The indigenous inhabitants of the territory claimed for 
Liberia were largely antagonistic to the establishment of the Liberian nation. In fact, the American 
Colonization Society and later the fledgling Liberian government were at war with various indigenous 
tribes over territory and trade routes throughout the 1800s. 
Liberia developed into a relatively stable oligarchy under (an almost exclusive) Americo-Liberian 
government through the 1800s and early 1900s. By the 1970s, however, tensions within Liberia were 
escalating. Riots broke out in 1979 in the capital city of Monrovia. In 1980, a military coup took 
place, resulting in the murder of the president, the summary execution of 13 government ministers, 
and the installation of Samuel Doe, an army master sergeant, as the new national leader. Doe ruled 
the country for the next decade. In 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa led a group of fighters in a failed 
coup attempt against Doe, launching the country into further turmoil. In 1989, Charles Taylor and 
his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire, setting off two 
civil wars that raged until 2003, involving more than 10 rebel factions, and impacting the entire West 
African sub-region.
Setting the Stage for conflict
An important aspect of the TRC’s mandate is the examination of the root causes of the conflict that 
engulfed Liberia. All individuals who agreed to be interviewed as part of the TRC process were asked 
their opinions about the roots of the conflict in Liberia. Several key themes emerged from the more 
than 1,500 statements documented in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in Ghana. Liberians 
identified the following as contributory elements in setting the stage for the conflict in Liberia as well 
Chapter One
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as exacerbating the conflict and leading to loss of life and the destruction of the Liberian nation: 
•	 oppressive dominance of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy over the indigenous peoples of 
Liberia,
•	 greed and corruption at the international, national, corporate, and individual level,
•	 breakdown of the rule of law,
•	 interference of foreign governments in Liberian affairs,
•	 conflicts among indigenous groups, and
•	 failure of the United States to intervene to stop the fighting.
 
Americo-Liberian Dominance
As Liberia began to establish itself as a new nation, a small number of Americo-Liberian families 
and their patronage networks dominated all aspects of government, the security sector, commerce, 
and social advancement. Government in Liberia was the domain of the Americo-Liberian controlled 
True Whig Party. Although other political parties existed, opposition to True Whig Party dominance 
was systematically repressed. Control of the Liberian territory and the indigenous tribes that lived 
there was established by the Liberian Frontier Force, later named the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). 
Commerce with the outside world was centrally controlled by the Monrovia-based government to the 
detriment of those who lived outside the city. TRC statements reflect the opinion that this oligarchic 
governance structure led to an excessive concentration of power in the presidency, lack of education 
and other opportunities for those of non-Americo-Liberian origin, and impunity for corruption and 
systematic human rights abuses.
The administrations of Presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert sought to reach out to the 
indigenous tribes and increase their involvement in government and society. Their efforts, however, 
were perceived by many to be insufficient, and their administrations were perceived to be corrupt. 
In 1979, rumors and widespread belief that President Tolbert planned to raise the price of rice to 
economically benefit him and his family led to protests and demonstrations known as the Rice Riots. 
The Tolbert administration’s brutal suppression of the Rice Riots and the administration’s use of 
foreign troops further entrenched the socio-economic and ethnic divides in Liberian society and 
heightened popular grievances. Many who provided TRC statements perceived the Rice Riots to have 
been the beginning of Liberia’s civil crisis.
Corruption 
Liberia has significant natural resources, including timber, gold, diamonds, and rubber. Historically, 
the majority of Liberians have not benefited significantly from the exploitation of these natural 
resources. 
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The concentration of state power among a few influential families meant that the government 
served the financial interests of those families and their networks. Special deals were reached with a 
multitude of foreign business interests. Most notably, the 1925 lease of one million acres of land on 
highly favorable terms to the Firestone Rubber Company led to the creation of the world’s largest 
rubber plantation. In the late 1920s the True Whig Party forcibly recruited workers for the Firestone 
plantation and other projects through its Labor Bureau and the Liberian Frontier Force, which meted 
out harsh punishments to indigenous leaders unable or unwilling to supply workers. A League of 
Nations investigation of the practices led to the resignation of one Liberian president. Labor practices 
at Firestone remain the subject of ongoing litigation in U.S. federal court.  
With the concentration of power and lack of economic opportunity, corruption and abuse of power 
spread to virtually all sectors of Liberian government. Corruption became endemic across ministries, 
the security forces, civil service, and the judiciary. 
Liberians have had little faith in judicial institutions to protect their interests or fundamental rights. 
Inadequate compensation for judicial officers and the influence of Liberian patrimonial governance 
structures subjected the judiciary to political, social, familial, and financial pressures. In addition, 
corruption and abuse of power in the security forces went unchecked by the judiciary and the state, 
leading to further deterioration of the rule of law. The breakdown in the rule of law and a history of 
pervasive illicit enrichment frustrated those seeking true democratic change in Liberia and led some 
to advocate the use of force to attain change. These entrenched aspects of life in Liberia exacerbated 
behavior during the civil conflict. Vigilantism became widespread, with multiple statement givers 
reporting that combatants used their newfound power to seek revenge for past losses. Wartime looting 
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and theft of property from those perceived as having benefited from the system of illicit enrichment 
were also commonly reported to the TRC. 
The Role of the United States
The United States played an important role in Liberia’s founding and the development of its governing 
structures. Many of the patterns of governance that became established in Liberia, including over-
centralization of power, were imported by members of the American Colonization Society. American 
Colonization Society members initially governed the colonies that later became Liberia, and they 
modeled government institutions on those of the United States. The authoritarian and paternalistic 
management style of the American Colonization Society played a role in establishing the systems from 
which the conflicts arose. The United States also played a role in exacerbating the conflict itself, most 
notably through its silence and inaction. The U.S. government failed to act at critical times throughout 
the conflict. During the height of the civil war, the United States stood by and watched, limiting its 
efforts to the evacuation of Americans. Many Liberian statement givers expressed the view that the 
United States had a special duty to assist a nation it founded and that the United States’ failure to do 
so led to thousands of deaths. The former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who was 
in Liberia in 1991, testified before the TRC that he believed U.S. intervention could have potentially 
reduced the violence and saved the country’s infrastructure, but that plans to intervene were never 
implemented. 
Other International Actors
Statement givers identified other international actors who contributed to Liberia’s chaos. The politics 
of the Cold War and long-standing relations among African nations also served to exacerbate and 
probably to lengthen the conflict in Liberia. 
Libya, in particular, was an important source of arms, training, and money throughout the conflict 
period. Muammar al Qadhafi of Libya reportedly hoped to unite African nations in an alliance against 
the United States. Libya was one of the first nations to establish ties to the Doe regime, and Libyans 
invested money in Liberia during the early 1980s. When Doe developed strong relations with the 
United States and Israel, Qadhafi recruited Liberian dissidents and trained them in Libyan camps. 
Most notable among the trainees was Charles Taylor. Qadhafi’s support of, and ongoing relations 
with, Taylor continued after Taylor came to power. Libya served as a major source of weapons for the 
war.
Taylor also received important support from the governments of Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, 
which served as places of refuge for the fighters and provided training and other means of support. 
Other sub-regional actors, including Guinea and Sierra Leone, contributed support to various fighting 
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factions as they emerged to contest Taylor’s regime. The Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, became involved in the Liberian conflict as peacekeepers. The 
ECOWAS peacekeeping force, known as ECOMOG, was a lifeline for many Liberians, but at times 
contributed to human rights abuses rather than preventing them.
Tribalism
Statement givers identified the growing prominence of tribalism as a factor that became entrenched 
during the years of Samuel Doe’s rule in Liberia. The Americo-Liberian oligarchy had established 
its dominance in Liberia by marginalizing all indigenous groups and establishing patrimonial 
networks based on fidelity to the True Whig Party, an ostensibly non-tribal entity but an effectively 
Americo-Liberian institution. In attempting to establish his own system of patrimony distinct 
from the traditional Americo-Liberian system, Doe relied on family and tribal affiliation to ensure 
loyalty. Statement givers perceived Doe to have favored his own small tribe, the Krahn, as well as 
the Mandingo. During Liberia’s two civil wars, fighting factions established themselves along tribal 
lines, and because language and dress were often easy indicators, tribe became an easy – but far from 
accurate – method for identifying perceived enemies. Overcoming tribalism was an oft repeated 
refrain amongst statement givers, who identified it as one of the continuing problems in the Liberian 
homeland and diaspora. 
a human rightS and humanitarian criSiS: liBeria 1979-2003
Starting with the government response to the Rice Riots of 1979 and continuing through the Doe 
administration (1980-1989), the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1997), and the administration of 
Charles Taylor and the Second Liberian Civil War (1997-2003), severe human rights and humanitarian 
abuses were pervasive in Liberia. 
Liberia is a signatory to key international instruments protecting fundamental human rights, including 
the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Geneva 
Conventions, and numerous other instruments that protect the rights of specific groups, such as 
women and children. During both the Doe and Taylor regimes, the government refused to take 
responsibility for the actions of its functionaries in carrying out abuses. Moreover, Doe, Taylor, and 
their close associates were directly implicated by statement givers in personally perpetrating human 
rights abuses. The perpetuation of human rights abuses with complete impunity was a defining feature 
of the TRC mandate period, and numerous statement givers narrated their futile attempts to obtain 
justice for abuses committed against them.
From the bloody coup that led to his assumption of power until his death, Samuel Doe was reportedly 
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responsible for massacres, disappearances, summary executions, imprisonments without trial, and 
systematic suppression of perceived opposition. Although Charles Taylor was initially welcomed by 
many Liberians as a liberator who would bring an end to the tyrannical rule of Samuel Doe, it soon 
became clear that the Taylor era would be as oppressive, if not worse, than anything experienced 
under Doe.
Taylor’s NPFL forces invaded Liberia in December 1989, touching off a full-scale civil war.  During the 
early 1990s, as Taylor’s NPFL marched through the country and then laid siege to Monrovia, hundreds 
of thousands of Liberians fled in the face of abuses against the civilian population. Additional warring 
factions soon emerged, including the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), 
the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Each was itself responsible for human rights and 
humanitarian law violations.  
During the Liberian civil wars, fighters committed wide-ranging violations of international 
humanitarian law. Statement givers reported massacres, rape as a weapon of war, torture, summary 
executions, collective punishments, violence to life, health, and mental well-being, as well as 
innumerable threats and outrages upon personal dignity. Fighting factions were implicated by 
statement givers in carrying out attacks on civilian populations and other non-combatants, such as 
medical personnel, humanitarian workers, and peacekeepers. Moreover, statement givers reported 
that fighting factions targeted refugee populations in cross-border raids. In many instances, statement 
givers who were victimized could not identify which faction was perpetrating the abuses because of 
the general chaos created, and the fact that fighters rarely wore identifiable uniforms. 
One statement giver’s account of violence is representative of the scope of the human rights abuses 
and level of brutality many Liberians suffered:
At the initial stages of the war, I moved to Ninth Street in Sinkor, Monrovia…
The children were outside cleaning the yard. Suddenly they ran inside and 
said that they saw armed men coming. Moments later, Taylor’s men busted 
in. One of them said, “This is the dog I’m looking for.” He told us to come 
outside. Myself, my ten children, and my wife obeyed.
The NPFL [commander] knew me…He had run against me in an election…
before the war. He said to me, “You cheated me during the election, but now 
I am in power. I will teach you a lesson you will never forget.”
He told his NPFL boys to take my eldest daughter into the house. She was 
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thirteen years old. They dragged her inside and dragged me in after her. [The 
commander] raped my daughter in front of me. My father (my daughter’s 
grandfather) was still in the house. He rushed at the NPFL men, trying to 
stop the rape. One of the men – I don’t know his name – shot and killed my 
[father] right there.
[The commander] then brought me and my daughter back outside. He said, 
“I’m going to show you what I came here for.” He beat the children with the 
butt of his gun. He made two of my sons, who were seventeen and twenty, 
drink dirty water with the urine of one of the NPFL men in it. When the 
twenty year old refused, he shot him in the foot. [The commander] stabbed 
my other son, who was eighteen, in the elbow with his bayonet.
He then began to beat my wife. He told her to lay on her back and stare at the 
sun. [The commander] said, “You will eat your husband’s heart very soon.” 
He took the daughter who had been raped. [The commander] held her and 
said, “I want you to know how you all will die.” He ordered one of his men 
to cut off my daughter’s head. She was beheaded in front of our eyes.
They dragged me over to lay beside her body. [The commander] said, “You 
will be the next one.”
Then I heard heavy shooting. ECOMOG was coming. The NPFL scattered. 
Before [the commander] left, he made a remark. He said, “Anywhere in 
Liberia I meet you or your family, I will kill you.”3
One of the most harmful aspects of the conflict was the recruitment and use of child soldiers, a 
tactic employed by Taylor’s forces, but also used by other factions. Children, sometimes as young as 
six or seven, were taken from their families, given drugs and guns, and forced to kill. Psychological 
techniques used to ensure their loyalty and fanaticism, such as forcing them to rape or kill their own 
family members, had the additional effect of preventing their return home. Thousands of former 
child soldiers now live in Liberia as well as in neighboring countries and the diaspora. With little or no 
education, they have few useful skills and are dealing with the trauma of violence and war. Providing 
appropriate care and services to former child soldiers remains one of the most difficult challenges for 
Liberia.
While men, women, and children all experienced the violence and trauma of the war, women and 
girls also were targets of gender-based violence. Already vulnerable due to a patriarchal culture and 
discrimination that existed before the conflict, women were subjected to widespread sexual abuse 
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during and after the fighting. Many of these acts were public and brutal.  
the diaSpora experience
The Advocates’ staff and volunteers met with hundreds of Liberians in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana. Although not all diaspora Liberians 
who gave statements fled as a result of the conflict, the general impression is that there is not a single 
Liberian anywhere who has not been affected in some way by the Liberian conflict.
The Liberian diaspora before 1980 was composed mostly of students and individuals with diplomatic 
and business connections in the international community. The Liberian conflict fundamentally altered 
the nature of the Liberian diaspora, however, both by increasing the diaspora’s size and by changing 
its composition to reflect the political, economic, and social divides in Liberia during the conflict. 
Liberians who were outside of Liberia at the time of the Doe coup, and later when the civil wars 
erupted through the 1990s, found themselves trapped with neither support nor the means to return 
home. Liberians describe their desperation in attempting to learn news of family members and events 
in Liberia. Many lost touch with their parents, children, spouses, and extended families for years, and 
many are still seeking to learn what happened to loved ones.
In the mid to late 1990s, as refugees began to be resettled from camps in the West African sub-region, 
the scale of the atrocities became clear to both Liberians and non-Liberians around the world. The 
pattern of abuses described in TRC statements reflects a well-known concept among refugee service 
providers – the “triple trauma” paradigm. First, Liberians in the diaspora were traumatized within 
Liberia to the extent that they decided to flee. Second, Liberians were traumatized during their flight 
through Liberia and in their attempts to cross international borders.  Third, Liberians experienced 
trauma living as refugees.
Flight
TRC statements reflect that, at the beginning of the war in 1990, many Liberians hoped they could 
hide for a period of time until the conflict abated. Accordingly, many initially fled their homes in 
Monrovia to seek refuge in the rural areas. Others hid within Monrovia, moving from place to place 
to avoid being targeted. Statement givers consistently described a triggering event after which they 
decided they had to get out of the country. This trigger very often was the violent murder, torture, or 
abduction of family members by one of the fighting factions. Others described being threatened or 
coming home one day to find everyone gone or their homes destroyed. This level of violence and fear 
forced many Liberians to flee by any means necessary. 
Those Liberians who fled by land described walking for weeks and sometimes months, often wounded 
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or guiding children and others who were unable to travel alone. Food, water, medical care, and safety 
were virtually impossible to find. Many died from starvation and otherwise minor ailments en route. 
Others were abducted or killed during encounters with fighting factions along the few open escape 
routes. Those Liberians who escaped by sea describe fighting their fellow Liberians, and sometimes 
international peacekeepers, for hours to enter the Freeport of Monrovia and to board any ship not 
already overrun with refugees.
Border crossing was another high-risk endeavor. Liberians tell of loved ones drowning in the Cavalla 
River between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire or traversing the seas in small fishing boats or dugout 
canoes to get to Sierra Leone. They describe being assaulted, jailed, and fined. They were subject to 
extortion at border checkpoints set up by Liberian fighters on one side of the border and then again at 
checkpoints set up by authorities 
in neighboring countries. Those 
on large transport vessels coming 
out of the port often fared no 
better, as other African nations 
turned away several ships full 
of refugees, leaving them to 
languish at sea for days with little 
food, water, or medical care.
Refuge
Once in refugee camps, the 
trauma for many Liberians did 
not end. The plight of Liberians 
in the West African subregion demonstrates the failures in the international refugee protection 
system. Hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, with 
some staying in formal camps and others integrating into the local population as best they could. As 
the war dragged on and spread to Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, huge intra-regional refugee flows 
were created. Many Liberians report having moved through more than one country, and sometimes as 
many as four or five, as they tried to escape cross-border raids or impending civil war in their country 
of refuge. Often, those in camps were targeted by host country nationals or by cross-border attacks 
from warring factions in Liberia.
Liberians who could do so fled to Ghana, which offered relative safety because of its stable political 
situation and because it does not share a border with Liberia. A refugee settlement was established 
at Buduburam, outside the Ghanaian capital of Accra. The Advocates interviewed Liberians in 
Buduburam during the spring and fall of 2007, at which point there were more than 35,000 Liberians 
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living in the settlement. 
Liberians in Buduburam narrated the same horrific stories of war trauma as Liberians in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Liberia. The distinguishing feature was that many of these statement 
givers had been in Buduburam for up to 18 “wasted years.” During this time, Liberians in Buduburam 
have experienced the effects of “donor fatigue” many times over, as programs and non-governmental 
organizations have come and gone, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
changed, and Ghanaian policies have fluctuated. Although conditions in the settlement have certainly 
improved over the years – tents have disappeared and permanent structures have been erected, for 
example – the settlement still lacks many basic services almost two decades after the first refugees 
arrived. Running water remains unavailable 18 years after the camp was established. Instead, water is 
trucked in for purchase. Access to food remains a problem for thousands in the camp. There are two 
part-time doctors working in a single clinic that serves the entire population. Sanitation is a major 
challenge. Limited toilet facilities are available for a fee; many residents must use the open fields 
surrounding the camps as toilets. Many children are not attending school because their caregivers 
cannot afford to pay the fees. Security also remains a concern, and sexual assault is an acute problem.
Despite these problems, Liberians in the camp have been ingenious in meeting their own needs by 
starting businesses, schools, community-based organizations, and faith-based institutions. Generally, 
Liberians who are doing well receive remittance payments from relatives who have managed to 
resettle elsewhere. Although remittance support assists many, the population remains vulnerable. 
Education beyond the elementary level and employment opportunities are available only to the very 
few. Liberian professionals find themselves with little to do because they have been unable to obtain 
work in Ghana. Those young Liberians who are able to get vocational training or a Ghanaian degree 
find themselves in a similar situation. Many make ends meet by engaging in petty trading, braiding 
hair, or relying on the generosity of friends. Others, especially young women desperate to feed their 
families, turn to prostitution.
For Liberians still in Buduburam, life has become a waiting game. They wait to see if Liberia might 
be safe enough for a return; they wait for UNHCR or Ghana to decide they must leave; or most of all, 
they wait to leave the camp on a family reunification visa or through luck in one of the resettlement/
visa lottery programs to the United States or the United Kingdom.
Resettlement
Of the more than 1,600 statements collected in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ghana, 
more than 230 statements came from Liberians who had settled in the United States or the United 
Kingdom. These statement givers’ experiences, coupling resettlement in a new country with retained 
ties to a homeland, depicted their lives in “a house with two rooms.”4 Expectations for life in the west 
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are extremely high, but the realities of life do not always meet these expectations. TRC statement givers 
generally express gratitude for the opportunities, safety, and freedoms they find in their countries of 
resettlement. Statement givers also discussed the challenges they faced in adapting to new countries. 
Some challenges may be found 
in any immigrant population, but 
Liberians noted that they faced unique 
challenges for a variety of reasons, 
including the legacy of war trauma. 
Initially, many Liberians described 
feeling isolated without the strong 
social support systems of Liberian 
communities. Liberians, particularly 
those in the United States, described 
difficulty adapting to different cultural 
expectations and laws regarding 
gender roles and raising children. 
Many Liberians with professional 
training are not able to work in their 
chosen profession in the United States 
– credentials from Liberia often are not 
recognized, and work experience from outside the United States is not valued. In addition, Liberians 
report discrimination because of their accents and describe challenges related to racism. 
The legacy of the Liberian conflict also weighs heavily on the resettled Liberian diaspora. Liberians 
describe immense pressure and often guilt about providing financial support to family and others 
back in Liberia or in refugee camps. The pressure to supply remittances impacts all aspects of life, 
causing many to limit their own opportunities or education so they can provide immediate support to 
those at home. Many Liberians in the diaspora still suffer from physical and mental health problems 
resulting from the conflict. Liberians report a general lack of recognition of these problems in the 
community –mental health issues, in particular, – and report that Liberians often do not seek out 
needed services. 
The war has left deep-rooted resentments and divisions along ethnic and political lines in the resettled 
diaspora. Liberians exchange accusations of human rights violations and allow anger over real or 
perceived wartime abuses to inhibit effective community action. Meetings of tribal associations are 
said to be more popular and draw better attendance than meetings of pan-Liberian associations. 
Memories of the war are exacerbated for those individuals who see their perpetrators walking freely in 
their communities. Yet fear of retribution, either in the diaspora or against relatives back home, deters 
many people from making open accusations. 
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Twenty years of war have devastated Liberia. Even though important steps have been taken since 
2003 to make improvements in governance, infrastructure, education, and health care, much remains 
to be done in all those sectors.  Many people in Liberia lost everything they had – possessions, homes, 
families, security, and employment. Nevertheless many Liberians repeatedly told the TRC of their 
desire to return home and aid their country in its recovery. 
overview of recommendationS from diaSpora trc StatementS
Statement givers in the diaspora had strong opinions about the measures that should be put into place 
in Liberia to help the nation recover and move forward.  While there was not clear agreement on every 
issue, major themes emerged.  
Statement givers in the diaspora identified a reexamination of the very foundations of Liberia’s national 
image as a critical piece of moving into the future.  Many felt that the history of their own nation 
should be rewritten and that long-standing national symbols should be remade to create a new, more 
inclusive image for Liberia. Underpinning this theme was a sense of falsity within the current national 
narrative and symbols, as well as a desire to reflect the “truth” of Liberia’s national identity. Part 
of establishing the truth of 
Liberia’s national identity for 
some statement givers focused 
on national symbols, from the 
national seal to street signs and 
place names.
The role of ethnic identity 
and the relationships between 
tribes were mentioned by many 
Liberians as an important com-
ponent of any recommenda-
tions that the TRC issues. 
Statement givers saw the issue 
of “tribe” as critical to building 
a united Liberia. Statement 
givers had some very specific ideas about how to involve the tribes in reconciliation efforts, including 
forming intertribal reconciliation committees, using sports, culture, and food to bring people of 
different tribes together, engaging tribal elders, and ensuring that people are educated to communicate 
in a common language. To build a unified Liberia, the importance of religious tolerance also was 
raised by many statement givers, particularly Muslims.  Developing wide ranging non-discrimination 
policies across government and the public sector also was an important theme.
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Addressing the legacy of conflict through reparations was raised by many.  Suggestions for reparations 
took many different forms.  For many in the United States and the United Kingdom, the return 
of or compensation for lost property is an important component of reparation.5  Throughout the 
diaspora, but especially in Ghana, many wanted assistance with finding family members who had 
scattered and disappeared.6 Several statement givers recognized the need to assist children orphaned 
by the war.7 Most statement givers who made specific recommendations about orphans stressed the 
need for education and vocational training.8  Addressing the needs of victims of sexual violence 
was also an important theme.  Statement givers focused on the need for accountability for crimes 
of sexual violence. The recommendations ranged from identifying or confronting their rapists9 to 
bringing perpetrators to justice.10 In addition to dealing with the consequences of sexual violence 
from the conflict, prevailing cultural, historical, political, legal, and economic forces render gender 
inequality an ongoing concern for many Liberian women who expressed their desire to see gender 
roles reevaluated.11 Reasserting the role of elders in communities and ensuring their protection going 
forward was also an important recommendation. 
Meeting the needs of war-affected persons such as refugees, internally displaced persons, and former 
child combatants was also an important component of reparations for many statement givers. Refugees 
remaining in the West African sub-region noted that their basic needs for food and water, safety and 
security, physical and mental health care, education, sanitation, and employment were not being met. 
Internally displaced people face many of the same challenges to basic health and safety in their daily 
lives.  Improving communication to these groups from UNHCR, non-governmental organizations, 
and the government of Liberia was identified as a critical need. Primary among the suggestions for 
reparations, however, was support for war-affected persons.  One top concern was ensuring that 
former combatants be rehabilitated.  For example, one statement giver said that “I want the TRC 
people to help all the children that fought the war so that they can stop doing wicked things again.”12 
Many suggested increased vocational training and other educational programs directed specifically 
at these individuals.13  Another recommendation was to provide direct assistance to victims. “[T]
he people of Liberia who were harmed throughout wartime need to be compensated and…the 
government of Liberia needs to look into how to accomplish this.” 14
Changes to the system of Liberian government were a major theme amongst statement givers’ 
recommendations.  As described earlier, corruption was seen by many as a major root cause of the 
Liberian civil crisis. Accordingly, many statement givers identified ending corruption as the first item 
on an important agenda of necessary governmental reform. Ending corruption was often linked 
with other important reforms, such as a fair pay scale for civil servants,15 reform of the national 
judiciary, and decentralization of power. 16 The theme of equality and non-discrimination also ran 
through comments about governmental reform. Putting an end to nepotism was an important 
recommendation for many statement givers.17 Finally, many statement givers discussed reestablishing 
the rule of law, 18 creating respect for human rights,19 and developing a true democracy in Liberia.20 
Several expatriate journalists discussed the importance of guaranteeing freedom of the press as a 
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check on the government and a support to democracy.21  Statement givers stressed the importance of 
the protection of a free and independent media to Liberia’s future. Throughout Liberia’s history, the 
Liberian government has exerted significant ownership over the media, and achieving a sustainable 
private media has been a struggle. Political influence and ties must be broken before the media can 
truly achieve independence.
Statement givers from Rhode Island to London to Ghana were in agreement that rebuilding both 
physical and human capital must be a top priority in Liberia.  Those items that topped the priority list 
included roads (specifically those between the rural areas and Monrovia),22 the health system (specifically 
more facilities equally distributed through the counties),23 and the education system (specifically free 
education)24 Electricity was also mentioned consistently, although somewhat less often than the other 
three.25 Finally, sanitation, including clean drinking water and available toilets, was also mentioned 
by statement givers, as was rebuilding the agricultural sector.26 Statement givers highlighted the close 
links between education, infrastructure, and development in their recommendations. One statement 
giver remarked that “if you increase human capital in Liberia by improving the minds of the people 
there, infrastructure and all else will come as a result.”27
Statement givers were clear in their desire for an end to impunity for human rights and humanitarian 
violations that took place in Liberia.  No consensus emerged, however, on what type of punitive 
measures should be put into place.  Statement givers’ opinions covered the full range, from apologies to 
lustration to a war crimes court.  Statement givers were, nevertheless, acutely aware of the complexities 
of trying to apply these measures on a large scale.  Many in the diaspora, especially those in the United 
States, feel that effective prosecutions are a critical anti-impunity measure.28 Opinions about who 
should be prosecuted and under whose authority varied.  Other statement givers told the TRC they 
had concerns that prosecutions were impractical and would “open old wounds.”29 This view was more 
prevalent in Ghana than in the United States or the United Kingdom. For example, one statement 
giver in Ghana noted that there “can’t be prosecutions because everyone participated.”30 Regardless 
of the statement giver’s opinion on prosecutions, one consistent theme was that perpetrators should 
tell the truth of what they did, apologize, and ask for forgiveness. 31
Whether through prosecution, reparation, or apology and forgiveness, Liberians across the diaspora 
recognized the need for reconciliation and healing the wounds of the Liberian nation. Based on the 
emergent themes in TRC statements from the diaspora, The Advocates has compiled a comprehensive 
list of recommendations based on international human rights standards.  The Advocates envisions that 
these will provide a foundation from which the TRC can draw insight for its own recommendations 
to the government of Liberia.
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia (TRC) requested that The Advocates for 
Human Rights (The Advocates) address the full 
scope of Liberia’s international legal obligations 
in The Advocates’ report. We have presented 
that information, in consideration of the Liberian 
context, in Chapter 14 at the end of this report. 
The current chapter contains priority areas that 
The Advocates suggest should be highlighted and 
addressed immediately. Prioritizing recommen-
dations in the context of a truth and reconciliation 
commission is a task that borders on the impossible. 
The priority areas set forth here reflect a struggle 
between the many competing needs and rightful 
demands of the Liberians with whom The 
Advocates interacted in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Ghana.  It also reflects the 
framework of international human rights that The 
Advocates seeks to promote and protect.
The Advocates recognizes that all of the following 
recommendations are important. Many measures, 
such as combating corruption and ensuring 
education, are integral to healing, justice, and 
non-repetition. The Advocates ultimately decided, 
however, to present recommendations in a sequence 
that acknowledges the need to address the most 
urgent rehabilitative needs of victims and other 
vulnerable populations. Truth and reconciliation 
commissions are designed in large measure to be victim-centered processes.  They cannot make 
victims whole, but unlike prosecutions and many other measures that focus on perpetrators, truth 
and reconciliation commissions document and validate the experiences of victims. Accordingly, 
victims’ needs should be at the center of the TRC process. The sequences of priorities here is also 
consistent with the TRC’s mandate to heed the experiences of women, children, and vulnerable 
groups.  Providing some remediation for the violations they suffered should register at the top of any 
post-TRC action plan.
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Priority Recommendations at a Glance
Addressing the Immediate Needs of Victims
Addressing the Immediate Needs of Refugees 
and the Displaced 
Addressing the Immediate Needs of Special 
Populations
Ensuring Civil and Political Rights Are 
Guaranteed Immediately
Ensuring Justice and Ending Impunity
Addressing Corruption
Ensuring Economic and Social Rights and 
Development
Implementation of TRC Recommendations
Taking Steps toward Reconciliation
United States & International Community 
Action
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addreSSing the immediate needS of victimS
The government of Liberia should adopt measures to address the immediate needs of war-affected 
persons. The ongoing physical and mental health effects of war trauma negatively impact the quality 
of life of innumerable Liberians and impede their ability to productively contribute to Liberia’s 
development. Although related to the economic, social, and cultural rights to which all Liberians are 
entitled, the needs of victims of war trauma are distinct and merit special inclusion and high priority. 
•	 The government of Liberia should ensure that victims’ critical physical and mental health 
needs are addressed. For example, victims of sexual violence have an immediate need for 
medical services such as diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, as well 
as other reproductive health concerns. Victims of other types of trauma have an immediate 
need for medical treatment to alleviate chronic pain and other ailments. Many former child 
soldiers require access to drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs.
•	 The government should ensure that victims have access to basic necessities, such as food, 
potable water, clothing, and shelter. 
•	 The government should support the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims into their 
community and society, which requires public sensitization, as well as educational programs. 
•	 Literacy programs, skills training, vocational and technical programs, and other education 
should be made available free-of-charge to victims. The government of Liberia should work 
with other organizations to create jobs, employment programs, micro-credit schemes, and 
business training opportunities.
•	 The government should facilitate family tracing and reunification through cooperation, legal 
measures, the issuance of documents, and provision of information.
•	 The government of Liberia should dedicate adequate resources, financial support, and 
political will to implementing the TRC’s recommendations concerning a reparations 
program, ensuring that the public is informed and has the opportunity to present and to 
receive collective claims. 
addreSSing the immediate needS of refugeeS and the diSplaced 
•	 The governments of Ghana and other host countries should immediately cease any activities 
that seek to pressure persons with refugee status to return to Liberia. The host governments 
should recognize the continuation of refugee status for certain individuals, including those 
with valid asylum claims, humanitarian needs, and established familial, social, or economic 
links in the host country. The host governments should adopt measures to give effect to the 
rights of refugees, paying attention to the right to work, right to health, right to property, and 
the right to education. 
•	 Host countries, the government of Liberia, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(UNHCR) should ensure that any repatriation process is carried out in accordance with 
international guidelines on safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation. 
	• The government of Liberia should provide internally displaced people with safe access to 
food, potable water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and health care, taking into account the 
special needs of particularly vulnerable populations within this group. 
•	 The government of Liberia should ensure that returning refugees and displaced persons have 
access to vocational and/or agricultural training and other services to enable them to provide 
support for themselves and their families.
addreSSing the immediate needS of Special populationS
•	 The government of Liberia should adopt measures to protect the rights of children to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living and the highest attainable standard of health. The 
government should strive to give effect to these rights, paying particular attention to needs 
of children formerly associated with fighting forces, children separated from their families, 
and orphans. Prime among recommendations is ensuring that children enjoy the right to 
education without discrimination, which includes eliminating user fees and increasing girls’ 
enrollment. In addition, the government should ensure that all children are protected against 
economic exploitation, including child labor, and it should adopt measures to eliminate 
harmful traditional practices. Harmful traditional practices include practices that are rooted 
in traditional cultural beliefs but which violate internationally accepted human rights norms, 
such as female genital mutilation.
•	 The government of Liberia should adopt measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in both law and practice, paying attention to the particular needs of rural, disabled and elderly 
women. This includes ending violence against women, social and cultural patterns that 
harm women (including traditional practices), early or forced marriage, and female genital 
mutilation. The government should strive to ensure that women enjoy the protection of, 
and equal access to, the law as do men, which includes measures to increase availability of 
free legal aid, gender-sensitive trainings for legal, court, and law enforcement personnel, and 
appropriate legislative reform. 
•	 The government of Liberia should adopt measures to meet older persons’ needs, including 
their access to health care and food, water, shelter, and clothing--paying particular attention 
to elderly women. 
enSuring civil and political rightS are guaranteed immediately
•	 The government of Liberia should ensure that the inherent integrity and dignity of the 
person is respected. The government should immediately repeal legislation that authorizes 
capital punishment and commute the death sentences of any inmates. It should take measures 
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to prevent and to punish acts of torture, slavery and involuntary servitude, and forced labor 
within its jurisdiction.
•	 The government of Liberia should ensure that its administration of justice, police and penal 
system, and press freedoms comply with international legal standards. Liberia’s history of 
abusive arrest and detention practices necessitates adherence to principles of international 
law relative to arrest and detention of prisoners, for which the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides the guiding framework. The government should prioritize 
guaranteeing a fair and impartial judiciary through the development and dissemination of a 
judicial code of conduct, trainings, the codification of employment terms, and appropriate 
disciplinary measures as needed, for which the U.N. Principles on the Judiciary provide a 
guiding framework. 
•	 The government of Liberia should prioritize improving the security situation in Liberia. Also, 
the government should ensure that its policies and procedures of the Liberian National Police 
and armed forces conform to international human rights standards and respect the basic rights 
enshrined in the constitution of Liberia. The government should provide adequate support 
to the Liberian National Police in the areas it has identified as critical challenges, including 
training, infrastructure development, logistics, and information technology. The government 
should work closely with UNMIL and civil society to ensure law enforcement is trained to 
respect human rights, to facilitate effective civilian oversight of the police, and to provide 
procedures for Liberians to make complaints about police misconduct to an independent 
investigatory body. Recommendations related to ensuring justice and ending impunity are 
relevant to the promotion of security.
enSuring JuStice and ending impunity
•	 The government of Liberia must ensure that individuals responsible for serious crimes under 
international law are prosecuted. The government should consider both new and existing 
prosecution mechanisms to give effect to this obligation. The government should consider 
authorizing a special court, in consultation with civil society and the international community, 
to prosecute serious violations of law. Alternatively, or in addition, the government may 
consider pursuing international and regional mechanisms, as well as national courts in other 
jurisdictions, for prosecution. 
•	 At all times, the government of Liberia should guarantee to anyone accused of a crime 
competent legal counsel and due process in accordance with international legal standards. 
All prosecutions should be carried out in a fair and impartial manner that protects the due 
process rights of the accused. 
•	 The government of Liberia must ensure that any grants of amnesty do not benefit perpetrators 
of serious crimes under international law or prejudice victims’ right to reparation or right to 
the truth. 
•	 The government of Liberia should adopt measures for lustration and vetting to ensure that 
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individuals personally responsible for violations of human rights do not serve as state officials 
or employees. Such measures must include due process protections for those individuals. 
addreSSing corruption
•	 The government of should take measures to combat corruption across all sectors. The U.N. 
Convention against Liberia Corruption and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption provide a guiding framework. The government should criminalize and prosecute 
acts of bribery, embezzlement and misappropriation, abuse of functions, laundering criminal 
proceeds, and obstruction 
of justice. The government 
should provide adequate 
resources, financial 
support, and political will 
to the Anti-Corruption 
Commission. 
•	 The government of Liberia 
should adopt and affirma-
tively implement and en-
force hiring policies based 
on merit and not influenced 
by nepotism based on fam-
ily, tribal or personal con-
nections. The govern-ment 
should likewise develop and fund an independent complaint and enforcement mechanism to 
ensure compliance with such policies. 
enSuring economic and Social rightS and development
Meeting the needs of victims and ensuring that the nation moves forward requires the government 
to undertake long-term reforms of the education and healthcare sectors, as well as to undertake work 
on the right to development. The Advocates recognizes that, while many of the recommendations 
underpin recommendations related to victims, the government of Liberia must address the economic 
and social rights of all people.
•	 The government of Liberia should take measures to increase access to education. Such 
measures include working toward increased school enrollment of girls; taking steps to 
eliminate user fees imposed by schools; prioritizing the recruitment, training, retention of, 
and salary structures for teachers; and developing strategies for providing technical and 
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vocational education to young people and adults. 
•	 The government of Liberia should take measures to ensure access to timely and appropriate 
health care as envisaged by the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health. Health care should be: available (in sufficient quantity); accessible (non-discriminatory 
in physical, economic, and informational terms); acceptable (ethical and culturally- and gender-
sensitive); and of good quality (in terms of goods, facilities, and personnel). Importantly, the 
right to health also includes sanitation, potable water, sufficient food, nutrition, shelter and 
information, and a healthy environment.
•	 The government of Liberia should devote adequate resources and financial support to 
implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
•	 The government of Liberia should work with other organizations to create jobs, employment 
programs, micro-credit schemes, and business training opportunities.
implementation of trc recommendationS
•	 The government of Liberia should dedicate adequate resources, financial support, and 
political will to implement the TRC’s recommendations. To this end, the government should 
act promptly to expedite the establishment of the Independent National Commission on 
Human Rights, including making presidential appointments to the commission, directing 
all relevant government entities to provide full support to the commission, and widely and 
timely disseminating the TRC report and recommendations. 
•	 Civil society should play an active role in monitoring and advocacy regarding the 
implementation of the TRC recommendations. 
taking StepS toward reconciliation
•	 The government of Liberia should adopt measures to regain national unity. In particular, 
this recommendation includes adopting measures to combat discrimination and to protect 
linguistic rights, land rights, and cultural rights, paying particular attention to disabled persons 
and minorities. Such efforts should cut across all sectors and levels, including constitutional 
and other legal reforms, changes to educational policies and curricula, and the development 
of national strategies to protect against discrimination and to promote social and cultural 
rights. 
•	 The government of Liberia should take measures toward national reconciliation. Many of 
these steps are low-cost or free and should be given priority:
o The government of Liberia should amend the constitution to protect against 
discrimination and ensure that such protections are fully enforced through 
implementing legislation and practices. 
o The government of Liberia should take steps to modify its national image to fully 
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reflect its history and people. Such steps may include re-naming streets, public 
buildings and institutions; changing the national seal; changing or creating national 
days and holidays; and ensuring historical accounts more accurately reflect the 
contributions of all people.
o The government of Liberia should take steps to facilitate inter-tribal reconciliation 
through activities that bring different tribes together, such as social and sporting 
events. 
united StateS & international community action
•	 The U.S. government should take immediate steps to allow Liberians registered under 
Deferred Enforced Departure status to apply for lawful permanent resident status.  
•	 The U.S. government should take legislative and administrative steps to facilitate family 
reunification and respect the right to a family by revisiting denials of refugee resettlement 
applications and other family reunification petitions based on DNA evidence and by passing 
the Child Citizen Protection Act. The U.S. government should ensure that its definition of a 
“child” includes those children adopted under traditional, non-formal laws in Liberia. 
•	 The U.S. government should ensure that Liberians in the United States can access health care 
that is culturally appropriate. Such services should take into account the specific Liberian 
context. For example, the government should expand federal funding for torture treatment 
and support programs that offer health services to former combatants and others who may 
be excluded because of their fighting status. Addressing mental health needs is a priority, and 
such efforts should include public education to overcome any stigmatization and the training 
of Liberian mental health workers.
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•	 The U.S. government should take steps to ensure that Liberians have access to education that 
is age- and language-appropriate, paying particular attention to the literacy needs of Liberian 
women. This will require school systems to assess and to develop policies to accommodate 
native speakers of non-American English and students whose age or educational progress 
may not match grade level structures.  
•	 The U.S. government should support policies that integrate Liberian professionals into careers 
matching their skills and training. Employment services should seek to pair Liberians with 
jobs that match their training and background and to support peer-mentoring programs. 
•	 The U.S. government, and/or other appropriate organizations, should work in consultation 
with Liberian community leaders to develop a long-term strategy to facilitate reconciliation 
among Liberians in the diaspora, as well as support the creation of memorials. 
•	 The U.S. government should cooperate with any prosecutions and act promptly to respond 
to requests for extradition. The U.S. government should explore prosecutions of foreign 
nationals for crimes committed outside of the United States, including those under the 
Genocide Accountability Act, Child Soldiers Accountability Act, War Crimes Act of 1996, 
and the Extraterritorial Torture Statute. 
•	 The U.S. government should make foreign aid and technical assistance to Liberia a priority, 
using the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a guiding framework. Such foreign aid 
should prioritize the re-development of Liberia and include recognition of the U.S. role in 
the conflict. 
•	 The international community should act in accordance with its legal obligations to prosecute 
and to cooperate in prosecutions of serious crimes under international law. The international 
community should cooperate in any extradition requests for persons accused of crimes. 
•	 The international community should intensify its cooperation regarding financial aid and 
technical assistance to Liberia, using the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a guiding 
framework.
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hiStory and goalS
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) was negotiated and agreed upon in the 
August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequently enacted into law by the National 
Transitional Legislative Assembly in 2005. The TRC was established to “promote national peace, 
security, unity and reconciliation,” and at the same time make it possible to hold perpetrators 
accountable for gross human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law that 
occurred in Liberia between January 1979 and October 2003. Once President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
was elected, she moved to inaugurate the TRC in February 2006.1 
The TRC determined early that it 
wished to engage Liberians living 
outside of Liberia, the “diaspora,” in 
the national truth-seeking process. 
While more than 30 countries have 
implemented some form of national 
truth seeking body, no similar body 
has systematically engaged a diaspora 
population in all aspects of its work. 
The TRC approached The Advocates 
for Human Rights (The Advocates), 
known at the time as Minnesota 
Advocates for Human Rights, and 
proposed a partnership to achieve its 
goal of engaging the Liberian diaspora, 
particularly the U.S.-based diaspora, in 
its work. 
The TRC and The Advocates ultimately signed a memorandum of understanding2 authorizing The 
Advocates to act as the TRC’s implementing partner in the diaspora. After a preparatory period, the 
TRC officially launched its work on June 22, 2006. The Advocates held a simultaneous launch in 
Minnesota for the U.S.-based TRC Diaspora Project.
The Advocates initially volunteered to develop a pilot project and recruit and train volunteers for 
the diaspora statement taking process in Minnesota. It quickly became apparent, however, that 
information from the diaspora would need to be gathered in a consistent and coordinated manner for 
it to be of use to the TRC. The Advocates subsequently agreed to coordinate the work of the TRC 
with the diaspora community throughout the United States as resources became available.
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The TRC approached The Advocates because it sought an organization that would be perceived as 
trusted, transparent, and neutral within the Liberian diaspora community. Moreover, the TRC was 
seeking an organization with established connections to the Liberian diaspora. The Advocates was 
ideally situated to partner with the Liberian TRC to undertake the Diaspora Project for a number 
of reasons. The mission of The Advocates for Human Rights is to implement international human 
rights standards to promote civil society and reinforce the rule of law. The Advocates is a non-profit, 
volunteer-based organization that investigates and exposes human rights violations; represents 
immigrants and refugees in the community who are victims of human rights abuses; trains and assists 
groups that protect human rights; and works through education and advocacy locally, nationally, and 
internationally to engage the public, policy-makers, and children about human rights and cultural 
understanding.
The Advocates, which is headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a long history of working 
with the Liberian diaspora. Minnesota is home to one of the largest populations of Liberians living 
outside of West Africa. Liberians fleeing the conflict in the 1990s made up the largest single client 
group seeking The Advocates’ free asylum legal services. In addition to providing legal representation 
to hundreds of Liberians, The Advocates trained dozens of volunteer attorneys to handle Liberian 
asylum cases. For years The Advocates also worked through the Building Immigrant Awareness and 
Support (BIAS) Project to provide training and resource materials to the Liberian community and to 
educators in schools with substantial Liberian refugee student populations. As an organization, The 
Advocates has a long-standing commitment to the human rights of Liberians. 
The Advocates began using human rights monitoring methods in 2002 to evaluate and contribute 
to the success of transitional justice in post-conflict societies. This expansion of the organization’s 
human rights work was premised on the belief that human rights monitors’ investigations and 
published observations would help uphold the integrity of the transitional justice process and on the 
belief that monitoring further supports the transitional justice process by bringing it to the attention 
of the international community.  
management and operation
Relationship to the TRC in Liberia
The Diaspora Project was an integrated part of the TRC’s overall work. The Advocates acted as an 
implementing partner for the TRC in the diaspora. As such, The Advocates consulted as extensively 
as possible with Commissioners and staff of the TRC regarding the broad operation and structure 
of the Diaspora Project. Day-to-day decision making and implementation were undertaken by The 
Advocates.
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Commissioner Massa Washington, who was charged with overseeing the Diaspora component of the 
TRC’s work, and Chairman Jerome Verdier traveled to the United States several times to assist with 
training volunteers in Minnesota and New York and to plan for future Diaspora Project activities. 
Commissioners Oumu Syllah, Gerald Coleman, and Arthur Kulah3 also participated in community 
outreach and volunteer training events in Atlanta, Chicago, North Carolina, Philadelphia, and 
Washington, DC.
In addition, The Advocates’ staff and volunteers traveled to Liberia four times in 2007 and 2008 to 
continue the coordination of activities and to observe TRC statement taking and public hearings 
activities in Liberia.
The Advocates did not receive funding for any part of its work from the TRC of Liberia. As with all 
of its projects, The Advocates raised a small cash budget from U.S.-based foundations and individual 
donors and then leveraged that budget through donations of volunteer time and in-kind support. Pro 
bono and in-kind contributions totaled nearly $4 million in fiscal year 2007 and more than $6 million 
in fiscal year 2008.
Project Structure and Scope
Upon accepting the responsibility for implementing TRC activities in the diaspora, The Advocates 
created a project structure that would ensure accountability to key stakeholders (including the TRC 
of Liberia, statement givers, and the Liberian diaspora community generally) and to other project 
participants such as volunteers. The TRC Diaspora Project was co-directed by The Advocates’ 
Executive Director and Deputy Director. Two staff members in The Advocates’ Special Projects 
Program worked full-time on the project, and three other staff members dedicated significant portions 
of their time to the project depending on need. The Advocates created a pro bono management team 
and a national advisory committee of Liberian community leaders to provide input and strategic 
advice throughout the project.4 
It was envisioned from the beginning that volunteers would undertake a substantial portion of the 
work of the project, specifically statement taking. The pro bono management team was composed of 
representatives from law firms who had committed from the outset to provide volunteers and in-
kind support to ensure the project’s successful completion. The national advisory committee was 
composed of members of the Liberian community in the United States who represented the geographic 
and ethnic diversity of the Liberian people and who were recognized as leaders in their respective 
communities. The members of the national advisory committee were approved by the TRC. 
In addition to seeking the input of the management team and the national advisory committee, The 
Advocates specifically sought the input of recognized experts in critical areas. For example, The 
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Advocates invited the International Centre for Transitional Justice5 to advise and train staff and 
volunteers on implementation of public hearings and on current issues in transitional justice. Relative 
to the psychosocial needs of statement givers, The Advocates sought expert input from the Center 
for Victims of Torture,6 an internationally recognized torture treatment center that has extensive 
experience working with Liberians both in Liberia and in the diaspora.
The TRC Diaspora Project 
piloted its model of community 
outreach and statement taking 
in Minnesota, then expanded to 
other locations where there were 
substantial Liberian populations 
and where pro bono support was 
available. Priority locations 
were selected in consultation 
with the TRC, the national 
advisory committee, and the pro 
bono management team. Before 
expanding statement taking to 
a new location, The Advocates 
identified pro bono coordinating 
partners in the area and worked with them to ensure that there would be sufficient administrative 
and volunteer support to complete the project goals in that location.7 Pro bono partners included law 
firms, law school clinics, and other community organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) who were willing to work on an entirely voluntary basis, receiving no funding from either 
the TRC or The Advocates. Ultimately, the project included statement taking sites in Minneapolis/
St. Paul,8 Atlanta/South Eastern United States,9 Chicago,10 Philadelphia,11 Washington, DC,12 New 
York,13 Newark,14 Providence/Boston,15 and the United Kingdom.16
The TRC also asked The Advocates to assist with statement taking in the West African sub-region, 
specifically the Buduburam refugee settlement near Accra, Ghana. Drawing on volunteers from all of 
its pro bono affiliates, The Advocates took more than twenty volunteers on three trips to document the 
statements of refugees in Ghana.17 TRC Diaspora Project volunteers worked alongside TRC staff and 
Liberian refugees who had been trained as statement takers.
pre-implementation conSiderationS
A Non-Liberian Organization in a Liberian Process
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Many national truth commissions grapple with whether and to what extent to include non-nationals 
in the process, either as commissioners or staff members. In Liberia, the decision was made to keep 
the process as Liberian as possible. For example, there are no non-Liberian commission members. In 
evaluating who could assist the TRC with its diaspora process, The Advocates and the TRC engaged 
in preliminary discussions about the feasibility of a non-Liberian organization taking a lead role in the 
project. From the outset the TRC was clear that it was important that a non-Liberian group take the 
lead because, at the time, no Liberian entity would be seen as sufficiently neutral to be trusted by all 
segments of the community. 
Nevertheless, questions consistently arose as to why a non-Liberian organization had been chosen 
and what benefits might accrue to The Advocates that would not accrue to a theoretical Liberian 
organization. Despite attempts to ensure Liberian involvement in the process through the creation 
of a community advisory committee, some advisory committee members were reluctant to support 
the TRC before it had been proven a success. This reticence hampered efforts to build community 
momentum. Some leaders went beyond reluctance to overt obstructionism. The political climate 
significantly varied by region in the United States and by specific community. In some communities, 
established community leadership was highly effective in partnering and pushing forward the TRC 
effort. 
Another key issue was that while many in the international community and sometimes the TRC itself 
saw the diaspora work as very separate from TRC efforts in Liberia, individuals in the diaspora saw 
the work of The Advocates as intimately connected with the TRC itself. Because of the instantaneous 
nature of the international news cycle, news about the TRC in Liberia immediately had a ripple effect 
on work in the diaspora. Although The Advocates had no control over TRC policies, scope of work, 
or timeline of activities, the organization was viewed by many in the diaspora as having influence 
over processes in Liberia. For example, the TRC’s decision not to call major perpetrators to public 
hearings until late in the process, the reluctance of key actors, including the president, to appear 
before the TRC, and media coverage of internal conflicts at the TRC all had dampening effects on 
participation in the diaspora. This highlights the complexity and importance of coordination between 
in-country and diaspora processes. This relationship can be reciprocal as well. News coverage of 
diaspora hearings in the United States, where high level witnesses came forward to testify, may have 
spurred many higher level witnesses in Liberia to come forward.
Legal Issues 
The legislation creating the TRC in Liberia has no applicability outside of the territorial jurisdiction 
of Liberia. Accordingly, the powers conferred on the TRC did not transfer to The Advocates in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, or Ghana. Moreover, protections for statement givers and other 
participants in Liberia did not apply in those other countries. 
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Given this reality, The Advocates consulted with legal experts in the areas of immigration law, 
criminal law, and ethics regarding the statement taking protocol. A primary consideration in the 
development of the TRC Diaspora Project was protection for statement givers in the form of fully 
informed consent. Specifically, it was critical that before disclosure of any information, all potential 
statement givers be informed that The Advocates could not protect them from prosecution or other 
legal consequences in any jurisdiction, that the information they provided would eventually be sent 
back to entities in Liberia, and that they could choose to provide an anonymous statement if they had 
concerns about any legal or safety ramifications of their statements. The Advocates, in consultation 
with the pro bono management team, developed a disclosure statement that was read, signed by, and 
given to every statement giver with whom volunteers interacted in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Ghana. In conjunction with that disclosure, each statement giver in the United States 
and the United Kingdom was offered the opportunity to speak with a lawyer before deciding whether 
to provide information to the TRC.18  Statement givers were able to use this opportunity to access 
legal services unrelated to their decision to give a statement, if they desired to do so.
In addition, The Advocates examined local law in the United States and the United Kingdom to 
assess any risks and or requirements related to conflict of interest, defamation, parental consent for 
minors providing statements, and other issues. Moreover, the possibility that anyone associated with 
the project might be sued for defamation based on any statements made during public events, such as 
radio interviews or public hearings, was closely examined and discussed with the TRC Commissioners. 
Treatment and ownership of documents and information gathered by the TRC Diaspora Project was 
also a consideration. All information gathered for the TRC Diaspora Project was treated as property 
of the TRC of Liberia. Accordingly, information provided to the Diaspora Project was subject to the 
same policy proscriptions as information gathered in Liberia. For example, it could not be used for 
academic research purposes without express permission of the TRC Commissioners.
Support for Statement Givers 
After ensuring that statement givers had relevant information about the legal status of the TRC 
Diaspora Project, the next priority was ensuring adequate psychosocial support for statement givers 
who might experience retraumatization during the statement taking process. The TRC Diaspora 
Project sought out pro bono services from mental health professionals who had experience working 
with survivors of trauma. These professionals were available on-site during some statement taking 
sessions in the United States and the United Kingdom and during U.S. public hearings. They were 
also available on call for pre- or post-statement taking counseling. In Ghana, where lack of mental 
health and counseling services was a major concern, statement takers were given additional training 
on how to support statement givers through the process and on how to access resources available in 
the settlement, including Ghanaian NGOs, the health clinic, and faith and traditional leaders. 
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The TRC Diaspora Project also saw this process as an opportunity to connect Liberians who might 
be in need of services with appropriate information about available resources in their communities. 
Each pro bono affiliate developed a referral sheet for the local area to provide statement givers with 
information about legal service providers, housing, health, and other resources. This information was 
provided to all statement givers in the United States and the United Kingdom.19
proJect activitieS and methodologieS
The TRC Diaspora Project was responsible for carrying out the same core activities as the TRC in 
Liberia: outreach and sensitization, statement taking, public hearings, research, and report writing. 
Community Outreach and Sensitization 
The TRC Diaspora Project out-
reach strategy was based on 
practices and materials developed 
by the TRC but adapted for the 
circumstances of the Liberian 
diaspora in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Outreach 
materials were approved by the 
TRC prior to use.
Outreach materials included 
brochures, a video about the 
statement taking process,20 online 
messaging, and Powerpoint 
presentations. Materials developed 
for use in the diaspora included the TRC logo, other TRC graphics, video of Commissioners, the TRC 
Peace Song, and other images from Liberia to ensure that the TRC Diaspora Project was viewed as a 
fully integrated component of the TRC’s work.
The Liberian diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom is organized into myriad political, 
ethnic, faith, and geographic-based organizations. In addition, a large segment of the community in the 
diaspora uses internet-based communication (listserves, blogs, new media) to exchange information. 
The TRC Diaspora Project sought to use these avenues to spread information about the opportunity 
to participate in the TRC process. 
As in Liberia, much of the community outreach was conducted through face-to-face communication 
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at events in the diaspora community. For example, The Advocates and its pro bono affiliates organized 
community meetings in Minneapolis, Atlanta, Chicago, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, and 
Washington, DC. The meetings provided an opportunity for several hundred Liberians in the United 
States to hear from Chairman Verdier and other Commissioners and to ask questions about the TRC’s 
operation and goals. In several cities, a festive kick-off event with food and cultural performances was 
held to launch statement taking. Some of the most effective outreach efforts centered on apartment 
buildings or neighborhoods populated by Liberians or at Liberian food shops, restaurants, beauty 
salons, and barber shops. On several occasions, The Advocates staff and volunteers conducted outreach 
at national conventions of diaspora community organizations. The Advocates also conducted a special 
“Healing Through Faith” conference for Liberian diaspora religious leaders. The Advocates staff, 
volunteers, and national advisory committee members conducted outreach at numerous churches and 
mosques, soccer matches, county association meetings, and other local events. 
Statement Taker Recruitment and Training
In Liberia, statement takers were Liberians paid by the TRC, but statement takers in the diaspora were 
all unpaid volunteers recruited from pro bono affiliates.21 Most were non-Liberian, but Liberians were 
welcomed to the process, and several did complete the training and participated as statement takers.22 
In addition to reviewing a 400-page training manual,23 all volunteers were required to complete a nine-
hour in-depth training program. Volunteer trainings were held in all project locations. Volunteers who 
were unable to attend could also complete the training by viewing video replay of the sessions, which 
remain available on-line.24 Volunteer statement takers received training on the mandate of the TRC, 
the history of Liberia and the conflict, international human rights and humanitarian law, statement 
taking protocols and policies, interviewing survivors of torture and war trauma, avoiding vicarious 
trauma, and cultural considerations for working with Liberians. All training sessions included a 
mock TRC statement interview facilitated by The Advocates’ staff and a Liberian volunteer. Trainers 
included The Advocates’ staff, Commissioners, psychologists, Liberian professionals and community 
leaders, as well as academics.
Statement Taking
Statement forms and protocols used in the diaspora were modeled after those used in Liberia with 
some modifications appropriate to the diaspora context. The addition of a disclosure form and 
resource information, as described above, was a key modification. Questions specifically relating to 
the experience of Liberians in flight and in the diaspora also were added to the statement taking 
protocol. Diaspora forms and protocols were pilot-tested in late 2006. Volunteer statement takers 
began taking statements in January 2007 in Minnesota. Project sites were added around the country 
and in the United Kingdom through January 2008. Statement taking continued through August 2008.
Chapter Three
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The majority of TRC statements from the diaspora were gathered during in-person interviews. In the 
United States and the United Kingdom, these interviews generally were one to two hours in length 
and took place in homes, designated statement taking sites, or other locations of the statement giver’s 
choosing. Interviews were conducted by a team of statement takers who then compiled a narrative 
summary of the statement giver’s experiences, opinions, and recommendations. As a result of an 
overwhelming demand from refugees in Ghana to provide statements to the TRC, interviews there 
were almost exclusively taken by single interviewers in designated statement taking sites around the 
settlement. 
Data Management 
Information from statement taking interviews was entered by statement takers from around the 
United States and the United Kingdom into a web-based data management system designed to store 
confidential client communications and other legal information. Volunteers were given passwords and 
the database was filtered so that they could view only the statements that they themselves entered. 
Statements gathered in the diaspora were also provided to the TRC coding unit in Liberia so as to be 
included in the statistical analysis undertaken by the TRC’s data management partner.
Research 
The TRC of Liberia requested that The Advocates provide the Research and Inquiry Unit of the TRC 
with support via The Advocates’ network of volunteers in the United States. To that end, several U.S. 
law firms completed background memoranda on topics ranging from the role of the United States in 
the Liberian conflict to a comparison of reparations programs that were provided to the TRC for its 
use.25 
Diaspora Public Hearings
Pursuant to the Memorandum of 
Understanding with the TRC of 
Liberia, The Advocates assisted the 
TRC by planning and conducting 
public hearings in the diaspora. The 
Liberian TRC was the first national 
TRC to hold public hearings in the 
United States.26 The public hearings 
were held June 9-14, 2008, at Hamline 
University in St. Paul, Minnesota. All 
eight27 Commissioners presided over 
44
the hearings, which centered on the theme of “Confronting Our Difficult Past for a Better Future: 
The Diaspora Experience.” Twenty-nine witnesses from 10 states traveled to St. Paul to testify about 
the human rights abuses in Liberia that forced them to flee, their experiences in flight and in refugee 
camps, and the experience of resettlement in the United States. 28 The hearings also provided Liberians 
in the diaspora the opportunity to present their experiences and recommendations directly to the 
TRC, which is mandated to make binding recommendations to the government of Liberia. 
Other Data Collection
Apart from gathering statements in the diaspora, The Advocates also gathered additional information 
to respond to requests from the TRC and to provide context for thematic information emerging from 
statements. This supplementary information was collected in a number of ways including (1) group 
meetings in the community, (2) background interviews with topic experts and community leaders, 
(3) review of academic literature, NGO reports, news articles, films, and other secondary sources, 
and (4) a review of the artifacts of Liberian diaspora community dialogue, such as articles posted on 
community websites, listserves, and other media outlets focused on the diaspora.29 
Report Writing and Analysis
The purpose of The Advocates’ report is to document for the TRC key aspects of the Liberian diaspora 
experience as expressed through statements provided to the TRC. The Advocates sought to ensure 
that the experiences and recommendations of Liberians in the diaspora are considered as part of the 
national reconciliation process in Liberia. The report does not attempt to replace any component 
of the final report of the TRC, nor to draw conclusions or to make recommendations on behalf of 
the Commissioners of the TRC. Rather, this report is a descriptive, qualitative analysis based on the 
authors’ review of statements and secondary information.  
Review of TRC statements collected in the diaspora was carried out by staff from the Advocates and 
a select number of pro bono management team members. The purpose of the statement review was 
to identify themes, critical events, people, and ideas that were central to the diaspora community’s 
experience of the Liberian conflict. Statement review also focused on identifying the breadth of 
recommendations from the diaspora. 
Each statement entered into The Advocates’ secure database was read by a staff or management team 
member. This included 1,377 statements gathered in the Buduburam refugee settlement and 253 
statements gathered in the United States and the United Kingdom.30 A preliminary thematic outline 
was created based on preliminary readings carried out over a period of months as statements were 
being entered into the database. Several subsequent readings were carried out in fall 2008, to refine 
the analysis. 
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The report authors include staff members from The Advocates and pro bono management team 
members who had engaged in the statement review process. Each report author had significant 
experience in the statement taking process in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ghana, or all 
three. Some sections of the report also draw heavily on background research memoranda completed 
by our pro bono affiliates. 
The report reflects an international human rights framework. The intended audiences for this report 
include the Commissioners of the TRC of Liberia, the Liberian people, the international human rights 
community, and the public at large.
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Notes
1 See Appendix A for a list of Commissioners of the 
TRC along with their biographical information.
2 See Appendix E.
3 Commissioner Kulah resigned from the TRC to take 
a new post outside of Liberia and did not complete 
his term.  No new member was appointed to take his 
place.
4 See Appendix F for a list of members of these 
advisory bodies.
5 See www.ictj.org.
6 See www.cvt.org.
7 Coordinating partners included Faegre & Benson 
LLP (Minneapolis & London),  King & Spalding 
LLP (Atlanta), Schiff Hardin LLP (Chicago), Fried 
Frank Shriver & Jacobson LLP (New York), Schnader 
Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP (Philadelphia), Akin 
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld (Washington, DC), 
Dechert LLP (Boston), and DLA Piper (Manchester, 
UK).
8 Partners in Minneapolis/St. Paul included the 
Organization of Liberians in Minnesota (OLM), 
Hamline University, and the law firms of Briggs & 
Morgan P.A., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Faegre & 
Benson LLP, Fredrikson & Byron P.A. Gray Plant 
Mooty, Leonard Street & Deinard, Lindquist & 
Vennum, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, and 
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi.
9 The Atlanta Friends of the Liberian TRC included 
The Carter Center, Emory University, Morehouse and 
Spelman Colleges, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
the Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial, the 
Liberian Association of Metro Atlanta (LAMA), 
Southern Truth & Reconciliation (S.T.A.R.), Refugee 
Resettlement Services of Atlanta, and the law firms 
of King & Spaulding, Kilpatrick Stockton, Alston & 
Byrd, and Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan. 
10 Partners in Chicago included the Bluhm Legal 
Clinic at Northwestern University School of Law, 
the law firm of Schiff Hardin, and the Organization 
of Liberians in Chicago, Illinois.
11 Partners in Philadelphia included the Liberian 
Association of Pennsylvania, the Liberian Mandingo 
Association of Pennsylvania, ACANA, members 
of the Liberian community in Trenton, NJ, as 
well as the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Transnational Law Clinic, the law firms of Ballard 
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, Blank Rome, Pepper 
Hamilton, Reed Smith, and Stradley Ronon Stevens 
& Young,  and immigration legal service providers 
HIAS, Nationality Service Center, and Liberty 
Center for Survivors of Torture.
12 Partners in Washington, DC included Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld, American University and the 
Liberian Association of Metro Washington, DC.
13 Partners in New York included The Staten Island 
Liberian Community Association (SILCA), African 
Refuge, and the Columbia University International 
Trauma Studies Program, as well as the law firms 
of Fried Frank, Akin Gump, and Dechert LLP. 
Students from New York University and Columbia 
Law Schools were also involved. 
14 Partners in Newark included Seton Hall Law School 
and the Liberian Association of Northern New 
Jersey.
15 In Providence/Boston, the Liberian Community 
Association of Rhode Island Inc. (LCARI) 
collaborated with the Roger Williams University 
School of Law, the Boston and Hartford offices of 
Dechert LLP, the Boston office of DLA Piper, the 
law firm of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, as well 
as Sun Life.
16 In the United Kingdom, partners included the 
Union of Liberian Organizations – UK (ULO-UK), 
Faegre & Benson LLP, Mayer Brown International 
LLP, and Eversheds LLP.
17 Volunteers from across the United States paid 
their own expenses to travel to Ghana and work as 
statement takers for a week at a time in Buduburam.
18 The Advocates and its partners recruited local 
lawyers in each project area who were willing to 
provide a free, confidential consultation regarding 
legal issues arising from a particular person 
providing a statement to the TRC.
19 Providing referral information for statement givers 
in Ghana was less formal than in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. All statement givers were 
provided with information about how to reach 
The Advocates and requests for information were 
followed-up on an individual basis. 
20 Quest for Justice is a video designed to demystify the 
TRC Diaspora Project and encourage statement 
47
Chapter Three
taking and is available for viewing at  http://
liberiatrc.mnadvocates.org/or upon request from 
The Advocates.
21 Some volunteers were not employees, students, or 
members of a specific pro bono affiliate, but were 
integrated into teams to work under the auspices of 
an affiliate.
22 All Liberians who wished to participate as statement 
takers were vetted by the TRC in Liberia.
23 The Liberia TRC Diaspora Project volunteer 
training manual is available for download at  http://
liberiatrc.mnadvocates.org/Training_Manual.html.
24 Video of volunteer training sessions are available 
for viewing at http://liberiatrc.mnadvocates.org/
Statement_Taker_Trainings.html.
25 Research topics included 1) international human 
rights and humanitarian standards, 2) prosecution 
and transitional justice models,  3) reparations and 
economic, social and cultural rights, 4) child soldiers, 
5) traditional religion and culture, 6) education, 
7) corruption and economic crimes, 8) media, 9) 
women, 10) the Diaspora experience, 11) the role 
of international actors, and 12) refugee protection 
standards for those in long term refugee situations, 
such as Buduburam.
Moreover, research conducted by the Minneapolis 
office of Dorsey & Whitney related to current country 
conditions in Liberia was compiled into a report 
that was used as part of The Advocates for Human 
Rights’ advocacy work on the issue of temporary 
protected status (TPS) for Liberians residing in the 
United States. The 2009 report, Liberia is Not Ready: 
A Report of Country Conditions in Liberia and Reasons the 
United States Should Extend Deferred Enforced Departure 
for Liberians, can be accessed at http://www.
mnadvocates.org/Publications_by_Date.html. 
26 In 2006, a truth commission in the United States 
focused on an examination of the context, causes, 
sequence, and consequences of events that took place 
on Nov. 3, 1979 in Greensboro, North Carolina, but 
was not a national body and was not focused on a 
diaspora population. See http://www.greensborotrc.
org/.
27 By the date of the public hearings, Commissioner 
Arthur Kulah had resigned from the TRC and had 
not been replaced. 
28 The Commissioners heard from two in camera 
witnesses and from the following public witnesses 
(listed below in order of their appearance): 
Dr. Augustine Konneh, Georgia
Bishop Bennie D. Warner, Oklahoma
Samuel Kalongo Luo, Minnesota
James Y. Hunder, North Carolina
Dr. Wilhelmina Holder, Minnesota
Sackor Zahnee, Pennsylvania
Garswah Blacktom, Illinois
Amb. Herman J. Cohen (former U.S. Assistant
   Secretary of State for African Affairs)
Alfred K. Zeon, Minnesota
Marie Y. Hayes, Minnesota
Bai Gbala, Pennsylvania
Miatta Adotey, Minnesota
Ali Sylla, Pennsylvania
Marie Vah, Minnesota
Jane Samukai, New Jersey
Dr. Patricia Jabbeh Wesley, Pennsylvania
Doris Parker, Minnesota
Kerper Dwanyen, Minnesota
Miamen Wopea, Minnesota
Telee Brown, New York
Georgette Gray, Minnesota
Aicha Cooper, Minnesota
Harriette Badio, Minnesota
Tetee Cole, Minnesota
Lynette Murray-Gibson, Minnesota
Sam Slewion, Pennsylvania
Hassan Kiawu, Georgia
Pajibo Kyne, Rhode Island
Rev. William B.G.K. Harris, Georgia
29 Pro bono affiliate Dorsey & Whitney also reviewed 
documents that were provided in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by 
the TRC in 2006. Information from the responsive 
documents was incorporated into a memorandum 
provided to The Advocates and the TRC on the 
topic of the U.S. role in the Liberian conflict.  
30 Statistical information about statements collected in 
the diaspora can be found in Appendix H. 
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Background on Liberia and the Conflict
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geography and peopleS1
Liberia is located on the Atlantic coast in West Africa and encompasses a territory of 43,000 square 
miles.1 The country shares borders with Sierra Leone to the northwest, Guinea to the north, and Côte 
d’Ivoire to the east.2 The country is rich in natural resources including iron ore, timber, diamonds, and 
gold, and provides a favorable environment for growing rubber trees.3
Liberia is divided into 15 counties whose territories correspond in some measure to territories claimed 
by particular Liberian ethnic groups.4 The population in 2008 was estimated to be 3,489,072.5 English 
is the official language of Liberia, although more than 20 indigenous languages and a form of English 
known as Liberian English are also widely used.6
Although Liberia is a small country, it has an ethnically diverse population. Ethnicity in Liberia, 
sometimes referred to as tribal identity, is a complex and often artificial notion,7 just as it is in other 
parts of Africa and the world.8 At least 95 percent of the population is of indigenous African origin.9 A 
defining feature of Liberia’s recent social, cultural, and political history is that a small proportion, less 
than five percent, of its population consists of descendants of repatriated Africans, including freed 
1  The audience for this report includes some individuals who have in-depth personal knowledge of Liberia and others 
who may be learning for the first time about Liberia, including its people, history, and the recent conflict. Accordingly, the 
following background and historical overview provides context for later sections of this report. This information is not 
intended as a definitive discussion of Liberian history and culture.
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slaves from the Americas and the Caribbean, free-born African-Americans, and Africans captured 
from slave ships on the high seas.10
This latter group, also known as Americo-Liberians, settlers, or Congo,11 forms one of the 17 generally 
recognized sociocultural groups in Liberia.12 The other 16 groups include indigenous Africans based 
on cultural and linguistic similarities, specifically the Gbandi, Bassa, Gio, Dei, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, 
Kpelle, Kru, Kuwaa (Belle), Loma, Ma (Mano), Mandingo, Mende, Vai, and Krahn.13 According 
to Liberian historians, “intermarriage, modern education and westernized Christianity, Islam and 
other foreign influences have blurred some of the distinctions” between these sociocultural groups.14 
These indigenous groups arrived in Liberia in waves beginning in 6000 B.C.E. and have cross-
border ties with similar ethnic communities in other West African countries.15 The last group to 
arrive was the Americo-Liberian settlers in the nineteenth century.16 Liberia also has a significant 
Lebanese community. People of Lebanese descent, and all other people of non-African descent, are 
not permitted to hold Liberian citizenship even if born in Liberia.17
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key featureS of liBerian culture
Liberia is a largely rural country, with the exception of the capital city, Monrovia.18 Most Liberians 
have strong ties to towns and villages outside the capital. These rural communities are generally 
the center of extended family, or kinship groups. Ties to an extended family network are critically 
important in Liberian culture and often form the foundation upon which local and national political 
governance is built.19 
Liberian society is also characterized by veneration of elders and patriarchy. Councils of male elders 
generally are decision-makers in a given community.20 The oldest male relative is the leader and 
decision-maker for the family group. Many communities, however, also seek the advice and input of 
councils of women elders.21
Leadership in Liberian communities is often expressed through membership in so-called “secret” 
societies. Such membership institutions exist in both the Americo-Liberian and indigenous 
sociocultural groups. The two most widely known indigenous secret societies are the Sande (for 
women) and Poro (for men). These societies, found among groups including the Vai, Gola, Dei, 
Mende, Gbandi, Loma and Kpelle, serve as institutions to acculturate youth and “formally carry them 
through the rite of passage from child to adult.”22 Poro and Sande are the most widely known because 
they are in fact the least secret – often all adult members of a community are initiates.23 Other more 
secretive societies with clandestine membership dedicated to communication with specific types of 
spiritual powers also exist.24 Americo-Liberians brought with them secret membership institutions, 
such as the Freemasons.25 
The existence of these institutions is tied to Liberians’ religious practices and worldview. Elders of 
the Poro, Sande, and the other Liberian secret societies are those who connect the human world with 
the powerful spirit world. Practices employed by the priests – or zoes – of secret societies include 
use of masks, dance, body markings, charms, ritual trials and punishments, animal sacrifice, and, 
in some cases, cannibalism.26 These traditional religious practices also merge with Christianity and 
Islam, which are important social forces in Liberia. Many Liberians are initiates into indigenous secret 
societies and also practice Christianity.27 Islam forbids participation in such societies, but has its own 
secret groups.28 
Apart from religious communication, dress and hairstyle are of great cultural importance in Liberia. 
The traditional hairstyle for Liberian men was uniformly closely cropped and reflected the hair 
depicted on traditional masks.29 Disheveled hair, such as that worn by many of the combatant groups 
in Liberia, would traditionally have been a sign of “distress, bereavement, or even insanity” 30 and 
would have sent a clear message to other Liberians that this person was well outside any social and 
cultural boundaries. 
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Finally, Liberian society since the arrival of the Americo-Liberian settlers has been characterized by 
dual systems of education, governance, law, and cultural practice. Indigenous systems of education 
(such as the Poro and Sande bush schools31), customary law using traditional methods of trial by 
ordeal,32 reconciliation under the palava hut,33 traditional punishment,34 and the chieftaincy system of 
governance are prominent in the interior areas of Liberia. In contrast, a more Western-styled system 
of education, courts, and bureaucratic governance is found in Monrovia and other larger cities.35 
hiStorical overview
Liberian history is contested and, as in many countries, is perceived as a political undertaking. This 
section seeks only to provide a general outline of certain historical events to provide the reader with 
context for the following report. A timeline of events during the TRC’s mandate period, from 1979 to 
2003, can be found at Appendix G. 
Early History 
Liberia’s current ethnic diversity reflects the many stages of migration to what today is known as 
Liberia. The oldest inhabitants of the Liberian territory include the Gola, Kpelle, Loma, Gbandi, 
Mende, and Mano peoples, who had settled in the area by 6000 B.C.E.36 Later arrivals included the 
Kru, Bassa, Dei, and Grebo peoples, who arrived during the sixteenth century from the west.37 The 
seventeenth century brought the arrival of the Vai and Mandingo, migrating from the north.38 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, actors within the United States began to play a part in the 
fortunes of the land that is now known as Liberia. As a reaction to America’s own social crisis created 
by the use of Africans as slave labor, a group of prominent Americans began a movement to return 
free African-Americans to Africa.39 They formed an association of abolitionists and whites who 
feared the growth of a free black population in the United States. This group became the American 
Colonization Society and ultimately selected land near the present day capital of Liberia to serve as 
the landing point for the first settlers.40 Settlers officially founded the government of Liberia in 1847.41 
The indigenous African inhabitants of the Liberian territory were generally antagonistic to the 
establishment of the Liberian nation and played no role in the decision-making around its founding 
principles and documents.42 According to Liberia scholar, Jeremy Levitt, the “Dei [the group located 
in the territory initially claimed by the ACS] abhorred the settlers’ presence…[and] they forcefully 
resisted the erection of a ‘colony,’ ‘settlement,’ or ‘dominion’ in Cape Mesurado or at any other location 
on the coast.”43 Indeed, the colonization society settlements and indigenous tribal communities were 
at war over territory and trade routes throughout much of the nineteenth century.44 
The settler-led government in Monrovia engaged in the process of establishing an independent nation. 
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Liberian settler politics from 1883 onward were dominated by a small clique of settler families and 
their allies who governed through the True Whig Party.45 
Indigenous African communities followed their traditional patterns of life while also attempting to 
adapt to settler dominance. After the turn of the century, the settlers had established a system of 
military and administrative control over what was known as the “hinterland,” or the interior.46 This 
area consisted of the land outside of the colonization society settlements that had been recognized 
by the international community as under the control of the settler-led government in Monrovia.47 
The hinterland made up the vast bulk of Liberian territory, and indigenous Liberians constituted 
the vast majority of the population.48 
The Liberian Frontier Force, which 
later became the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL),49 was used as the primary 
instrument of control in the hinterland.50 
Liberia’s rich natural resources led to 
success in establishing international 
commerce from its coast. During the 
1860s, however, Liberia began to face 
economic problems. Liberia took out 
high-interest loans from the United 
States and Europe in the 1870s, be-
coming economically dependent on 
other countries.51 Liberia signed a con-
cession agreement with the Firestone 
corporation in 1926.52 Under the agreement, Liberia leased one million acres of land to Firestone for 
99 years at an annual cost of six cents per acre.53 Rubber soon became Liberia’s biggest export. The 
Firestone plantation became a major driver of Liberia’s economy, employing thousands of workers.
Liberia’s relationship with Firestone led to international attention and criticism when the True Whig 
Party was accused of forcibly recruiting laborers to work on the Firestone plantation and elsewhere in 
a system known as pawning.54 This led to an inquiry by the League of Nations, which concluded that 
officials of the Liberian government had pursued a policy of forcing indigenous Liberians to work in 
slavery-like conditions.55 Although the president of Liberia was forced to resign, the True Whig Party 
remained in power.56 
The Tubman and Tolbert Eras
In 1944, William V.S. Tubman was elected President of Liberia.57 With income from foreign 
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investments and the discovery of minerals, Tubman modernized Liberia’s economy and developed 
some of Liberia’s basic infrastructure.58 During his tenure, Tubman slowly increased the access to 
governing structures for indigenous Liberians.59 Tubman rewarded loyalty with public money and 
suppressed political opposition,60 however. Therefore, the stratification of Liberian society between 
Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians persisted. 
By the time Vice-President William Tolbert succeeded Tubman in 1971, many indigenous Liberians 
were frustrated with widespread poverty, lack of basic amenities, and political domination by the 
Americo-Liberians. As one Liberian scholar noted, a “wave of rising expectations overtook Liberians 
following the death of Tubman.”61 In 1972, one year after Tolbert assumed the presidency, the 
Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) was organized by professors and students at the University of 
Liberia.62 In 1975, the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) was established by Liberians living in the 
United States, and PAL opened an office in Liberia in 1978.63 Tolbert, MOJA, and PAL would become 
the primary antagonists in the civil unrest that many believe led to Liberia’s first military coup d’état 
in 1980.
According to Levitt, MOJA and PAL “worked together with numerous other organizations to 
pressure the government to make fundamental changes in the way that it allocated resources and kept 
[indigenous] Liberians and poor, rural and unemployed Liberians of all descents at the periphery of 
decision making…”64 MOJA and PAL took action as a result of two major historical events.65 The 
first was leaked information about a government plan to increase the price of the Liberian staple 
food, rice.66 Second, the government effectively barred “poor and landless Liberians” from exercising 
their right to vote by its invocation of “150-year-old constitutionally based property ownership 
rules.”67 The price increase, in particular, was perceived as an opportunity for members of the ruling 
elite, many of whom had significant economic stakes in Liberia’s cash crops, to benefit personally.68 
The Tolbert administration stated that the price increase was designed to stimulate domestic rice 
production and support small farmers, to slow the rate of migration to urban areas, and to discourage 
rice importation.69 Regardless of its intent, the price increase caused a widespread negative response. 
In 1979, PAL applied for a permit to demonstrate against the proposed price increase and was denied.70 
PAL leaders met with Tolbert in March 1979 and were again ordered not to demonstrate.71 Despite the 
order, PAL called for demonstrations on April 14, 1979.72 Hundreds of people protested, and conflicts 
between police and demonstrators resulted in demonstrators being shot.73 Unleashed by these Rice 
Riots, many people, including some soldiers, turned to looting.”74 Political tensions between Tolbert, 
MOJA, and PAL continued throughout 1979 and 1980.75
Samuel K. Doe Era
On the night of April 12, 1980, a group of soldiers from the AFL staged a military coup against 
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President Tolbert.76 Tolbert was assassinated during the attack on the executive mansion.77 
The military junta, or People’s Redemption Council (PRC), assumed power and chose Samuel K. Doe, 
a member of Liberia’s indigenous Krahn tribe, as PRC co-chair and head of state.78 On August 22, 
1980, 13 members of President Tolbert’s cabinet were marched down to a beachside military barracks, 
tied to poles, stripped, and executed by firing squad.79 Many political figures fled the country, and 
many others were imprisoned.80 
After several years of pressure to return to civilian rule, Doe agreed to a process of constitutional 
reform and elections. Elections were held in 1985 and, while numerous political parties participated, 
the elections were widely seen as fraudulent.81 Doe declared himself and his party, the National 
Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), victorious. In November 1985, one month after the election, 
PRC co-founder Thomas Quiwonkpa returned from exile in the United States and attempted a coup 
to topple Doe. The rebellion was violently quashed. Doe was inaugurated as the first president of 
Liberia’s Second Republic in January 1986.82 
Immediately after seizing power, and throughout his regime, Doe’s government engaged in widespread 
human rights violations.83 At the same time, Liberia was a close ally of the United States under the 
administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. During Doe’s regime, Liberia received 
more than 400 million dollars in foreign aid.84 
Charles Taylor Era
On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor, a former bureaucrat in the Doe administration who had 
been educated in the United States and who had fled Liberia after being charged with embezzling 
government funds,85 launched an invasion from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire.86 Throughout 1990, Taylor 
and his group of fighters, who called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), began 
seizing control of increasing amounts of territory outside Monrovia.87 Many Liberians, frustrated by 
Doe’s oppressive and inept rule, initially welcomed Taylor’s incursion.88
Within six months, Taylor’s NPFL had reached Monrovia and reports of human rights abuses and 
an impending humanitarian crisis demanded international action.89 In response, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a Cease-fire Monitoring Group peacekeeping 
mission, known as ECOMOG, to Monrovia in August 1990.90 On September 9, 1990, a splinter group 
of the NPFL, Prince Johnson’s Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), captured 
and tortured Samuel Doe to death.91 The NPFL and Doe’s soldiers signed a ceasefire agreement in 
November; a second peace agreement was signed between an interim government, the NPFL, and 
Doe’s supporters in December.92 Notwithstanding the peace agreements, the fighting continued. The 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), a rebel group composed of Doe supporters 
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from neighboring Guinea and Sierra Leone, was formed to oppose Taylor. ULIMO invaded Liberia 
in April 1991.93 
Although additional peace agreements were signed by the warring factions throughout 1993 and 1994, 
the conflict continued,94 and other armed factions emerged. In 1995, Taylor agreed to a ceasefire and a 
timeline for the demobilization and disarmament of his troops. Taylor, along with five other factional 
leaders, became members of a collective transitional presidency.95 Elections were held in 1997, and 
Taylor won the presidential election.96
The civil unrest persisted, however. In 1999, exiled Liberians formed armed groups to oppose Taylor. 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL) launched military campaigns against Taylor’s government.97 
Under international pressure, Taylor stepped down in exchange for asylum in Nigeria on August 11, 
2003.98 Soon thereafter, the warring factions and an interim government signed the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana, which provided for a transitional government until the 2006 
elections.99 Gyude Bryant was selected to lead the National Transitional Government of Liberia 
(NTGL).100 
Post-conflict Liberia
Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Liberia has been at the center of several 
historic firsts: the first election of a female president in Africa, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and the 
prosecutions of a former national president and his son, Charles Taylor and Chuckie Taylor. 
Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, elec- 
tions were held in 2005. On November 23, 2005, 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected President of 
Liberia. The first democratically elected female 
president in Africa and a member of the Unity 
Party, Sirleaf suffered persecution under prior 
regimes.101 Initially an appointee in Doe’s govern-
ment,102 Sirleaf was later imprisoned in 1985 and 
1986 for criticizing Doe’s administration.103 She 
initially supported Taylor’s NPFL invasion but later 
disassociated herself from the group.104
One of President Sirleaf’s early acts was to inaugurate the TRC. On June 22, 2006, the TRC of Liberia 
was launched. Composed of nine commissioners,105 the TRC was mandated to “promote national 
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peace, security, unity and reconciliation,” while making it possible to hold perpetrators accountable 
for gross human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.106 Apart from the 
TRC, two key prosecutions have begun to address the issue of justice for crimes by key actors in the 
Liberian conflict – that of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and that of Chuckie 
Taylor in U.S. federal court.
The United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone created the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
January 2002.107 The objective of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is to “prosecute persons who bear 
the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”108 On March 7, 2003, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone charged Charles Taylor with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The charges allege that Charles Taylor is 
individually criminally responsible for the actions of others, specifically those under his command, 
given his position of executive power.109 Because these criminal charges are brought by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, they do not cover Taylor’s criminal actions perpetrated against the Liberian 
people. 
Taylor argued that he was “immune from any exercise of jurisdiction…by virtue of the fact that 
he was, at the time of the issuing of the indictment and warrant of arrest against him, a Head of 
State.”110 For three years, Taylor remained in exile beyond the Special Court’s reach. It was not until a 
request by the Liberian government that Nigerian President Obasanjo delivered Taylor to the Special 
Court on March 29, 2006. To preserve regional stability, Taylor’s trial was transferred to The Hague, 
Netherlands, where he is currently incarcerated.111 Presentation of evidence in the Charles Taylor trial 
began in January 2008. The United Kingdom has agreed to incarcerate Taylor should he be convicted. 
Charles Taylor’s son, Roy Belfast, Jr., a U.S. citizen known as Chuckie Taylor, was indicted in 2006 in 
U.S. federal court for his actions as the head of the Anti-terrorist Unit (ATU), a notorious paramilitary 
unit alleged to be responsible for torture and killings.112 This indictment was the first in the United 
States under a statute criminalizing torture, 18 U.S.C. §2340A.113 The statute brings within the 
jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts all acts of torture committed outside of the United States when 
the offender is a U.S. citizen, national, or is present in the United States.114 On October 30, 2008, a 
federal jury found Chuckie Taylor guilty of torture and conspiracy115 and he was sentenced to 97 years 
in prison.116 Despite these prosecutions, several individuals who played important roles during the 
conflict were elected to public office in Liberia in 2005 and currently hold public office in Liberia.
root cauSeS of the conflict
The mandate of the TRC of Liberia includes “[i]nvestigating the antecedents of the crises which 
gave rise to and impacted on the violent conflict in Liberia.”117 Accordingly, statement givers in the 
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diaspora were asked to discuss their opinions as to what they believed to be the root causes of the 
conflict.118 Overwhelmingly, Liberians in the diaspora identified three major root causes: inequities 
implicit in the structure of the settler-dominated Liberian state, tribalism, and greed/corruption. 
Systemic inequity between the ruling elite and the majority indigenous population, tribal allegiance 
and intertribal conflict, and pervasive corruption were critical factors that led to the collapse of the 
Liberian state. Throughout the war, however, illegal personal enrichment and violent repression of 
opposition were perpetuated by all sides to the conflict. Those with guns became lawless, seeking to 
enrich themselves and targeting those against whom they had personal grudges or anyone who was 
perceived to have benefited from the system prior to the war. Government soldiers took money and 
food from civilians at checkpoints.119 Statement givers again and again described rebel fighters taking 
personal revenge during raids.120 Some statement givers described being targeted because of “money 
arguments.”121 They also described how some people got “rich because they commit atrocities and 
they feel that warfare is…the green light or…the passage to creating wealth.”122 Through each regime 
in Liberia, and all through the conflict period, these root causes as identified by statement givers were 
reflected in widespread violations of basic human rights.
The Americo-Liberian/Indigenous Liberian Divide
Civil war really started from the way the people in Liberia were treated by 
Liberians that returned to the country from America. There was no good 
representation for the tax payer and they did not want the indigenous to be 
educated. They wanted to keep the education limited so they could continue 
to oppress the indigenous. Over time the indigenous began to recognize the 
exploitation and called for a two-party system.123
The systematic exclusion and marginalization of indigenous Africans from the economic, political, 
and social arenas during the many years of Americo-Liberian dominance is widely regarded as one 
of the root causes of the civil crisis. Numerous statement givers in the diaspora identified this as one 
of the primary causal factors.124 Statement givers expressed the opinion that, “indigenous Liberians 
were treated like dirt by Americo-Liberians”125 and “[Americo-Liberians] enriched themselves off the 
backs of the indigenous people, who were kept poor.”126 One statement giver observed: “The very 
seal of the country says ‘The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here,’ which implies that there was no one 
in the country before 1822. This overemphasizes the role of the Americo-Liberians, which I believe 
is a fundamental and very serious problem.”127 
Tensions between indigenous Liberians and settlers existed almost from the first interaction between 
the two groups 130 years before the 1980 coup.128 The new settlement, initially under the control of 
white ACS agents, and then under black settler rule, viewed Western culture, education, and religious 
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practices as superior to practices of indigenous Africans. Statement givers opined that, “[w]hen the ex-
slaves arrived in Liberia from the United States, they brought with them segregation. They drew a line 
between themselves and the indigenous people of West Africa.”129 Even the leadership reflected this 
sense of superiority, as Liberia’s first president, J.J. Roberts, reportedly called indigenous Liberians “a 
heathen and barbarous people.”130 
Americo-Liberians demonstrated their contempt for indigenous culture 
in many ways: by their reluctance to marry indigenous Liberian women 
with whom they had informal liaisons, by their ceaseless efforts to convert 
indigenous Liberians to Christianity, by ordinances against public nudity…, 
by efforts to replace indigenous Liberian traditional land ownership (based 
on use and need) with private ownership, and by de facto segregation in 
towns.131
This attitude set the stage for systematic exclusion 
and marginalization of indigenous Liberians as 
settlers consolidated power. While Americo-
Liberians constituted only a small percentage of the 
population,132 this small minority group effectively 
dominated the majority indigenous Africans 
politically, economically, and socially for more than 
100 years. Americo-Liberians were, as historian 
Stephen Ellis writes, “as much a social and political 
class, a type of aristocracy, as they were a true ethnic 
group.”133 
During the years of settler rule in Liberia, 
government policies focused on consolidation 
of power among the ruling elite in Monrovia. In 
addition to establishing an indirect rule system to 
collect taxes from the hinterland for the central 
government,134 the government used the Liberian 
Frontier Force to “quell internative conflict, collect 
taxes, and enforce government mandates.”135 
Historians and statement givers alike describe 
violence and intimidation inflicted in the interior by the Liberian Frontier Force.136 In the Liberian 
Frontier Force and its successor, the AFL, the officer corps was made up of Americo-Liberians, while 
the rank and file soldiers were indigenous Liberians.137 Such a system began to provide incentives for 
consolidation of loyalty to the state among indigenous Liberians who gained benefits from aligning 
with the settler elites. 
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Once effective military control was established over the territory of Liberia, policies to ensure the 
perpetuation of the settlers’ political and cultural system focused on political, economic, and social 
power. Liberia was a one-party state dominated by the True Whig Party, which was founded by the 
settlers in 1869.138 The True Whig party ruled the country continuously from the late nineteenth 
century until President Tolbert’s assassination in 1980.139 Power was concentrated in the presidency, 
especially under Liberia’s longest ruling leader, President William V.S. Tubman. An attempt at political 
opposition under Tubman ended in 1955, with an assassination attempt against the president and the 
suppression of the opposition.140 
Not only did Americo-Liberians dominate politics, but their leading cultural and religious institutions, 
such as the Freemasons and the Christian churches, were key opportunities for upward social 
mobility.141 Prior to 1980, Liberia was reportedly stratified along social and class lines so rigid that 
one statement giver described it as an “apartheid” approach.142 One scholar, Ayodeji Olukoju, has 
described Liberia’s stratification in the following way:
[In the 1960s, Monrovia] was subdivided into three distinct social groups 
arranged in a pyramidal order. At the apex were the elite and honorables, 
followed by the civilized in the middle, with the tribal or uncivilized at 
the base of the pyramid. The civilized comprised clerks, schoolteachers, 
nurses, and junior officials. Drivers, mechanics, domestics, technicians, 
and electricians occupied the transitional zone between civilized and 
tribal. Outside Monrovia, this unwritten class or social differentiation…
was reinforced even by the activities of formal groups known as civilized 
committees or civilized communities or elements, which existed to promote 
relations between the local elites and the central government.143
Liberians of indigenous descent had few options for full participation in Liberian society. Other than 
joining the army, the best way for an indigenous Liberian to advance was through the ward system. 
Indigenous Liberians could gain a quality education and thus access to economic power only through 
attendance at schools in Monrovia. To attend such schools, indigenous children became “wards” of 
Americo-Liberian families.144 As one statement giver described it, “[i]n the past, the only way the 
illiterate could go to school was through patronage.”145 Liberia scholar J. Gus Liebenow noted that 
the ward system was legally recognized in Liberia in 1838. “In return for food, clothing, shelter, and 
often education as well, the ward helped out with the farming and other chores. When the system was 
abused, it differed little from domestic slavery. In many instances, however, a ward was fully adopted 
into the Americo-Liberian family and permitted to bear the family name, inherit property, and enjoy 
the prestige of his ‘father.’”146
According to Levitt, “Most settler Liberians…realized that in order for the oligarchy to survive, it 
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would have to make concessions to its native populace.”147 Tubman made some concessions through 
the Open Door and Unification policies.148 These policies were designed to encourage foreign 
economic investment and to bring more indigenous Liberians into government. While the Open 
Door economic policy resulted in rapid economic growth in Liberia, it was growth that benefited 
the Monrovia elite and excluded indigenous Liberians. 149 Tubman’s successor, President Tolbert, 
went further and opened the door for a political opposition that Tubman had never allowed.150 By 
the 1970s, a “counter-elite” was emerging of young people from indigenous backgrounds who had 
completed college and graduate education.151 The 1979 Rice Riots were an example of the efforts of 
the counter-elite, or student leaders, who called on their followers to demonstrate.152 The Tolbert 
government responded with violent suppression of the opposition.153 
Tensions between the settler elite and the indigenous population reached their apex with the 
assassination of President Tolbert in 1980. One of the former Tolbert government ministers who 
was imprisoned and narrowly escaped execution after the coup described how some imprisoned 
government officials were initially saved from death solely because they were considered to be of 
“pure” indigenous background – soldiers who were ordered to carry out the executions refused to do 
so because they would not kill a fellow indigenous Liberian.154 After Tolbert’s execution, Liberians 
of indigenous descent celebrated,155 danced, and sang “[n]ative woman born soldiers, soldiers killed 
Tolbert,” with the hope that the military junta would end the more than 133 years of Americo-
Liberian rule.156 
Tribalism 
Scholars note that although “tribal” identity and conflict in the region that became known as Liberia 
had been a factor since pre-settler days,157 the notion that there are 16 clearly defined tribal groups 
in Liberia is a fiction that emerged along with the development of the modern Liberian state.158 Yet 
“tribalism” – tribal conflict and allegiance – was identified as a root cause of the Liberian conflict 
by numerous statement givers in the diaspora. Many statement givers also described policies that 
favored one tribe over another, leading to deep divisions based on ethnic identity. Some statement 
givers expressed the opinion that conflict leaders used ethnic strife to fuel the war.159 While members 
of all ethnic groups in Liberia suffered human rights abuses during the conflict, the favoritism and 
targeting of individuals based on identification with the Krahn, Gio, Mano, and Mandingo tribes was 
particularly significant. 
Statement givers frequently attributed the rise in indigenous ethnic tension to the policies of former 
President Samuel K. Doe, who was reported to have favored members of his own Krahn tribe, as well 
as Mandingos. Statement givers who were involved in the Doe government point out that initially 
many of the key positions in the PRC government were held by individuals from non-Krahn ethnic 
groups.160 The following commentary, however, is representative of the view of many statement givers:
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Because most of the PRC members were of the ethnic Krahn tribe, they 
began practicing tribalism and nepotism, placing a premium on members 
of the Krahn tribe only. Most of the key government positions were filled 
with Krahn men and women, some of whom could neither read nor write.161
By most estimates, Krahns made up less than five percent of the Liberian population in the early 
1980s.162 As the Doe era progressed through the 1980s, however, Krahns were appointed to a 
disproportionate number of positions in the government and in the AFL.163 Statements described 
how Krahn employees were appointed to higher positions of authority than non-Krahn employees, 
regardless of their ability. One U.K. statement giver recalled: 
that a key official was appointed who could not even read and write, just 
because he was a Krahn and the uncle of the then Head of State. A qualified 
person would be appointed to each Government post who could come 
from any tribe, but there was always a “watchdog” from the Krahn tribe 
appointed as well.164 
The perception was echoed by a statement giver from Providence, Rhode Island in her TRC statement: 
When President Doe took over Liberia, he put family and those belonging 
to the Krahn tribe, or with connections to the Krahn tribe, into positions 
of power whether or not they had the skills to handle those positions. 
Realizing that many of those put into power would not have the requisite 
skills, President Doe would match those he put in positions of power with 
individuals who did have the necessary skills. President Doe’s people would 
become managers and those with the true skill would be assistant managers. 
My husband was one of the people with knowledge, and his boss was 
manager solely because of his family connections.165
Mandingos, known in Liberia for their trading and economic activities, shifted their loyalty and 
support from the Americo-Liberian regime to Samuel K. Doe,166 who rewarded them with official 
positions in government as well as trade privileges.167 Although they have been in Liberia for 
generations, Mandingos have historically been viewed by other Liberian ethnic groups as foreigners.168 
This shifting of support to the Doe regime added to resentment against the Mandingo, particularly in 
Nimba County, as many of the Mandingos appointed to official positions were there.169 
Doe’s favoritism toward his own tribe and others whose support he hoped to gain extended to all 
public and private sectors of Liberian society. Many statements detail examples of government and 
private discrimination against non-Krahns in employment, housing, education, and other areas. One 
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statement giver reported how his neighbor, a Krahn, kept repeating that he was now a “first-class 
citizen” because he was from the same tribe as Doe.170 A Mano statement giver described how he joined 
Doe’s army, where he excelled and became a company first platoon leader.171 Because of his experience 
and high school education, President Doe promised him a scholarship to attend West Point.172 To 
his disappointment, he did not receive the scholarship because, he believed, he was not Krahn.173 A 
Gio statement giver described how she applied to the University of Liberia in 1980.174 She passed her 
national exams and was accepted by the university while in the twelfth grade.175 Nevertheless, both 
she and her sister were unable to enroll in the university. She believes that the university president, 
who was Krahn, took her name off the list because it was obviously Gio.176 Later she also experienced 
difficulties in finding housing in the town of Kakata, in western Liberia, despite the availability of 
multiple units. She believes she again was denied consideration because of her name.177 
Subsequent events continued to 
deepen the ethnic divide. In the 
1985 presidential election, Jackson 
F. Doe, a Gio from Nimba County, 
was widely believed to have de-
feated Samuel K. Doe, a Krahn.178 
The attempted coup by Thomas 
Quiwonkpa, a Gio from Nimba 
County and one time PRC associate 
of Samuel K. Doe, and Doe’s 
violent retaliation against residents 
of Nimba County escalated the 
tension among tribes, particularly 
between Gio and Krahn. Those 
affiliated with Nimba County and its 
predominant tribes, the Gio and the 
Mano, were targeted in Monrovia and across Liberia. Numerous statement givers cited Doe’s revenge 
as engendering hatred and revenge-seeking by the Gio and Mano tribal groups against members of 
the Krahn tribe.179 One statement giver who now lives in Atlanta told the TRC of losing her uncle in 
the post 1985 coup retaliation: 
Doe’s soldiers had targeted people from the Mano and Gio tribes…Doe’s 
soldiers caught [my uncle] as he walked on the street, when they asked him 
in what tribe he belonged. He said, “Mano,” and Doe’s soldiers executed 
him there by slashing his throat…[He] was such a kind, gentle man that did 
not deserve to die that way…[He] would have been identifiable by his speech 
alone because the Mano tribe speaks a very unique way from that of the 
other tribes and are easy to target.180
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Statement givers detailed how government soldiers arrested government employees with Gio, Mano, 
or Nimba County affiliations. One Gio statement giver described how soldiers arrested her husband 
three times.181 Although they never provided a reason for his arrests, she believed it was because of his 
government role and Gio background:182 
My husband was imprisoned for nearly three months and was kept in an 
underground cell in Monrovia that I described as a “lion’s den.” He was 
tortured and beaten while kept in confinement, his whereabouts unknown 
to me. While I was terrified to hear about what he had gone through after he 
was freed, I was thankful that he was still alive…
My husband was arrested a second time, not long after his first arrest…
Again, he was not told why he was being arrested…While imprisoned, he 
was beaten and deprived of food. I tried to visit my husband while he was in 
jail, but I was not allowed to see him. The food I provided was not given to 
him. Eventually, he was freed from jail…
My husband was arrested a third time and I did not know where he was 
held. After release, he recounted some gruesome stories of being tied to the 
back of a pickup truck and being dragged across the ground. During his 
imprisonment, I saw him on the television…A captive was decapitated right 
next to my husband. My husband was hit with the decapitated head so hard 
that he passed out. The soldiers soiled him with feces and urine while he 
was passed out.183 
Some statements described how this targeting was perpetrated against the very young as well to 
prevent the emergence of a future opposition. Statement givers reported accounts of Doe’s forces 
exacting revenge on the residents of Nimba County by taking babies and killing them, generally by 
drowning them in wells.184 Other statement givers reported that Doe forces rounded up children in 
Nimba and had them buried alive so that they could not “grow up and seek revenge.”185 Regardless of 
the truth of such reports, they persist in the Liberian consciousness. As late as the NPFL invasion in 
1989, statement givers reported that Doe’s forces were drowning people in wells in Nimba in revenge 
for Quiwonkpa’s coup attempt and for Nimba County’s support of Taylor’s invasion.186 
Ethnic divisions became fundamental to the civil war when Charles Taylor’s rebel forces invaded in 
1990.187 TRC statements from the diaspora are replete with stories of NPFL fighters targeting Krahns 
and Mandingos,188 while Doe’s armed forces targeted Gios and Manos.189 In the case of Mandingos, 
who are predominantly Muslim, statement givers also reported having to change their names and 
attire to avoid being targeted.190 Krahn, Mandingo, Gio, and Mano tribes were not the only ones 
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targeted. For example, people with names that sounded Americo-Liberian were also targeted.191 Many 
statement givers described witnessing persons singled out for brutal treatment at checkpoints because 
of their alleged tribal affiliation or the language they spoke.192
Corruption
Both statement givers and scholars identify rampant corruption as one of the causes of 25 years of 
conflict in Liberia. One statement giver summarized: “[T]here is deep-rooted corruption in Liberia, 
which is very sad. If anyone tries to exercise integrity, they are laughed at. If you don’t steal from the 
government, you’re seen as stupid.”193 
Perceived government corruption194 was one of the factors that led to the coup against President 
Tolbert in 1980. Similarly, the PRC and Doe administration’s continuation of corrupt practices can 
be viewed as a major cause of the subsequent 14-year civil war.195 Corruption continued during the 
years from 1990 to 2003, and in fact was “aggravated during the years of civil war when most of the 
interim governments were created based on a peace formula whereby appointments in Government 
were based on warring faction membership and loyalty…”196
Liberia’s extensive corruption is generally attributed to several factors. According to the Government 
of Liberia’s own Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) “over-concentration of power” in the 
hands of the urban Americo-Liberian ruling elite led to corruption, “restricted access to the decision-
making process, and limited the space for civil society participation in governance processes.”197 
A second factor is the traditional dominance of the Executive Branch – and within the Executive, 
the overwhelming dominance of the President – over the other constitutionally equal branches of 
government.198 The President not only controlled the Armed Forces but also had disproportionate 
influence over the national budget, particularly appropriations and disbursements.199 After an 
attempted coup in 1955, Tubman further consolidated power in the presidency and began developing 
a network of civilian spies and specialized security personnel for protection.200
Third, “the limited state of civil service rules and policies in Liberia [furthered a system] whereby 
the president…influenced or made appointments to key civil service positions below the directorial 
level.”201 A report commissioned by Transparency International notes that, as a result of the President’s 
extraordinary power over public sector employment, Liberian presidents for decades influenced 
decisions regarding the recipients of almost “every public contract, permit, license, etc.”202 This, 
according to the report, “…led to poor governance, inefficient management, and limited accountability 
in the public sector, which caused and/or contributed to many acts of corruption, including abuse of 
functions, trading in influences, and bribery.”203
These problems were further compounded by problems inherent in the justice system. Judges in 
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Liberia have always been subject to “political, social, familial, and financial pressures” 204 because the 
judiciary has never been adequately compensated. As one statement giver noted, “they should pay the 
civil servants better. They need to restructure the 
government and give the civil servants something 
to feed the children. If the government does not 
feed the children, the corruption will be there. The 
country’s legal system needs to be stronger.”205 
Low wages and unattractive conditions of service 
meant that many lawyers were not willing to work 
in the Liberian judicial system. 206 This contributes 
to the struggles of the justice system, including the 
infrastructure and corruption problems.207 At the 
lower levels of the courts, corruption was due in 
large part to the meager salaries paid to Justices of 
the Peace and magistrates.208 Such an environment 
led to corruption and allowed people with money to 
act with impunity.209
Corrupt practices resulting in illicit enrichment of 
public officials appear to have been widespread 
both before and during the time period under 
examination by the TRC. Even in 2006 – three 
years after Charles Taylor went into exile – “…a 
substantial percentage of all the private wealth in 
Liberia [was] held by current or former government 
officials.”210 Corruption in “state-owned enterprises, regulatory agencies and parastatal enterprises”211 
was of particular concern.
Illicit enrichment during the period of Americo-Liberian rule is well documented. During the 
True Whig Party’s administration, a few state officials held a cumulative wealth that was greater 
than Liberia’s total budget; the government at times borrowed money from these officials.212 The 
U.S. Department of State also noted in 1980, that “[c]orruption was rampant among high officials 
including the President and his family.”213 Information provided by one statement giver was typical 
of perceptions of illicit enrichment of high-ranking government officials: “In the 1970s, President 
Tolbert used money to build two housing projects that were supposed to be for low-income people, 
but he built big houses that were lived in by the government ministers.”214 
A long history of corrupt practices exists in the armed forces, particularly related to soldiers abusing 
their position to obtain material goods. One statement giver described President Tubman sending 
soldiers to capture the statement giver’s father in 1955.215 The soldiers came into the village, “grabbing 
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chickens, food, animals, and things.”216 At least one scholar has noted a clear progression from the 
breakdown in discipline among the AFL to the fighting factions during the 1990s that in many cases 
were nothing more than armed gangs.217 When the AFL changed its recruiting practices in the 1960s, 
it began to recruit from Monrovia’s urban poor:
[L]acking property rights in both indigenous and “Western-oriented” 
societies, members of this group could become easily mobilized for plunder 
of both rural villages and for mayhem in cities. It was members of the 
lumpen military and others from the same social pool…that constituted the 
core of not only the security forces of the Doe regime but also those of 
Charles Taylor and other armed groups in the Liberian conflict.218
Following the 1980 coup, problems with illicit enrichment of public employees continued.219 Shortly 
after the PRC took power, “government employment expanded rapidly, apparently far in excess of any 
reasonable projection of the demand for public services.”220 Those who obtained these government 
jobs did relatively well. Lower level government workers earned approximately four times the national 
per capita income.221 Those who worked for government-owned corporations also enjoyed substantial 
benefits.222 
Doe used both government and private companies to divert funds for personal use.223 This widespread 
government corruption led to the departure of several foreign companies from Liberia in the latter 
half of the 1980s.224 Doe then turned to more surreptitious commercial activities by eschewing the 
more regulated foreign firms in favor of preexisting personal connections and trade in commodities 
(such as timber, rubber, gold and diamonds) that could be easily masked.225 Thus, use of more discrete 
channels of trade made state oversight of commerce increasingly difficult.226 
Statement givers shared their personal experiences with regard to the corrupt practices. A statement 
giver reported that in the 1990s he witnessed corruption as a driver for an American company. The 
project was supposed to pay them $450 in U.S. currency per month. But he and his coworkers were 
only paid $35 per month. His coworker discovered financial statements showing that the company 
claimed to pay workers $350 in salary and $100 per diem, but the decimal point had been moved 
so they only needed to pay them $35.227 Another statement giver reported depositing money into a 
Liberian bank and expecting $50,000 in U.S. currency to be transferred to his account in New York.228 
The money was not wired on time, and calls to the bank went unanswered. 229 Eventually, 50,000 
Liberian dollars was transferred into his account several months later. 230
One of the most highly publicized incidents of corruption under Doe involved his eventual 
successor, Charles Taylor, who fled to the United States after being accused of embezzlement. A 
witness from Minnesota told the TRC that she worked with Taylor when he was responsible for 
69
Chapter Four
government purchasing as Director of General Services Administration in the Doe government. As 
an administrative assistant to the Deputy Director for Administration, she helped negotiate a lucrative 
contract for spare parts with a local supplier. She stated that Taylor refused to sign the contract, 
however, and directed that the parts be purchased from another entity. When the parts failed to 
arrive, she conducted an investigation and discovered the deal was a sham, the entity did not exist, 
and the funds had been sent to a Swiss bank account.231
Once Taylor won the presidency his efforts at personal enrichment were often aided by the majority 
support he enjoyed in Parliament that allowed him to take over functions and divert resources from 
other branches of government.232 For example, in 1999, Taylor appropriated the Forestry Department’s 
revenues from Liberian timber exports.233 Another practice was to increase the price of staples and 
take part of the rate increase for himself.234 A 2002 report aptly summarized the extent of Taylor’s 
corrupt management:
The system was started in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia territory 
in 1990 and merely extended to Monrovia when Taylor won the presidency. 
It might be described as appropriating the entire tradable economy into a 
single firm, with Charles Taylor as Chief Executive Officer and majority 
shareholder. Industries are parceled out to the small group of businessmen 
in Taylor’s inner circle – fellow shareholders in “Liberia Inc.”235
One major development under Taylor was the re-designation of the Liberian Maritime Registry 
administrator, which thereby increased government control over the shipping industry. Under its 
50-year administration, the Liberian Maritime Registry remitted around $700 million to the Liberian 
Government.236 The previous administrator, the U.S.-based International Registries, Inc., was viewed 
as a well run and highly efficient registry, in part because its management of the registry was completely 
independent of the Liberian Government.237 In 1999, however, the Liberian government signed an 
agreement to transfer administration of the registry from International Registries, Inc. to the Liberian 
International Ship and Corporate Registry, run by Taylor associates.238 
This change allowed Taylor to divert millions of dollars from the shipping industry. Although the 
Minister of Finance was to have exclusive control over the registry revenue,239 he acknowledged a 
“significant diversion of the maritime funds for extra-budgetary uses by the Executive Mansion.”240 
In addition to providing funds to Taylor, the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry 
directly or indirectly aided Taylor and the civil war by agreeing to send registry revenue to non-
governmental bank accounts.241 The U.N. Panel of Experts found that this money was used for the 
delivery of weapons, including submachine guns, which were smuggled into Liberia from Uganda.242
Taylor also entered into contracts that granted him lucrative interests. For example, the American 
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televangelist Pat Robertson’s Freedom Gold Ltd. signed an agreement with Taylor in 1999, so as 
to gain development rights to diamonds and gold in Liberia. 243 Despite the Liberian government’s 
refusal to ratify the agreement, Freedom Gold started a diamond mining venture in southeastern 
Liberia in 2000. Subsequently, it became known that Taylor had a ten percent ownership interest in 
Freedom Gold.244 
As described by statement givers, Taylor’s illicit economic activity aggravated an already unstable 
situation and contributed to the rise of armed groups aiming to oust him during the second Liberian 
civil war.245
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rice riotS and aftermath: 1979-19801
During the 1979 Rice Riots, state actors perpetrated human rights violations against civilians as they 
attempted to quell the instability. Government security forces reportedly perpetrated abuses such as 
killings, torture, and arbitrary detention of civilians. In addition, there were reports of Liberian forces 
taking part in looting alongside rioters.1 Guinean soldiers were also responsible for perpetrating 
violence.2 By the end of the riots, it is estimated that hundreds were killed and injured.3 
Several statements recount the shootings of civilians that took place during the Rice Riots, many of 
which resulted in injuries and deaths. One statement giver reported that the army fired a bullet that hit 
his 12-year-old son in the mouth and became lodged in the back of his neck.4 Another statement giver, 
who was a teenager at the time of the riots, recalled that 
a younger friend of his, known as the “marble champ” 
for his game skills, was killed while looting the Center 
Supermarket on 12th Street in Monrovia.5 Another 
statement giver witnessed soldiers firing machine guns 
and people running.6 He heard stories about people 
being killed in their backyards by bullets falling to 
earth after soldiers randomly shot into the air.7
Some statements suggest, however, that not all soldiers 
were willing to use lethal violence against civilians. 
One statement giver reported that, while some soldiers 
fired to hit the looters, others tried to disperse the looters by firing their weapons in the air or at the 
ground.8 Another statement giver described how soldiers were reluctant to shoot at civilians who 
were trying to reach the Executive Mansion.9 Although no statements articulated a specific reason 
for this hesitance to shoot, at least one statement giver reflected on the riots’ ethnic undercurrent.10 
He observed that President Tolbert, an Americo-Liberian, ordered the mostly indigenous Liberian 
1  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) is charged with “investigating gross human rights 
violations and violations of international humanitarian law as well as abuses that occurred, including massacres, sexual 
violations, murder, extra-judicial killings and economic crimes, such as the exploitation of natural or public resources to 
perpetuate armed conflicts, during the period January 1979 to October 14, 2003…” An Act to Establish the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Liberia art. IV, § (4)(a), (enacted by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, May 12, 
2005), https://www.trcofliberia.org/about/trc-mandate.
Accordingly, this chapter and the following three chapters describe violations as recounted by TRC statement 
givers, public hearing witnesses, and other Liberians in the diaspora. The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates) 
has not investigated or corroborated any of these accounts. The Advocates has no reason to doubt the truth of any state-
ment provided to the TRC. Nevertheless, the events described reflect a mix of statement givers’ opinions, actual personal 
experiences, experiences as remembered or perceived many years later, as well as the perceptions of statement givers about 
events around them. All of these types of information have value in the national healing process. Where possible, these 
chapters distinguish between these types of information and supplement the information from statements with informa-
tion from secondary sources.
Chapter Five. 
Human Rights Abuses During the Rice Riots and Doe Era
“Every human being has the inherent right 
to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.” Art. 6(1), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. No derogations 
from this article are permitted, even in 
times of public emergency. Art. 4(1)-(2), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
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military to shoot the mostly indigenous protesters.11 The statement giver witnessed soldiers refusing 
to shoot the protesters, who were indigenous Liberians like them.12 Eventually, the senior military 
officers pointed their guns at the soldiers’ backs, forcing them to shoot into the crowd.13 Like the 
senior military officials, however, other forces were prepared to carry out the shooting. When the 
military refused to use force, the statement giver reported, the police stepped in.14 
In addition to gunfire, soldiers and police 
used other forms of violence against people 
who disobeyed the 7:00 p.m. curfew.15 A 
statement giver witnessed soldiers employ 
methods such as forcing people to “pump 
tire,”16 “swim” on the cement or in dirty 
puddles, or squat repeatedly for hours.17 
He also reported seeing soldiers use threats 
of arrest to force women to have sex with 
them.18 
In the aftermath of the riots, Progressive 
Alliance of Liberia (PAL) leaders and 
members were arrested and detained.19 
One public hearing witness described the 
government posting a “Wanted Dead or 
Alive” poster offering a $5000 reward for the PAL leaders, one of whom was her brother.20 Working 
in the government at the time, she described being asked about her brother’s whereabouts and later, 
when her brother was found and taken into detention, being called into Tolbert’s office.
After her brother’s arrest, her father went to Tolbert to demand his son’s release.21 Tolbert’s former 
defense minister also recalled that the grandmother of PAL Chairman Baccus Matthews “importuned” 
Tolbert to release the PAL leaders.22 Ultimately, Tolbert released the leaders of the demonstration.
After the Rice Riots, a commission was established to 
investigate the causes of the unrest. The Presidential Com-
mission on National Reconstruction issued a report to the 
government, which drew attention to a submission by citi-
zens that identified socio-economic disparities as the cause 
of the tension. The report cited the fundamental causes as 
the following: 
 
Torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in 
or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Art. 1(1), Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
“Everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty except on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedure 
as are established by law.” Art. 9(1), 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
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They are in a real sense a culmination of more than one hundred years of a 
national leadership that appears to have eroded its constituents’ participation 
in a meaningful way. The surfacing of these problems which the events of 
April 14 occasioned could nevertheless be viewed as a consequence of the 
continuing decline of the quality of the social mores and principles provided 
for in our constitution.23
Through the next year, unrest continued in Monrovia. In 
January, PAL became a registered political opposition 
party called the Progressive People’s Party (PPP).24 At the 
beginning of March 1980, the PPP led a midnight march 
on the executive mansion and a few days later called for the 
resignation of the Tolbert government.25 By March 28, 1980, 
the Tolbert government had banned the PPP.26 
As a result of the Rice Riots, the government’s credibility 
and stability diminished.27 These conditions, combined with 
the deteriorating economic conditions, widespread popular 
frustration, and negative public views of the government 
contributed to the climate of civil unrest. Many statement 
givers identified the Rice Riots as an influential factor in the 
events leading to the 1980 coup.28 
Samuel k. doe era: 1980-1989
Life in Liberia under the regime of Samuel K. Doe and the human rights violations that were 
perpetrated by his government reflect a pattern of oppression seen in many military dictatorships. 
Both during the period of military rule and after Doe assumed the civilian presidency, his regime 
was characterized by ruthless suppression of any perceived threat to his power. The perceived threats 
to Doe’s power encompassed an ever widening circle of Liberians. Doe’s methods of governance 
in Liberia helped set the stage for the violent civil wars that later engulfed the country. Based on 
information from TRC statements, public hearings witnesses, and secondary sources, this section 
describes life under the Doe regime for the different groups in Liberian society, including both high-
level officials and ordinary Liberians. 
The Coup
The first targets of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC) were members of the former regime, 
including the families of those serving in the government. The then-serving president, William Tolbert, 
“Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others…
No restrictions may be placed on 
the exercise of this right other 
than those which are prescribed by 
law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This article 
shall not prevent the imposition of 
lawful restrictions on members of 
the armed forces and of the police in 
their exercise of this right.” Art. 22(1)-
(2), International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
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was brutally murdered inside the 
presidential residence. His wife, 
Victoria Tolbert, described being 
awakened by the sound of gunfire 
on the night of April 11-12, 1980. 
Upon opening the door, she saw 
two bodies covered in blood on the 
floor, one of whom she recognized 
as their guard.29 Soldiers later 
forced their way into Mrs. Tolbert’s 
bedroom and threatened to kill 
her and the President: “If you no 
be Vai woman, we kill you tonight. 
Right now, right now,” one of them 
proclaimed as he pressed his gun 
even more firmly into my flesh. 
“But we no kill Vai woman. We 
kill president!” shouted the other.30
Mrs. Tolbert reported that she was in the room when her husband was murdered, and she described 
the scene this way: 
Then…six virtually naked and horrifyingly masked men rushed by me. 
Their bodies were painted for war, in tribal fashion – like the warriors of 
Cape Palmas during Liberia’s tribal wars. Only jagged and weathered scraps 
of fabric hung securely about their loins. I could see that their gruesome 
masks, designed to terrify, disguise and intimidate, were painted on…I 
didn’t recognize any of those men…Suddenly, a deafening explosion blasted 
our ears. One of them had shot [President Tolbert]. He sank to the chair, his 
walking stick dropped to the floor, and I knew he was dead.31
Twenty-seven other government officials were reportedly killed during the coup.32 After the PRC 
took power, Liberians associated with the President or with other government leaders were hunted. 
President Tolbert’s daughter, Wilhelmina Holder, described hiding with her mother-in-law’s neighbor:
The soldiers came in the house and were knocking over chairs and 
screaming, “If we find Wilhelmina Holder and Burleigh Holder, we’ll skin 
them alive and bury them.” And my heart – I mean, I can feel it now – those 
people, they came to my door and I took my glasses off and I said my last 
Human rights violations reported during the Doe era: 
Summary executions
Enforced disappearances
Unlawful detentions
Violations of rights related to the administration of justice
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment
Violation of the right to take part in the government
Violation of the right of equal access to public service
Discrimination
Violation of freedom of expression
Violation of the right of peaceful assembly and association
Arbitrary interference with privacy, family life, and 
correspondence
Violation of the right to property and the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of property
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prayer, gave myself to God, because I said – well, at that time I didn’t know 
whether – I knew my father was dead. I didn’t know what had happened to 
my mother, I didn’t know where my husband was, I didn’t know where my – 
none of my sisters were. I knew my brother was maybe in hiding and maybe 
dead, and I just knew my children were dead. So I was ready to die, took my 
glasses off, put it down, said my last prayer and presented – gave my whole 
life and self to God.33
Members of Tolbert’s government were systematically rounded up. One statement giver, whose father 
had been a political leader and senator,34 described her family’s fear of persecution after the 1980 coup:
We stayed at home, scared that we would be killed. I recall that Doe’s people 
were out killing anyone, for any reason or no reason. If Doe or his people 
knew you were part of a political or governmental group that didn’t support 
Doe, his people would kill you. If they couldn’t get to you, they would kill a 
close family member or someone else you knew.35
The Minister of Defense under President Tolbert, Burleigh Holder, was one of the ministers arrested 
after the coup and slated for execution. Holder was imprisoned first at the Barclay Training Center 
where he was beaten in the middle of the night by former members of his staff. He recounted his 
experience: 
[T]hese men pushed me to the ground, commanded me to lie on my 
stomach, and the three of them beat me simultaneously until I passed out. 
I counted eighty-seven triple lashes before I fainted…[W]hen I regained 
consciousness, they had stopped beating me and were wondering whether I 
was alive or dead.36
Holder, who was jailed for ten months, during part of which he was in the notorious Belle Yallah 
Prison, recounted the treatment he experienced just after the coup:
Within a few days of my imprisonment, sixteen of us, prisoners, were called 
out to dig holes in the grounds of the prison. I was told to dig a hole ten 
by ten feet…we were handed a shovel each… rifles began firing all around 
me so close to my body that sand was thrown up onto [me]…By this time a 
crowd of at least four to five thousand people had gathered in the open field 
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Art. 6(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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around, all derisively gazing at the spectacle…I was ordered to strip buck 
naked while digging…a soldier advanced to the partial dugout and emptied 
a potty of human feces into it, and he ordered me to eat it…Each mouthful 
was mixed with sand, and I was forced to swallow it.37
Several former government officials were tried by 
a special military tribunal set up by the PRC. This 
tribunal recommended death sentences for four 
of the former government officials.38 On April 20, 
1980, however, 13 former government officials 
were taken to a beach in Monrovia, stripped naked, 
and executed by firing squad. One statement giver 
witnessed Doe’s men tie the 13 government officials 
to poles and heard Doe himself give the order to his men to start firing. 39 The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) later reported: “Journalists who had been taken to the barracks to watch the 
executions said they were cruel and messy. They said four men were forced to watch the others die 
before being shot themselves as there were only nine stakes.”40 A statement giver who now lives in the 
Washington, DC area described his memories of the executions:
I stayed there and witnessed the execution and it was very disgusting. Most of 
the victims died before they were shot. They must [have had] a heart attack 
because they had fainted before they were shot. I saw that Richard Henries41 
and Frank Tolbert42 had passed out. The soldiers fired indiscriminately, 
hitting the officials in the stomach or head. Each official got fifty or sixty 
rounds of bullets in their body. Cecil Dennis43 was the only one alive after 
the barrage of gun fire; he had not been shot at all. At this point, two soldiers 
with the firing squad started shooting him and killed him.44 
“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
Art. 10(1), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
“[S]entence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law 
in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This 
penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement [sic] rendered by a competent court.” Art. 
6(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
“Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement [sic] rendered by a 
competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, at least 
equal to those contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may 
be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings.” ¶ 5, Safeguards guaranteeing 
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty.
89
Thousands of Monrovians cheered as the executions proceeded.45 
One witness stated that, although horrified at what he had seen, 
he was afraid not to cheer along with the rest of the crowd 
because he did not want anyone to question his loyalty.46 
The PRC imprisoned almost all of Tolbert’s family members and 
many other perceived opponents. Victoria Tolbert, the murdered 
president’s wife, was imprisoned for one month. According to 
testimony from Mrs. Tolbert’s daughter, “She was on the bare 
floor, she didn’t have even a piece of cloth to sleep on for over 
two weeks before one of the soldiers was merciful and brought 
her a mattress.”47 President Tolbert’s son, A.B. Tolbert, was 
imprisoned in the Post Stockade and was summarily executed.48 
All but one of President Tolbert’s daughters were placed 
under house arrest and separated from their children with no 
knowledge of the children’s whereabouts or the whereabouts of 
their other family members.49 According to Wilhelmina Holder, 
Some family members came and brought us food and they were arrested 
then. And Chea Cheapoo50 called on his walkie-talkie and before long some 
of the PRC – and George Boley,51 he came too, to look at us. And they put 
us in a room and told us that they had to think about what to do for us, what 
would be our fate. And we were terrified because they could have killed 
every one of us. And during the six weeks we were under house arrest, all 
hours of the night people would come knocking at the door just to gloat at 
us.52 
Another statement giver now living in Washington, DC summarized the situation after the 1980 coup: 
[O]ne of [Doe]’s first acts was purging Liberian society of what he considered 
to be Tolbert supporters. During this time, my friend M. was thrown in 
prison for political activities. He spent three months in prison with no trial. 
During this time, he was so underfed that he reached the point of starvation. 
When I saw him after the ordeal, M. looked like a Holocaust survivor. 
During this period, men were routinely tortured, beaten and stripped of 
their positions in the government due to their name, tribal affiliation or 
association with the former government.53
In the days immediately following the coup, Liberians in Monrovia and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 
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soldiers reportedly engaged in looting and random killings. According to one estimate, approximately 
200 people were killed in just three days.54 One statement giver described his experience on April 12, 
1980:
We came close to getting killed. We as Liberians had never ex-
perienced a coup before and my friend argued with the soldier that 
we were just going to the airport. The soldier was intoxicated and 
trigger happy and willing to shoot my friend in the head if he had 
continued arguing. The soldier put the gun to my friend’s head and 
cocked it to shoot.55
Liberians, particularly those of Americo-
Liberian descent, lived in a climate of fear. 
Those who had initiated the coup and 
taken control of the government were 
primarily of indigenous African descent. 
A statement giver now living in the United 
Kingdom also described her memories of 
the time just after the coup: 
I remember being absolutely terrified during this time. There were frequent 
radio announcements that the Krahns were coming after Americo-Liberians 
and I did not know what was going to happen from one day to the next and 
was afraid to walk in certain parts of town. People of Americo-Liberian 
descent could be identified from their name (the name is often westernized) 
and the way they spoke. As time went on…Doe’s stance against Americo-
Liberians became less severe. However, the Americo-Liberians had been 
subjected to terrible violence, including execution, torture, imprisonment 
and being taken from their homes in the middle of the night.56
Military Rule Under the People’s Redemption Council
After the coup, the PRC quickly set up a system of military rule 
to impose its authority. Executive orders were one mechanism 
used to control the population and stifle opposition. According 
to one Liberian historian: 
“Each State Party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts 
of torture…No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may 
be invoked as a justification of torture.” Art. 2(1)-(2), 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
“Everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person.” Art. 9(1), 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
91
Here, [Doe] was ruling by decrees. There was one decree that prohibited 
workers from striking. There was another law that made it impossible 
for schools and other institutions of higher learning [to have] student 
governments. But not only that, it was the famous Decree 88A, which 
allowed for anyone that was suspected of criticizing Doe’s government to be 
arrested and sent to jail with no justice.57
Statement givers also reported hiring practices that favored ethnic Krahn in appointments and 
promotions, regardless of ability.58 
Despite the curtailment of civil and political rights, life 
returned to some degree of normalcy after the immediate 
post-coup violence subsided. One statement giver noted 
that “life was going on as normal at that time; people 
were just more careful about what they said.”59Although 
the constitution had been suspended,60 the PRC claimed 
that they would soon return the country to civilian rule.61 
Also, the Doe regime was not entirely purged of former 
employees and Americo-Liberians. One historian notes 
that:
[Despite] the fact that he had executed their colleagues, Doe’s first cabinet 
included four ministers from Tolbert’s era, and others from that era were 
promoted into the top ranks of the civil services. Of twenty-two cabinet 
ministers listed in 1985, at least half had held bureaucratic positions in pre-
Doe governments. Many were “pure” Americo-Liberian descendants of 
settler families…62 
Nevertheless, for ordinary Liberians, life under the PRC military regime was often filled with fear. A 
Bassa statement giver who had grown up in Monrovia described it this way: 
Doe proceeded to take the law into his own hands, effecting murders and 
rapes with impunity. Everyone was frightened;…If a man were walking with 
his wife or daughter on the street, Doe’s men or others would simply take 
the woman and rape her. I personally witnessed such an event one day in the 
vicinity of the radio station. When I saw three soldiers take a woman into 
a building, I ran to find their commander; but by the time the commander 
arrived the woman, presumably raped by all three, simply sat weeping on the 
ground. Only one of the perpetrators was detained, and the next day he was 
All persons have the right to enjoy “just 
and favourable conditions of work 
which ensure…[e]qual opportunity 
for everyone to be promoted in his 
employment to an appropriate higher 
level, subject to no considerations 
other than those of seniority and 
competence.” Art. 7(c), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
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released.63
Checkpoints and Curfews
Soldiers often terrorized civilians at checkpoints and 
after curfew. One statement giver who was a young 
woman at the time told the TRC that “the environment 
was very threatening in…Monrovia. Everywhere one 
went there were soldiers with guns; it was a military 
government with a six o’clock curfew. No one was 
crazy enough to break curfew. At 5:30 p.m., people 
would come home because no one dared to break it.”64
Women were often raped at checkpoint[s]. Individuals were forced to strip 
and walk home naked. Many men were made to “pump tire,” an exercise 
where an individual holds his ears and moves up and down balanced on 
the balls of your feet. Others were made to “fall like a palm tree,” flat to 
the ground without supporting themselves…[T]he soldiers inflicted these 
tortures on the people simply to amuse themselves.65
Arrests and Unlawful Detentions
Throughout the Doe regime, detainees were held in various locations 
including Belle Yallah prison,66 the Central Police Station,67 Post 
Stockade military prison,68 Barclay Training Center,69 the Executive 
Mansion,70 unidentified cells, and in some cases, their own homes.71 
Statement givers reported periods of detention ranging from a few 
days to months at a time. Conditions of detention were abysmal in 
most cases: overcrowding, little or no sanitation, and generally no 
medical treatment.72 Prisoners were routinely flogged with rattan 
switches, pieces of steel belt radial tire, or other items while in 
detention.73 One public hearing witness described the conditions in 
the Post Stockade as “terrible and almost uninhabitable.”74 Individual 
cells were often overcrowded with poor sanitation. Verbal and physical 
abuse, harassment, and intimidations to extort money from prisoners 
were the norm.75 
The Doe regime also was characterized by periodic purges of any 
perceived opposition. The killing of Thomas Weh Syen, Doe’s PRC 
“States should condemn violence against 
women…[r]efrain from engaging in violence 
against women…[e]xercise due diligence 
to prevent, investigate and, in accordance 
with national legislation, punish acts of 
violence against women, whether those 
acts are perpetrated by the State or by 
private persons” Art. 4, Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women. 
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vice-chair, was the first high-profile purge. In August 1981, Weh Syen and four other high-ranking 
PRC officials were arrested and accused of plotting to overthrow Doe.76 The accused plotters were 
tried by the Supreme Military Tribunal that had been established to try former Tolbert government 
officials. According to reports, the proceedings were conducted in secret.77 The five accused were 
found guilty on August 13, 1981, and executed the next day.78 A public hearings witness now living in 
North Carolina was liaison between the prison where Weh Syen was being held and the PRC’s Special 
Security Service (SSS). He reported that Weh Syen asked him to take a message claiming that he was 
innocent to Doe.79 This statement giver was present at the prison when Weh Syen and the other four 
co-conspirators were executed the next day. He described the scene:
Colonel B. ordered the jailor to release…Major General Thomas Weh Syen 
and his four co-conspirators. It immediately became apparent to Weh Syen 
and his co-conspirator that they were about to face their fate… Suddenly 
Weh Syen and his co-detainees each broke into loud cries and hollering in 
English saying: “My people, they coming to kill us, oh! Doe is killing us, 
oh!” They were repeating their cries in the various vernacular[s] continuously 
as the special squad was ordering them to shut up and line up…The most 
unbearable moment came when the squad leader ordered his men to shoot. 
The condemned prisoners began to cry even louder but only to be silenced 
forever by the barrage of bullets when Weh Syen and his co-conspirators 
were savagely and unceremoniously gunned down without being blindfolded 
or even administered some spiritual right…I stood there helplessly, in total 
disbelief that I had just witnessed the murder of another human being. I can 
still picture the scene like it is just happening. It is a memory that I will take 
to my grave. As if it was not enough to watch the gruesome murder of fellow 
Liberians without due process, I was even more heartbroken when the PRC 
government announced the same day that Weh Syen and his co-prisoners 
were killed as they were escaping through the attic of the post stockade. Not 
only did the Doe government murder fellow citizens in cold blood, but they 
shamelessly lied to the Liberian people without any remorse.80
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Art. 14(1), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. “Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right 
to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction, and steps should be taken to ensure that such appeals shall 
become mandatory.” ¶ 6, Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death 
penalty. “Where capital punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum possible 
suffering.” ¶ 9, Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty.
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In 1984, this statement giver himself was accused of plotting to overthrow the Doe government.81 He 
was arrested and detained for more than two months, then released without explanation.82 After his 
release, however, he was unable to find any work.83 
Academic Repression
The military regime particularly targeted 
students, professors, and other intellectuals. 
In 1982, the PRC issued Decree 2A, which 
made it a capital offense to engage in academic 
activities that “directly or indirectly impinge, 
interfere with or cast aspersion upon the 
activities, programmes, or policies of the 
government of the PRC.”84 The decree also 
banned the formation of student organizations 
or parties.85 The PRC arrested and tortured 
university administrators and professors.86 
During the early 1980s the Doe government 
infiltrated student organizations and harassed 
those it felt were fomenting opposition. One 
former University of Liberia student told the 
TRC:
[T]here was a lot of government infiltration in student organizations. Often 
times, the infiltrators stood out because they would try to jump into other 
people’s conversations and ask questions that were obviously designed to 
gain information…[S]ometimes identifying an infiltrator was as easy as 
asking them where their next class was, because the infiltrators would not be 
aware of the building abbreviations typically used by students…87
The conflict between academics and the Doe regime climaxed in the summer of 1984. According to 
one statement giver now living in Minnesota, tensions between the government and the university 
community had been on the rise: 
In 1984, I and other students published a story in the newspaper about 
President Doe stealing money from the national treasury for personal use. 
We had been informed by a person at the treasury who did not want to report 
it himself because of fear of the consequences. After the story was published 
in the newspapers, government soldiers demanded to know the source and 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others…No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, public order 
(ordre public), the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.” Art. 22(1)-(2), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. “Everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference.” Art. 
19(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
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we students refused to give the name. Government soldiers arrested me and 
sixteen other students, and detained us at Belle Yallah Prison. The prison 
was only accessible by plane, as there was no road. Eight of the students were 
killed, and eight survived. The entire student population was in an outcry, 
demanding our release.88
Doe had appointed Amos Sawyer to lead the national constitutional commission a few years earlier, 
but by 1984 Doe saw him as a threat.89 In August 1984, the PRC arrested Sawyer and George Kieh, 
professors at the University of Liberia. Students demonstrated to protest the arrests.90 One statement 
giver now living in Minnesota told the TRC about participating in a student demonstration against 
Doe on August 22, 1984.91 In the middle of the demonstrations, he decided to take a taxi and leave 
because he became concerned about the level of military presence.92 
The PRC responded to the student demonstrations with brutal force. Statement givers told the TRC 
about what happened when the military began to act against the demonstrators:
The students had created a closed coffin meant to represent the death of 
President Doe…[T]he military then detained any students the military 
claimed were associated with the demonstration. These students were 
brought to a ridge, were shot, and their bodies were pushed off the ridge 
down to the road. The students’ bodies were left there as an example.93
Another student, who was on campus that day to take an entrance exam, described the scene at the 
University of Liberia:
Soldiers entered campus between noon and 1:00 p.m. firing automatic 
rifles and student leaders convinced students to stay on campus because 
the student leaders said it was against international law for the military to 
come on campus. During the chaos, most of the soldiers were speaking 
French. They were Ivorian Krahn soldiers who had been drafted into the 
Liberian army. The soldiers beat professors and stripped them naked. I saw 
a professor I knew running from campus naked and a market woman had 
to take her wrap and give it to him. The soldiers mistreated girls by beating 
or raping them. A cousin of mine was beaten. Other girls were held in the 
“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of 
this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection 
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Art. 21, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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dorms and raped for several days before they were released. I escaped from 
the campus by jumping over the concrete fence at the back of the cafeteria…
soldiers opened fire on those jumping over the fence…94
Rapes of female students demonstrating in 1984 were documented by the Lawyer’s Committee for 
Human Rights.95 One woman interviewed for that report stated:
I could hear the screaming of the girls in the cafeteria. They must have 
been doing it on the tables in there. I could hear the soldiers asking them to 
undress. I could hear them saying “lie down,” and “kiss me” and “spread 
your legs.”96 
After the August 22nd attack at the University of Liberia, 
the PRC dismissed the entire administration and faculty 
and closed the university.97 “The day after this incident, 
students did not return to University. Checkpoints were 
established in Monrovia, and anyone found in possession 
of a student identification card was detained.”98 The 
university later reopened after President Doe reappointed 
only certain members of the faculty.99
Media Repression
Under the Doe administration, the Liberian media experienced tremendous growth at the same 
time it faced significant repression. Between 1980 and 1990, more than 30 private newspapers were 
founded100 but there was also an increase in repressive measures.101 As one Liberian stated, “The 
general attitude of the Doe government was to consider the press an enemy.”102 The Doe regime 
labeled news stories critical of the government “irresponsible” and “lies and misinformation.”103 
Thus, government enforcement of “responsible journalism” became the justification for systematic 
violations of the right to freedom of expression. The government used a variety of means to oppress 
and to control the media, including state directives, closures, bans, arrests, intimidation, and violence.
The government issued policies seeking to tighten state control over the media. In September 1981, 
Minister of Information Colonel Gray D. Allison announced that the government would begin to 
enforce a new directive “giving the ministry the mandate to edit all releases and announcements 
by or about [the] Government or its agencies.”104 The 1986 Media Act required state approval for 
all reporting.105 Decree 88A essentially made it impossible for the media to hold the government 
accountable and subjected dissident media to accusations of “hate speech.”106 State control extended 
to foreign media as well. Early on, the Doe regime issued a directive requiring foreign journalists to 
Everyone has the right to an education. 
“[E]ducation shall enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations and 
all racial, ethnic or religious groups...” 
Art. 13(1), International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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report at the Ministry of Information for proper accreditation and requiring that all press activities be 
coordinated through the ministry.107 
The Doe government also used temporary bans and permanent closures to punish and to suppress 
media outlets that criticized the government. For example, the Daily Observer was banned approximately 
five times between 1981 and 
1985 for various reasons, such 
as publishing letters to the 
editor reacting to a govern- 
ment ban on University of 
Liberia student leaders,108 
publishing an article critici- 
zing the unsanitary condi-
tions in Monrovia, and giving more coverage to a trade union dispute than to a speech delivered by 
President Doe. These bans prevented the Daily Observer from printing for periods of between one 
month and well over a year.109 A memo by one of Doe’s advisors condemning a closure resulted in the 
advisor’s suspension from his job.110 
In addition to closing media outlets, the Doe administration used harassment and arrest to deter 
journalists from publishing unfavorable stories and to punish those who did. A reporter described 
how the offices of The Daily Observer were burned down, its offices were closed several times, and 
journalists were whipped.111 Another reporter for The Daily Newspaper recalled how the government 
closed down the newspaper on two occasions and jailed six journalists.112 A journalist for The Daily 
Observer described how he was jailed for two weeks in 1988 for investigating the Director of the 
Criminal Investigation Division, who allegedly accepted bribes in return for not divulging findings 
of corruption:113
When I refused to disclose my source, I was jailed. The first jail in which 
I was held was decent, but after still refusing to divulge my source, I was 
transferred to a cramped and unsanitary jail where I stayed for three days. I 
asked to speak with my lawyer but this request was denied. I was permitted 
to make a telephone call to my boss at The Daily Observer. I was returned to 
the jail where I spent about eight more days. I was finally released…[T]he 
authorities must have decided that they could not obtain any information 
from me.114 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Art. 19(2), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention 
and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” Art. 9(4), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
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Ethnic Targeting
Doe’s revenge against his opponents increasingly focused on people from Nimba County. In 1983, 
Doe split with AFL Commanding General Thomas Quiwonkpa, a prominent member of the Gio tribe 
from Nimba County, forcing Quiwonkpa and his supporters out of the country. Some of Quiwonkpa’s 
supporters carried out raids in and around Yekepa, in Nimba County. The 1983 Nimba Raids were, 
according to historian Stephen Ellis, “the first open sign that the Krahn-Gio ethnic rivalry had spilled 
over from the barracks into the country itself.”115 Commanding a security post in Yekepa at the time 
was Charles Julu, later to become a general in Doe’s AFL. Julu’s nephew, now living in the diaspora, 
told the TRC about his memory of the Nimba Raid:
In 1983, my family, including my auntie…and her husband, Charles Julu, 
was a target for elimination. During the Nimba Raid…our family’s home 
was stormed. In Area F, a part of Nimba county, fighters came but [my aunt 
and uncle] were not home…my cousin, opened the door. The fighters were 
looking for Charles Julu, Sr. but searched and found nothing so they shot 
[my cousin] in his side. He pretended to be dead. The fighters then came out 
and beheaded the wash man. We hid in the pantry. My brother was asleep in 
the sitting room and was killed by gunmen. The fighters left and the family 
called the police.116
Statement givers and secondary sources re-
ported Gen. Julu exacting brutal revenge on 
the residents of Nimba County throughout the 
latter half of the 1980s.117 
The Doe government also began purging those 
perceived to be aligned with Quiwonkpa. One 
statement giver recalled that “people were 
‘picked up’ by Doe’s men and imprisoned 
following accusations of treachery. In 1983, 
a friend of [mine] named Patrick Kennedy 
disappeared. His wife said that he had been 
taken in the middle of the night supposedly because he tried to launch a coup against the Krahn 
Government.”118 His body was never found.119 A statement giver from Nimba County who now lives 
in Minnesota noted that his father lost his job in the Doe administration after the split between 
Quiwonkpa and Doe.120 Another statement giver from Nimba County, who had been a close associate 
of Doe’s and had in fact been promoted by Doe, found himself under arrest in 1983 for alleged 
involvement in the coup plot.121 After spending a year in prison, he was released after being found not 
States Parties are to “prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the 
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality 
before the law” in the enjoyment of the “right to 
security of person and protection by the State 
against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted 
by government officials or by any individual group 
or institution.” Art. 5(b), International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
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guilty.122
1985 Elections and Coup Attempt
Under domestic and international pressure, Doe had agreed to return Liberia to civilian rule by 1985. 
Elections were scheduled for October 1985, but the PRC did not lift its ban on political activity until 
July 1984.123 In the run up to the election, political freedoms were curtailed despite the lifting of the 
ban. The government detained opposition leaders and banned popular political parties,124 leaving 
only the weaker parties to participate in the elections.125 Hefty registration fees further discouraged 
political parties from participating.126
One statement giver opined that Samuel K. Doe “took off 
his uniform, put on a suit and tie and decided to run.”127 
Doe’s main opponent, Jackson F. Doe,128 was a popular 
politician from Nimba County. Statement givers reiterated 
to the TRC what human rights groups have documented 
regarding the 1985 election results:129 that the elections 
were “unfair,”130 “rigged,”131 that “Doe forced himself 
into the presidency,”132 “declared himself the winner,”133 
and “Doe lost the election but stole it anyway.”134 
Statement givers detailed their belief that Doe and his 
partisans engaged in ballot stuffing,135 burning ballot 
boxes,136 replacing destroyed ballot boxes and ballots with 
new ones,137 and appointing cronies to recount the votes 
in Doe’s favor.138 Those who suggested the boxes were 
destroyed were arrested and beaten.139 One statement 
giver used the example of Sam Hill as evidence of election 
fraud that went beyond the presidential ballot. Sam Hill 
became speaker of the house without appearing on the 
original ballot or being nominated in the primary.140 The 
Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights described Doe’s vote rigging as “one of the most brazen 
electoral frauds in recent African history.”141 
Just after the election, on November 12, 1985, Quiwonkpa returned to Liberia from exile in the 
United States with the intention to overthrow Samuel K. Doe. Quiwonkpa had fled Liberia for the 
United States in 1983, after Doe demoted him and accused Quiwonkpa of plotting a coup. Reportedly, 
Quiwonkpa entered the country from Sierra Leone. Quiwonkpa and his supporters invaded Monrovia 
and seized the Barclay Training Center and two radio stations. Quiwonkpa’s broadcast promising free 
and fair elections was met by public elation.142 Monrovians began celebrating in the streets, singing, 
“Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and 
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the 
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of 
equality, to public service in his country.” 
Art. 25, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
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and stripping billboards of Doe.143 
The public response manifested the anti-Krahn sentiment that Doe’s regime had long fomented. 
Immediately after Quiwonkpa’s announcement:
People were jubilant and started to physically and verbally attack their Krahn 
neighbors. Shop owners were giving out free liquor, people were blowing 
their horns and giving the rooster sign, the symbol of the Liberian Action 
Party, the party of politicians Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Jackson Doe…
Quiwonkpa was considered the savior who had come to save the Liberian 
people from Doe and his Krahn people.144
One statement giver described the atmosphere in Gbarnga, a large city in Bong County about two 
hours’ drive from Monrovia: “things were tense, with mixed feelings of hope and fear. It was quiet 
in [Gbarnga]; people were just waiting. Quiwonkpa said that where Doe is, there is no escape for 
him. The rebels seemed to have the country under control. Then three to four hours later, Doe…
announced that the coup had failed.”145
Statement givers and secondary sources both report that Doe had advance warning of Quiwonkpa’s 
plans.146 Doe announced over the radio that he was still leading the government and that Liberians 
should “remain loyal.”147 Doe supporters quickly recaptured control of the country. Quiwonkpa was 
killed and his was corpse mutilated and paraded through the streets of Monrovia. 148 It was reported 
that Doe’s soldiers cut off parts of Quiwonkpa’s body and consumed it in an act of cannibalism.149 
A statement giver from Nimba County who worked in the National Security Agency at the time 
recalled that “Monrovia was silent” and that even though he worked in the government, “he was very 
scared.”150
Post-Election/Coup Repression
The coup attempt by Quiwonkpa led to a renewed cycle of revenge against Doe’s enemies. 
Anyone could randomly accuse a person of being a part of the coup and 
it would lead to death. The television stations filmed citizens celebrating 
the coup attempt and after Doe regained power, all persons who followed 
Quiwonkpa’s orders were killed, including police officers who thought they 
were just doing their jobs.151 
Another statement giver noted:
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People who had been videotaped while “jubilating” began to disappear 
– apparently soldiers would arrive in the middle of the night and take 
individuals from their homes while the rest of the family slept unaware, and 
the individuals were never heard from again. V.R., a friend of [mine] was 
tipped by a young boy about the “disappearances” and apparently knew that 
he had been observed “jubilating,” and fled to Côte d’Ivoire in 1985.152 
These reports of targeting those who had celebrated Doe’s overthrow were confirmed by Doe’s then 
press secretary:
[A]ll those tapes that the radio, television, private, public people…had 
taken during that eight-hour period, twelve-hour period [when people were 
celebrating], were brought to the mansion and Doe was playing those tapes, 
looking at them. That’s how people were arrested…the security attendants 
that were watching the tapes, they would say, oh, I know that person who is 
doing that…That’s how most people lost their jobs also.153
After Doe assumed the presidency, he retained virtually 
all of the decrees and practices that had restrained civil 
and political rights during the period of military rule. 
In 1986, however, Doe granted a general amnesty to 
all those suspected of participating in the 1985 coup. 
Life continued largely as it had before the 1985 election 
under Doe’s civilian leadership. Historians have noted 
that during the latter half of Doe’s regime, between 
1987 and 1988, “[a]buse of human rights and rampant 
corruption [became] characteristic of the regime.”154 
The government continued to detain people who voiced 
opposition. Many in the political opposition fled the 
country, if they were not already in prison. 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia’s first elected post-war president, was detained by the Doe government 
on two occasions, shortly after the attempted coup and approximately a year later.155 She described 
her experiences in detention to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, noting that “When you 
are in jail…you live with the fear that anything can happen to you at any time, by anybody, without 
any recourse. So many terrible things have happened to so many people, you know they can happen 
to you.”156
The human rights violations perpetrated by the PRC military government and by Doe’s civilian 
“Each State Party shall ensure in its 
legal system that the victim of an act 
of torture obtains redress and has an 
enforceable right to fair and adequate 
compensation, including the means for 
as full rehabilitation as possible. In the 
event of the death of the victim as a result 
of an act of torture, his dependants shall 
be entitled to compensation.” Art. 14(1), 
Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 
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government were another step on Liberia’s path to civil war. The culture of brutality and impunity, as 
well as the increasing ethnic conflict, was a harbinger of the crisis to come.
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Chapter Six. 
Tactics and Fighting Factions during the Liberian Civil War
comBatantS and fighting forceS
Liberians who filled the ranks of combatants during the conflict came from many different tribal 
groups and were from different sectors in society. While some fighters were educated or wealthy 
(particularly those in leadership roles), many others were less privileged and illiterate.1 Although 
most combatants were men or boys, rebel groups also contained women and girls who fought in the 
conflict.2 Combatants ranged in age, from small children to middle-aged adults. This section presents 
a discussion of the combatants – who they were, why they fought, their lifestyle, and tactics. 
Statement givers did not always clearly 
identify the groups to which combatants 
belonged. For example, many statements 
refer generally to fighters as “rebels,” 
referring to non-government fighting 
forces, or “soldiers,” referring to the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) or other 
government forces. The delineation 
between rebel and soldier is not always 
clear, and some statements referred to 
Doe and Taylor’s government soldiers 
and security forces as “rebels.” The 
attackers’ affiliation often was unclear for 
a number of reasons, such as the lack of consistent identifiers or the surrounding chaos. In many 
cases, the witnesses did not know their attackers’ names. A statement giver summarized, “I would 
remember their faces, I had seen them before, but I do not know any of their names.”3 One victim’s 
statement aptly portrays the confusion over combatants’ identities:
I think he may have been killed by ULIMO or NPFL fighters, but am 
unsure. There were two pickup trucks full of fighters wearing bandanas. 
Some were wearing t-shirts and others were shirtless…I remember that they 
had big guns on their chests.4 
Even combatants found it difficult to determine to which groups other combatants belonged. One 
ULIMO fighter observed that, although their goal was to fight the NPFL, “on the battlefield, things 
go different.”5 When fighting, he noted, it was difficult to identify with which group fighters were 
aligned.6 ULIMO combatants found themselves in armed confrontation with the government army, 
other armed forces, and civilians.7 
Although the commission of certain abuses was reported to be more prevalent among specific factions, 
Fighting forces during the Liberian conflict were known by 
their acronyms, and statement givers referred to them as 
such. These are the most commonly mentioned forces:
AFL – Armed Forces of Liberia
INPFL – Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LDF – Lofa Defense Force
LPC – Liberia Peace Council
LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL – Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ULIMO – United Liberation Movement
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all groups committed human rights violations. Where possible, this chapter identifies which armed 
groups statement givers identified as being responsible for the violations. 
Reasons for Joining a Fighting Force
I was recruited into fighting in 1996…I decided not to hold [a] gun 
throughout my life, but because I was forced to do so by the Mandingo 
who was always attacking Bomi [and] killed all of my family: mother, father, 
sister and brother. My first battle…we were attacked by ULIMO-K, and they 
even killed one of my best friends by the name of V. In that battle it was 
my first time to kill a human being, and from there on I became a killer…I 
killed a lot of people/soldiers which up to today I regret. The only reason is 
that I was forced and under the influence of drugs. Money and holding a gun 
give[s] to you…the advantage…8
Combatants joined the conflict for many reasons. The potential to gain power and wealth may have 
motivated some warlords and faction leaders. Combatants of lower rank often joined for similar 
reasons: either to share in the power held by their faction leaders or to partake in the wealth to be 
gained from looting.9 One statement giver stated he believed soldiers fought because they were given 
promises of land.10 Some chose to join a faction out of loyalty to an ideology.11 
The grouping of factions along ethnic lines indicates some combatants were motivated, at least in part, 
by strong loyalty to their own tribes and hostility against the tribes identified with enemy factions. 
Such hostility, in turn, may have been based on a desire for revenge for past wrongs, either on a 
national scale, such as the targeting of Krahns in retaliation for the abuses Samuel Doe committed, 
or on a more personal level. Most Liberians sustained losses of family, friends, property, or personal 
well-being during the conflict. Some combatants appear to have joined the fighting forces for power 
and retribution against those who had harmed them.12 
The practices of the Doe government particularly fomented resentment among those persecuted. 
One statement giver stated that Doe’s “scorched earth” response to the attempted 1985 coup and 
subsequent rebel incursions in Nimba County displaced and incensed many civilians. He explained:
As the wave of refugees grew, they saw their family members being tied 
up and burned; the anger was so high, they were ripe for recruitment. 
This is how [Taylor] built his base from Nimba and eventually overran the 
government.13
Others may have joined or remained in the conflict to obtain drugs, which some faction commanders 
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reportedly distributed to their troops freely.14 The drugs made them dependent on their commanders 
and had the effect of making them feel invulnerable on the battlefield. One combatant stated that 
Charles Taylor provided regular shipments of cocaine to NPFL fighters on the battlefront.15 The 
statement giver said the drugs were his “food.”16 He said if he went into battle scared he would not 
survive, but if he was on cocaine and a bullet hit him he would not feel it.17 He said after smoking one 
or two grams of cocaine he was “unstoppable.”18 
For some combatants, joining a fighting force was not a voluntary decision. Many were abducted, 
detained, and forced to participate.19 One such combatant told a story that reflects the experience of 
many other fighters. He stated he was abducted by the rebel commander who had killed his parents, 
and he was forced to fight for the NPFL for 11 years.20 The General forced him to take up a gun and 
asked him “to choose between life and death.” He felt he had no other option.21 Another combatant 
described how the INPFL forcibly recruited him:
I met up with INPFL, and I was conscripted and taken to Caldwell Base. 
Conscripted – put in a car, thought I would be killed; forced to fight and 
loot.22
Many combatants viewed joining the conflict as a means of survival. Food was scarce, and civilians 
without weapons were victimized by all sides. Joining a rebel group was seen by some as the only path 
to self-defense or to obtain basic necessities.23 
A former combatant who gave his statement explained he had joined a fighting force after both of 
his parents were killed and their murderers abducted him. He had no family left to support him, 
so he began following the orders of his 
commander. He stated that he would see 
his fellow combatants “doing things and 
knew they could do it to me. So I had to 
protect myself. So I had to do the same 
things so they knew…I did what I had to 
do to survive.”24
Child soldiers were heavily used in the 
Liberian conflict.25 There were a variety 
of reasons for child soldiers’ association 
with warring factions.26 Many were 
forcibly conscripted. Some child soldiers 
lacked family or friends to care for them, 
leading them to become involved in a 
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faction for companionship and protection.27 Some had families too poor to feed them.28 Some lived 
in places beset by warring factions and became involved to protect their families.29 Others came from 
families that had experienced factional violence and participated to seek revenge.30
Uniforms, Costumes and Body Markings
Combatants from the various factions wore a wide range of traditional and informal uniforms and 
used them for apparently different purposes. As is the case in most military conflicts, uniforms helped 
identify combatants to the public and each other as members of one or another organized faction. For 
example, military fatigues and boots frequently identified the wearer with the government and denoted 
membership in Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or the 
AFL.31 
The use of uniforms was not exclusive to the government, however, and Prince Johnson’s men also 
were reported to have worn uniforms to appear more legitimate.32 This use of uniforms at times led 
others to mistake INPFL rebels for Doe’s troops.33 Many statement givers associated combatants 
wearing jeans, red T-shirts, and red head-bands with the NPFL.34 One statement giver said he was 
attacked by NPFL fighters “wearing uniforms of black overalls.”35 Others identified their attackers as 
wearing blue or black T-shirts, or white T-shirts with pictures of Charles Taylor, skulls, or scorpions 
on them.36
Also, certain factions identified themselves by markings or tattoos on their skin. Such symbols enabled 
them to prove membership in a particular group if ever questioned by another combatant on the same 
side. For example, members of Prince Johnson’s INPFL were reported to have scorpion tattoos on 
their arms.37 
Sometimes combatants used costumes to conceal their identity or instill them with magical protections. 
Some statement givers said rebels wore camouflage paint or wigs during attacks.38 Others stated 
they were attacked by perpetrators wearing traditional masks.39 Because masks in traditional Liberian 
religions carry with them great spiritual power, the use of masks served both to frighten the victims 
and to prevent them from later identifying their attackers.
Other costumes worn by combatants may have been used either to convey power or to frighten and 
subdue people. For example, scorpions, symbolizing poison, could be found on t-shirts of fighters.40 
One statement giver reported he saw rebels wearing necklaces made of bones.41 Other male fighters 
wore dresses, women’s hair ornaments, leaves on their heads, women’s underwear, or pajamas.42 One 
statement giver witnessed INPFL rebels wearing ladies’ hair ornaments and chains with bones around 
their necks.43 Another statement giver said Liberia Peace Council (LPC) fighters attacked his village 
wearing wigs or dreadlocks and “[o]ne ear removed.”44 Fighters in Joshua Blahyi’s Butt Naked Brigade 
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went into battle wearing nothing at all.45
Monikers
The monikers adopted by some combatants played a prominent role in the Liberian conflict. The 
many striking war names combatants gave themselves include General Red,46 General Mosquito,47 
Rebel King,48 Gio Devil,49 Deadbody Trouble,50 Commander Tiger,51 Jack the Rebel,52 General Death, 
General Kill-The-Bitch, General Peanut Butter,53 Super Killer,54 General Eat Your Heart Out,55 and 
General Butt Naked.56 Some monikers, including “General Rambo”57 and “Chuck Norris,” reflect the 
strong influence on combatants of violence in Hollywood movies.58 
Some monikers’ negative and violent connotations suggest combatants adopted them in part to 
convey power and strength to their enemies and to create fear in the civilian population. Monikers 
also appear to have denoted rank within rebel factions, with group leaders using the term “Colonel” 
and high-ranking officers using the term “General.” Monikers may have functioned as an initiation. 
By designating new members with special monikers, group leaders communicated acceptance into the 
group and established a wedge between initiates and their former identities as non-combatants. The 
use of monikers also makes it difficult to identify combatants. For example, statement givers indicated 
that more than one commander used the name “General Rambo” and that many child soldiers were 
called “Small Soldier.”59 A civilian attacked by a rebel known only as “General Rambo” or “Small 
Soldier” would have more difficulty identifying the perpetrator of the crimes against him.
Reasons for Perpetrating Atrocities 
Upon joining a group of fighters, combatants were indoctrinated into a culture of violence. Statements 
show that various reasons motivated combatants to commit human rights violations, including 
material gain, strategy, peer pressure, and revenge. Other times, the reason was simply that the civilian 
population served as the battleground. The extreme climate of violence also caused some fighters to 
turn on their own families. One statement giver reported that a relative who had joined the NPFL 
shot and killed his mother when she tried to talk him out of working with Charles Taylor.60 
The range of training proffers another potential explanation for the commission of atrocities. Some 
child soldiers described being handed guns and sent to the front lines with little to no training at all.61 
Other accounts indicate that at least some combatants received extensive formal training. One former 
INPFL combatant described his training to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): 
Under the command of [Commander P.], I was in a group of 16-17. We were 
taught how to attack, how to kill, how to fight, retreat and advance; taught 
how to dismantle, assemble and shoot guns.62
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Statement givers noted the rewards of using violence against civilians. A former NPFL combatant 
said combatants were rewarded with food, cars, and drugs based on the amount of killing they did.63 
Another NPFL combatant explained that he killed anyone who refused to let him take their things: 
“If I saw you with anything and I wanted it, and you refused to give it to me, you would die. I would 
kill you.”64 
Statements show that violence against civilians occurred for tactical reasons. A former NPFL 
combatant stated he felt compelled to kill any civilians he may have mistreated during combat, to 
prevent them from joining the enemy. For this reason, he said he would “[n]ever wound anybody and 
let them go.”65 He also stated: 
Sometimes when civilians were killed on the line it was because we know 
what they can do to us. They can give the location of the soldiers…If a baby 
is crying, you have to kill the baby…If the baby cries, the enemy will hear 
you.66
Pressure from others to appear strong or climb the ranks served as another incentive to commit 
abuses. For example, one NPFL combatant said he took things from civilians only because he did not 
want to be perceived by other combatants as “a weak person.”67 Another former NPFL combatant 
stated: 
The first thing I learned in my whole life was to press the trigger…The more 
you press the trigger [the more] they promote you…The more you killed, 
Taylor would give you more food, a car…He gave you free drugs, cocaine.68
Revenge motivated many atrocities, according to both perpetrators and victims. Many statement 
givers gave accounts of their families being targeted by combatants for personal reasons that had 
little to do with the conflict itself.69 They said the combatants sought revenge because of pre-conflict 
disputes over lost employment,70 land ownership,71 a failed lawsuit,72 or even romantic rejection.73 
Many civilians were targeted in retaliation for acts perpetrated by their relatives. A former NPFL 
combatant said in his statement, “[i]f I watched you kill my brother I have to kill your brother too. 
You see we can never be friends.”74
Although numerous accounts exist of faction leaders and commanders purposefully targeting civilian 
groups, the killing of civilians was not always promoted or even tolerated. Some statements mentioned 
disciplinary action taken by superiors for the commission of atrocities. In those instances where 
leaders took disciplinary action against their troops, their response often matched the brutality of the 
behavior being punished. Statements indicate the line between discipline and brutal punishment was 
indistinct for both Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor. One statement giver stated Prince Johnson 
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would sometimes execute his own soldiers as punishment for killing innocent civilians.75 The same 
statement giver disclosed witnessing Prince Johnson kill an INPFL soldier in charge of distributing 
rice to civilians where the soldier sought to exchange rice for information. He said that Prince Johnson 
heard the soldier was selling the rice for profit, so he reportedly shot him.76 Prince Johnson also 
reportedly killed his own soldiers for “wasting his ammunition” on civilians.77 Statements reveal that 
Taylor was similarly harsh in meting out punishments. A former NPFL combatant alleged that Taylor 
would intentionally send fighters to 
the front to be killed if he wanted to 
get rid of them.78 Another statement 
giver described a group of NPFL 
fighters who ripped fetuses out 
of pregnant women’s bellies and 
“killed anyone they saw.”79 Because 
these rebels were particularly out 
of control, Taylor ordered his other 
men to kill them.80 
Some statement givers attributed 
their survival to the kindness of 
combatants who helped them.81 
Several statement givers stated they 
were spared torture or execution by rebels who recognized them and convinced their comrades not 
to harm them.82 Others managed to escape conflict zones only because combatants carried them to 
safety.83 There are also several accounts of combatants releasing civilians from unwarranted detention 
in their own compounds.84 One statement giver described being rescued by a combatant who secured 
his release by pretending to kill him:
[T]he boy told me to get up and came and took me to the bush where he 
fire[d] his gun two times at an object and told me to run from there and not 
to let them catch me again. “You are too good, I cannot kill you, so go.” 
That’s how I escaped then and decided to come to exile.85
Many times, victims were spared or helped because of a previous connection to one of the combatants. 
Just as familial connections could precipitate violent acts of revenge, such connections could also save 
one’s life. These connections, however, often depended on random luck as to who was on duty, where, 
and when. One statement giver described how rebels stuck an AK-47 in her son’s mouth.86 Before 
they could pull the trigger, a female soldier ordered, “[D]o not touch him.”87 The statement giver had 
formerly taught the female soldier typewriting.88 Another statement giver described how a ULIMO-K 
combatant saved her because he knew the woman accompanying her: 
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We were on the road and some rebels stopped us. These were Alhaji 
Kromah’s men [ULIMO-K]. One of the men killed the woman. Another 
ULIMO[-K] man yelled, “Why did you kill her!?” He said she was a good 
woman he knew because she used to sell in his community. He asked me if I 
was her daughter, and I said yes. He helped put me on the road to a village.89
Another statement giver described how an NPFL rebel helped her. He brought rice for her and the 
others staying at the compound after she told him they had no food.90 He gained their trust and helped 
the statement giver and her brother flee Monrovia:
[H]e was going to come back one more time, but after that the fighting 
would get bad and he wouldn’t be able to help me find my mother. He went 
back to Kakata and when he came back, he brought me something that 
belonged to my mother. So I agreed that my brother and I would go with 
him out of Monrovia. We made it all the way to Kakata, where we were 
stopped at a “very bad” NPFL checkpoint. The big man at the checkpoint 
said to the [fighter], “You’re frisky.” He responded, “I’m doing business. I’m 
supposed to carry these kids.” The [fighter] wouldn’t pay any money, so we 
were seized.91
Later that night, the fighter returned with more high-level rebels to demand their release.92 He then 
took the statement giver and her brother to their mother.93 The combatants who engaged in such 
acts of kindness often did so at great personal risk. Combatants who returned to their factions after 
rescuing people risked punishment if their actions were discovered. In some cases, combatants were 
tortured and killed by their own commanders as punishment for helping others.94
communicationS and information gathering
Fighting forces’ methods of gathering intelligence and controlling the flow of information played an 
important role in the conflict. Some of the tactics combatants used to control communications plainly 
and directly violated international humanitarian law. Such tactics include the torturing of civilians for 
confessions or information,95 holding family members hostage to force people to come out of hiding,96 
and killing people to prevent them from sharing intelligence.97 
Interrogations, accompanied by violence and humiliation, were frequently reported in statements. 
One statement giver summarized how NPFL rebels arrested and questioned him about his family, 
who were Krahns associated with the Doe government: 
I was forced to strip down to my underpants and was tortured because I 
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would not give information about my family. The rebels made me walk 
around while hitting [me] in the head with the butts of their guns. Next, 
they put me in a car and started driving on the highway before I was pushed 
from the car wearing only my underpants.98
Some statement givers described the 
use of spies and informants embedded 
with the opposition.99 There are nu-
merous reports of “blacklists” being 
used among rebel groups to com-
municate the identity of targets.100 
Many people were specifically tar-
geted by combatants based on their 
past affiliations or old disputes. Some 
faction leaders reportedly named 
these individuals on lists that were 
circulated throughout the country.101 
Blacklisted people would be pulled 
out of line if identified at a checkpoint 
or hunted by combatants using other 
information-gathering techniques. 
Liberia’s small size and the interconnectedness of Liberian society meant that blacklisted individuals 
ran a substantial risk of recognition. Perpetrators and their victims often knew each other as old 
schoolmates, neighbors, or co-workers. As one statement giver said, “[p]eople who had grown up 
together were suddenly turning on each other and it was hard to believe.”102 Thus, perpetrators often 
could find their targets through simple word-of-mouth, by talking to the targets’ neighbors, co-
workers, and associates, or by going door-to-door to find them.103 
Some perpetrators used deceptive communications to find their targets. Statement givers reported 
that combatants sometimes tricked people into coming out of hiding by sending other civilians to tell 
them the combatants wanted to meet peacefully or give out rations. One statement giver summarized 
how rebels deceived people in his town in 1990:
The rebels arrested some people in the town and let some of them go to 
bring more people back into the town from the bush. The rebels said they 
were going to hold a meeting, in an attempt to draw everyone back into 
town. When people came, the rebels tied everyone up. After it was all over, 
the rebels killed at least 50 of the town people.104
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Combatants used other methods to communicate with each other. One statement giver reported that, 
after a firefight between the NPFL and ULIMO-J in his Monrovia neighborhood, he returned to 
find all the homes marked with flags from one faction or the other, indicating that a faction claimed 
control over the civilians’ homes they had marked.105 Another statement giver stated that, after rebels 
had raided his village, they put red marks on all the homes they had looted so that other rebels could 
see they had already been there.106 A third statement giver explained that ULIMO-K used white cloths 
to communicate. He stated, “[i]f they tied a white cloth on your door, it meant purity.”107
Faction leaders and combatants also used a variety of communication tactics to frighten and to control 
the civilian population. Statement givers reported that rebel groups would sometimes chant or sing 
violent songs. The singing communicated messages of fear to anyone within earshot and also may 
have helped identify troops from the same faction to each other.108 One statement giver spoke of how 
his family awoke one morning to the distant sound of singing by NPFL rebels:
In the morning in our house, my mother, father, and sister and 2-month-
old baby and my brother heard people singing. My father woke us up and 
said, “Listen. Something is going on.” Our dog was barking. We heard this: 
“Anyone who says No More Taylor, we treat you like dogs.” The singing 
came closer. My father went to his room. We heard a loud pop, and the dog 
stopped barking. We heard footsteps around the house. They knocked on 
the door and said, “Open the damn door,” and used profane language. They 
burst into the house…109
The rebels killed the family dog, then invaded the home, and slaughtered the statement giver’s family.110 
Only the statement giver and his brother escaped.111 
Other perpetrators used communication to intimidate people from afar. Rebel groups reportedly sent 
civilian messengers ahead of them to warn villagers of their approach. Sometimes such messengers 
were charged with telling villagers that a rebel faction would arrive at a particular day and time to 
collect all of their money, animals, and food. One statement giver summarized how NPFL rebels 
forced him to pass a message to his village:
[T]hey gave me a message to transmit to the town. I was to tell all the 
townspeople that the rebels would arrive on a certain day and hour – the 
townspeople were to collect up all their animals, money, and food so that 
it could be given to the rebels. They told me to deliver the message or they 
would hunt me down and kill me.112 
On the exact date and time in the message, the rebels arrived in his town.113 In this fashion, combatants 
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could intimidate entire communities without even being present.
manipulation of the media
Faction commanders and other forces used the media as a means of influencing the population and 
gaining power in the conflict. Scholars have explained that various factions vying for control of 
Liberia targeted the international media because they understood that “the international media [was] 
a tool that they could use to benefit their aims.”114 One scholar, William Reno, has noted, however, 
that “the effect of the international media’s reporting was probably minimal enough that it [did not] 
fundamentally change events in the course of the war.”115 
There were reports of ECOMOG restricting freedom of the press and censorship throughout the 
first civil war.116 The peacekeeping force included a Military Public Information Officer, who was 
responsible for determining what information the press was allowed to relay and which politically or 
militarily sensitive events the media was permitted to report on.117 According to an interviewee and 
a statement giver, journalists who did not report in a way ECOMOG deemed appropriate were often 
arrested or beaten.118 
A journalist who gave his statement told the TRC that Prince Johnson had forcibly conscripted him 
to write a propaganda-laced newspaper called the “Scorpion.” He described how, after he had printed 
an article about several killings in which Prince Johnson was said to have participated, Johnson tried 
to suppress the story by burning all of the newspapers. When the story leaked out anyway, Johnson 
came looking for the statement giver at his office, but he had already fled.119 
Charles Taylor reportedly was particularly adept at controlling the media and using it as a means of 
gaining public approval. Elizabeth Blunt, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) West Africa 
correspondent from 1986 to 1990 and in 1997, explained that “Taylor was by far the most media savvy 
person around in the country [in about 1990].”120 Early in the conflict, “[n]one of [the other factions 
was] very actively using the media. [Reporters] had to go to them and some [factions] would talk more 
freely than others, but the one person who came to us was Taylor.”121 
Liberian journalists who gave statements commented that Taylor used the media as a means of 
spreading propaganda.122 One Liberian journalist told the TRC that Taylor had used the BBC’s “Focus 
on Africa” to advertise AFL retribution against civilians after the December 1989 invasion.123 Civilians 
angered by the reports responded by joining Taylor’s ranks in large numbers.124 Taylor reportedly also 
used the BBC “to regularly blast the international airwaves with stories of overwhelming NPFL 
battlefield success…Taylor’s regular BBC interviews helped to accelerate the AFL’s demoralization 
and intensify public panic.”125 Robin White, editor of the BBC’s popular Focus on Africa segment, 
contests the assertion that the BBC was used as a tool of war by Taylor. White told the TRC that the 
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BBC was careful not to broadcast direct threats by the warring factions. “We did not let anybody on 
air who would issue a threat. We would not let that go out. You know people would come along and 
say ‘let me advise the people of Monrovia to flee because we are coming right there tomorrow and 
going to kill them all.’ You know we would not put that on under any circumstances.”126 
The media coverage boosted the notoriety of the NPFL and, according to one scholar, the resulting 
increase in popularity translated into large recruiting gains during Taylor’s campaign through the 
hinterland towards Monrovia.127 In addition, a statement giver described how Taylor’s forces exploited 
radio broadcasts by leaking false stories about planned NPFL attacks on villages. Upon hearing the 
broadcast, the villagers would flee, allowing Taylor’s forces to enter empty villages unopposed.128 
According to journalist statement givers, Taylor also used radio interviews to expand the reach of his 
propaganda to areas that he could not reach on transmitters under his control.129 Additionally, one 
statement giver suggested that Taylor planted coded instructions for his troops into material sent to 
the BBC for his soldiers.130 
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Chapter Seven. Liberia’s First Civil War, 1989-1997
npfl invaSion: decemBer 24, 1989
On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in an 
invasion of Liberia, thus beginning a civil war that would last more than seven years. After experiencing 
a decade of Doe’s military regime and the failure of the 1985 elections to create real change, many 
Liberians supported Taylor’s plan to oust Doe.1 The brutality that followed the 1985 attempted coup, 
however, foreshadowed the civil unrest that would accompany Doe’s ouster.2 One statement giver 
described his realization that a Taylor regime would not seek change for the greater public good, but 
merely perpetuate yet another despot’s self-interest:
That day we witnessed someone who was begging for his life on his knees. 
Three rebels pushed him to the edge of the bush and then opened fire on 
him. That was what turned me against Charles Taylor, because I realized he 
was not about fighting for us.3
The first civil war unleashed a torrent of egregious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. Fighting forces engaged in exceptional brutality against combatants and civilians 
alike. Deliberate targeting of and disregard for civilians were widespread and included the staging 
of battles in highly populated areas, attacks 
on unarmed civilians, widespread rape and 
sexual violence, hostage-taking and similar 
tactics designed to terrorize the population, 
interruption of food supplies to civilians, 
looting, and extremely brutal violence. 
These atrocities resulted in massive 
numbers of internally displaced people 
and refugees and in tremendous suffering 
by virtually all Liberians who remained 
within the country. One statement giver 
summarized, “I observed and heard a 
rebel say ‘I want to see blood.’ He took a 
man, cut his throat and then pulled out his 
intestine and stretched it like a gate and 
then cut off his head and put it on a tree.”4
The extreme violence that characterized 
the conflict was not the result of isolated 
incidents involving a few rogue fighters. 
Rather, these were deliberately brutal 
Human rights and humanitarian law violations 
reported during Liberia’s First Civil War:
Violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being
Collective punishments
Taking of hostages
Outrages upon personal dignity
Enslavement
Acts of terrorism
Forced displacement
Looting and pillaging
Summary executions
Threats
Attacks against civilians 
Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and medical 
personnel
Violation of the right to security of person
Forced labor
Extermination
Persecution against any identifiable group
Freedom of movement
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methods condoned, encouraged, or even directed by the faction leaders. Taylor reportedly told one 
statement giver’s brother, “this was a war, and that the boys are trained to kill, even if they killed his 
mother.”5 A former combatant stated that Taylor would use media broadcasts to instruct the rebels, 
“everybody loot, take anything you see.”6 Coupled with the poor training and lack of discipline among 
fighters,7 such direction encouraged a culture of unchecked violence. 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Abuses in Greater Liberia 
In the few months following the 1989 invasion, the NPFL fought its way from Nimba County to 
the Port of Buchanan, thus bisecting the country.8 With the Doe government-controlled northwest 
and southeast unable to coordinate, Charles Taylor was quickly able to take over the majority of the 
country,9 with the exception of Monrovia. By April 1990, 90 
percent of Liberia was under NPFL control.10 This territory, 
known as Greater Liberia, remained primarily under NPFL 
rule for most of the first civil war. Taylor governed Greater 
Liberia from the town of Gbarnga.11 
The period from the initial invasion in December 1989, until 
a peacekeeping force was deployed in August 1990 marked 
an intense episode of fighting, killings, and other human 
rights violations.12 During this time, both rebel factions 
and government forces were responsible for the deaths of 
thousands of civilians.13 As Taylor’s NPFL sought to gain 
control over territory and the Doe government sought to 
repress it, civilians became both the collateral damage and 
intended targets of opposing forces. 
Forced Displacement
Those living within Greater Liberia, particularly Nimba County, experienced particularly intense 
fighting and hardship as the NPFL pushed forward its offensive. The insurgency resulted in massive 
displacement, and it is estimated that approximately half of Liberia’s population was displaced in 
1990.14 While in many cases Liberians fled to escape the fighting, in other cases they fled after their 
family members had been killed and homes destroyed.15 A statement giver living in Grand Gedeh 
described how she and her brother’s family fled after rebels attacked them in 1990:
My sister-in-law was pregnant at the time and the rebels cut her open to see 
the sex of the baby…At the time of the fighting after my sister-in-law was 
killed, I was beat and hit on the back of the head – knocked unconscious. 
“Persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors 
de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall 
in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria.” Art. 
3(1), Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War.
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My brother went missing at that time. I have not heard from him since that 
day – 18 years ago. My brother had two kids, and I recall one of the kids 
was shot in the head…My Aunt’s son (cousin) was an adult and killed by the 
rebels. Everyone ran for their lives at this time and went to Côte d’Ivoire.16 
In some cases, rebels used forced displacement as a technique to clear the area for their occupation. 
Statements reveal how combatants displaced entire villages by forcing residents to march long 
distances from home.17 One statement giver described how Taylor’s rebels captured his hometown in 
1991 and forced one hundred men to walk all night from Tubmanburg to Kakata, a distance of nearly 
40 miles.18 Another statement giver summarized his experience: 
[NPFL] rebels [took] me to the Catholic church in Plibo along with 
approximately fifty to one hundred other people, including some friends of 
mine. After I was taken to the church, the rebels burned my house down. 
They also burned a number of other houses within Plibo. The rebel soldiers 
forced the people taken to the Catholic Church in Plibo, who were essentially 
prisoners (and were not free to leave), to walk to Mmalu, another village in 
Plibo district, approximately 18-20 miles from Plibo. It took us about two 
days to walk to Mmalu. The rebel soldiers walked behind us, but did not 
mistreat us.19
Food as a Weapon of War
The NPFL offensive resulted in food shortage, particularly in the early years of the war.20 The 
insurgency drove farmers off their lands, leaving some crops in the ground and other fields unplanted.21 
One statement giver described how Taylor forced people to join the conflict by threatening to cut off 
food supplies if they did not participate.22 He stated that Taylor told a group of displaced people 
that, if they joined him, they would “get food; if not, no food.”23 Another statement giver stated that 
child soldiers refused to let them harvest food because of their belief that the villagers, especially 
older women, would turn into feline spirits at night and harm the rebels.24 Water deprivation was 
“1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict 
unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such 
displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian 
population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition. 
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.” 
Art. 17, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol II.
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another significant concern.25 Some statements 
indicate that lack of food and water was not 
merely a side effect, but a deliberate tactic used to 
kill people through such deprivation.26 Statements 
revealed accounts of combatants contaminating 
water supplies by throwing corpses into wells or 
streams.27 The shortages that ensued drove more 
people to become refugees. The combination of 
forced displacement and scarcity of food and water 
resulted in thousands of deaths from malnutrition 
and sickness.28 
Widespread Looting
Rebel factions did not have central supplies and so pillaged basic necessities for sustenance.29 A 
statement giver reported that fighters regularly participated in organized raids against civilians called 
“food attacks” or “clothes attacks” whenever they found their supplies were getting low.30 Charles 
Taylor reportedly not only tolerated such conduct but even encouraged his troops to engage in it.31 A 
former soldier who fought for the NPFL in the early years of the war summarized:
Food was scarce, so the NPFL orders were to collect rice and meat from 
villages they captured. Those protesting the taking of their property were 
killed or otherwise harmed. Usually, we would raid a village and ask the 
chief for food. If he said no, we would tie the chief up.32 
Civilians unable to provide food for rebels often faced brutal consequences. One statement giver 
described the death of his brother after rebels demanded livestock from him in 1990:
When the NPFL forces arrived in the village, they asked him to provide 
them with cows, goats, and sheep. He could not provide what was demanded 
of him. He was killed because he could not provide what the NPFL rebels 
wanted.33
The pillaging and extortions were representative of 
the pervasive lack of discipline among rebels. Rebels 
did not restrict themselves to basic necessities. One 
statement giver stated that the rebels would “steal any 
and everything they could get their hands on inside 
of the homes,” even taking her wedding albums.34 
“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat 
is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless for 
that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population such as food-
stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water 
installations and supplies and irrigation works.” 
Art. 14, Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts.
Pillage and threats to commit pillage are 
prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever” during non-international armed 
conflicts. Art. 4(2)(g)-(h), Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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Another statement giver described the full extent to which NPFL rebels pillaged:
Rebels attacked the village, ransacking houses, killing village people, stealing 
property and then setting light to the houses. I was a trained midwife: the 
rebels even took my medical equipment and supplies…As my house had 
been destroyed, my family was forced to live in one room of the house. I 
was left with nothing: my house was burned; my possessions stolen; and my 
crops were burned.35
Several statement givers described how rebels abducted 
them or a family member in exchange for ransom.36 One 
statement giver described how Taylor’s rebels abducted 
her stepfather, forcing the family to pay $10,000 for his 
return.37 Another statement giver described how NPFL 
rebels accused him of being on a reconnaissance mission 
when he was actually just foraging for food.38 The rebels 
kept him in a jail in Seclepea until his father paid $1,500 
Liberian dollars for his release.39 
Restrictions on Movement
The NPFL subjected residents of Greater Liberia to a myriad of restrictions on their movement and 
privacy during the first few years of the war.40 Travel restrictions and checkpoints were prevalent 
in NPFL territory. NPFL fighters enjoyed wide freedom of movement and could visit Monrovia;41 
civilians, by contrast, needed to obtain a pass from G-2 (Taylor’s intelligence and administrative 
center) to travel within NPFL territory.42 One statement giver described how dangerous it was to 
travel for both men and women.43 A rebel group would draft a man into combat or kill him; women 
would be at risk of attack and rape when 
they ventured out alone or with children to 
find food and firewood.44 
Checkpoints provided combatants a means 
to target, extort, abuse, and terrorize 
individuals.45 Many people reported that 
rebels demanded their clothes, food, 
money, other property, or certain behavior 
at border crossings and checkpoints as the 
“price” of gaining passage without harm. 
One statement giver described a checkpoint 
The “taking of hostages” and threats 
thereof are prohibited “at any time and 
in any place whatsoever” during non-
international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)
(c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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where there was “a wall running with blood.” She said people coming through the checkpoint were 
ordered to drink from the pool of blood, and “if you don’t drink the blood, they kill you.”46 
Even outside of checkpoints, people were still at risk while moving through the countryside. Another 
statement giver described how NPFL rebels intercepted her and her family en route to Côte d’Ivoire.47 
The rebels forced her to watch as they cut off her husband’s ears, then forced him to eat them before 
killing him.48 
Targeting Civilian Populations
In addition to hardship and displacement, the warfare 
resulted in massive civilian fatalities. Although civilians 
were sometimes caught in random crossfire between the 
factions,49 civilians often were the victims of deliberate, 
targeted killing based on their ethnicity or perceived 
support for a faction or the government.50 The Doe 
government targeted residents of Nimba County, par-
ticularly the Mano and Gio for their rebel support.51 In 
turn, the rebel factions targeted Doe supporters, many 
of whom were Krahn and Mandingo.52 While ethnic 
affiliation had been used to discriminate or favor during 
Americo-Liberian rule, it now served as the basis to kill, 
torture, rape, or otherwise punish people.53 
Targeting NDPL Affiliation
The NPFL’s intentions to target specific groups became apparent early in the conflict. A statement 
giver described the NPFL’s targeting in Greater Liberia a few months after the 1989 invasion: 
NPFL rebels occupied Bong Mines between February and March 1990. 
They targeted Krahns, Mandingos, and members/officials of the Samuel 
K. Doe government. A group of NPFL rebels entered the home of our next 
door neighbor and pulled him from behind the wardrobe where he was 
hiding. He was taken outside and shot dead. The victim was M.Q. He was 
the first Krahn man that was killed in our part of the concession area.54
“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of 
movement...” Art. 12(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Violence to life and to person, hostage-
taking, outrages upon personal dignity, 
and extrajudicial executions carried out 
against “persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities” are prohibited at all times 
and places. Such protected persons are 
to be treated humanely “without any 
adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria.” 
Art. 3(1), Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.
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Many statement givers reported that NPFL rebels targeted them because of their past or present 
employment in either the Doe administration or the Tolbert administration.55 Others stated the rebels 
targeted them because of their membership in the NDPL, Doe’s political party.56 A person’s affiliation 
with a group need not have been close for perpetrators to target him or her. Individuals who had long 
ended their employment with the government appear to have been targeted as aggressively as current 
employees. One statement giver described such a targeted attack: 
A cousin of my father was branded as the one who initiated President Doe 
into the Poro Society Fraternity. Because of this, he was skinned alive by the 
rebels. They did not kill him first. They began by cutting his face and then 
peeled away his skin. By the time they got to his knees, he just died. His 
crime was his association with the president.57 
Some statement givers suggested that even having an education or good employment could render 
one susceptible to NPFL targeting.58
Targeting Ethnic and Tribal Groups
Rebels frequently targeted people of the Mandingo ethnicity. Reasons for targeting Mandingos varied 
and included the misperception that Mandingos were “foreigners,” had too much wealth, or were too 
closely associated with the Doe government.59 Membership in a particular ethnic group superseded 
nationality, and the NPFL targeted Guineans and Malian Mandingos.60 One Mandingo statement 
giver summarized his and his family’s experience at the hands of NPFL rebels as they fled in their 
truck in March 1990:
[A]fter proclaiming that they were there to liberate the country, [the rebels] 
asked to which tribe my father belonged. When I replied that he was 
Mandingo, they said, “You come down.” I complied and the rebels started 
beating me up. My sister started crying. When the rebels accused me of being 
a Mandingo too, I denied that I was and also denied that I had any relation 
with my father. Rather, I alleged that my sister and I were just getting a ride. 
But the rebels said, “We can’t believe this story.” They offered to let my 
sister go but insisted that “you join us.” I was then beaten and tortured by 
the NPFL…I overheard a young rebel say, “We killed that old man.” I never 
laid eyes on my father again.61
Mandingo, Krahn, Gio and Mano, which are commonly mentioned in historical accounts of the 
conflict as targeted groups, were not the only ones identified as the victims of ethnically motivated 
atrocities. Statement givers also gave accounts of abuse perpetrated against civilians because they 
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were Kru, Sarpo, Lorma, or Bassa during the first and second civil wars.62 The reasons why these 
groups may have been targeted are less well-documented. One statement giver said rebels targeted 
Lorma tribe members because the Vice President was Lorma,63 and others stated rebels targeted Sarpo 
because of the close connection between Sarpo and Krahn.64 At times, however, ethnic loyalties were 
unclear, blurring the motivation behind persecution. For example, while one member of the Kru tribe 
said the Kru were targeted by the Doe government, another member said they were targeted by rebels 
for past ties with the Doe government. 
Statement givers described perpetrators selecting civilians for torture based on very tenuous evidence 
of the victims’ affiliation with a targeted group, evidence that statements revealed was often incorrect. 
As a result, virtually no one was safe because the risk of being mistaken as the enemy of any combatant 
was so high. Indeed, statements suggest that some combatants simply attributed group affiliation to 
their victims as an excuse to engage in random killing. As one statement giver noted “the rebels would 
kill people for working for the government even if the victims didn’t really work for the government…
Just killing because they want to kill, that’s how I feel.”65
Body markings often played a significant role in the identification of government soldiers. Statement 
givers reported that rebels targeted civilians at checkpoints because they had marks on their legs 
that appeared to be boot marks, sufficient evidence that the victim was a soldier.66 Rebels similarly 
claimed they could tell a person was a soldier from the “residual smell” of a soldier’s uniform.67 One 
statement giver stated that rebels assumed he was a soldier because he had a gunshot wound.68 Even 
the appearance of being healthy or wealthy could cause rebels to pull a person out of a checkpoint line 
and kill him on the assumption he must be a soldier or government loyalist. 
Body marks consistent with membership in secret 
societies might mean the difference between torture 
or freedom at checkpoints.69 One statement giver 
said she was targeted as Mandingo because she had 
a mark on her forehead.70 The rebels claimed the 
mark proved she was Muslim because it resulted from 
praying prostrate.71 A Lorma woman who was accused 
of being Mandingo said she proved she was Lorma by 
showing her captors a mark on her back that she had 
received during a Lorma secret society rite.72 She said 
one of the rebels accused her of being Muslim anyway, 
as a justification for taking her as a bush wife.73
The NPFL used a variety of means to locate and identify target groups. Checkpoints, home invasions, 
village raids, and even organized searches of the bush enabled combatants to seek out and persecute 
“All persons who do not take a direct 
part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has 
been restricted, are entitled to respect 
for their person, honour and convictions 
and religious practices. They shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction.” Art. 
4(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts.
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targeted individuals.74 Checkpoints were a common place to pull people out of line.75 Statements 
revealed how rebels forced civilians at checkpoints to speak their own tribal languages to prove 
they were not Krahn, and how those identified as Krahn were pulled out of the line and killed.76 
Illegal entries into civilians’ homes were another means of singling out people. Some statement givers 
related accounts of rebels arriving at their homes and demanding that the “Krahn dogs” come out, 
or shouting insults such as “You’re a Krahn woman – we smell you,” immediately before torturing 
them.77 Rebels also used informants to identify their targets. One statement giver described how Gio 
and Mano villagers in the Bong Mines area marked residents’ houses before the rebels arrived.78 
The NPFL not only aggressively sought out people, but they used deceptive tactics to lure people 
and facilitate massacres.79 One statement recounted how rebels had deceived the villagers in a town 
in Grand Gedeh County by claiming they came to “discuss 
peace.” Instead, they massacred more than fifty people, 
including the town chief.80 Survivors told another statement 
giver of a massacre in Youkorway-Old Town in 1990.81 
The townspeople had gathered for a soccer game and were 
awaiting the arrival of an opposing team from the neighboring 
town.82 Dancing and singing as if they were the neighboring 
townspeople, NPFL rebels approached and began firing on 
the crowd at random, killing both Krahn and Gio people.83
In many cases, rebels carried out summary executions 
predicated solely on ethnicity or government affiliation.84 
Other statements revealed how the NPFL arrested targeted 
individuals who were often not seen again. One Nimba County resident described the early atrocities 
by NPFL rebels in her hometown: 
Suddenly one day, NPFL occupied Karnplay in the morning of January 1, 
1990. The rebels began arresting officials of Doe’s government amidst much 
shooting. Business people and people who had money were seized and taken 
away by the fighters. Then the shooting ceased. My mother told me later 
that my father who was Treasurer of the Woto Farmers Cooperative was 
taken away by the rebels. My father never came back and I have not seen 
him since.85
Other family members who happened to be present were subject to punishment as well. One statement 
giver summarized how the NPFL punished her father, brother, and sister because her father supported 
Doe. “A group took my father and said he was a Doe supporter, and he was beheaded with a power 
saw and I was stabbed in my stomach with a bayonet from the back. They burnt my brother with 
“The civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall 
not be the object of attack. Acts 
or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” Art. 13(2), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts.
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plastic and my sister’s fingers were broken.”86
The killings were often preceded by multiple forms of violence. 
It was not uncommon for rebels to commit torture, mutilation, 
rapes, beatings, and other cruel treatment before or in the course 
of the murder. One form of torture commonly reported by 
statement givers was that of “tabay.” Several statement givers 
witnessed or were subjected to this practice, which involves 
tying a person with his hands behind his back so tightly that his 
chest protrudes—sometimes to the point of breaking the chest 
cavity.87 Tabay was occasionally followed by stabbing the victim’s 
chest with a bayonet and causing it to explode.88 
Rebels often psychologically tortured victims, forcing them 
to sing, dance, or cheer while witnessing the rape, torture, or 
killing of their loved ones or themselves.89 One victim described the layers of violence used by NPFL 
rebels when they targeted her father, a superintendent in Bomi County: 
The men told the father to dance and the townspeople to sing. There were 
two sisters and two brothers there, also stripped. They told the children to 
dance too. They told the father to drink dirty water…The rebels shot the 
father many times and started cutting the sisters and brothers to pieces with 
cutlasses.90 
The Armed Forces of Liberia Response
As the NPFL insurgency progressed, Doe directed the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to respond with 
violence in both Greater Liberia and Monrovia. Government forces engaged in a violent campaign 
throughout the country, committing widespread killings in Monrovia,91 as well as indiscriminately 
shooting unarmed people in several villages, looting possessions, and burning homes.92 Liberians, 
particularly residents of Nimba County, were targeted for suspected opposition activity or ethnic 
affiliation. Statements reveal that government forces deliberately sought out and persecuted Mano, 
Gio, Americo-Liberians, and other suspected rebel supporters. 
“[O]utrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment, rape, 
enforced prostitution and any 
form or indecent assault” and any 
threats thereof are prohibited 
“at any time and in any place 
whatsoever” during non-
international armed conflicts. 
Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts.
States Parties are “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction” civil and political rights, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Art 2(1). 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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One statement giver described how AFL soldiers came looking for his father, an outspoken critic 
of the Doe government, in Nimba County in early 1990.93 They shot up the house, stole his father’s 
clerical robes, and burned down the home.94 “They made threatening statements for my father, saying, 
‘Doe told us to come and get your head. Come out and say what you’ve been preaching. We’re going 
to take your head out on a platter.’”95
One statement giver described how AFL soldiers maintained blacklists of targeted people. The 
statement giver described how an AFL soldier dropped a list while searching his home.96 When the 
statement giver picked up the list, he saw it contained the names of various individuals, including his 
father. Next to each individual’s name was written “and family.” Some of the names on the list had 
been crossed off.97 That night, the AFL soldiers killed his father, mother, and sister.98 
Often, however, government soldiers failed to ascertain affiliations, thus casting a wide net that 
often encompassed more than the targeted groups. One statement giver summarized Doe’s sweeping 
violence in Nimba County after the invasion: 
The news of the killings started coming to Monrovia and President Doe 
sent the AFL up to Nimba County to confront Taylor’s forces. The problem 
was that the AFL couldn’t tell rebel from civilian. Taylor’s forces would be 
housed in with families and sometimes civilians would set traps for AFL 
soldiers by offering them hospitality and then ambushing them. So, the 
AFL started killing everyone and the word spread that the Doe army was 
targeting Gio people.99
Simply wearing the wrong color, bearing body markings, or other arbitrary reasons subjected persons 
to suspicion by government forces. One statement giver said the police mistook his parents for rebels 
and killed them simply because they had not fled sooner.100 Another statement giver described the 
problems he faced as a result of a skull-and-crossbones 
tattoo on his body.101 Because rebels used a similar 
symbol, soldiers stopped him at a checkpoint, stripped 
him naked, and forced him to walk through the city at the 
point of a bayonet.102 Although he had obtained the tattoo 
for fun upon his graduation, it caused him a great deal of 
trouble over the next several years, and he was subject to 
questioning several times.103 
Another statement giver described how his brother was 
mistaken for a rebel by Doe’s AFL soldiers:
Collective punishments and threats 
thereof are prohibited “at any time and 
in any place whatsoever” during non-
international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)
(b), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts.
Protected persons include those who are 
not taking a direct part in or those who 
are no longer taking part in hostilities. Id. 
at Art. 4(1)
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If you are a man and wear a red T-shirt and jean pants, they felt that was the 
rebel uniform and you were killed. They killed my brother-in-law. He had on 
jean pants. He liked to wear them. He did not know the AFL were looking 
for pants that color. The AFL were of President Doe’s tribe. They shot my 
brother-in-law. He drove a taxi.104
Government attempts to identify suspected rebels heightened the risks of traveling, and one statement 
giver described how perilous it was to move through the country at this time. He stated, “If you 
lived in another town and were going to Monrovia, you might reach there by the grace of God. The 
Liberian Army will kill you.”105 
In Monrovia, as in Greater Liberia, the Doe government continued its sweep. In January and February 
1990, the government made hundreds of warrantless arrests of Gio and Mano males.106 A statement 
giver living in Monrovia described witnessing AFL soldiers seizing Gio and Mano people in the spring 
of 1990: “Day and night, I saw Krahn soldiers of the AFL 
take away civilians of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. 
These people were my neighbors who never came back 
after they were taken/carried away.”107 The detentions were 
often coupled with the disappearances or killings of NPFL 
supporters, Gio, and Mano people.108 A Gio government 
inspector described seeing numerous corpses when AFL 
soldiers arrested him and took him to their barracks in 
1990: 
When I entered inside, I saw a lot of dead bodies -- hundreds. I could not 
recognize any of them. There were wounded people without any medical 
attention. On March 7, they sent a grader to bury the people, right behind 
the barracks. The grader covered them with soil.109 
riSe of the independent national patriotic front of liBeria (inpfl)
The hostilities between Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Doe’s AFL were soon exacerbated by the rise 
of another fighting faction. In July 1990, a split developed between Taylor and a group of NPFL 
fighters led by Prince Johnson.110 Prince Johnson launched a splinter group known as the INPFL, 
comprised of approximately 500 combatants.111 The INPFL gained control of areas in Monrovia112 
and established its base in the city’s outskirts at Caldwell. The rise of the INPFL increased the risks to 
civilians, as they not only became subject to violations by fighters in INFPL territory, but also could 
be suspected of association with yet another faction. 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.” 
Art. 9(1), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
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Charles Taylor’s response to the splinter was particularly oppressive. One statement giver described 
Taylor’s reaction as follows: 
Furious with Johnson’s betrayal, Taylor’s occupation of [Monrovia] was a 
“reign of terror.” He called everyone out of their homes, and made everyone 
walk single file and stand in a line. All men were stripped naked so that 
Taylor’s men could search for the marks that most of Johnson’s followers 
bore…When Taylor and his men discovered “defectors,” they would gather 
all civilians to watch while the person was forced to his knees and shot in the 
back of the head…Once Taylor had taken control of Bong Mines, civilian 
men were forced to report daily to “G-2 offices” to receive clearance to go 
to the market or move freely in town. The clearance consisted of a pass that 
was meant to show that one was not a threat.113 
The INPFL, and notably its leader, demonstrated a capacity to carry out egregious atrocities against 
both targeted populations and random victims. Like its NPFL forerunner, the INPFL targeted 
Krahn, Mandingo, government affiliates, and NDPL members. INPFL also attacked homes and 
accosted people in public. 
One statement giver recalled how Prince Johnson and his men came to his house looking for his 
father, a soldier in Doe’s army:
We lived in Monrovia, Vaitown before the war started in 1990. During the 
war when Prince Johnson’s INPFL took control of that area we left there 
with our father and mother. Prince Johnson and boys entered the area and 
[were] shown to our house by some people who knew we were Krahn and 
that my father was in the army at the time. Mr. Johnson and his boys entered 
our yard and started cursing and asking “Where are the Krahn dogs that are 
living here?”114 
When his father came out of hiding, the rebels looted the family’s belongings, set the house on fire, 
and beat the statement giver’s father for information about his friends and family before shooting him 
in the head.115 Overall, the situation was so dangerous that it was risky even to look for food because, 
in the words of the statement-giver, the “INPFL would kill you if they saw you.”116 Attempts to resist 
INPFL abuses resulted in death or other violence.117
Numerous statements describe the atrocities condoned or committed directly by Prince Johnson.118 
Statement givers reported how Prince Johnson stood by and watched his fighters commit atrocities. 
For example, following the Doe assassination, a Krahn woman reported that she sought to flee 
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Monrovia on an ECOMOG ship. Prince Johnson 
and his men boarded the ship where the refugees 
were waiting. Prince Johnson reportedly sat in a 
chair on top of a table, playing a guitar and singing, 
while his soldiers randomly killed people. The 
statement giver said she overheard Prince Johnson 
state, “Take them to the base. Feel free, this is 
Liberia, anyone can be your president and the next 
morning you will be executed.”119 
Other statement givers related how Prince Johnson 
played a direct role in perpetrating violations, either by carrying out the atrocities himself or ordering 
his fighters to do so. A statement giver described how INPFL rebels beat his father so severely he 
could no longer speak, at which point Prince Johnson took out a pistol, shot his father in the head, 
and left.120 One statement giver described how in July 1990 Prince Johnson sought revenge against his 
father for winning a lawsuit against him: 
Prince Johnson and his men came to our house and asked us out. He told my 
father that his time was finished. He ordered his men to beat my father after 
he wounded me on my head [and I was] on the ground bleeding. They beat 
my father to death. That day Prince Johnson was dressed in blue jeans with 
a red t-shirt--written on it “Freedom Fighter.” After my father was killed, I 
was ordered to go to the Caldwell base with them.121
The INPFL often arrested and detained people 
at Caldwell, where they would be tortured, 
sometimes to the point of death.122 Statement 
givers described the atrocities that took place 
at the INPFL base, including “manhandling of 
people; severe torture; summary executions.”123 
One Krahn statement giver was forcibly 
conscripted and taken to Caldwell base where 
he was trained to fight.124 The statement giver 
described the conditions and treatment he 
experienced at Caldwell: 
We were arrested by the INPFL and taken on their base. I personally was 
tortured because of tribal affiliation. I was kept in prison for about 6 days 
without food. I only survived on mere rain water. While in the process of 
Persons detained due to reasons associated with 
the armed conflict shall “to the same extent 
as the local civilian population, be provided 
with food and drinking water and be afforded 
safeguards as regards health and hygiene and 
protection against the rigours of the climate and 
the dangers of the armed conflict…” Art. 5(1)(b), 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
Those responsible for the detention of 
persons, who are deprived of their liberty 
for reasons associated with armed conflict, 
shall seek to respect, within the limits of their 
capabilities, that their “physical or mental 
health and integrity shall not be endangered 
by any unjustified act or omission…” Art. 
5(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts.
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having us executed, Prince Johnson gave the order to have us released.125
While the INPFL targeted specific groups, it also demonstrated the same greed, lack of discipline, and 
depravity that characterized other armed factions. In addition to taking revenge, INPFL rebels often 
extorted money from the civilian population. One statement giver described how the INPFL in 1990 
demanded money from his family, who were prosperous and worked for the government:
On that fateful cool morning, Prince Johnson and his INPFL attacked our 
home. At dawn, [they] ordered our entire family out in single file: father, 
mother, brothers and sister. They ordered my father to surrender his financial 
assets, but he told them that he had no money with [him that] instant. They 
(rebels about 8 in number) pushed him six feet and shot [him] in the head 
and chest. My mother ran on top of his body. She was shot from the back 
twice. [W]hen my brother and sister ran to their bodies, they too were shot 
at close range.126 
firSt Battle for monrovia: July 1990
By summer 1990, Monrovia remained an area of contention among warring factions. Doe, while still 
in office, was losing his ability to administer the country and enforce the rule of law.127 The INPFL 
commanded various areas of Monrovia, as well as Bushrod Island.128 Taylor controlled large, key parts 
of Liberia, but Monrovia still remained outside of NPFL control. As different forces sought to acquire 
or retain control of the capital, intense fighting around Monrovia surged during battles in 1990, 1992, 
and 1996. These three battles afforded factions not only the opportunity to seize Monrovia, but also 
the chance for opportunists to plunder and take revenge.129
One statement giver described the atmosphere leading up to the first battle for Monrovia as “tense” 
because “[t]he rebels were coming; nobody knew when.”130 Another statement giver described how, 
in April 1990, people heard rumors that rebels were approaching Monrovia.131 Businesses began 
to shut down, some government officials fled the country, and food became increasingly scarce.132 
While there were rumors that the rebels and the AFL were fighting in nearby neighborhoods, there 
were no confirmations on either of the two radio stations.133 Some Liberians who had education and 
employment at stake took notice of the impending crisis. One statement giver, who was a high school 
student living with his brother, a physician, described the growing realization that it was necessary to 
leave: 
Combatants are prohibited, at all times and places, from committing “violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds” against persons not taking part in the hostilities. Art. 3(1)(a), Convention 
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Chapter Seven
144
We didn’t want to leave Monrovia. We hoped that they would just go away, 
but it soon became obvious that there would be no school and no work in 
Monrovia. Like everyone else, we decided to leave. It was June 1990.134
In July 1990, the NPFL launched what would be the first of three major battles for Monrovia. Some 
Liberians simply could not believe the rebels would ever advance to Monrovia and the attack took 
them by surprise.135 One statement giver, a charcoal seller in the market, described the unexpected 
alarm and chaos that ensued:
The NPFL war came in 1990. I was at the market and didn’t even know 
it was coming. People came and started beating people. I hid behind coal. 
They grabbed M. and killed her right there and then they started looking for 
me. I went to my house to find my husband but he had been killed. I started 
running when someone grabbed and beat me. I was wounded in the stomach 
and fainted in a gutter.136 
Numerous statement givers gave eyewitness 
accounts of atrocities committed by both rebels and 
government soldiers as they fought for control of 
the capital. The statements again reveal the multiple 
forms of violence and the targeting of certain 
groups and ethnicities. An NDPL youth wing leader 
summarized an INPFL attack based on NPFL and 
Mandingo affiliations in Duala:
They (INPFL) started going on a house to house…[W]ithin that instant, 
my boss lady, M.M., whom I was assistant to, was arrested, tortured, beaten, 
raped and she was subsequently executed (beheaded). My husband, M.K., a 
Mandingo by nationality, was a businessman. He was arrested and executed. 
Realizing that my life was at stake, I decided to run away with my two kids, 
but I was caught by the rebel. They started to beat me with the gun butt. I 
was stabbed with the soldier knife in my stomach and lost consciousness. So 
they thought I was dead, so they left me.137
Another statement giver, whose father worked for President Doe, described how rebels broke into 
their house in July 1990.138 The men tied the statement giver’s father’s wrists behind his back and 
told him he was enjoying money from President Doe and always drinking wine with Doe. A fighter 
threatened to hit the statement giver for crying and then stabbed him in the stomach with a knife and 
rammed the butt of a gun on his foot.139 
Parties to the conflict are prohibited at 
all times and places from committing 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment” against 
persons taking no part in the hostilities. 
Art. 3(1)(c), Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
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The men made my father stare at the sun…The men took me and my father 
to an unfinished block house. The men continued beating and torturing 
both of us. They beat us with wire and the butts of their guns. The men 
told us we had spoiled the country and ate the money. I was on the ground, 
hurt and crying hard. Another rebel came and said that my father was Doe’s 
campaign manager and that they needed to kill him. They forced my father 
to drink urine from a cup and said it was wine. My father tried to spit it out 
and they continued to beat him by hitting him on the back of his neck with 
the butts of their guns. Another man hit me because I was crying and I 
passed out. When I came to, others told me that the men had shot and killed 
my father…140
AFL soldiers were equally ruthless in their 
attempts to defeat the rebels. The atrocities 
were often misdirected or senseless and they 
resulted in the loss of numerous innocent 
lives. For example, one statement giver 
described how the AFL shot indiscriminately, 
opening fire on everyone at the supermarket 
in July 1990.141 As the INPFL approached, the 
AFL retreated, slaughtering many people as 
it did so.142 One statement giver summarized 
how a group of AFL soldiers transporting a 
wounded man ordered him and his family into 
the bush:
The entire family (my birth mother, stepfather, sister and me) ran into the 
bush where we were followed by some of the soldiers that were on the trucks. 
The wounded man was now being held up by two of the soldiers. A soldier 
pointed to the wounded man and angrily said to me and my family, “You are 
responsible for this. We are going to kill all of you.” I was frightened as the 
man put shot in the rifle and was pointing it at my mother. The bullet went 
in between my mother and sister and hit a man standing slightly behind and 
in between the two of them. The man fell and died instantly. As the man 
reloaded the gun my family and I were frozen in terror. Once he reloaded 
the gun, he raised it towards me and said, “You, I am going to kill YOU.” 
I shook as the soldier kept trying to squeeze the trigger but the trigger or 
something on the gun had become jammed. The soldiers then took all of 
our food.143
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The terroristic impact of the killings was magnified by mutilation and other inappropriate treatment of 
the bodies.144 One statement giver described finding the bodies of his family after they were murdered 
by AFL soldiers on July 30, 1990:
My father’s body was terribly mutilated. My mother’s stomach was ripped 
open. She was eight months pregnant. I was so frightened I couldn’t even 
touch them. My sister had been shot right in the middle of her head. I was 
in a terrible state. I couldn’t even look at them closer because I was just in 
shock. I mean even to see my father was hard. I could just recognize him by 
his watch which was still on his hand.145
One of the most egregious examples of government atrocities was the St. Peter Lutheran Church 
massacre in July 1990. AFL soldiers and Doe loyalists killed hundreds of people who had sought 
refuge in the church from the war.146 One statement giver lost seven family members in the Lutheran 
Church massacre.147 According to accounts, the soldiers were deliberate and comprehensive in the 
executions. As one Liberian stated, “the soldiers were shooting to kill.”148 A public hearings witness 
described one survivor’s account of how the entire room was filled with sleeping people when heavy 
shooting began.149 The troops came upstairs to the classrooms and opened fire on people.150 With 
no time to flee, people lay flat, but the soldiers walked over them and shot them as they lay there.151 
Those who tried to escape were gunned down.152 One statement giver explained how women in the 
church tied babies to their backs, and as they fled, the 
soldier shot their backs, killing them and the babies.153 
The disregard for the church as a safe haven magnified 
the horror for many civilians. Another statement giver 
stated, “imagine trying to seek refuge in the church, a 
house of God, and they opened fire.”154 Statement givers 
who witnessed the aftermath of the incident, or knew 
survivors, confirmed the massacre accounts.155 One of 
them recalled the aftermath:
[It was] a horrible sight. There was blood all over the place. People had been 
killed by bullets in their heads. There was blood all over the walls and the 
floors. There was a mass grave that was dug. It broke my heart to know 
Liberians were killing other Liberians.156
“[A]ll possible measures shall be taken… 
to search for the dead, prevent their 
being despoiled, and decently dispose of 
them.” Art. 8, Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
“The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” Art. 13 (2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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The few individuals who did survive were saved by chance or by their ethnicity. One person survived 
only because another body had fallen on top of her, shielding her from the soldiers’ view.157 During 
public hearings, one witness testified how the aforementioned Liberian survived. When the soldiers 
began shooting, she screamed in Grebo, “Please don’t kill me among these dogs tonight, please don’t 
kill me.”158 When the soldiers heard her, they stopped shooting and asked, “What are you doing 
among these dogs? We’re going to kill up the whole church and you are among them?”159 The witness 
summarized what happened next: 
And so they told her they were going to kill everybody, but because these – 
the two of them were Grebo, according to her, they wouldn’t kill them. But 
they had to figure out a way. So she said the Krahn soldiers said they needed 
to slash her, because they needed to spill blood from everybody that night. 
That was the rule. So they slash her. And they slash her friend. And she had 
two kids. And they said, “We’re going to take some bodies and lay them 
around you. Lie flat, and we’ll put some dead bodies around you so it looks 
like you [sic] dead and because all through the night there will be inspections 
to make sure everybody is dead.”160
Like so many other horrific events, the St. Peter Lutheran Church massacre was a trigger that 
compelled many Liberians to flee the country.161
Statements reveal that combatants from all factions, besides targeting and killing groups, abused their 
power to loot and to seek revenge during the battle for Monrovia. As in the preceding months, soldiers 
and rebels demanded food, money, or other goods. One statement giver described how, in early July 
1990, he witnessed NPFL soldiers confiscate food and the clothes off of people’s backs.162 Another 
described how rebels dressed as women and wearing weave caps came to his home and ordered him 
to catch his family’s chickens for them to eat.163 The rebels 
ordered him and his family to leave while they prepared 
a meal for themselves and took “everything they wanted 
from the property.”164 When victims could not meet 
fighters’ demands, they were often punished. AFL soldiers 
asked one statement giver’s father for food and money, then 
killed him because he could not give them either.165 One 
statement giver summarized an INPFL fighter’s retaliatory 
treatment of him over his father’s failure to pay him:
It was July 1990. It happened in Jimmycar Road, Bushrod Island, Monrovia. 
It was a Prince Johnson boy [who] identified [himself ] as Henry. He was 
dressed in an INPFL rebel uniform. He first slapped me in [my] mouth with 
“It is prohibited to order that there 
shall be no survivors.” Art. 4(1), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II) (1977).
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his bare hand and because of that, my three teeth came out from my mouth. 
He said he committed the act because he worked for my late father, G.A., 
and that my father did not pay him. He alerted me under Bong Mine Bridge 
and asked me for my name. I told him my name and he later said, “I work 
for your dirty father and he did not pay me.” He told me to give him six feet, 
but I refused to go back so he slapped me on my mouth.166
Families became separated and displaced as civilians were taken away or fled.167 Both males and 
females were susceptible to being abducted as statements indicate they were taken away to become 
bush wives, laborers, or combatants. One statement giver summarized the abduction of his sister and 
aunt by NPFL rebels:
The next day, as we were making our way to the Soul Clinic, we were 
approached by a group of Charles Taylor’s rebels in trucks, who were looking 
for “wives.” They proceeded to abduct my sister (15 years old) and my aunt 
(17 years old). I was horrified and devastated to see them taking my sister and 
aunt away while I and my parents stood by watching helplessly. I had heard 
by word of mouth what happened to women and girls that were abducted.168
The statement giver himself ended up being abducted by rebels and forced into manual labor, along 
with other children, at the Old Soda Factory.169 Another statement giver described how rebels came to 
their home and killed his father, a government employee.170 His mother, sisters, and brothers fled in 
different directions, and the statement giver has not seen any family members since that day.171 
During their flight from the battle, Liberians were 
subject to additional abuses.172 One statement giver 
described his experience during the siege: 
During the first week in July 1990, when Taylor attacked Monrovia, my 
mother, six brothers and I sought to flee to Kakata by way of the Fendell 
campus. As we were walking, we were detained by Taylor’s militia…[The 
leaders] directed militia members to beat my older brother. My brother was 
also subjected to tabay and was killed in front of my eyes. The following day 
my mother instructed me to proceed without her and to flee with my five 
younger brothers. As my brothers and I resumed walking, we were again 
detained by Taylor’s militia. The militia cut one of my young brothers then 
shot all of them dead -- only I was spared.173 
Later, the statement giver learned that his mother had also been killed.174
“No one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour.” Art. 8(3)(a), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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deployment of ecomog
By the time the first battle for Monrovia began, a regional response mechanism to the conflict was 
already in process. The government’s rapid loss of control, the rising state of anarchy, and faction 
leaders’ control over certain areas175 compelled Doe to make an appeal for international assistance 
in May 1990. 176 In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created 
a military intervention force on August 7, 1990, to send to Liberia.177 Composed of approximately 
3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia, the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) mission arrived in Monrovia on August 24, 1990.178 The largest contribution and 
greatest number of forces came from Nigeria.179 
ECOMOG’s primary purpose was to ensure compliance with peace and ceasefire agreements.190 A 
gap between ECOMOG’s articulated mandate and the actual needs of the situation soon became 
apparent.191 Thus, absent an effective police force and the need for political intervention, ECOMOG, 
the regional force, became involved in responsibilities beyond peacekeeping.192 Throughout its seven-
year deployment, other responsibilities that ECOMOG assumed included mediation between warring 
factions,193 helping establish the Interim National Government,194 the implementation of ECOWAS-
Nigeria pursued a dominant role in West Africa on many fronts, including the establishment of 
ECOWAS and the maintenance of regional order.180 For example, Nigeria was the largest supporter of 
the ECOMOG mission to Liberia, contributing nearly $50,000,000 and most of the troop support for 
the initial deployment of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force.181 Following the execution of Doe when 
Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo was in charge of the mission,182 ECOMOG adopted the provision 
that a Nigerian would always hold the position of ECOMOG Field Commander.183 Nigeria’s influence in 
Liberia continued to grow even stronger, and by 1994 about 7,000 of the 11,000 ECOMOG troops were 
Nigerian.184
Scholars recognize that Nigeria had several interests in quelling the instability in Liberia. Because it saw 
the Liberian conflict as a threat to the region’s economic and military stability, Nigeria sought to restore 
order. It also believed that dissidents from Nigeria and neighboring countries had trained in Libya with 
Taylor and NPFL forces with the idea that Taylor would support their rebellions in their countries if he 
succeeded in Liberia.185 Nigeria’s perception that intervention was necessary was intensified by the 
rebels’ attacks on the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, the UN mission, and Nigerian and other ECOWAS 
citizens, including the August 1990 massacre by the NPFL of hundreds of Nigerian citizens inside the 
Nigerian embassy.186
Finally, Nigeria was motivated to act from a desire to support Doe and to prevent Taylor from 
succeeding in his rebellion.187 The president of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, who had come 
to power through a military coup in 1985, was a friend and ally of Doe.188 While Nigeria’s motives 
for intervening in Liberia are complex, it is also likely that the personal relationship between Gen. 
Babangida and Doe played a role. Indeed, Doe made his May 1990 appeal for assistance directly to 
Gen. Babangida (and President Eyadema of Togo) rather than to ECOWAS.189 
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brokered peace accords,195 disarmament, safeguarding aid supplies, sheltering troops,196 helping 
supervise the 1997 elections,197 and promoting security by helping to rebuild Liberia’s military, police, 
and security forces.198
The regional forces successfully repelled the NPFL invasion.199 Nevertheless, political undercurrents 
and inadequate planning, logistics, and lack of equipment hindered ECOMOG’s initial efficacy.200 
Preexisting regional political tensions led to division among ECOWAS members.201 With the exception 
of Guinea, the Francophone nations (led by Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) supported Taylor and 
objected to the intervention; the Anglophone countries, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, 
supported the intervention.202 Logistical factors, including inadequate force levels, the lack of a 
Monrovia-based ECOWAS official to facilitate political negotiations, and inconsistent interpretations 
of the mandate, reduced ECOMOG’s effectiveness.203 Finally, many sources point to concerns about 
ECOMOG’s conduct and neutrality. There were reports of widespread looting by ECOMOG soldiers, 
alleged sales of weaponry by Nigerians to armed groups, and concerns about Nigeria’s support for the 
Liberia Peace Council (LPC).204 Its deficiencies were quickly evidenced by its failure to prevent the 
assassination of President Doe by INPFL forces less than two weeks after its arrival. 
Many statement givers, however, described how ECOMOG saved their lives, prevented further 
human rights abuses, or helped them escape Liberia.205 Statements also attributed the presence or 
imminent arrival of ECOMOG forces to lives saved. In numerous cases, statement givers reported 
how rebel fighters would stop terrorizing them and disperse upon hearing about the impending arrival 
of ECOMOG troops. One statement giver’s description was typical:
Through the intervention of the Almighty God, some ECOMOG soldiers 
of the multinational peacekeeping force came from the Vai Town area and 
rescued us when the rebels fled from my area. [The rebels] left us when they 
got to know that some ECOMOG soldiers were coming to our rescue.206 
In this way, the presence of ECOMOG played an important role in preventing rebels from committing 
further human rights violations and humanitarian crimes. Statement givers described how they would 
call or alert ECOMOG to attacks, prompting them to respond.207 In addition, ECOMOG frequently 
provided safe haven at their base for Liberians. Statement givers reported staying on the ECOMOG 
base for periods of a few days up to two weeks.208
In addition to playing an enforcement role, ECOMOG at times assisted with the health and other 
basic needs of Liberians. Statement givers reported how ECOMOG soldiers often carried them to 
the hospital209 or to their base for medical treatment.210 ECOMOG soldiers gave civilians food,211 
sometimes in exchange for work.212 ECOMOG also sent ex-combatants to St. Mary’s Catholic School 
in Duala, Liberia to be reintegrated.213 
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Early on, Taylor viewed the ECOMOG intervention as a threat to his objectives and as an adversary.214 
In August 1990, prior to ECOMOG’s deployment, Taylor criticized the peacekeeping force, which 
he considered an act of aggression. He proclaimed he would “fight to the last man,” stating, “I’ve 
given orders to open fire on any strangers setting foot on our territory.”215 NPFL-controlled radio 
frequently broadcast anti-ECOMOG messages.216 The NPFL intended to weaken the political resolve 
of ECOMOG’s member states so that Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens would force their governments 
to withdraw.217
Although it was intended to be a neutral peacekeeping force, 
ECOMOG soon assumed a more offensive role.218As early as 
October of 1990,219 violence erupted between ECOMOG and 
the NPFL220 as ECOMOG successfully pushed the NPFL out of 
Monrovia.221 Violence escalated between the two groups when the 
NPFL launched “Operation Octopus” in 1992.222
Another consequence of Taylor’s hostility toward ECOMOG was that foreign nationals became the 
target of human rights abuses.223 The NPFL targeted citizens of ECOWAS countries in retaliation 
for ECOMOG’s role in the conflict. Specifically, the NPFL adopted a policy of targeting Nigerian, 
Ghanaian, and other ECOWAS civilians in retribution for the deployment of ECOMOG.224 Referring 
to the ECOMOG force, Taylor reportedly stated that, “for every Liberian that’s killed I’m going to 
make sure some other nationals get killed too.”225 In a widely reported massacre of foreigners, the 
NPFL killed two hundred ECOWAS nationals in 1990.226 
Nationals of Nigeria, the predominant 
contributor to the ECOMOG peacekeeping 
force, were particularly at risk.227 In referring to 
Nigerian citizens, Taylor was quoted as saying, 
“They are not refugees. They are aggressors…
They are all going to bear the brunt of this.”228 
Rebels also targeted doctors and other civilian 
aid workers from Nigeria and other ECOWAS 
nations on a routine basis.229 Statements also 
described the targeting of Ghanaians. One 
statement giver summarized:
There was a big Jeep with Charles Taylor’s soldiers, causing cars to stop. A 
woman was with her husband and their children on the road. My daughter 
and I were at the creek, brushing our teeth and washing. A soldier got 
down from the Jeep, stopped the woman and her husband, and asked where 
“Any propaganda for war shall 
be prohibited by law.” Art. 
20(1), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.
“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all 
organizations which are based on ideas or theories 
of superiority of one race or group of persons of 
one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to 
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination 
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate 
and positive measures designed to eradicate all 
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination…” Art. 
4, International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.
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the woman was from. She replied that she was from Ghana and lived in 
Monrovia. The soldiers took her husband, took off his shirt, tied his hands 
behind his back. The lady ran to the house for her passport to prove she was 
from Ghana and came back with it. The soldiers told her, “Look at your 
husband and say goodbye. You’ll never see him again.” They took him to a 
little place nearby and shot the man three times…230
Later, the statement giver recognized one of the 
soldiers as her former student.231 When she 
asked him what was happening, he told her that 
ECOMOG had reached Monrovia and that “we’re 
here to kill all the foreigners.”232 The statement 
giver then understood why they killed the man 
from Ghana.233 
Another statement giver said he escaped from NPFL forces to their preoccupation with targeting 
Ghanaian citizens:
Because the ECOMOG troops in Monrovia were from the sub-region, the 
NPFL was arresting people from the countries that had supplied soldiers. 
There were two Ghanaian teachers in the town. The NPFL rebels caught 
them and while they were interrogating them, I was able to sneak away into 
the bush. I heard two shots as they killed the Ghanaians.234
The NPFL adopted other strategies to punish citizens of ECOWAS countries. For example, the 
NPFL restricted movement for ECOWAS citizens through and out of NPFL territory.235 Arrest and 
detention were another means of punishing these citizens. A Human Rights Watch report described 
large scale-detention facilities in NPFL territory established to hold captured ECOWAS nationals 
of both military and civilian background.236 Nigerian journalists claimed that they were hostage 
targets.237
“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.” Art. 20(2), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Persons who “find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict 
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals” are entitled to protection under Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions.* Art. 4, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War.
* “Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a 
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent 
State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal 
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.” Id. 
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Despite the ECOMOG presence in Monrovia, statements reveal that the INPFL continued to 
perpetrate violations, including forced labor. One statement giver described how the INPFL attempted 
to force her to prepare food for them:
From time to time, I was harassed by them always to cook for them. At that 
time there was widespread insecurity. Based on that fear for me to continue 
to cook for rebels, I decided not to cook for them anymore. That action 
made them vexed. As a result, three of the rebels flogged me in the morning 
of September 5, 1990, just before President Doe was captured on September 
9, 1990.238
Execution of President Samuel K. Doe
In addition to the targeting of its nationals, ECOMOG encountered other early challenges. On 
September 9, 1990, Prince Johnson and INPFL troops captured Samuel Doe at a meeting brokered 
by ECOMOG.239 The rebels assassinated a number of Doe’s supporters and tortured Doe to death, 
videotaping the event and distributing copies throughout Monrovia.240 The videotape, which depicts 
Prince Johnson drinking beer while fighters cut off Doe’s ears, became widely available in Liberia and 
elsewhere.241 Doe is seen pleading to be spared before he is killed.242 A statement giver recalled that 
day: 
I saw a convoy with Samuel Doe in it, wearing a grey suit and in an open-
topped car. As I was on the street, watching the convoy cross the bridge, 
I remember thinking that if Doe crossed the bridge, he would be killed 
by Prince Johnson…I heard shooting. The shooting lasted for 30 minutes. 
Then it was very quiet. The next day, as we left, we heard the BBC was 
reporting that the Liberian President was captured by a Liberian faction 
and was wounded. I decided it would be too dangerous to leave, and I felt 
trapped…The next 72 hours were worse. Doe was tortured, with his elbows 
tied together behind his back…They captured, tortured, mutilated, and 
murdered Doe on camera.243
Statement givers described heightened ECOMOG restrictions on the press immediately following 
Doe’s murder. One statement giver who reported for the Torchlight newspaper recounted how 
ECOMOG took journalists to see Doe’s body, but refused to allow publication of photographs of 
States Parties are to “recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the 
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts…” Art. 6(1), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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Doe’s body for political reasons.244 Another statement giver described how ECOMOG forced the 
Daily Observer to burn all newspapers that contained pictures relating to Doe’s death.245
These conditions spawned what would be a series of broken accords throughout the next several years. 
The period between 1990 and 1992 was described as an “uneasy truce”246 as peace talks interspersed 
with fighting took place. In November 1990, ECOWAS attempted to broker peace talks between 
Taylor and Doe loyalists, and established an interim government to lead Liberia.247 Amos Sawyer was 
appointed head of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).248 Monrovia reverted to a 
relative degree of calm. One statement giver described: 
While Sawyer was in control, people were able to move more freely around 
Monrovia. Prior to Sawyer’s control, few people could leave the greater 
Monrovia area because Prince Johnson had divided it.249
The negotiated ceasefire was fragile, however, with bouts of sporadic fighting. Within days, the 
INPFL violated the peace agreement by launching an attack against the AFL.250 Fighting between the 
NPFL and other factions continued in Greater Liberia.251 Finally, the emergence of new rebel groups 
threatened the precarious situation. 
“operation octopuS”: octoBer 1992
On October 15, 1992, NPFL forces launched their second effort to seize Monrovia from ECOMOG 
forces.252 On the day after bombings began, one statement giver recalled her school principal 
announcing that everyone would leave school early that day.253 She recalled thinking, “Wait a minute, 
when you said that in 1990, we didn’t come back for a long time.”254 
The NPFL’s attack, named “Operation Octopus,” was illustrative of the widespread violence by 
multiple factions. One statement giver recounted: 
They called it Operation Octopus because it had so many arms, and there 
were [soldiers/fighters] everywhere, even in the swamps. There were launches 
[bombings] all the time. They would see people coming out everywhere with 
blood on their faces.255 
Operation Octopus lasted approximately one month.256 Although it was brief, a statement giver 
classified it as one of the deadliest conflicts: “very short, but more crazy than the previous outbreaks.”257 
According to another statement giver, Taylor’s mission was to “engulf Monrovia and kill everyone 
that moved in order to capture Monrovia.”258 By the end of the operation, more than 200,000 people 
were displaced and approximately 3,000 had been killed.259 A statement giver summarized the chaos 
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and intensity during the operation: 
We ran to the main street, more than five thousand people on the run 
again. It was very sad because the rebels were mixed up with civilians, some 
women were walking naked, some people lost their kids. The rebels were in 
the midst of the people – some of them had guns in mattresses tied up on 
their heads.260
Statements describe the difficulties of trying to survive amidst the hardship and the warfare. 
Monrovians experienced severe food and money shortages during Operation Octopus. The operation 
had the economic impact of devaluing the Liberian currency. One statement giver estimated that 
the Liberian currency depreciated 85 percent overnight, thus diminishing the means of already 
impoverished people.261 Another statement giver summarized the difficult food situation:
[E]veryone “hustled.” You had to sell the food you hustled in order to get 
more. Rice was like gold dust, money was nothing. We ate rice and beans and 
small clams from the river that we would boil and suck. We would also eat 
sugarcane. The custom was to drop the sugarcane after the juice was gone, 
but then little children would come along and pick it up and continue to 
suck on it…Food was so scarce that, if people were behind you and saw that 
your jaw was moving, they would pick up whatever you dropped. We also ate 
palm butter from the trees but this was difficult because you had to smash 
the kernel and mash it by hand.262 
Many statements reported fatalities that occurred as a result 
of crossfire and bombings. One statement giver living on 
Bushrod Island stated that stray bullets killed at least ten 
people he knew.263 Another statement giver recalled that 
the bullet spray was so intense that his family hid in the 
bathroom for hours one night.264 At that time, Prince 
Johnson also began launching bombs.265 A statement giver 
described how his pregnant sister-in-law was hit on the 
head with a mortar round in Logantown; “she disintegrated 
and died of the injuries she sustained.”266
Statement givers described the strategies they learned to survive Operation Octopus. For example, 
one statement giver described how people learned to run toward the source of rocket fire after a 
launch because running away from the rocket’s source might place them directly in its landing path.267 
Also, he recounted how they prayed for night fighting, because bullets were more visible in the dark.268 
“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant, recognizing the 
fundamental right of everyone to 
be free from hunger, shall take, 
individually and through international 
co-operation, the measures, including 
specific programmes, which are 
needed…” Art. 11(2), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1976). 
Chapter Seven
156
Another statement giver stated that she had to finish her cooking quickly because she cooked outside 
where there were always stray bullets.269 The atmosphere was tense. A statement giver summarized 
how drastically their lifestyles changed during Operation Octopus: 
Every night we heard bombing. We stayed at our home. We didn’t sleep. We 
wore jeans and sneakers with undershirts and t-shirts on our heads. We had 
to be ready to leave at any time. We were always in the hallway and had to 
stay away from windows.270 
Operation Octopus lacked the same level of ethnic targeting of the first battle for Monrovia. Both 
AFL and rebel forces demonstrated more interest in looting and killing regardless of ethnicity.271 Like 
the first battle for Monrovia, Operation Octopus afforded opportunities to exploit power. Because 
NPFL rebels were unpaid they were encouraged to plunder and were promised compensation in the 
form of loot or even a house.272 One Liberian statement giver described how a child soldier put his 
name on their home, stating that Taylor promised any property they captured would be for them.273 In 
other cases, the rebels destroyed property. A statement giver described how rebels burned down her 
home, possessions, and other neighboring houses.274 
Rebels also used Operation Octopus as a means to exact revenge. Accounts describe how, once 
again, rebels raped, tortured, and arrested civilians as revenge for past grievances. One statement 
giver described how she had previously refused to have sex with an NPFL fighter; during Operation 
Octopus, he came to her house, stabbed her in the knee, and raped her.275 Another statement giver 
recounted how an NPFL leader sought revenge because of his expulsion from the statement giver’s 
organization:
He was expelled from his post and disappeared from the township only to 
resurface in NPFL uniform and well armed. So he was able to get even at me 
during ‘Octopus.’ I was taken at their command post at Kakata and put into 
a cell. I was tortured and beaten on several occasions.276 
A few statement givers discussed the role of ECOMOG during Operation Octopus. Given the 
exigencies of the situation, ECOMOG began fighting the NPFL alongside the AFL and the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO).277 While some people blamed ECOMOG for the 
atrocities, one statement giver conceded that they may have been killing in defense and to protect 
Monrovia.278 Another statement giver described the failure of ECOMOG troops to protect civilians 
during their retreat from New Georgia Estate.279 After a missile landed and rebels began to approach, 
Liberians ran toward the ECOMOG troops for protection.280 Instead of defending the civilians, the 
Sierra Leonean commander stated that his troops were not going to die for Liberians, and ECOMOG 
retreated.281 
157
A public hearing witness related ECOMOG’s use of the media during Operation Octopus. He 
testified that, as a reporter for the Liberia Broadcasting System, he was compelled to run propaganda 
for ECOMOG and the IGNU.282 When the NPFL attacked ECOMOG throughout Monrovia, the 
Liberia Broadcasting System did not broadcast where Taylor’s forces were in the suburbs. Instead, to 
his regret, Liberia Broadcasting System told people to go home: 
“Go back. Mr. Taylor is just giving propaganda. There is no war somewhere. 
Go back to your various homes. Everything is calm.” When people went 
there, and they were slaughtered, they were killed by Mr. Taylor during the 
interim government.283
Ultimately, ECOMOG, with the assistance of the AFL and 
ULIMO, was able to successfully repel the offensive and 
maintain control of Monrovia.284 In addition, ECOMOG 
successfully wrested Kakata and the port of Buchanan from 
NPFL control,285 but at the expense of more civilian lives. 
One statement giver described the ECOMOG bombings 
around the port:
Air bombers came and started to bomb the port in Buchanan. There were 
also gunships at sea throwing shells at the city. The gunships and bombs 
were destroying homes. The gunships didn’t seem to have targets, but the 
planes may have had targets at or near the port.286 
INPFL involvement in the conflict began to decline, and the faction eventually disbanded in October 
1992.287 ECOMOG troops entered Taylor-controlled areas in April, but soon pulled out because 
of fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL.288 The NPFL, however, held 580 ECOMOG troops 
hostage through September 1992.289 Although former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiated their 
release, the incident heightened the hostility between ECOMOG and NPFL.290 
At this time, the United Nations stepped up its efforts to stem the warfare, including implementation 
of a weapons embargo on all factions and the establishment of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia.291 
Stockpiles of arms had already grown so large in Greater Liberia, where their movement could not 
be easily regulated, that the embargo was imposed too late to be truly effective.292 Also, Liberia’s 
borders remained porous and open to weapons flow because ECOMOG had been unable to position 
its troops along key points.293 Thus, fighting and atrocities continued, including an AFL massacre of 
547 displaced persons at Harbel, west-central Liberia, in June 1993.294
The right to freedom of expression 
includes the freedom to “receive and 
impart information and ideas of all 
kinds… either orally, in writing or in 
print…or through any other media 
of…choice.” Art. 19(2), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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riSe of other factionS
The years between 1991 and 1994 saw the emergence of several new armed factions. In late May 
1991, a group of former Doe loyalists and AFL officers formed a new rebel group to resist Taylor’s 
forces.295 ULIMO received support from Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as initial support from 
ECOMOG.296 A former ULIMO combatant described the formation of ULIMO:
The objective of the new group was to fight against Taylor while avoiding 
the killing of innocent civilians. I joined ULIMO and helped recruit fighters 
and solicit donations for the organization among the Liberian refugee 
population in Guinea. I and other militants mobilized boys, girls, men, older 
people to fight - although, with respect to the recruitment of youngsters…
Alhaji [Kromah, the ULIMO leader] couldn’t accept children under 18. 
ULIMO first entered Liberia from Sierra Leone and its early military actions 
against Taylor’s forces were successful. There was fighting in Gbarnga, 
Taylor’s headquarters. Initially, ULIMO combatants were armed only with 
cutlasses, knives. They soon acquired weapons by “arresting” NPFL forces 
and seizing their guns.297 
From 1993 to 1994, a number of events resulted in the rise of other new factions. On July 25, 1993, the 
AFL, NPFL, and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Agreement.306 Although the Cotonou Agreement failed 
within months, it established a new government that included NPFL and ULIMO representatives.307 
ULIMO was formed in Sierra Leone in 1991, with the support of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.298 
Sierra Leone and Guinea supported Liberian refugees, primarily Krahn soldiers, in instigating a 
counteroffensive against the NPFL; this support was a response to the 1991 Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) invasion of Sierra Leone which came from bases in NPFL-controlled Liberia.299 With both countries 
providing a base, training, weapons, support, and trade in diamonds and other resources, ULIMO 
emerged as a major adversary to Taylor.300 
Later, in 1994, ULIMO divided into two factions, one of which was the Mandingo based ULIMO-K headed 
by Alhaji Kromah.301 The government of Guinea was closely involved in the factional struggle for the 
control of ULIMO because of ULIMO’s access to diamonds in Sierra Leone. During 1996-97, ULIMO-K 
surrendered 800,000 rounds of ammunition, more than all of the other factions put together.302 
Additionally, Kromah claimed to have a large contingent of Mandingo fighters in Guinea.303 ULIMO-K, 
like other military factions, looted the areas it controlled. After looting, ULIMO-K traded directly across 
the northern border with Guinean officers, who were often members of ECOMOG.304 In one example of 
looting and then trading in Guinea, a car was taken and disassembled in Liberia, reassembled in Guinea, 
and then sold.305
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Consequently, the accord not only elevated the NPFL into the political sphere, but also generated new 
factions, such as the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), that were not bound to the peace negotiations.308 
In 1993, the LPC was launched.309 An 800-person-strong, Krahn-dominated group headed by former 
PRC minister George Boley, the LPC was composed of members of the AFL and Krahn fighters 
of ULIMO.310 By October 1993, the LPC had begun fighting the NPFL,311 wresting from it control 
over key areas in the southeast.312 In March 1994, ULIMO split into two factions.313 The ULIMO-K 
faction was led by Alhaji Kromah, allied with Guinea, and dominated by members of the Mandingo 
ethnic group.314 The ULIMO-J faction was led by Roosevelt Johnson, allied with Sierra Leone, 
and dominated by members of the Krahn ethnic group.315 In turn, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), 
supported by Taylor, fought ULIMO-K in Lofa County.316All sides, including the new factions, 
reportedly continued to carry out human rights violations. 
There were still reports of ECOMOG soldiers committing human rights violations against civilians. 
One statement giver reported how family members and friends told stories about how ECOMOG 
troops violated people, raped girls, demanded bribes, and generally “took advantage of their power 
to treat people poorly.”317 Sources have described the looting by ECOMOG forces, which was so 
widespread it led to the joke that ECOMOG stood for “Every Car or Moving Object Gone.”318 
Another statement giver summarized how a Ghanaian ECOMOG soldier commanded her to pick up 
a wrapper dropped by a child she was accompanying:
When I did not immediately pick it up, he slapped me very hard in the ear. 
When I spoke back to him, he pointed his gun at my face. People began 
running in the street. I pushed the soldier and told him to kill me, but he 
took his gun and left. I could still hear a high pitched noise in my ear as a 
result of the slap.319
There were reports of ECOMOG carrying out summary executions. One statement giver stated that 
the Senegalese contingent of ECOMOG near Paynesville, a Monrovian suburb, would inspect youths 
for rebel marks; if they found youth bearing such marks, the soldiers arrested and killed them.320 
These tactics compelled the statement giver to 
join the NPFL out of fear for his life.321 Another 
statement giver witnessed the shooting of a man 
who took money and food. ECOMOG soldiers 
first shot him in the foot, felling him, then shot 
him again.322 In addition, statement givers stated 
they witnessed ECOMOG troops humiliating, 
torturing, and killing rebels whom they had 
captured and taken into custody.
“No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall 
be executed on a person found guilty of an offence 
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced 
by a court offering the essential guarantees of 
independence and impartiality.” Art. 6(2), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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Statements and secondary sources revealed accounts of ULIMO violations, including summary 
executions, torture, arrests, looting, the use of child soldiers, and restrictions on freedom of 
movement.323 One statement giver reported that, “the ULIMO war in 1993 was the toughest.”324 She 
fled for two months in the bush without food, surviving on strained mashed bush yams.325 Another 
statement giver described how ULIMO-J fighters broke into his family’s store, stole their money, 
killed his father, and raped his sister.326 
Furthermore, ULIMO fighters often crossed over into Guinea where Liberians had sought refuge.327 
One statement giver described how ULIMO soldiers crossed over and grabbed people from the 
Guinean camp where she stayed in 1993.328 She began disguising herself as an old woman to avoid 
abduction.329 Another statement giver recounted how ULIMO-K fighters brought pictures depicting 
their tortured captives to a school in Nzerekore, Guinea.330 
Crossing over into other countries to attack 
refugees, a violation of international law, was 
not a practice exclusive to ULIMO. Many 
statement givers described how other rebel 
groups had crossed the border and attacked them 
in refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire,331 Guinea,332 
Sierra Leone,333 or even as far away as Ghana.334 
Those who sought refuge in Côte d’Ivoire were 
particularly vulnerable. A Krahn statement giver 
recounted that his home in Côte d’Ivoire was 
close enough to Liberia that he could see NPFL 
rebels taunting him from the other side of the 
border. In this case, the rebels tried to coax refugees to come back to Liberia.335 One of the men 
acquiesced and crossed over to Liberia, whereupon NPFL rebels tied him up and then defecated and 
urinated on him before burning him alive and dumping his body into the river.336 The statement giver 
also described how NPFL rebels crossed over and attacked a group of women, who went to a nearby 
farm to plant food.337 He explained:
While the women were planting, Charles Taylor’s rebels crossed the river 
and slaughtered them. Twenty seven women were killed in all. Their bodies 
were dismembered. The rebels laid out the body parts in long lines and sold 
the body parts to other rebels…the rebels sold the hands for 25 cents, the 
arms for 50 cents and the heads for $2.00.338
Several statement givers described accounts of cannibalism by ULIMO and other factions.339 One 
statement giver overheard ULIMO girls describing how a girl was forced to cook human intestines 
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and heart.340 She became so traumatized, “she would just sit there and laugh all day.”341 One woman 
described how NPFL rebels killed a young boy, cut out his heart, and forced people to eat it.342 At 
times, the victims were still alive when their flesh was eaten. A woman said NPFL rebels had cut her 
hand and drank her blood.343 Another statement giver said she had seen a rebel commander chew 
off someone’s thumb.344 One man provided an explanation for the origins and reasons behind eating 
human flesh:
The Liberian saying is that when you eat the heart of your enemy, their 
power transcends to you. These people could extract the heart in a split 
second, while the victim was still alive, better than surgeons, and eat it raw. 
It has to be the Burkinabes who trained them to do it, because this was not 
the Liberian way before the war. None of this ever happened before Charles 
Taylor’s War of 1990.345
The LPC was also responsible for the commission of severe abuses. Statements describe LPC atrocities, 
including rape,346 murder,347 forced recruitment,348 use of child soldiers,349 use of drugs,350 torture,351 
abductions of bush wives,352 forced labor,353 and looting.354 As with other armed groups, the civilian 
population became the battleground for the LPC. One former LPC combatant recounted:
The LPC said to kill anyone they found because they were paying a debt. 
When I fought for LPC, the orders were to leave no one standing when we 
captured a village, so we killed everyone in the village.355 
Statements bear out accounts of the LPC’s widespread 
attacks on civilians, particularly in 1994 and in the southeast. 
A student living in Harper in 1994 recounted how LPC 
rebels attacked her school. They beat the teachers, poured 
gasoline around the school, and threatened to burn it down 
“from first grade progressing to ninth grade” if the teachers 
refused to send the students outside. When the teachers let 
the students out they “ran for their lives,” but LPC rebels 
killed many people, including the principal.356 
Like other warring groups, the LPC reportedly perpetrated their attacks using multiple forms of 
violence. One statement giver described how LPC rebels attacked him and his family in Zwedru in 
1994:
Protected persons include those not 
taking a direct part in or those who 
are no longer taking part in hostilities. 
Art. 4(1), Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts.
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One day some men from the LPC came to my house looking for my father, 
who worked for the government. The men, none of whom were wearing 
uniforms or carrying guns, raped my mother and sister, murdered my father 
in front of me, and hurt everyone in my family. Then they took me and my 
mother away from our house, and made us tote loads for them for two hours 
until we reached Fishtown. On the road to Fishtown, the rebels who were 
carrying me slashed a knife into my leg when I asked where they were taking 
me. To this day, I have a permanent scar on my leg, and cannot work for 
money because I can’t stand for longer than five minutes.357
Fighting, albeit at a lower intensity, continued. By August 1994, the Washington Post reported, “[w]
hile organized armed confrontation has been relatively light, there is no end in sight to the war...”358
akoSomBo agreement: 1994
On September 12, 1994, three warring factions, the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and AFL, signed the 
Akosombo Agreement. The accord granted Taylor considerable dispensations, including a seat on the 
five-person Council of State,359 much to the displeasure of the Nigerian government.360 Subsequently, 
ECOMOG attacked Gbarnga in September 1994. Civilians in Gbarnga found themselves in the midst 
of fighting and bombings. One statement giver summarized his experience and the long-term injuries 
he and his child sustained: 
During the fighting in Gbarnga in 1994, a rocket exploded in our house 
resulting in the near shattering of my left leg and the dislocation of my hip 
bone. I was in a coma when I was taken to the hospital in Abidjan. I stayed 
at Cocody Hospital in Abidjan for a year and a half. My left leg is presently 
shorter than my right leg, and I used to walk with crutches occasionally 
because they cause my left side to pain when I use them for a whole day from 
place to place. My daughter was also hit the same day. Some of the rocket’s 
particles penetrated her chest; she underwent surgery to have the particles 
removed. Today, she continues to live in pain, and drinks quite often in a day 
due to perpetual heart burn. I too live in perpetual pain.361
The attack, although unsuccessful, nevertheless demonstrated that Nigeria would not passively accept 
Taylor’s ascent to power.362 
Various factors, including politico-historical roots, ethnic divisions, and ECOMOG’s maneuvering 
among the armed groups, continued to splinter the factions.363 Alliances between ECOMOG and other 
factions proved unstable, leading to severances and attacks between factions and the peacekeeping 
163
force.364 
For example, ECOMOG and the Nimba Redemption Council (NRC) had discussed plans to 
launch a second front against the NPFL in early 1993.365 Upon deployment, the NRC’s spokesman 
issued a statement announcing the formation of the NRC and calling for support for ECOMOG’s 
deployment.366 To his surprise, however, ECOMOG forces were not deployed alongside the NRC 
combatants as planned:
It turned out that the ECOMOG soldiers were not in place. It turned out 
that Nigeria had borne too heavy of burden, and we found [this out] after 
the fact that Nigeria had borne a heavy burden for the ECOMOG effort 
in Liberia. And in order for them to deploy the troops, they would have 
to move a lot of conventional weapons, tanks, artillery from Conakry to 
Sinkor, which is I believe is about six or seven hundred miles and the road 
was largely unpaved…So, they made a decision against it, that they were not 
prepared to commit those resources…I got to find out from the ECOMOG 
commander…that they didn’t attempt to deploy anymore…they are taking 
the option off the table. And at that point I was really furious and a lot of 
us were furious because this was not what we signed onto. What we signed 
onto was to see that the peacekeepers would be deployed with our help to 
minimize the resistance from the Taylor fighters.367 
As a result, Taylor had forewarning of the 
attack, which enabled him to engage in 
combat and kill eight of the NRC fighters 
while they waited for the arrival of their 
ECOMOG allies.368
In 1994, division within the NPFL arose, 
leading Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie, and 
Lavelli Supuwood to form the NPFL-
Central Revolutionary Council.369 By 1995, 
there were seven different fighting factions, 
including the NPFL, NPFL-CRC, LDF, 
ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, AFL, and LPC. 
The exclusion of the newer, non-signatory factions from the Akosombo negotiations remained 
contentious.370 Thus, the factions convened to sign two more agreements on December 21, 1994.371 
The Accra Agreement enabled, inter alia, accession to the Akosombo Agreement, a ceasefire to begin 
midnight of December 28, 1994, and the establishment of a new Council of State composed of five 
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representatives selected by the various fighting factions.372
During this time, hostilities remained widespread throughout 80 percent of the country, but at a lower 
level of intensity.373 A U.N. report noted the segmenting of fighting into different territories according 
to the warring factions. For example, the NPFL and LPC coalition forces primarily battled in the 
eastern, northern, and to some extent, southern, parts;374 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K fought in the 
western areas;375 ULIMO-K and the NPFL fought in Lofa County;376 and ULIMO-J and the NPFL 
fought in Bong and Margibi Counties.377 Most fighting consisted of skirmishes, looting, and attacks 
on infrastructure.378
Statements detail atrocities by factions in spite of the relatively lower levels of fighting. A statement 
giver living in Maryland County described how in 1994 she returned home from the market to find 
her parents, brothers, and sisters gone.379 Rebels later captured and raped her.380 Another man living 
in Grand Gedeh County described how LPC rebels tried to forcibly recruit him in August 1994; when 
he refused, the rebels tortured him, stripped him naked, and jailed him for a day.381 Another statement 
giver living in Maryland County recounted how she and three other women ran into an ambush of 
Doe loyalists.382 One of the rebels raped her; when he finished he called over one of his friends to rape 
her as well.383 
Statements also contained reports of 
attacks against medical personnel and 
patients during the war.384 Two incidents 
in 1994 recounted by statement givers are 
demonstrative of these humanitarian law 
violations. A nurse recounted how Taylor’s 
rebels attacked the Bong County hospital 
and forced the nurses to render services to 
them.385 When ULIMO-J forces attacked 
in 1994, Taylor’s rebels reportedly returned 
to the hospital and “started killing nurses 
indiscriminately.”386 One woman living in Gbarnga described how Taylor’s forces attempted to take 
over the hospital in 1994:
Not long after they arrived at the hospital, Taylor’s troops attempted to take 
over the building, but the hospital personnel were able to hold them off. A 
few hours later, Taylor’s troops came back with reinforcement, and made 
everyone in the hospital come outside with their hands over their heads 
in a line. They treated invalids, the elderly, and hospital staff with equally 
brutal force. Everyone sat on the ground for hours, while Taylor’s men shot 
“Medical and religious personnel shall be respected 
and protected and shall be granted all available help for 
the performance of their duties…In the performance of 
their duties medical personnel may not be required to 
give priority to any person except on medical grounds.” 
Art. 9, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II) (1977).
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randomly at patients. I saw the body of my former doctor and my former 
reverend lying on the ground.387
aBuJa i: auguSt 1995 and the april 6, 1996 war
On August 19, 1995, warring parties reached the thirteenth peace agreement, Abuja I.388 The 
agreement provided for a new Council of State, disarmament, and elections.389 On September 1, 
1995, a collective transitional government known as the Liberian National Transitional Government 
II (LNTG II), headed by Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, and three civilian representatives, 
came into power.390 By bringing factional opponents into the political realm, the Abuja agreement 
ushered in political strategy as another means to gain control of the country.391 Notably, ULIMO-J 
was excluded from direct participation in the Abuja peace negotiations.392 Although the agreement 
included a provision granting ULIMO-J’s Roosevelt Johnson a head position at the Ministry of Rural 
Development,393 the exclusion of his faction from negotiations and the implicit failure to recognize 
ULIMO-J as a major force within the conflict likely served to alienate Johnson and ULIMO-J from 
the final terms of the Abuja accord. The outcome proved detrimental to both Roosevelt Johnson and 
Kromah, as ULIMO-J’s alienation and the new political framework stratagem converged against 
both leaders’ limited political backgrounds and mass appeal.394 As a result, it essentially preserved the 
potential for future conflict. 
Under the terms of Abuja I, a ceasefire commenced on August 26, 1995.395 Once again, the brokered 
peace remained tenuous. In December 1995, ULIMO-J forces violated the ceasefire agreement, 
attacking ECOMOG forces in Gbarma and Tubmanburg396 and repeatedly using civilians as human 
shields.397 During the fighting, ULIMO-J forces killed 16 Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers, wounded 
78 others, and seized the peacekeepers’ arms.398 
At this time, Taylor was setting the stage for a third battle in Monrovia by contriving a rift between 
ULIMO-J and ECOMOG.399 Using a murder reportedly committed by Roosevelt Johnson’s forces, 
Taylor urged the government to respond.400 The Council of State attempted to arrest Roosevelt 
Johnson, compelling him to seek refuge in AFL military barracks.401 Roosevelt Johnson insisted that 
the police represented henchmen of Charles Taylor’s NPFL and would not afford him just treatment.402 
The confrontation launched the third battle for Monrovia on April 6, 1996.403 ULIMO-J, LPC, and 
AFL forces fought against NPFL and ULIMO-K.404 Within the first few days, an estimated 2,000 
people were killed,405 with total fatalities rising to 3,000 people.406 One statement giver recalled that 
the death toll was so high that human bones began to pile up in the streets.407 Another statement giver 
witnessed combatants throwing bodies into the river.408
Statements attribute responsibility to all sides for human rights violations during the third battle 
for Monrovia. Liberians described seeing both rebel and military forces burning homes, attacking 
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families,409 killing,410 and seeking revenge.411 Tactics used previously throughout the war, such as 
forced cannibalism and tabay, were again employed to terrorize the population. One statement giver 
described how NPFL rebels sought to inflict this punishment on him and his family on April 6:
They cut my grandfather’s throat and cut his heart. We were all forced to 
drink his blood. They cut off my grandfather’s head and were going to make 
us eat it. I cried, “No, no.”412
Another statement giver, who was aligned with Doe loyalists, described how NPFL rebels arrested 
him, told him that he would not live to tell the story, and tabayed him.413 Numerous statement givers 
witnessed or were subjected to tabay.414 One statement giver described this treatment as being so 
painful and harmful that a tabay victim “would only have about an hour to live.”415
As discussed above, the third battle for Monrovia featured atrocities and targeting similar to those 
in the preceding hostilities.416 This time, however, statement accounts revealed the role of the new 
factions in perpetrating these and other abuses. One statement giver described the role of the LPC in 
assaulting, abducting, and sexually abusing him because he refused to give them water. He summarized 
his experience: 
In April 1996, during the third battle for Monrovia, I was near the Governor’s 
mansion selling cold water…Fighting broke out. Several men in a truck 
passed and demanded that I give them water. When I refused, they slapped 
me, hit me, and beat me. When I still refused, they grabbed me and put me 
in a pickup truck. I still have a scar on my nose from where I was hit with a 
rifle butt by the men in the truck. The men, who were with the LPC, took 
me to a dark house where I was required to entertain them. They would beat 
me and use me as their “playboy.” I spent several months in the house with 
the LPC and they threatened to make me fight for them.417
In the chaos, the fighters used extortions to obtain goods for themselves. One statement giver 
described how ULIMO-J rebels demanded money from her father. When he could not provide it, 
“Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons,* in particular murder as well 
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment” and threats thereof 
are prohibited at all times and places. Art. 4(2)(a), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
(1977).
*“Persons” indicates those who are not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in 
hostilities. Id. at Art. 4(1)
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they punished her father. She recounted: 
In that night, they captured my father and killed him. My father was a 
businessman. The ULIMO-J rebels came late in the night and called 
out, “Come out. Where’s the money?” My father responded, “I don’t 
have money. Just [enough] to sustain myself.” They beat him with rocks 
and guns. They tore him apart. Then they came for me and said I should 
take care of my father.418
The chaos and violence drove Liberians to seek refuge.419 One statement giver described the massive 
flight that ensued:
Militants burned my house in Monrovia, and at gunpoint, my family 
left. The whole neighborhood fled. Once they see one family run, the 
next family followed.420
Several Krahn hid in the abandoned military barracks in Monrovia.421 When the rebels were unable 
to take the barracks,422 Taylor ordered his forces to fire rockets at the barracks, which killed many 
people.423 
Many statement givers reported seeking haven at the U.S. Embassy’s Greystone Compound.424 Some 
Liberians were able to stay in a dormitory in the compound, but others were relegated to an outside area 
with limited shelter and no sanitation facilities.425 Both areas presented difficulties because of health 
problems and hazardous conditions. One statement giver who lived in the outside area stated her baby 
became ill due to heavy rains, while she contracted a high fever and lost significant weight because of 
sickness.426 People developed diarrhea because the toilet was located near their water source, which was 
heavily contaminated.427 Another statement giver described how they had to pour the drinking water 
out slowly to avoid consuming 
maggots.428 Food was also scarce 
at the compound, forcing people 
to venture out of the compound 
to buy food at the rebel lines.429 
While the compound provided 
relative safety from the rebels, it 
was not completely secure from 
gunfire.430 One statement giver 
reported that NPFL rebels would 
shoot haphazardly over the fence 
to try to kill people.431 
“[M]easures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible 
with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or 
custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove 
children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking 
place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are 
accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-
being.” Art. 4(3)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977).
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Statements revealed that ECO-MOG played a significant role in helping people escape the war in 
Liberia as well as in dispersing fighting forces and therefore stopping further human rights abuses. 
For example, many statement givers described how ECOMOG evacuated them by ship or truck to 
other countries. Most statement givers did not indicate they provided any payment for such transfer, 
although at least one statement giver reported she had paid $50 “to be stowed away on an ECOMOG 
boat to Ghana.”432 ECOMOG facilitated Liberians’ passage to cities and neighboring countries, such 
as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. One statement giver wsummarized: 
There was no way out. There were no more flights. No way to go out by car. 
ECOWAS soldiers provided the only safety we had.433 
Yet another ceasefire agreement commenced on April 19, 1996.434 When Taylor and Kromah returned 
to their government positions, however, Roosevelt Johnson’s forces resumed fighting a mere ten 
days later.435 By mid-May 1996, the United Nations reported that the fighting appeared to be at a 
stalemate.436 While the factions controlled different parts of Monrovia, no single group appeared able 
to assume full control.437
aBuJa ii: auguSt 1996
On August 17, 1996, another ECOWAS-brokered peace 
agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria with a revised timetable 
that called for elections to be held in 1997.438 The agreement 
extended the timetable for disarmament and elections beyond 
the original timetable of Abuja I and added the threat of 
sanctions, including a bar against running for elected office 
and prosecution for war crimes, against anyone violating the 
agreement.439 Under the terms of Abuja II, ECOMOG began 
disarming the fighting factions in November 1996 with 
assistance from the United Nations.440 A new ceasefire was 
declared on August 20, 1996, and elections were set for May 
30, 1997,441 although ECOMOG later postponed the elections until July 19, 1997, to allow time for 
preparation.442 On September 3, 1996, Ruth Perry, a former Liberian senator, assumed her position as 
Chairman of the reformed Council of State.443
Although the promise of elections brought some hope for change, the NPFL still engaged in 
intimidation of voters leading up to the elections.444 A statement giver summarized how rebels 
punished her entire family for a speech her mother gave in 1996, when her mother asserted that 
anyone involved in the war should not be voted for as President:
All citizens have the right to “vote 
and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be 
by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors.” Art. 
25(b), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
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Because of that speech, our neighbors brought his [rebel] friends to our house. 
When they got there, they asked all of us to come outside to them. When we 
came out of the house, they asked for our mother O. and we said they were 
gone on the farm. Then my sister, S.B., along with my grandmother, K., and 
my uncle, they all died on the spot. My sister S. and I were raped, beaten by 
them and they tied us on the tree. They went away, but before going, they 
told us that they will be back, and then they left us.445
The first Liberian civil war was both violent and tragic. Some commentators regard it as one of 
Africa’s bloodiest civil wars.446 In addition to killing hundreds of thousands of people and displacing 
more than one million, the war rendered countless civilians victims of other egregious human rights 
abuses. Numerous actors, ranging from combatants who committed violations, leaders who condoned, 
facilitated or ordered the atrocities, and onlookers who failed to intervene, bear responsibility for this 
suffering. One statement giver’s opinion about Charles Taylor is illustrative of the destruction and 
pain these actors perpetrated on Liberia. To this statement giver:
[Taylor] was a man of greed to whom nothing mattered other than his 
flamboyant lifestyle. His destruction of Liberia’s youth…has put a curse on 
Liberia, and I wish I could scratch out that part of the country’s history.447
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Chapter Eight. Liberia’s Second Civil War, 1997-2003
Background: the election of charleS taylor 
On July 19, 1997, Charles Taylor defeated 12 other candidates to win the presidential election. 
International observers declared the elections to be fair.1 Nevertheless, some human rights groups and 
scholars note that the elections took place in a general climate of intimidation.2 With rebel factions 
still largely intact, with few measures to prevent Taylor from challenging election results, and with 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) having promised to leave Liberia after 
the elections, many Liberians saw a vote for Taylor as the only path to stability.3 Indeed, Taylor was 
infamously associated with the slogan, “He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, I’ll vote for him.”4 
 When Taylor was inaugurated on August 2, 1997,5 Liberia was emerging from the seven-year conflict 
in a fragile state. Liberia’s treasury contained only $17,000, but the government owed some $2 billion 
in foreign debt and nearly $200 million in domestic debt, largely attributable to unpaid wages to 
civil servants.6 Economic and social rights remained deplorable after the 1997 elections. Out of 
a population of more than 3 million people, nearly one million Liberians, primarily women and 
children, remained displaced in 1997.7 Basic necessities, such as food and health care, were difficult 
for many Liberians to access. The conflict resulted in a dearth of health care facilities and personnel; 
it is estimated that more than 70 percent of health facilities were damaged, and only 1,806 of the 5,000 
health workers remained in the country.8 Statement givers also reported that food was difficult to 
obtain.9 Finally, after helping oversee the elections, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces 
departed Liberia in January 1998.10 
In addition to these challenges, the continued pattern of human rights abuses and corruption further 
aggravated Liberia’s precarious situation. Despite the hopes for peace, the Taylor government made 
few efforts toward reconciliation or the protection of human rights.11 The human rights violations 
under the Taylor government after the 1997 elections are well documented by secondary sources. 
These included torture and rape of suspected opposition supporters,12 extrajudicial executions,13 use 
of child soldiers,14 and persecution of government critics.15 Statements and testimony by Liberians in 
the diaspora confirmed the commission of human rights violations, as well as widespread corruption. 
In particular, statement givers described the discrimination against the Krahn and Mandingo groups, 
which was often manifested in violence and murder. One statement aptly depicted the situation under 
the elected Taylor regime: 
Taylor won the 199[7] election but reneged on his pre-election commitments 
to nation-building. Taylor created his own paramilitary force, the Anti-
Terrorist Unit (ATU). Taylor’s son, Chuckie Taylor, ran the ATU and 
tortured and killed many people…Conditions deteriorated for people in 
Liberia. There was no functioning economy and no infrastructure, including 
no water and no electricity. Taylor and his men, however, plundered the 
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Liberian treasury and had plenty of money, luxury cars, and other excess. 
Taylor maintained many girlfriends and tortured or killed people who 
opposed him. As a result, a new rebel group arose to fight him.16
Prime among actors responsible for these atrocities 
were the state security forces. In addition to the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)17 and the Liberian 
National Police,18 Taylor assumed leadership of 
the state security forces, the ATU and the SSS, 
both of which were directly accountable to him.19 
The most experienced of Taylor’s rebels joined 
these security forces.20 Many of these forces, 
however, were undisciplined, lacked training, and 
often acted unfettered by state authority.21 Many 
statements reveal the ATU’s role in perpetrating 
human rights abuses.22 Led by Chuckie Taylor, the ATU was responsible for torture, assault, rape, 
beatings, burning civilians alive, extrajudicial killings, abduction, and the recruitment of child 
soldiers.23 
One statement giver’s summary of experiences describes the brutal methods employed by the ATU’s 
members:
The first was…the Executive Mansion Guard Commander and the second…
was the Assistant Training Commander at the Gbatala base of the ATU anti-
terrorist unit. During the war, two of my brothers, M. and O., got killed 
by these two men and our homes were set on fire and burned down…My 
mother’s ear was cut off because she asked the people why they killed her 
children...These men who killed my brothers, M. and O., beat, threatened, 
and dragged me and my family out of our homes. They are still in the state 
security in Liberia.24
High-level government officials also 
perpetrated abuses. In some cases, 
they bore command responsibility for 
having ordered or known about the 
commission of atrocities. In many 
other cases, these officials assumed 
a direct role in perpetrating human 
rights violations or threats. For ex-
State Parties “shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.” The state or threat of war, political 
instability or a public emergency does not justify 
the use of torture. Art. 2(1)-(2), Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
“[T]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by 
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples” is prohibited.* Art. 3(1)(d), Convention (IV) 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(1949).
* Protected persons include those taking no active part in 
the hostilities. Id. at Art. 3(1). 
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ample, one statement giver described the threats he faced from a government minister. Shortly after 
the 1997 elections, he published a story that detailed the minister’s embezzlement from the national 
soccer team.25 Upon meeting him on the street, the minister told the statement giver, “I can have my 
boys flog you for trying to tarnish my character.”26 The journalist 
responded by publishing a front-page story, “Minister threatens 
journalist,” as well as an op-ed, “We will remain resolute.”27 The 
minister came to his office and threatened, “I still have my boys with 
me. You better shut up or you won’t live to tell the story.”28 These 
exchanges continued for some time, and with the minister “on [his] 
back,” the statement giver began moving from place to place living 
with family members.29 
These government abuses exacerbated an already unstable situation, 
given the ongoing violations by rebel factions. Insurgent activity 
continued after the 1997 elections, and rebel groups, including 
ULIMO-K, had remained intact or were beginning to become active 
again. Statement givers reported rebel violence that paralleled that of 
the government forces: abductions, rape, forced recruitment, forced 
labor, torture, destruction of property, interference with privacy and family, and killings.30 While 
not as systematic as the rebel violence that later followed in 2000, these incidents were nevertheless 
effective means to terrify and to punish civilians for no reason. 
Statements show that the atrocities committed by rebel factions were no less horrific than those 
committed by government forces. ULIMO-K rebels remained active and continued a pattern of 
atrocities similar to that of the first civil war. One statement giver from Lofa County summarized 
how ULIMO destroyed her father’s home and killed him:
In 1998, members of the ULIMO group tied and beat my father. He died 
later from the beating wounds. He had a stroke. During the beating, they 
cut his back, and his spinal cord got infected. He couldn’t move, and then 
he died. I was in Monrovia when it happened, but I met my father before he 
died, and he explained everything to me. He told me that the ULIMO rebels 
tore his whole house apart, and took everything out, all that he had built 
up from his retirement. My father was about 64 years old. My father was a 
good man, and he loved his children. He was innocent, and he hadn’t done 
anything to anyone, and they just beat him for no reason.31
Opposition groups during this time included new entities – Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). LURD was a rebel 
“Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of 
expression; this right 
shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, 
or through any other media 
of his choice.” Art. 19(2), 
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
(1966).
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group supported by Guinea and formed to oust Taylor, made up of primarily Krahn and Mandingo 
combatants from the previous civil war.32 MODEL was a breakaway group from LURD that received 
support from Côte d’Ivoire.33 The situation was further complicated by the activity of regional forces. 
For example, the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), frequently 
crossed into, recruited from, took refuge in, and 
launched attacks from Liberia.34 As with the first 
civil war, several statement givers did not specify 
or were not able to identify which armed faction 
had perpetrated the reported violence. Some 
statements refer to the perpetrators as “rebels,” 
“armed men,” “unknown men,” or “mixed group,” 
without indicating to which group they belonged.35
LURD rebel activity was also beginning at this 
time. For example, one statement giver described 
how several LURD rebels broke into the Lutheran 
World Church Services office in Lofa County 
in 1996 or 1997, “killing everyone they could, 
including clergy, and children of all ages.”39 
Another statement giver described how, in 1998, LURD rebels burst into their home, beat everyone 
in the house, and killed his two brothers and father.40 According to him, his father was the town chief 
and accused by LURD rebels of harboring government forces against them.41
As in the first civil war, all sides 
continued to abuse their power to 
exact revenge, enrich themselves, 
and repress vocal opposition. Trivial 
matters, such as personal conflicts 
or petty grievances, were cause for 
forces to exploit their authority. One 
statement giver summarized how a 
member of Taylor’s ATU punished 
her as a result of a personal conflict 
over borrowing her cell phone:
[H]e took a bayonet from behind him (he had it stuck in his trousers) and 
proceeded with slashing me all over my body. He cut me deep on my back 
resulting in the cutting of a major vein. Then he cut across my left thigh and 
almost around the entire thigh. He stabbed me several times on my head and 
External Actors’ Support of LURD
Liberian refugees in West Africa formed 
LURD in 1999. LURD received support from 
various government actors, among them 
Guinea and Sierra Leone. In a 2002 report, the 
International Crisis Group described Guinean 
President Conté’s government as “LURD’s 
primary source of direct military and financial 
support.”36 Guinea provided support to LURD 
in the form of logistical assistance, medical 
treatment, a base, transport, food, arms, 
weaponry, and ammunition.37 Sierra Leone also 
provided support to LURD by supplying rebels 
with a base, combatants, and a shipping route 
for weapons.38
“[V]iolence to the life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons,* in particular murder as well as cruel 
treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal 
punishment” and threats thereof are prohibited at all places 
and times in non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)
(a), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts. 
*“Persons” indicates those who are not taking a direct part in 
or those who are no longer taking part in hostilities. Id. at Art. 
4(1).
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gave me deep cuts on my left and right arms, on my back and my abdomen. 
I bled profusely. The cut veins in my thigh and back had to be stitched in 
those parts/sutured before bleeding stopped in those parts of my body.42 
Some statement givers related experiences of rebels abusing civilians to settle personal grievances as 
the government soldiers had done.43 One statement giver from Lofa County summarized the extreme 
violence by a LURD rebel in 1999 over a land dispute between their fathers: 
My father, stepmother and I were in the house that morning when [the 
man’s] son…a LURD rebel, entered the house with four other LURD rebels. 
[The LURD rebel] busted down the house with the butt of his gun, called 
my father a dog, yelled at him, took money from him and said, “If possible, 
I will get rid of you and your whole generation.” They were shooting in the 
house. My stepmother and I tried to hide under the bed in a bedroom. The 
rebels took all three of us outside of the house, and [the LURD rebel] asked 
where the deed for the land was. My father responded that he did not have it 
and explained that [the LURD rebel’s] father had tried to use more land than 
was given to him. The rebels tied my father’s wrists behind his back and 
beat all three of us. [The LURD rebel] then asked me to search the house 
for the deed. [The LURD rebel] forced me into a room, tore my clothes off 
and raped me. He told me that he was going to “finish her family.” He then 
called each of the other four rebels one at a time, and each one of them also 
raped me. The rebels then brought me outside and [the LURD rebel] told 
us because you will not give us the deed, we will kill you. He told me that to 
let you know that we are serious, we will kill your father. Then [the LURD 
rebel] shot and killed my father.44
At times, the climate of violence afforded civilians opportunities to avenge personal grievances 
alongside the rebels. A farmer living in Kolahun described how he often sold food and loaned money 
to people.45 In 1998 or 1999, ULIMO-K rebels 
came to the village and began torturing him.46 
People who owed him money joined the rebels 
in their torture, tying sticks together to press on 
his shin, hitting him on his back, and torturing 
his brother.47 To this day, he still bleeds when 
urinating as a result of the torture.48 
Government soldiers also used their position of 
power to extort money from civilians in their 
“Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Art. 6(1), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966). “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence...” All people are 
entitled to the protection of law against such 
interference. Art. 17, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
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homes and in public. A statement giver, who worked in the susu (informal community banking) 
business, described how a general in Taylor’s forces led a group of rebels to his home and demanded 
money.49 The general took his money and cut him on his left arm and stomach.50 Checkpoints 
continued to serve as a means for security forces to conduct arbitrary searches and extort money from 
passersby.51
camp JohnSon road: SeptemBer 1998
In September 1998, violence 
intensified as the government 
responded to threatened 
opposition on Camp Johnson 
Road. On September 18 and 
19, 1998, Taylor’s soldiers 
attempted to arrest Roosevelt 
Johnson, who sought refuge 
at the U.S. Embassy.52 As a 
result, fighting again broke out 
between Johnson’s supporters 
and Taylor’s security forces.53 
Statement givers reported 
being caught in the crossfire, 
which resulted in injuries and 
in some cases, death.54 One statement giver recounted how army soldiers began to beat him and his 
family, arrested his father, and told everyone to leave the house:
As we were running from the house, my mother was hit by a stray bullet and 
she died. The barracks people were exchanging fire with R. Johnson people. 
I hauled my mother in between houses trying to stop her bleeding, but I had 
to leave her. The bullet hit her from the back.55 
During and following the incident, Taylor’s forces intensified their crackdown on suspected opposition. 
The ensuing violence was demonstrative of the state’s general response to threats. Multiple statement 
givers described how security forces made arrests, entered homes, and carried out rapes, beatings, and 
killings on and following September 18.56 
Given their historical ties to Doe, the Krahn, Mandingo, Roosevelt Johnson supporters, and National 
Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) members were particularly susceptible to these abuses.57 One 
statement giver, whose father was distantly related to former Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison, 
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described how 12 armed Special Security Service (SSS) men entered his home and took away his 
father.58 They stated, “you people are the same conspirators causing problems for the country. We will 
deal with you.”59 
Security forces did not limit their violence to the 
suspected individual, and family members and 
associates were all at risk of violence during arrests. 
Statements described the extreme violence perpetrated 
against members of targeted suspect groups and 
their families in their homes. One Krahn statement 
giver, whose father was in the army and was a NDPL 
member, summarized how security forces broke into 
their home, called them “Krahn dogs,” and stated 
“they would finish us that night.” The security forces 
shot and killed their aunt, beat all of them, paralyzing 
his stepfather on one side of his body. When his 
brother pleaded for his father, they twisted his arm 
until it broke.60
The September 18 fighting propelled Taylor’s efforts to uncover alleged enemies and supporters 
of rebel factions, whether real or perceived, and resulted in more persecution. Security personnel 
harassed suspected rebel supporters, conducting illegal surveillance and entries into homes.61 Another 
statement giver summarized how her father was accused of passing sensitive information to the then-
exiled Prince Johnson in Nigeria after September 18 and of storing a cache of weapons:62 
Without a search warrant, they went from room to room searching for the 
alleged hidden arms. In the meantime, the entire household which included 
my father, step-mother, my siblings and myself were tied with nylon twine 
on chairs and beaten with gun butts and any object they could lay their 
hands on. I was severely beaten with a gun butt in my abdomen. I sustained 
serious abdominal injury that led to me undergoing abdominal surgery in 
Ghana. The same soldier that beat me in my abdomen also pierced my feet 
with sharp rusty iron. The scars of this barbaric treatment are on my feet 
to this date. The blows to my abdomen caused me to faint. My first cousin 
who was also tied tried to reach me and help me stand. Seeing his effort, one 
of the armed men who referred to himself as Turtle shot my cousin in his 
forehead killing him instantly. They never found the arms and ammunition 
that were allegedly hidden in the house. Yet, they took away my father 
for interrogation. He was detained for a few days and released. When he 
returned home I observed that he had lost one of his front teeth as a result 
“States Parties shall assure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction effective protection 
and remedies, through the competent 
national tribunals and other State 
institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his human 
rights and fundamental freedoms contrary 
to this Convention, as well as the right to 
seek from such tribunals just and adequate 
reparation or satisfaction for any damage 
suffered as a result of such discrimination.” 
Art. 6, International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965). 
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of being beaten while in detention.63 
Taylor also turned on those within his own administration. For example, Bai Gbala, who served 
nine months as an advisor to Taylor’s government, testified about his arrest on September 19, 1998, 
sentencing and imprisonment. Gbala was tried and convicted with 17 others on charges of treason. 
The defendants were given sentences of ten years. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Liberia not only 
affirmed the lower court decision, but added 20 years to the sentence.64
Such persecution forced numerous ethnic Krahn and Mandingo to flee their homes and the country. 
One Krahn statement giver recounted how his uncle’s friend advised him to go to Ghana, because 
“Taylor’s men were killing Krahn.”65 It is estimated that in September 1998 as many as 18,000 Krahn 
fled Liberia to the Côte d’Ivoire.66 
lurd invaSion: SeptemBer 2000
By 1999, the country was on the verge of a second civil war. Armed opposition groups, whose exact 
identities were unclear, began launching offensives from Guinea in 1999.67 The combination of 
regional instability, rebel activity, and the government’s atrocities laid the foundation for even greater 
strife. One statement giver who perceived the impending war decided to leave Liberia at this time. 
He explained: 
After Taylor won the election, he was supposed to move on with peace. 
Instead, by 1999, President Taylor’s actions in training the army, fiscal 
mismanagement, etc. were all indications that the country was boiling to 
crisis. It was a time bomb waiting to explode.68
In September 2000, the situation escalated when LURD launched its offensive from Guinea into Lofa 
County.69 As in the first civil war, Liberians were again thrown into chaos and a constant state of fear 
for their lives. A statement giver summarized his family’s experiences as the conflict intensified:
My wife, five children, and I lived peacefully all our lives in Nimba County, 
Liberia until the civil war erupted locally with fire upon the Liberia’s 
States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “shall take special precautions 
in time of public emergency to ensure that neither official nor semi-official groups engage in a practice 
of arbitrary and extra-judicial killings or involuntary disappearances, that persons in detention are 
protected against torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and 
that no persons are convicted or punished under laws or decrees with retroactive effect.” ¶ 59, Siracusa 
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
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civilians…[T]he war hit hard where my family and I lived and thus, we were 
forced to flee. It was around the year 2000…We remained in Monrovia for 
some time, as we could not find transportation away. We survived day by 
day, taking refuge wherever we could find it and hiding in the bush upon 
hearing the gunfire announcement of another rebel attack. Every minute of 
each day, we lived in fear of the rebels, for our lives or being abducted and 
tortured.70 
Reports of these violations were especially pronounced in Lofa County, which borders Sierra Leone 
and Guinea. From the start of the invasion, the regional hostilities along the Sierra Leonean, Guinean, 
and Liberian borders, along with armed incursions from Guinea, placed Lofa County at the center of 
the violence.71 LURD intensified its village raids in northern Liberia’s Lofa County around February 
2001.72 Again, statements revealed the recurring theme of targeted violence based on affiliation or 
ethnicity. Lofa County residents with NDPL affiliations or of Mandingo or Krahn ethnicity were 
particularly vulnerable. A Mandingo statement giver, who was a member of the NDPL and lived in 
Lofa, summarized his persecution:
Because I had been a member of the NDPL, and was also Mandingo, I 
knew I was in danger. People in Lofa would often accuse me of being part 
of LURD. One day, when I was coming from my farm, my brother saw 
three men with guns coming toward the house. The men starting calling my 
name, and saying that I was a Doe supporter who wanted to create another 
war. The men then began calling for my father until my father opened the 
front door. The men shouted that my family and I weren’t citizens and began 
shooting inside the house. I jumped immediately into the bush and never 
went back to my house. When I reached the Voinjama checkpoint, I was 
arrested and beaten by government soldiers, who told me I was causing 
trouble. The beating left permanent scars on my head.73 
The invasion precipitated even further human 
rights abuses by government forces as Taylor 
sought to uncover suspected rebels. The 
government continued its practice of targeting 
suspected opposition members using sweeps that 
specifically targeted supporters of LURD and 
MODEL. One statement giver described how 
Taylor’s forces arrested her son based on a rumor 
that he was a member of LURD.74 He, along 
with 14 other boys, was taken to the National 
Bureau of Investigation and charged with being 
“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention 
is not lawful.” Art. 9(4), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966).
 “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation.” Art. 9(5), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
Chapter Eight
192
an informant, but was never brought before a court.75 During his detention he was beaten every day.76 
He was eventually released in 2004, along with other political prisoners.77 
Suspected LURD members were arrested and tortured to obtain information. For example, one 
statement giver described how ATU forces severely beat and electrocuted him, putting a wire in his 
penis and shocking him.78 They then threw him 
into saltwater to maximize the pain and shot 
rounds at him at close range.79 Security forces 
told him they would release him if he admitted 
to working with LURD, provided information 
about LURD members, and agreed to go into 
exile when released.80
One statement giver described how a boy who 
worked in her husband’s store falsely told Tay-
lor’s forces that her husband supported LURD. She summarized what happened when the boy led the 
forces to their home in 2003: 
The rebels busted down the door and told my husband he was a dog for 
supporting LURD. I was five months pregnant at this time. It was early 
in the morning and there were many rebels. The rebels began beating my 
husband and torturing him with the butts of their guns. My eight-year-old 
son and I were under gun point. My son ran to his father crying out “Oh 
Papa.” The rebels cut my son with a knife and stabbed him in the chest. I 
went to protect my son and the rebels kicked me in the stomach and I lost 
consciousness. When I came to I saw a pool of blood. I started crying and 
saying “Come for me, I am dying.” Someone came to my rescue and brought 
me to Redemption Hospital, which was near my house, in Monrovia. After 
three days, my baby came out dead. I was told that my husband and son had 
been killed in the rebel attack.81 
“world warS i, ii, and iii:” Summer 2003
From June to August 19, 2003, LURD launched three major attacks against Monrovia, known as 
“World Wars I, II, and III,” in reference to their destructive impact. 82 Estimated fatalities in July alone 
ranged from 300 to 1,000 people.83 During the LURD invasions of Monrovia, those living in the city 
also fell victim to their abuses.84 One statement giver’s experience reflected the broad human rights 
violations, which included beatings, killings, gang rape, destruction of property, and abductions: 
“Each State Party shall ensure that any statement 
which is established to have been made as a result 
of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any 
proceedings, except against a person accused 
of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made.” Art. 15, Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984).
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[W]hen the war came to Monrovia again and LURD invaded, the commander 
came to our house. They beat everyone. I stayed with my brother and uncle 
but then ran to my father. My sisters, brothers and mother ran away. The 
LURD men hit me and I fell to the floor. Five LURD men raped me. My 
uncle tried to rescue me and they shot and killed him. His name was C.B. He 
was my father’s brother. They burned our house. While they were raping me, 
the LURD men took my father. I have had no news of my father, mother or 
brothers and sisters since then.85
riSe of model
In March 2003, antagonism toward the LURD leader, Sekou Damate Conneh, led to the group’s split 
into a separate faction, MODEL.86 Comprised of approximately 1,000 fighters, MODEL received 
support from Côte d’Ivoire, and it took control of the southern and eastern parts of Liberia.87 Sources 
report that MODEL was responsible for human rights violations, such as harassment at checkpoints, 
detention, torture, killings, forced labor, the looting of property, forced recruitment, and rape and 
sexual violence.88 Fewer statements provided accounts of abuses by MODEL forces relative to other 
armed groups. One possible explanation for this disparity is that MODEL did not form a recognized 
fighting force until early 2003, just months before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Taylor’s 
exile. 
At least one statement described the summary killings that MODEL rebels carried out. 
In April 2003, the MODEL rebels came with a list of the people they were 
targeting. They were looking for my mother and my family. The names of 
all of the adults in my family were on their list. When the rebels reached the 
town, I saw them kill people. Other rebels arrived and some were taking off 
their uniforms. The rebels were chasing, attacking and killing the refugees. 
The rebels killed my cousins, uncle, grandfather, grandmother and great 
aunt.89
Another statement giver described the harassment, torture, and deprivation of property he experienced 
by MODEL soldiers. In July 2003, MODEL soldiers stopped him, his wife, and his children at a 
“War crimes” in non-international armed conflicts include the commission of “rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy…enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.” Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998). 
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checkpoint.90 The soldiers did not touch 
his wife, but took her bag containing her 
belongings.91 Another time, he described 
how MODEL soldiers caught him while 
he was searching for food in the bush.92 
The soldiers tied his arms behind his 
back, hit him on the back and sides, 
and then released him.93 To this day, the 
statement giver still feels pain.94 Finally, 
he reported that MODEL soldiers 
destroyed his house.95 
As LURD and MODEL pushed toward 
Monrovia and Buchanan in the first half of 2003, and particularly in June and July of that year, the 
AFL, MODEL, and the LURD engaged in regular forced recruitment, including the recruitment of 
children.96 Armed factions used displaced persons and refugee camps in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Guinea as recruiting grounds for child soldiers.97 
By September 2003, LURD controlled territory in western Liberia, while 
MODEL controlled areas in the south.98 In June 2003, the warring parties 
signed a ceasefire agreement, which was broken by LURD when it launched 
new offensives on Monrovia.99
Finally, on July 6, 2003, under international pressure, Charles Taylor agreed 
to leave Liberia for asylum in Nigeria.100 He formally resigned the presidency 
and departed Liberia on August 11, 2003, handing over power to his vice 
president.101 On August 18, 2003, MODEL, LURD and Taylor’s forces 
signed a comprehensive peace accord in Accra, Ghana, and an agreement 
to form a new transitional government was established.102 Gyude Bryant 
was elected to head the National Transitional Government of Liberia, 
which was inaugurated on October 14, 2003.103
Acts, such as murder, extermination, torture, rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced disappearance of persons, severe 
deprivation of physical liberty, persecutions against any 
identifiable group based on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural religious or gender grounds, or other 
similar inhumane acts that are intended to cause great 
suffering or serious bodily injury or injury to mental or 
physical health, constitute “crimes against humanity” 
when “committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.” Art. 7(1)(a)-(b), (e)-i), (k), Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
The conscription 
or enlistment of 
children under 15 
years of age for use 
in armed forces or 
active participation in 
hostilities constitutes 
a war crime. Art. 8(2)
(e)(vii), Rome Statute 
of the International 
Criminal Court (1998).
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Chapter Nine. Child Soldiers
1991 was the time I held a gun myself. All the way until 1996 I fought for 
Taylor…The rebels came and took [my parents] from the house. It was 
raining. The rebels beat them and made them lie down in the rain and 
tied their hands behind their back. Then [the commander] came and took 
me away and made me his personal body guard…I had an AK-47 with a 
wooden guard not a folding stock. My war name was Kali; I was very slim 
as a cat and very swift.1
Child soldiers were used by multiple fighting factions in Liberia beginning in 1989.2 Statement 
givers detailed both their involvement as child soldiers, as well as the gross human rights violations 
committed by child soldiers. During the conflict, child soldiers themselves were subject to numerous 
human rights and humanitarian law violations, including abductions, compulsory and underage 
recruitment, torture, forced labor, rape, killings, and threats. By using children to fight in the armed 
conflict, factions not only forced children to commit egregious human rights violations themselves, 
but also deprived them of rights to which they, as children, are entitled.3 
In this report, the term “child soldier” is used to refer to any “child associated with an armed force 
or armed group” and includes any girl or boy less than 18 years old4 “recruited or used by an armed 
force or armed group in any capacity,” including as “fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for 
sexual purposes.”5 
In armed conflicts not of an international character: 
“Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: 
(a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes 
of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care; 
(b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated; 
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces 
or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; 
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of 
subparagraph (c) and are captured; 
(e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or 
persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily 
from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that 
they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.”
Art. 4(3), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
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Estimates of the number of child soldiers engaged in fighting during the Liberian conflict range 
from 15,0006 to more than 20,000.7 Although the warring factions forcibly recruited children, some 
associated themselves with fighting forces for other reasons, usually because there was no alternative 
for survival.8 Children reported joining factions for a variety of reasons: “to avenge the killings of 
parents, other family or friends; to protect their families from the warring factions; or to get food for 
themselves and their families” or because “no one was left to take care of them.”9 
Life for children associated with fighting factions was traumatic and very dangerous as they attempted 
to survive the rigors of a military existence. Children were put to work as fighters, made to fetch 
and carry ammunition, and used as cooks.10 Girls were often raped and used as sexual slaves.11 One 
statement giver now in Ghana described his recruitment at age seven. “I was in Maryland County, in 
Harper, when the war started in 1990. One day there was plenty firing around where we were living. 
The [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] (NPFL) men carried me to cook for them and work carrying 
wood. I was only seven years old. This went on for many months.”12 
Children who were used as fighters, like many of their adult counterparts, often received little 
training.13 Instead, they were given drugs and alcohol to make them aggressive and fearless.14 Under 
these conditions, children were particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition.15
The TRC mandate specifically addresses the issue of child soldiers. Section 4(e) states that the TRC is 
to promote “national peace, security, unity and reconciliation” by:
Adopting specific mechanisms and procedures to address the experiences 
of women, children and vulnerable groups, paying particular attention to 
gender-based violations, as well as to the issue of child soldiers, providing 
opportunities for them to relate their experiences. Addressing concerns and 
recommending measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of such violations 
in the spirit of national reconciliation and healing.16
This section of the report summarizes the recruitment of children to serve as soldiers, the experiences 
of child soldiers, the violence perpetrated by child soldiers, and the status of former child soldiers in 
the aftermath of the war.
demographic characteriSticS of child SoldierS
The available information both from statements and secondary sources on the origins, numbers and 
demographic characteristics of Liberian child soldiers is limited. Many statement givers’ accounts of 
atrocities perpetrated by particular groups did not single out child soldiers from among the perpetrators. 
Statement givers’ descriptions of perpetrating groups and individuals included “boys,” “soldiers,” 
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“soldier boys,” “rebels,” or “rebel boys,” sometimes with estimates as to the age of perpetrators, 
but often without reference to age. One statement giver reported that she was raped at age eight by 
a “rebel boy;”17 another statement giver reported her rape by two “boys” at age 13.18 One statement 
giver recalled seeing a nine- or ten-year-old child soldier armed with a gun and grenade in July 1990.19
By 2000, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 15,000 children had fought 
in the Liberian conflict.20 In 2004, Amnesty International estimated that 21,000 children, including 
approximately 2,000 girls, had been combatants in Liberia.21 The United Nations noted “that one 
out of every ten Liberian children may have been recruited at some time into the war effort both 
in Liberia and in the neighboring 
countries…”22 In 1994, UNICEF 
estimated that ten percent of 
combatants, or 6,000, were less 
than 15 years old.23 It also estimated 
that in 1996-97, 18 percent of 
NPFL soldiers were children.24 The 
majority of these were between 15 
and 17 years old and had served for 
an average of four years; 27 percent 
were between 12 and 14 years old.25 
It was reported that some child 
combatants were as young as six 
years old26 and that ten-year-olds 
would hold command responsibility 
at checkpoints and roadblocks.27
Demobilization statistics also provide some insight into the magnitude of the problem. At the war’s 
end in 2003, between 38,000 and 53,000 fighters of all ages reportedly needed to be demobilized.28 
By 2005, UNICEF reported that it had demobilized 11,780 child soldiers and reunited virtually all of 
them with family or caregivers.29 It was reported, however, that previously demobilized combatants 
were being re-recruited to fight in Côte d’Ivoire.30
The vast majority of child combatants were boys, although girls were also recruited for combat and 
sexual slavery. During the 1996-97 demobilization, roughly one percent of the demobilized child 
soldiers were “girls or young women.”31 Between 2002 and 2005, the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) demobilized 10,963 children, of which 23 percent were girls.32
Child soldiers reported having little education, generally less than a fifth grade level.33 For those who 
participated in the fighting, their education was interrupted sometimes for years. Among a group of 
Chapter Nine
206
ex-combatants interviewed by Human Rights Watch, most reported attending first grade; one boy 
interviewed could not read or write his name.34 One statement giver, forcibly recruited at age ten, 
reported that he was the only one in his unit who could read and write.35 
recruitment of child SoldierS
Forcible Recruitment and Conscription
Forcible recruitment of child soldiers by combatant groups occurred in a variety of contexts.36 Former 
child solders described seizure and kidnapping of children from their families in the course of raids 
or fighting. One statement giver 
described his recruitment by NPFL 
forces at age eight in the aftermath 
of a raid on his village that resulted 
in the deaths of several adults 
and children.37 The surviving 
village children were rounded up 
and taken away, including the 
statement giver, who was told by a 
commander, “My man, from today 
you’re with me.”38 Another former 
child soldier, taken away at age ten 
by Taylor’s forces after they killed 
his parents in Nimba County, 
was designated the bodyguard 
of the commander of the group 
responsible for his parents’ kil- 
lings.39 At age 13, another state-
ment giver witnessed the be-
heading of his father by Taylor’s 
forces before being taken away by 
them; the rebel commander then 
told him that he should fight with 
them.40 
Another former child soldier stated that, when the rebels came to his village in Sinoe County in 1990, 
they lined up all the village children in front of their families’ houses and asked which child was the 
oldest in each family.41 Every oldest child, whether male or female, was taken away by the rebels to 
fight.42 The statement giver explained that 14 of these conscripted children were killed in a single 
International human rights and humanitarian law governing the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers: 
“Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a 
State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in 
hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.” States Parties are 
to take “all feasible measures” to prevent this practice, including 
prohibitions against and criminalization of such acts. Art. 4(1)-(2), 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict. 
“Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts constitutes 
a war crime. Art. 8(2)(e)(vii), Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. 
“[C]hildren who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall 
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed 
to take part in hostilities” in non-international armed conflicts. 
Art.4(3)(c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflict (Protocol II).
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battle, and the rebels later returned to villages to force second-born children to join their forces.43
The consequences of refusing to join a fighting faction were dire. Children were presented with the 
choice to join a particular fighting faction or face being beaten,44 tortured,45 or killed46 for refusing to 
do so. As described by one former child soldier, in 1992 at age 15, he was forced to take up arms by 
a NPFL general who told him to “choose between life and death.”47 A 14-year-old boy, captured and 
tortured with his father, reported that the rebels forced him to smoke opium, beat him, slapped him 
and tortured his father in front of him in an effort to persuade him to join their forces.48 An 11-year-
old survivor of a raid was jailed by the perpetrators for three days and given the option to “join the 
rebels or be killed.”49
Children were also subject to forced recruitment techniques that included seizure at checkpoints50 or 
random abduction from roads or streets.51 Knowledge that boys were particularly targeted for forced 
recruitment led many to remain in hiding during certain periods of the conflict.52 Some statement 
givers recounted their fear of sending boys in their families out to find food or water for fear that they 
would not return. One such statement giver commented that “Liberia was not safe for young men” 
like himself because of their vulnerability to forced recruitment.53
Other Reasons for Recruitment and Enlistment
According to a 1994 Human Rights Watch report, although some children had been forcibly recruited, 
some also associated themselves with one faction or another because of “the advantage.”54 The 
“advantage” meant participating to “avenge the killings of parents, brothers and sisters, to protect 
their families, or to get scarce food for themselves and their families…”55 For some child soldiers, it 
also meant participating for quasi-patriotic reasons – “to fight for my country”56 or to fight “for my 
freedom.”57 
Secondary sources and statements described how children may have participated in armed groups 
because they saw it as the only way to access scarce resources after the death or disappearance of 
parents and family.58 One statement giver described his reasons for joining the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) at age 12 after witnessing the aftermath of the Lutheran Church 
Massacre:
[After my e]xposure to all this terror, horror and violence, I became bitter 
and decided to affiliate with forces of the Independent National Patriotic 
Front (INPFL), headed by Prince Y. Johnson. My purpose for befriending 
the INPFL was to get food daily and for safety.59
Another statement giver told the TRC that he managed to stay with his father during the early stages 
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of the conflict, but in 1996, lost contact with his father at age 15.60 Seeing no other choice for survival, 
he began fighting with the rebels.61 Another former child soldier described joining the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia – Johnson faction (ULIMO-J) forces at age ten after 
opposition forces killed his entire family.62 The necessity to “preserve my life” was described by one 
former child soldier as his motive for joining the NPFL during 
Operation Octopus.63 He witnessed Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Senegalese 
peacekeepers arrest and kill tattooed rebel fighters and feared 
for his own survival, as he himself bore tattoos as a result of his 
two years serving as a child soldier in Prince Johnson’s forces.64 
Some child soldiers associated themselves with fighting factions after having been forcibly recruited 
earlier by other factions. One statement giver who fought for the NPFL for three years following 
his forced recruitment by that group later associated with the LPC and fought for an additional four 
years.65
Other children joined fighting forces because one or more friends were already members of the group. 
One statement giver began fighting for the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) at age 11 because his friend 
was already fighting for the group.66 Another statement giver reported being recruited by his friends 
to fight with them as members of Taylor’s forces, although he declined to join them.67 
In addition to joining armed forces to meet their basic needs for food, clothing, and protection, some 
children were motivated by commanders’ promises of financial compensation, usually in U.S. dollars, 
and by the opportunity to enrich themselves through looting. Fighting groups promised children a 
part of the spoils they acquired from looting.68 Accordingly, children learned to target civilians so as 
to confiscate their property.69 
A reverence for the military was prevalent in Liberia and may have contributed to a desire among 
some children to become involved with an armed group. Children were used as war mascots by early 
tribal armies, and successful warriors exercised power in their local communities.70 Prior to the war, it 
was an honor to be in the military because it was considered a prestigious group. Many of the recruits 
for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) came from indigenous communities and after serving “would 
return to their hometowns and villages where they would be considered among the elders of their 
communities; many became chiefs.”71 Americo-Liberian governments had touted modernization as 
a means to success; joining the armed forces became a means of upward mobility and guns became a 
status symbol.72 
For many children who joined combatant forces after the death of parents and other family members, 
their commanders and associates became their new family:
“States Parties shall ensure to 
the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the 
child.” Art. 6(2), Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
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I had no mother or father or brother or sister to tell me what to do. Just my 
commander…Never really missed my family ‘till I left [Liberia] ‘cause rebels 
became my family.73
experienceS of child SoldierS
Roles, Duties, and Responsibilities
As noted above, a child soldier’s service could include both non-combat and combat roles.112 Statements 
given by former child soldiers describe tasks ranging from combat, to serving as ammunition couriers113 
and water carriers,114 to locating and securing scarce food in villages captured by their forces.115 One 
statement giver described his initial work for the INPFL as an “errand boy,” but said he eventually 
took up arms during a fierce battle between the INPFL and the AFL:
I had no other option than to fight. INPFL were retreating, so my chances 
for survival became slimmer and slimmer by the second.116
Human Rights Watch reported that children most commonly: a) worked as porters, laborers, and 
cooks; b) served as bodyguards, servants, and personal assistants to commanders; c) acted as spies or 
informants; d) controlled checkpoints; e) carried out ambushes; f ) fought on the front lines; and g) 
executed suspected enemies.117 Additionally, because children on all sides were frequently not paid, 
they spent some percentage of their time stealing from civilians to survive. Some children reported 
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National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
Charles Taylor’s NPFL used child soldiers in groups referred to as small boys’ units (SBUs). Young children 
could be easily persuaded to fight for very little and were easier to control.74 Many statement givers 
described child soldiers associated with the NPFL.75 In his march through Nimba County, Taylor was 
described by one statement giver as using child soldiers to “kill their own people” in revenge for Samuel 
Doe having killed the leaders of Taylor’s forces.76 According to one statement giver, Taylor recruited 
“children…as young as six or seven,” and “anyone who could carry a gun (some of them barely).”77 Other 
statement givers had family members78 or friends79 recruited by Charles Taylor, or were themselves child 
soldiers in Taylor’s forces.80 A former child soldier “captain,” who led almost one hundred men, reported 
that by age 12, he participated in Operation Octopus;81 a 15-year-old “general” was reported by another 
statement giver to have led an attack on a UN facility.82 Taylor also used boys, as young as ten years of age, 
as his personal bodyguards.83
Use of child soldiers under the Taylor Administration
Once Charles Taylor was elected president, use of child soldiers became tantamount to government 
policy. Government forces were composed of former NPFL fighters, many of whom had been recruited as 
children.84 Many children left Taylor’s forces after a demobilization program in 1997,85 but the emergence 
of new factions fighting against Taylor led his security forces, such as the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and 
Special Security Service (SSS), to begin recruiting children again.86 Reports indicate that many children 
recruited by the government during the period 2000-2003 were rounded up on the streets, often while 
traveling to and from school and home.87 Children were also recruited into the government forces in raids 
on internally displaced persons’ camps near Monrovia in 2002 and 2003.88 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)
ULIMO also recruited and used child soldiers.89 One statement giver stated that Alhaji Kromah and other 
ULIMO fighters “mobilized boys, girls, men, older people to fight.”90 Another statement giver reported that 
ULIMO-K (Kromah’s faction) killed male children because of their potential to become child soldiers.91 
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Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)
The rebel group headed by Prince Johnson also recruited and used child soldiers.92 Johnson’s forces were 
described by one statement giver as known for including “many Nimba boys.”93 One statement giver recalls 
seeing Prince Johnson’s “boys” enter Monrovia – armed and dressed in fatigues – and kill a man.94 
Liberia Peace Council (LPC)
Like other factions, the LPC recruited and trained children combatants.95 One statement giver described 
how LPC combatants abducted him when he was 12 years old.96 They used him as their “playboy” and 
threatened to drug and force him to fight for them as a small soldier.”97 Another statement giver, who 
had fought for the LPC since he was 11, stated that he and other minors in the LPC were given drugs and 
alcohol.98 Another statement giver reported that he fought for the LPC from the age of 11 until he was 
15.99
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
LURD’s use of child soldiers has been well documented.100LURD was known for cross border attacks to 
abduct children from refugee camps101 and for recruiting from IDP centers within Liberia.102 Some children 
were also driven to join LURD by the treatment they received at the hands of Taylor’s government forces.103 
Statement givers also told of LURD’s recruitment of children.104 One Buduburam resident recounted how 
LURD recruited fighters from the settlement in 2001 and 2002.105 During that time, it was dangerous in 
Buduburam, and one person was shot.106 One statement giver stated that LURD rebels entered his house 
in Newkru town and took his wife and four children.107 His wife returned to the home later, but without 
the children.108 He has not seen his children since the war.109
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)
MODEL began operating in 2003 and consisted mostly of former Doe loyalists. Believed to have had 
the backing of the Ivorian government, MODEL was reported to have forcibly recruited children from 
refugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire.110 Human Rights Watch reported that children also were forcibly 
recruited from the countryside as MODEL began its assault on the southeastern port city of Buchanan.111
Use of Child Soldiers
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that they were never paid and relied solely on stealing to survive.118 
An Amnesty International report speculated that children were used as soldiers because they were 
“perceived as cheap and expendable, and easier to condition into fearless killing and unquestioning 
obedience.”119 This fearlessness and inexperience led to the death of children at higher rates than their 
adult counterparts during fighting.120 As one statement giver observed, the young children, “as young 
as six or seven, grade-school age…were killed very quickly.”121
Treatment of Child Soldiers
By any standard, child soldiers were treated harshly by combatant groups and were subject to both 
physical and mental abuse. Life with the fighting forces placed child soldiers in a harsh, volatile, 
violent environment. Former child soldiers told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of 
living in camps in which coercion, beatings, torture, and summary executions were commonplace,122 
medical care for wounded soldiers was non-existent,123 food was scarce,124 and sudden accusations 
of betrayal or disloyalty to the group could lead to torture or death.125 A statement giver described 
his abduction and detention by the LPC, followed by several months of threats, beatings, and sexual 
abuse before he managed to escape.126 Another told the TRC that in his seven years with NPFL forces, 
he saw someone die every day.127 The climate of violence was so pervasive, one former child soldier 
described, “Fighting became my hobby at the time. I found pleasure in it.”128
Like their adult counterparts,129 child soldiers were trained as guerillas,130 trained to attack, advance, 
and retreat and to dismantle, assemble, and shoot guns.131 For one statement giver, his training as 
a member of a Small Boys Unit (SBU) lasted five months.132 In addition, child soldiers in all of the 
forces underwent initiation procedures. To prove their loyalty and courage, children were sometimes 
forced to perform some atrocity, such as killing or raping someone.133 Other initiation or identification 
rites were usurpations of traditional practices marking the transition into adulthood and involved 
changes to the child’s physical appearance, such as tattooing,134 scarring, and head shaving. 135 Fighting 
forces also used traditional amulets and charms136 telling children that the items had magical powers 
that would protect them from bullets or other harm when they entered battle.137
“States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.” Art. 32(1), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. States Parties are to take measures to ensure implementation of 
this right, including through the provision of “appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the 
effective enforcement.” Art. 32(c), Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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Several child soldiers recounted their first combat experiences in their statements to the TRC. One 
recalled that as the fighters left camp to do battle, they were given a send-off by singing girls; when they 
returned, there was celebration and a feast, reminiscent of the festivities surrounding a soccer game.138 
The former child soldier called the event a “bitter first day,” in which he killed people and cried when 
it was over. He was 12 years old.139 Another former child soldier, who at age nine served in the SBU, 
remembers being told that “everyone was to survive on 
his own” during the upcoming battle.140 A third former 
child soldier stated that during his first battle at age ten, 
his group was attacked by United Liberation Movement 
for Democracy in Liberia – Kromah faction (ULIMO-K) 
forces, and “it was my first time to kill a human being, and 
from there on I became a killer.”141 
Child soldiers reported that, if they spoke up or questioned orders, they were threatened with torture 
or death.142 In a statement to the TRC, a former child soldier simply stated that he did not want to do 
certain things, but had no choice because that was how he survived.143 All of the forces generally meted 
out harsh punishment to child soldiers such as being hung upside down by the feet and beaten,144 
being beaten with cartridge belts, being tied tabay, being dragged through dirty water, or being forced 
to watch the execution of family members.145 One child soldier said that soldiers in his camp would hit 
children with gun butts in the mouth, thereby breaking the children’s teeth, and in the eyes to force 
the children to train and to follow orders.146 
Children learned quickly to obey. One former child soldier told the TRC about witnessing the 
accusation and execution of a comrade alleged to have betrayed the fighting group.
The general give me an order, and I would do it 
without question…[I saw] them doing things and 
knew they could do it to me. So I had to protect 
myself. So I had to do the same things so they knew 
[that I was loyal]…If you are ordered to give your 
mother and father a thousand lashes, you’ll give them 
one thousand lashes.147 
To encourage them to act without exercising judgment, child 
soldiers were regularly given alcohol and drugs, including 
marijuana, cocaine, opium, a mixture of cane juice and gunpowder, 
and “bubbles,” an amphetamine.148 One statement giver, forcibly 
recruited at age ten, stated that the first thing the rebels did was to 
force him to consume alcohol and smoke marijuana at gunpoint.149 
“No child shall be subjected to torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Art. 37(a), 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Chapter Nine
“States Parties shall take all 
appropriate measures, including 
legislative, administrative, social 
and educational measures, 
to protect children from the 
illicit use of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances 
as defined in the relevant 
international treaties, and to 
prevent the use of children 
in the illicit production and 
trafficking of such substances.” 
Art. 33, Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. 
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He thought the commanders provided the drugs and alcohol so that the “children would feel brave 
and could shoot anybody they saw.”150 Another former child soldier told the TRC he was given food 
laced with marijuana, gun powder, and cocaine,151 while a third statement giver said he and other child 
soldiers were given “[marijuana], cocaine, dugee [tablets] and spirits to make us brave.”152 Although 
the children often drank and smoked voluntarily, the drugs were given to them by their commanders, 
and many children believed the substances were “medicine” for protection.153 They believed if they 
took the medicine and were hit by a bullet, it would bounce right off. 154 One former child soldier 
stated, “Drugs used to be my food.”155 He believed that the protection provided by drugs given to him 
would prevent him from feeling a bullet if he were shot.156
As discussed in Chapter Six, most soldiers had fighting names that signified their particular 
characteristics in fighting.157 Children’s dress and appearance were dictated by the dress and uniform 
customs of the fighting force with which they were associated. Most fighting factions did not use 
formal uniforms but instead used colored t-shirts, 
unusual dress such as wigs and underwear, or a 
specific hairstyle as unit identification.158 According 
to one statement giver, some child soldiers under the 
command of Charles Taylor wore neither uniforms 
nor shoes, thus making it impossible to identify the 
children as fighters.159 
Escape from Fighting Forces
Numerous statement givers told of escaping from 
combatant groups after varying lengths of time. 
One former child soldier stated he escaped to 
Côte d’Ivoire at age 12 during a period of chaotic 
fighting among NPFL soldiers who were drinking.160 
Another escaped the INPFL through the bush, 
disguised himself, and eventually made his way to 
Côte d’Ivoire.161 A third former child soldier served 11 years with the NPFL, during which he tried 
unsuccessfully to escape. By 2003, he was “tired of hurting people and of carrying a gun,” and took 
advantage of an opportunity to escape by bush road into exile in Ghana.162 
One former child soldier, having fought with Charles Taylor’s forces from his forcible recruitment 
in 1990 at age ten until 1997, ultimately determined that he was in danger of being killed by those 
forces.163 After a series of battles in Maryland County to root out supporters of Samuel Doe, he came 
to believe that he was in danger because he “knew too much and the rebels would not want the child 
soldiers around.”164 The statement giver and ten other child soldiers ran across the border to Côte 
“States Parties shall cooperate in the 
implementation of the present Protocol, 
including in the prevention of any activity 
contrary to the Protocol and in the 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of 
persons who are victims of acts contrary to 
this Protocol, including through technical 
cooperation and financial assistance. 
Such assistance and cooperation will be 
undertaken in consultation with concerned 
States Parties and relevant international 
organizations.” Art. 7(1), Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflicts.
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d’Ivoire during chaotic celebrations that followed the rebels’ success in capturing the villages loyal to 
Doe.165
Female Child Soldiers166 
About 2,000 women and girls served in the fighting forces on all sides of the Liberian conflict.167 Girls 
often had their own units and participated in fighting as well as in activities such as cooking, domestic 
work, and portering.168 Like their male counterparts, females became a part of the combatant forces for 
a variety of reasons, including forced abduction, the need for protection against rape or other forms of 
violence, the urge to avenge violence against themselves or their families, a so-called “marriage” to a 
combatant, as well as for economic benefit.169
Girls and women associated with combatant groups were routinely raped and sexually assaulted. 
Several statement givers described their experiences. One statement giver, who was 22 years old at 
the time, recounted how she was the oldest of five girls abducted by LPC rebels who used them 
“as cooks and for other things.”170 
One statement giver recounted how 
a rebel forced her sister to become 
his bush wife and took her to lower 
Nimba County.171 “She had to go 
with him because he was behind the 
barrel of the gun, and she was forced 
to have children by this man.”172 
Another woman who was abducted 
by rebels and forced to become a 
bush wife recalled that she had “no 
choice.”173 Amnesty International 
elaborates that most of the girls and 
women abducted and forced to fight were raped at the time of their forced recruitment, and they 
continued to suffer sexual abuse throughout their time with the forces.174 Many girls were forced to 
become “wives” of their abductors, and some young girls were assigned to provide sexual and other 
services to particular combatants.175
Violence Perpetrated by Child Soldiers
A review of statements and the available literature supports the conclusion that child soldiers not only 
witnessed, but also participated in the full range of atrocities of the combatant groups to which they 
belonged. These atrocities include military assaults, killings, torture, kidnappings, rape, looting, and 
other violent acts. 
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Through all stages of the release, reintegration and follow-
up, “actors should recognise that girls are at risk of being 
‘invisible’ and take measures to ensure that girls are included 
and relevant issues addressed at all stages. It is important 
that the differences between girls’ and boys’ experiences 
are understood and taken into account by all actors and that 
programming for children who are or have been associated 
with armed forces or armed groups explicitly reflects the 
particular situation of both girls and boys.” ¶ 4.1 The Paris 
Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with 
Armed Forces or Armed Groups, Feb. 2007.
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Some former child soldiers acknowledged their participation in fighting, but provided vague or no 
detail related to their activities during the conflict.176 Other statement givers provided details about 
aspects of their combat activities, but maintained that they never killed anyone. In meetings with 
former child soldiers in Buduburam Refugee Settlement, many were reluctant to admit responsibility 
for their actions during their time as child soldiers. They stated that they were victims rather than 
perpetrators.177 
Other statement givers described in detail the violence in which they participated. One child soldier, 
who fought with both the NPFL and the LPC, admitted that as an LPC rebel he killed civilians in 
response to his commanders’ orders.178 He also described using the torture technique of “dog fat 
tabay,” a modified version of tabay, in which the victim’s feet are tightly tied between two sticks, 
squeezing the feet and leaving the victim unable to walk for a month.179 A former ULIMO-J child 
soldier reports that at age ten, he 
…[L]ed a group that attacked ULIMO-K and I killed a lot of people [and] 
soldiers which up to today I regret. The only reason is that I was forced and 
under the influence of drugs, money and holding a gun.180
A detailed description of violence perpetrated by a child soldier was provided by a statement giver 
who was forcibly recruited by the NPFL at age ten, following the murder of his parents in Nimba 
County.181 He was a child soldier from 1991 to 1996, when he escaped to Côte d’Ivoire.182 At one 
point, he participated in a raid that resulted in the killing of several people and the capture of three, 
including one girl.183 According to the statement giver, his group “put a bottle in the girl and just left 
her like that.”184 He also described the killing of civilians in the course of combat operations.185 He 
described torturing and killing enemy combatant forces:
Sometimes you capture someone and you shoot them but they don’t die. Tar 
comes out of the wound, like you put on roads…So you cut them [a] little, 
or you tie them and put them in a mattress and put stones on it and throw it 
into the river…You hear a brother crying and find they cut his two arms and 
hung him by them and cut his navel and pull his intestines and pull them 
across the road and tie them…You see that happen to your brother and then 
you capture some of them. Never wound anybody and let them go. I would 
not even cut a finger, I would rather cut off their head.186
This child soldier also described other torture techniques, including hanging victims upside down 
from morning to evening and beating victims rolled up in mattresses.187 He stated that these techniques 
were used on enemies: “We did those things because we saw what they did to us.”188 This same former 
child soldier, a commander, reported killing his own wounded troops because there was no medic 
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available to care for them: “If [my man] is wounded in the gut, he would just have to suffer more, you 
just have to finish it up.”189
Some statement givers discussed their perception that child soldiers were the fighters to be most 
feared. Their age and lack of cognitive development, coupled with the use of drugs, made their 
behavior extremely unpredictable and violent:
[Y]oung boys were some of the worst of the rebels as they were drugged 
with cocaine and LSD. These boys had no emotion or remorse and would 
use AK-47s without a second thought.190
One statement giver stated that he thought child soldiers killed people in the streets for “fun,”191 
further underscoring the incendiary and terrifying combination of an armed child vested with 
absolute authority over others. Other statements likewise revealed this power dynamic, as does a 
1994 Human Rights Watch report stating that child soldiers commonly commanded checkpoints.192 
One statement giver stated that when passing 
through a checkpoint, an armed child soldier who 
had obviously been smoking marijuana threatened 
to kill the statement giver unless he gave the 
child all of his clothing.193 Children in control of 
checkpoints sometimes killed people for no reason 
at all.194 
 This dynamic of absolute authority also manifested 
in the looting by child soldiers. A former NPFL 
child commander told the TRC that those under 
his command broke into shops and looted during 
the events of April 6, 1996.195 Those who resisted 
this looting were shot.196 
A few statement givers told stories of unexpected compassionate actions by child soldiers. One 
statement giver reported that a child soldier saved her life by vouching for her identity as a teacher.197 
“Children who are accused of crimes under international law allegedly committed while they 
were associated with armed forces or armed groups should be considered primarily as victims of 
offences against international law; not only as perpetrators. They must be treated in accordance 
with international law in a framework of restorative justice and social rehabilitation, consistent 
with international law which offers children special protection through numerous agreements and 
principles.” ¶ 3.6, The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed 
Forces or Armed Groups, Feb. 2007.
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“States Parties shall take all feasible measures 
to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction 
recruited or used in hostilities contrary to 
this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise 
released from service. States Parties shall, 
when necessary, accord to these persons 
all appropriate assistance for their physical 
and psychological recovery and their social 
reintegration.” Art. 6(3), Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflicts.
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Another statement giver credited a child soldier with not identifying an adult to his commanders, 
thus saving the adult from harm.198 A third statement giver recounted how a child soldier told his 
commander that the child had killed the statement giver, as ordered, when the child soldier had in fact 
allowed the statement giver to escape.199 
While children were often quickly and easily abducted or recruited to serve as soldiers, years of 
effective treatment are required to repair or remediate the psychological damage suffered as result of 
their experiences in a brutal civil war.
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Chapter Ten. Women
Statements from Liberian women and men, as well as reports from civil society groups and international 
organizations, detail extreme forms of violence and other human rights abuses perpetrated against 
women before, during, and after the war in Liberia. During the conflict, women were subject to 
many of the same human rights violations as men were, including forced labor, killings, torture, and 
beatings. Many women were also targeted for gender-based violence, such as rape, sexual violence, 
and sexual slavery. After the conflict, violence against women, including sexual and domestic violence, 
continues to be prevalent in Liberia.1 
Violence against women impairs fun-
damental rights and freedoms, such as the 
rights to life, security, and liberty, and the 
right not to be subjected to torture. The 
United Nations has recognized the con-
nection between violence and inequality, 
stating that violence is one of the “crucial 
social mechanisms by which women are 
forced into a subordinate position compared 
with men.”2 Other forms of discrimination 
against women in both law and practice 
are prevalent in Liberia as well. While 
there are some laws that promote equality, 
weaknesses in the law and inadequate implementation prevent the full realization of women’s human 
rights. The problem is exacerbated by the bifurcation of Liberia’s laws into formal and customary 
systems, the latter of which allows discrimination against women in many cases. In addition, many 
social and cultural practices, as well as the deprivation of social and economic rights, contribute to the 
subordination of women in Liberia.
The mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia recognizes that a thorough 
understanding of gender and its impact on both Liberian society and the conflict are essential to 
the success of the TRC process. Section 24 of the Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia provides: 
The TRC shall consider and be sensitive to issues of human rights violations, 
gender and gender based violence thus ensuring that no one with a known 
record of human rights violations are employed by the TRC and that gender 
mainstreaming characterizes its work, operations and functions, ensuring 
therefore that women are fully represented and staffed at all levels of the 
work of the TRC and that special mechanisms are employed to handle 
women and children victims and perpetrators, not only to protect their 
dignity and safety but also to avoid re-traumatization.3
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The statute creating the TRC also recognizes the importance of the full participation of women in 
understanding the conflict and building the future of Liberia. The statute requires that at least four 
of the nine commissioners be women. Four of the commissioners appointed to the TRC are women, 
who have diverse experiences with regard to women’s issues, and women have participated at various 
levels in the work of the TRC.4 The TRC’s mandate requires that it adopt “specific mechanisms and 
procedures to address the experiences of women, children and vulnerable groups, paying particular 
attention to gender based violations…”5 The statute also requires the TRC to “employ specialists in 
children’s and women’s rights” and “ensure that special measures or mechanisms are employed that 
will enable women and children to provide testimony to the TRC, while at the same time protecting 
their safety and not endangering or delaying their social reintegration or psychological recovery.”6 
Past truth commissions have been criticized for their approach to women’s issues because of a 
failure to fully incorporate the gender perspective into their work.7 The above provisions provide 
the Liberian TRC the authority and mandate to give focused attention to women’s human rights 
issues. In addition, the TRC has undertaken outreach measures to encourage the participation of 
women. For example, the TRC’s Committee on Gender held workshops and town hall meetings for 
women throughout Liberia, which included an overview of the TRC mandate, women’s human rights 
violations in Liberia, and how other truth commissions have addressed gender issues.8 Also, the TRC 
has drafted a gender policy based on workshops, town hall meetings, and collaboration with other 
stakeholders.9 In line with this approach and taking into account the widespread violence against 
women during the war, The Advocates has included a separate section on women to give the specific 
attention that is mandated. 
pre-exiSting factorS: the role of women in liBerian Society 
In an experts’ report prepared for the United Nations in 2002, Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf note that the violence women experience during armed conflict “does not arise solely out of the 
conditions of war; it is directly related to the violence that exists in women’s lives during peacetime. 
Throughout the world, women experience violence because they are women, and often because they 
do not have the same rights or autonomy that men do.”10 As a result, a discussion of the factors that 
existed before the conflict is essential to better understand both women’s human rights violations 
during the conflict, as well as the problems that still affect women post-conflict. 
Life has been, and can often be, very difficult for women in Liberia. Discrimination against women 
both in law and in practice is pervasive in Liberia.11 Deficiencies in the legal system, a reticence to 
investigate and prosecute certain cases affecting women, and the unavailability of legal assistance 
hamper women’s access to justice. Furthermore, there is a need to increase public awareness of women’s 
rights.12 In practice, few domestic laws and policies realize the principle of equality between men 
and women. Liberia’s civil law system is patriarchal, and laws are often construed at the expense of 
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women’s human rights.13 Social attitudes tend to accept sexual crimes against women and children as 
one of life’s risks.14 For example, there is no domestic violence law in Liberia,15 and witness testimony 
revealed the reluctance of police to intervene in such cases: 
I lived in Liberia. I have experienced situations where women have been 
abused, and in the heat of the situation, the police [were] called, and [the 
victim and perpetrator] were told, “That’s your domestic problems.” [The 
police] have nothing to do with that.16
Finally, socio-economic factors present challenges for many women in Liberia. Girls face greater 
barriers to accessing education because of violence against women and girls, early marriages, 
prioritization of males over females for schooling, and other biases.17 The formal—and therefore 
regulated—economic sector lacks job opportunities, leading many women to work in the informal 
sector where they are more susceptible to harassment.18 Access to health care is extremely limited in 
Liberia, with resulting high maternal and infant mortality rates.19 
A Note about the Role of Liberian Women as Leaders
Despite such discrimination and socio-economic obstacles, it is important to recognize that Liberian 
women often wield considerable personal power and political autonomy. Liberian women have held 
authority within traditional societies and more formal networks, which afforded them a base for 
socialization, support, and activism. For example, in secret societies such as the Sande society, female 
zoes, or traditional priests, train young girls in domestic skills, cooking, singing, food production, 
community leadership, midwifery, and story narration.20 Traditional women’s societies that both 
entertain and assist one another are also found among the Kru and Bassa.21 Collective action has also 
been employed by women to assert their rights. Academic Mary Moran witnessed one example where 
women carried out a mass protest to demand amends for a wrong; in leaving their village en masse and 
implementing a local, institutionalized practice, these women sought to protect their rights and claim a 
role in decision-making.22 Liberian women also established more formal organizations, beginning with 
church-based groups to foster community bonds, forge connections among classes and ethnicities, 
and promote general unity, to socio-political organizations designed to increase women’s political 
participation.23 Their early work in establishing girls’ schools and churches24 facilitated their later 
emergence in the public sphere. Women shifted into the more visible political sector when President 
Tubman appointed a number of women, albeit of the ruling settler class, to significant positions.25 It 
was not until the Tolbert administration that the number of women appointees increased and their 
backgrounds broadened substantially to include “women who supported and represented change.”26 
There are examples of prominent Liberian women in the international arena as well. For example, 
Liberian Assistant Secretary of State Angie Elisabeth Brooks served as the President of the U.N. General 
Assembly during its 24th session.27 Finally, Liberian women assumed a prominent role in the peace 
process in the final years of the war; for example, the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) 
played an extensive part in advocating for peace.28 WIPNET members mobilized Christian and Muslim 
women in peaceful protests in both Liberia and Ghana as a way of pressuring the factions to end the 
conflict.29 
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Legal Systems
The division of Liberia’s legal system into formal and customary laws creates additional disparities 
between rural and urban areas.30 Liberia’s formal legal system, which employs statutory law, is 
composed of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, magistrates’ courts, and justices of the peace courts.31 
Liberia’s customary legal system, which is more prevalent in the rural areas, is bifurcated into state-
sanctioned customary law and non-state-sanctioned 
customary law. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
oversees state-sanctioned customary legal systems, 
which adjudicates disputes by town, clan, and 
paramount chiefs.32 The state provides a framework 
for this system through the Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Hinterland of Liberia. In contrast, 
non-state-sanctioned customary law generally 
involves mechanisms such as palava huts, Poro and 
Sande secret societies, leaders with special powers, 
and may include trial-by-ordeal.33 There is a notable 
lack of coordination between the formal law and 
both customary legal systems, which consequently 
impedes fair execution of justice.34 
Customary law mechanisms are the most accessible form of justice for the majority of Liberia’s 
population.35 War and mass displacement have impacted the local systems, however, which are 
“loosely governed by anachronistic and obscure laws and regulations.”36 Furthermore, the practices 
and outcome of traditional courts may not be consistent with Liberia’s Constitution and international 
human rights obligations.37 Decisions are not always objectively made. The International Crisis Group 
reports that chiefs improperly impose fines to garner income for themselves, since they seldom receive 
the state compensation as required for their services.38
The civil and customary components of Liberia’s civil law system often conflict with traditional 
practices, the effect of which disfavors women.39 Discrimination is more pronounced in rural areas for 
various reasons. For example, men are the most common arbiters of customary law, thus diminishing 
the role of women in this process.40 Customary legal traditions discriminate against women by 
prohibiting them from executing contracts and controlling property.41 Other discriminatory practices 
include the payment of dowries to husbands, payments to husbands in cases of adultery, and different 
legal ages for marriage between men and women. Many of these practices are predicated on the notion 
of women as property. For example, Rules Regulating the Hinterland impose a $100 fine on males 
who commit adultery against their first wives and a $10 fine for adultery with additional wives.42 Trial-
by-ordeal, where the suspect is subject to extreme pain or potential death, is a customary method 
employed to test the guilt of the accused.43 Such methods are sometimes used to assess the guilt of 
“States Parties condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy 
of eliminating discrimination against women 
and, to this end, undertake…To establish 
legal protection of the rights of women on an 
equal basis with men and to ensure through 
competent national tribunals and other public 
institutions the effective protection of women 
against any act of discrimination.” Art. 2(c), 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. 
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women and girls suspected of witchcraft. 
Outside of the legal context, other cul-
tural practices exist, such as female geni-
tal mutilation and levirate marriage, 44 
which have a harmful effect on women. 
Members of the cabinet and Parliament 
have expressed ambivalence, however, 
toward the discontinuation of these tra-
ditional practices.45 Furthermore, a lack 
of awareness that discrimination is a vio-
lation of human rights and of Liberia’s 
international legal obligations perpetuates 
the problem of violence against women.46
Education and Employment
The gender gap in education has been a problem in Liberia, predating the period of conflict. In 1979, 
83 percent of males and 51 percent of females were enrolled in primary school.47 By 1986-1988, the 
statistics for primary education of girls remained more or less the same. Statistics for gross primary 
enrollment ratio indicated that 82 percent of males and 50 percent of females were enrolled in primary 
education.48 In other words, for every 100 males enrolled in primary education, 61 females were 
enrolled.49 
In terms of employment, women have 
traditionally played a central role in Liberia’s 
informal workforce. According to a 1983 U.S. 
Department of State human rights report, 
70 percent of Liberia’s population worked in 
subsistence agriculture.50 The report notes 
that women comprised the major labor force 
in producing and managing food within the 
home and for sale in the market.51 Working 
in the informal sector, while a significant 
responsibility, poses a number of obstacles to 
women’s economic empowerment. Women in 
subsistence economies spend much of any given day performing tasks to maintain the household like 
carrying water, collecting fuel wood, preparing food, care-giving, agricultural production, and taking 
goods to the market. All of these activities require tremendous obligations but fall outside the scope 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women requires States Parties to: 
“…accord to women equality with men before the law. 
 …accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity 
identical to that of men and the same opportunities 
to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give 
women equal rights to conclude contracts and to 
administer property and shall treat them equally in all 
stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 
 …agree that all contracts and all other private 
instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is 
directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall 
be deemed null and void.” Art. 15(1)-(3).
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in order 
to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field 
of education.” Art. 10, Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights.” Art. 
11, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. 
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of regulated labor. According to the U.N. Population Fund, “[p]oor women do more unpaid work, 
work longer hours and may accept degrading working conditions during times of crisis, just to ensure 
that their families survive.”52
Social Norms and de Facto Discrimination
Patriarchal norms and expectations also operate to subordinate women in Liberia. Such social attitudes 
are reflected in both formal and informal relationships between men and women, as described by 
statement givers, and help contextualize the violations during the war. For example, one statement 
giver recounted how she became engaged in 1994 after her fiancé paid a bride dowry for her.53 Also, 
although formal Liberian law prohibits polygyny,54 traditional systems still allow this practice.55 
Cultural norms and tribal rules provide some regulation over polygyny, but even this oversight has 
diminished considerably in the context of rural-to-urban migration.56 
In terms of informal relationships, some male statement givers described having children with several 
women and when asked to provide their names, they delineated between those they acknowledged 
and those they did not. One interviewee described the problem:
Africans have close and very large families as a result of the custom of 
polygamy and of the African concept of extended family. My father had 
children by three women. He was relatively well off before the conflict and 
his children all lived with him. It is common for men to have sex with 
multiple women and they often don’t take responsibility to care for the 
children that result...There is a double standard for women and they are 
often treated deplorably. The women have a hard time caring for children 
by themselves.57
Furthermore, statements revealed that women are often the primary and sole caretakers in households, 
and many women described difficult family circumstances. Often, they are not married to the fathers 
of their children and in some cases have sole responsibility for their care. 
In other instances, the father has left the country to seek other opportunities and ceased providing 
for his family in Liberia.58 In this case, he may be burdened with the responsibility of establishing 
“States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and the significant 
roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families, including their work in the non-
monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application 
of the provisions of the present Convention to women in rural areas.” Art. 14(1), Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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himself in a new country or may have simply abandoned the family. A statement giver summarized 
how his mother, who was impoverished and ill, attempted to seek financial help from his father who 
had moved to the United States and met another woman:
Because she had little money, my mother asked my father to send us money 
from the United States. She mailed him messages recorded on cassettes 
telling him that she was sick and needed help. My father was “putting his 
life together in the US” and did not send money.59
Ultimately, his mother died from what the statement giver believed was a lack of proper care and 
medicine.60 Statements revealed particular difficulties for family members who remained behind 
during the conflict, as they faced economic hardship coupled with the need to escape. One statement 
giver’s children called their father in the United States at the onset of the war to beg for money so 
they could flee the rebel advancement.61 The father never responded to their pleas for assistance.62 In 
another case, a statement giver described how the father of her child left her for the United States 
while she was pregnant.63 She described her experience:
The father of this child left me just about a month pregnant and travelled 
to the U.S. I was quite a teenager and when I contacted him on the issue he 
decided to write my family to tell them that he was going to marry me. For 
the past 25 years, he has never talked to me. The only thing he did was he 
sent for [our child].64
Poor governance factors also subjugate women in Liberia. For example, corruption and the abuse of 
power are closely linked to women’s human rights violations in Liberia. Statements revealed instances 
of men abusing their positions of authority for purposes of sexual exploitation. A statement giver 
described how she was accepted into the John F. Kennedy Center in Monrovia to pursue a nursing 
degree in 1988.65 The school’s registrar refused to enroll her until she had sex with him.66 He told 
Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, States Parties 
are to undertake “all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social 
function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and 
development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial 
consideration in all cases.” Art. 5, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.
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the young woman that “trading sex for favors was the way to survive in Liberia.”67 Eventually, the 
woman’s brother intervened and convinced the school to register her for classes.68
Periods of instability have presented further opportunity to abuse power, exacerbating violence 
against women. A statement giver described how at the time of the 1979 rice riots she saw soldiers 
committing abuses against civilians who broke the 7:00 p.m. curfew.69 She witnessed soldiers rape 
women who were out past this hour.70 If soldiers encountered a man and a woman breaking curfew, 
she related, “the male would be tortured and sent away, and the woman would be told to have sex with 
the soldier (give it up) or be taken to jail.”71 Poor governance, abuse of authority, and other problems 
demonstrate the broader need for state system reforms to protect women’s human rights.
gender-BaSed violence during the conflict
The Liberian TRC has a specific mandate to focus on “vulnerable groups.”72 In a discussion of 
women and war, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) defines vulnerability as 
“the result of the precarious conditions of existence of individuals, families or communities placed 
under threat by a brutal change in their environment.”73 Importantly, it recognizes that certain social, 
economic, political, and cultural factors give rise to vulnerability during war.74 Discrimination in 
law and practice, patriarchal attitudes, polygamous family structures, and the abuse of power have 
acted as subordinating factors for Liberian women. As a result, women’s human rights violations 
in Liberia long predated the conflict and contributed to the disposition toward widespread use of 
violence against women during the war. 
The civil war in Liberia increased the violence against women in many forms, particularly sexual 
Gender-based violence constitutes discrimination against women and violates women’s human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, including:
 
(a) The right to life;  
(b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;  
(c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of international or internal 
armed conflict;  
(d) The right to liberty and security of person;  
(e) The right to equal protection under the law;  
(f) The right to equality in the family;  
(g) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;  
(h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work. ¶ 7, Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 19, Violence against Women.
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violence. Increases in fighting were often accompanied by more rapes. The former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women has explained this phenomenon: 
[S]ince women’s sexuality is seen as being under the protection of the men 
of the community, its defilement is an act of domination asserting power 
over the males of the community or group that is under attack... Women 
are particular targets as they are often regarded both as representing the 
symbolic honour of the culture and being the genetic gatekeepers to the 
community.75
The increase in sexual violence against women during conflict is connected to militarization, the 
absence of traditional societal networks and structures, and the pre-existing factors outlined above.76 
According to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, evidence indicates that “the militarization 
process, including the ready availability of small weapons, that occurs prior to and during conflicts, as 
well as the process of demobilization of often frustrated and aggressive soldiers after a conflict, may 
also result in increased violence against women and girls.”77 In their report, Rehn and Sirleaf describe 
gender-based violence during armed conflict: 
Men and boys as well as women and girls are the victims of this targetting 
[sic], but women, much more than men, suffer gender-based violence. 
Their bodies become a battleground over which opposing forces struggle.78 
Women are raped as a way to humiliate the men they are related to, who are 
often forced to watch the assault. In societies where ethnicity is inherited 
through the male line, “enemy” women are raped and forced to bear 
children. Women who are already pregnant are forced to miscarry through 
violent attacks. Women are kidnapped and used as sexual slaves to service 
troops, as well as to cook for them and carry their loads from camp to camp. 
They are purposely infected with HIV/AIDS, a slow, painful murder.79
Statements bear witness to the use of Liberian women as a means to inflict revenge and attack the 
enemy. One rebel, who had just raped a woman, responded to the consternation of an onlooker: 
“Yes, they did it to our women and I’m going to do it to her.”80 
Prevalence of Violence against Women during the Conflict
As seen in conflicts throughout the region and world, sexual violence as a weapon of war is an 
increasing problem. In 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the use of 
sexual violence in warfare, noting that sexual violence continues to occur in situations to the point 
of becoming “systematic and widespread.”81 Wartime sexual violence is not unique to the Liberian 
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context, but rather is a violation increasingly used in conflicts around the world. 
Sexual violence was widespread during 
the Liberian conflict. More than 90 
percent of Liberian women in one study 
reported being subjected to at least one act 
of sexual abuse during or after the war.82 
In an earlier controlled study published 
in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, nearly half the Liberian 
women interviewed indicated they had 
been physically or sexually abused.83 As 
these statistics demonstrate, the numbers 
of reported rapes vary and represent only 
estimates because of a number of factors. 
First, sexual violence statistics are often 
extrapolated from the pool of victims who have come forward to seek medical attention for the 
consequences of rape.84 Second, rape and sexual violence are often under-reported for several reasons. 
Fears of stigma or retaliation may deter victims from coming forward, the death of the victim may 
preclude reporting, or a victim may believe reporting to be of little utility since the violation is already 
complete.85 While statistics cannot conclusively determine the extent of sexual violence, the empirical 
evidence nevertheless shows that sexual violence against women and girls was widespread during the 
Liberian conflict.
Nature of the Sexual Violence
Often, rape and sexual abuse occurred in the context of broader violence and chaos.86 Other violations 
committed concurrently with sexual violence included killings, abduction, beatings, destruction of 
property, strip searches, binding, mutilation, and torture. Perpetrators carried out these atrocities 
not only against women, but also against their family members and others present at the time. One 
statement giver described her experience:
Six or seven rebels attacked our house. The rebels were insulting everyone, 
pulling everyone outside and beating them. My older daughter was hit on 
the face and my husband was shot in front of me. The rebels wanted to put 
me in a car but instead the commander took me back into the house. I tried 
to refuse him and was cut on my butt with a knife, but I got weak and gave 
up and the commander raped me. I was then dragged outside again and the 
rebels put my house on fire. The rebels got in the car and ran away.87
Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, rape constitutes:
- Genocide, “committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group,” Art. 6(b);
- A crime against humanity, “when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” Art. 
7(1)(g);
- A war crime, “in particular when committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of 
such Crimes.” Art. 8(1). 
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Many statement givers described how the rapes often involved the death of the victim and/or family 
members. Statement givers described brutal incidents of aggravated rape accompanied by violations, 
such as gang-rape and rape with foreign objects. It was not uncommon for a woman to be raped by 
multiple perpetrators at a given time. In a study of 991 Liberian women and girl victims of violence, 
the International Rescue Committee reported that 376 had been gang-raped.88 One statement giver 
described a particularly brutal attack:
In 2003, I was living in Caldwell with my husband. On June 1, Taylor’s boys 
(NPFL) took over…Rebels wanted our car and took it. They accused me of 
lying about my husband being Grebo. They stabbed me in the breast and 
dragged my husband outside and began to cut him. They forced me to carry 
his private parts and then they cut off his arms. They caught me and four of 
them raped me. I was three months pregnant and am still having pain from 
the rapes.89
Perpetrators also used foreign objects, such as guns, knives, and household objects, to carry out 
rape.90 Another female statement giver described an attack involving a foreign object: “[The rebel] 
asked for money to buy petrol for his car. I told him I didn’t have money. He came back the very next 
day with his boys and put me at gunpoint, two or three raped me, beat me up and shoved the gun in 
my vagina.”91 Even everyday objects were used to inflict suffering through rape. One public hearing 
witness testified how rebels raped her and other detained women using a spoon.92 
Breaking of Social Taboos
Combatants used rape and other forms of sexual violence to systematically break social taboos. In 
particular, combatants forced civilians to break sexual norms regarding age and family. Young men 
were forced to rape their mothers and grandmothers. Men were forced to have sex with their sisters. 
The Rome Statute uses the following definition of rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime:*
“The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of 
any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital 
opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body…The invasion was committed by 
force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of 
giving genuine consent.” Art. 7(1)(g)-1(1), (2); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(1)-(2), International Criminal Court, 
Elements of Crimes. 
* These elements are in addition to the specific elements required to constitute a crime against 
humanity and war crime. 
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In addition to inflicting torture on members forced to commit incest, this war tactic had the long-
term impact of destroying families. In one case, after National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
rebels forced a son to rape his mother, the mother 
sent her son away, telling him “she could never see 
him again.”93
Also, perpetrators broke social taboos by forcing 
people to perform sexual acts in public. Statement 
givers reported men forced to have sex with women 
in front of their children and other family members. 
Men were also forced to watch as rebel forces brutally 
raped their wives, daughters, and other family 
members. Such mental abuse provided another tool of 
torture that perpetrators employed as systematically 
and deliberately as the actual violations. Rape was 
thus used not only as a weapon of war against the 
women who were violated but also as a means to 
traumatize those forced to witness the rapes. One 
statement giver described her traumatic experience:
Late one night, about 1:00 [or] 2:00 am, I heard outbursts of gunfire. I, my 
parents and my three sisters woke up...a group of NPFL fighters...forcefully 
entered our house. One of them recognized my father and remarked, “These 
are the people we are looking for.” My father was dragged out of the house, 
laid on the ground and they bound him with a strong rope. His feet and 
hands were bound. Then one of them said, “We have meat to eat here,” and 
also said to my father, “watch the show.” [They brought my sisters and me 
out.] After we had been brought out of the house they began raping us. I 
cannot remember what else happened because I blacked out...94
The mental anguish experienced by witnesses to these violations was substantial, even where the 
victim and observer were unrelated. A public hearing witness described the emotional trauma she 
experienced firsthand from witnessing perpetrators rape a Ghanaian girl lying on the ground: 
And then they took the gun, the sharpness of the gun, and they ram it in 
her…And they ram it in her. And I’m like, “God, I know by now you have 
taken her life so there’s nothing down there that she’s feeling.” But to my 
surprise, she managed to lift her arm up to try to take that gun out of her. 
And I collapse, knowing that she was still alive and she was feeling that gun 
Parties to the conflict are prohibited at 
all times and places from committing 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment” against 
persons taking no part in the hostilities. 
Art. 3(1)(c), Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
“[O]utrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault” are 
prohibited “at any time and in any place.” 
Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts.
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being rammed in her.95
Attempts by other civilians to prevent these rapes often resulted in further violence and killings. One 
statement giver described how NPFL soldiers raped her in front of her husband and killed him when 
he tried to rescue her.96 
Disregard for the Age of Victims
The rape of young girls also reflected the intentional disregard for the age of victims. During the 
conflict, perpetrators committed sexual violence against victims of all ages. Children younger than 
ten years old and women older than 50 years suffered from sexual violence.97 Perpetrators rape young 
girls to torture, injure, punish, obtain information, disgrace, humiliate, and break social bonds.98 
Attacking girls both dishonors the community and invalidates any protection their parents provide.99 
Rape as Torture
International treaties and caselaw prohibit rape at all times. As an act of torture, rape constitutes a 
war crime and a crime against humanity. States should take appropriate steps to punish such acts as 
mandated by international law. 
Human rights and humanitarian law prohibit torture, even in times of public emergency or war. Art. 7, 
4(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 2(1)-(2), 4, Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Art. 7(1)(f),8(2), Rome Statute, Aydin v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 25 Sept. 1997, Eur. Ct. of H.R., Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-VI, ¶¶ 
83-84; Fernando and Raquel Mejia v. Peru (Decision of 1 March 1996), Report No. 5/96, case no 10.970, 
in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1995 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 at pp. 182-
188. 
Also, international criminal jurisprudence recognizes that rape constitutes a form of torture both as 
a crime against humanity and as a war crime. Providing the elements of torture are satisfied, rape 
constitutes “severe pain and suffering amounting to torture.” Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 
¶ 145, Judgment, Nov. 2, 2001 (citing Celebici Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶¶ 495-496 and 941-943, 
Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶¶163, 171, Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgement, ¶¶ 597-598).
With regard to rape as a crime against humanity, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
found that “the presence of a state official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture 
process is not necessary for the offence to be regarded as torture under international humanitarian 
law.” ¶ 496, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment, Feb. 22, 2001. 
Rape also constitutes torture as a war crime. The ICTY has stated, “Rape may also amount to a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war,” providing the elements of 
the crimes are met. ¶ 172. 
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One statement giver described an attack:
NPFL rebels burst my door in Caldwell and said they were looking for my 
husband...who was working at the Executive Mansion as chief mechanic. 
But he wasn’t home and I was raped by four men and burnt on my neck with 
a cigar to force me to take off my clothes. Other men raped my ten-year-old 
daughter, who was a virgin, right in front of me.100
Statements from Liberian women indicate that perpetrators committed rapes against even younger 
children. A woman described her experience:
I was eight years old when the war came in July 1990. My mother, brother 
and sister were in Grand Gedeh visiting a friend. Rebels knocked on the 
door and my father went out and was killed. A rebel boy came into the house 
and raped me. I have had problems ever since.101
The rape of older women reinforced the breaking of social taboos. Many of the rapists were young 
males, and according to Liberian culture, rape by a young person was equivalent to rape by one’s 
own child.102 Statement givers who were older at the time described their own rape or the rape of 
their mothers.103 One statement giver who was 45 years old at the time of a gang rape by NPFL child 
soldiers described her experience: 
In March 1990…[an NPFL rebel] came to my house and said that I should 
bring the gold I have. I told him please sir, I don’t have any more gold. When 
I told him this, he said I should take off my clothes so his boys can have 
sex with me. As old as I was, his boys (three of them) had sex with me. My 
husband could not stand it and so he rushed to them and that’s how he was 
shot dead.104
Targeting Pregnant Women
Perpetrators targeted women who were pregnant. Many statement givers described the practice of 
rebels finding a pregnant woman, wagering on the sex of the fetus, and then splitting open her 
stomach to determine the winner of the bet.105 This practice occurred during raids, at checkpoints, 
Combatants are prohibited, at all times and places, from committing “violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds” against persons not taking part in the hostilities. Art. 3(1)(a), Convention 
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
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and anywhere rebels found pregnant women. In one case, NPFL troops killed a pregnant woman and 
her husband:
The woman was at the end of her pregnancy when a group of rebels came 
to her house and demanded their car. The woman’s husband told the rebels 
that they could not have the car because the woman was about to go into 
labor any time now and he needed it to take her to the hospital to deliver her 
baby. The rebels then took the woman, cut her open from the breast bone 
down to her pelvic bone while she was still alive, bet on the sex of the baby, 
and then cut the baby out of her uterus. The rebels then proceeded to cut the 
baby into three pieces and discarded the remains to the side. They then shot 
her and her husband to death.106
Bush Wives
Some women were kidnapped, systematically raped, 
and forced to act as “bush wives” of the attacker.107 
In this role, they were forced to cook, clean, bear 
children, use drugs, and provide sex to the rebels 
during the conflict. As one statement giver described 
her sister’s experience as a bush wife, she became 
the rebel’s “whatever.”108 Another statement giver 
related her experience as a bush wife:
I was in Liberia until 1995, living in Zwedru. One day, I was sent out to fetch 
water. The rebels came out of the bush and kidnapped me. I was seventeen 
years old. I was not sure which rebel group it was. . . . I was forced to become 
a bush wife and was kept in the camp for a few months. During that time 
I was forced to work for them and I was raped. When I tried to fight back 
against the sexual assaults I was slapped and beaten… [A]s a result of my time 
as a bush wife, I contracted a sexually transmitted infection. I have sought 
treatment for the infection on numerous occasions, but it is recurrent.109
Another statement giver described her abduction by a rebel in 1990. The rebel took her to a large 
building filled with Krahn children of government workers and numerous women. All were 
considered “war slaves” and forced to work on a cocoa farm. At night, the rebels would rape the girls 
and threaten to kill those who resisted.110 As bush wives, victims were not necessarily shielded from 
more perpetrators, and they were still subject to rape by multiple men. 
“Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms” 
are prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever.” Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
Protected persons include those who are not 
taking a direct part in or are no longer taking 
part in hostilities. Id. art. 4(1).
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A public hearing witness also testified about her sister’s experience as a bush wife. Her sister was ten 
years old when rebels abducted her in 1990. The rebel commander raped her so brutally that she was 
unable to walk. She bled and was incontinent for three days.111 For the next 12 years, she was enslaved 
as a bush wife.112 The witness described the emotional impact of her sister’s abduction on both her 
sister and the family: 
And she said that she lived in this village, ten years old, far away from where 
her home, didn’t know anybody. And she kept crying and hoping that my 
father would come back because this is what he had told her, that he was 
going to come back and get her. But she said she kept waiting. She kept 
waiting and wondering why isn’t he coming to get her, and nobody came 
for her.
For twelve years she lived in this village, not knowing where her family was, 
and we didn’t know, as a family. All we knew was she was captured. And 
because someone was killed in that home, we thought she was dead. So for 
12 years we thought she was dead, and most of the family members came to 
the United States. 113
The length of time women and girls were forced to serve as bush wives varied. Statements and 
testimony revealed periods ranging from a few days to 12 years.114 Women and girls were forced to 
remain as bush wives until they could escape or were liberated. 
The following elements must be met for sexual slavery to constitute a war crime in non-international 
armed conflicts under the Rome Statute:
 
“1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one 
or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by 
imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an 
international character.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
conflict.”
Art. 8 (2) (e) (vi)-2, International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (citation omitted)
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Returning Home
Bush wives have faced social, economic, 
and emotional challenges in separating 
from their captors or returning to their 
communities. They may be unable to 
return because of the potential stig-
matization from their families and 
communities, lack of economic means, 
emotional attachments to their com-
manders, or continued coercion by their 
captors.115 A public hearings witness 
from Minnesota described her family’s 
difficulty in persuading her sister to leave 
after several years of captivity. The witness recalled, “I remember we’re bribing her; we’ll buy you 
this; we’ll do this; don’t go back...” 116 Not only had the husband’s family kept her baby as a guarantee 
for her return, but the witness believed she harbored a “Stockholm Syndrome” attachment to her 
husband, as well.117 
Several of the statement givers revealed abuse by peacekeepers and soldiers who bartered necessities 
for sex. One statement giver reported that his stepmother’s sister “supported the family by dating 
soldiers.”118 Another statement giver described how she was arrested for five days and forced to have sex 
with soldiers because they controlled food and shelter.119 Other statement givers described violations 
by Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers. One 
statement giver described how they fled to the ECOMOG base in December 1996. The ECOMOG 
soldiers “tried to take advantage of the situation” by sexually harassing them and asking refugee girls 
to show them their breasts.120 Other statement givers reported that ECOMOG soldiers committed 
rapes.121 One statement giver reported that while ECOMOG soldiers were carrying her to the hospital, 
one of them raped her, resulting in a pregnancy.122 Other Liberians recounted how ECOMOG bartered 
food for sex with the civilians.123 One statement giver stated that these peacekeepers “left behind a 
dispirited nation of violated women and illegitimate children.”124
Impunity for Rape
In the few instances where women reported rapes to authorities or commanders, they received no 
response or, worse, additional threats. One statement giver described how rebels took her and several 
other women away and raped them repeatedly in 1990.125 She contracted a severe infection following 
the rape, requiring antibiotics for several weeks.126 After this incident, the statement giver decided to 
report the rape:
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The rebel who raped me was named Anthony…Anthony was a bodyguard 
of [a man called] Gio Devil. He was a senior commander in the NPFL 
(National Patriotic Front of Liberia). My family and I went to report the 
incident to [Gio Devil]. But he said to me: “You sleep with my boys, and 
then you come to complain to me?” Shocked at the accusation, I repeated 
three times, “Me?”127
She reported that hearing his response was like “being raped again.”128 In another case, a statement 
giver recounted how she reported an NPFL rebel who beat, bound, and raped her.129 Her attempt to 
seek redress resulted in further intimidation by her attacker. She described:
He threatened to kill me if I reported him. Notwithstanding the threat, I still 
reported the incident to a man…at the Defence Ministry in Monrovia. The 
[general] was arrested and detained at the Defence Ministry where he again 
threatened to kill me thereafter. That was the reason why I left Liberia.130
In some cases, the offenders used “African science” or threats of supernatural means to intimidate 
victims.131 A statement giver described the threats she faced when she sought to find the men who 
raped her sister while they were refugees in Ghana:
I went back to the market with my sister to try and find out who raped 
my sister. We went from person to person seeking information, but the 
community members of Awutu eventually told us that they would set spells 
on my sister and me if we did not drop the matter.”132
Women as Combatants and Saviors 
While women experience significant and devastating abuses during war, some also actively engage 
in many ways during conflicts and play critical roles in reconstruction processes. Elisabeth Rehn and 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, States Parties are:
“(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” Art. 2(3), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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Ellen Johnson Sirleaf explain in their report, “[w]omen are not always victims. They actively work 
to improve their situation, and they often actively support one side or another in conflict. Given that 
many conflicts arise out of social and economic inequality, it is not surprising that women take sides in 
an effort to better their lives, or to protect themselves and their families. Women become combatants, 
provide medical help, protect and feed armed groups.”133
In some cases, female victims took up arms to oppose the forces that brought their attackers.134 
Statement givers reported seeing female NPFL combatants. Human Rights Watch also reported that 
girls served as both combatants and helpers with Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and the government forces.135 The structure 
of female units varied across factions. For example, the Women’s Artillery Commandos were all-
female units headed by female leaders within the LURD faction.136 Likewise, Taylor’s government 
forces included females, although all-female units were less defined, and girl combatants could be 
found in men’s battalions.137 
Statements revealed instances of females perpetrating human rights abuses against both men and 
women. At times, these women engaged in sexual violence against other women. A female rebel forced 
a woman to strip naked and lay on the floor before inserting the barrel of her gun into the woman’s 
vagina.138 The female combatant moved the gun around so violently that the woman screamed out of 
pain.139 While female combatants waged the human rights violations as part of broader war tactics, 
they also reflected deep-seated traditional attitudes toward women. For example, a public hearing 
witness described the chattel-like treatment of a bush wife. The commander’s wife forced the bush 
wife to marry her brother, telling her, “Oh, don’t you know I know that you’re mine?”140 
Women as combatants represented a shift in traditional gender roles, at times contradicting traditional 
expectations. Some victims reported looking to these females for help and were taken aback when 
they instead perpetrated abuses. One statement giver described her experience with a female rebel: 
In 1993, my father died. I was then taken to Gbange by a female NPFL 
member who I thought was going to help me. Instead, [she] destroyed me, 
letting her boyfriend and other men rape me. She beat me, leaving a mark 
on my head.141
In other instances, women played the role of ally and protector to other women and girls. 
Another statement giver described how a female NPFL fighter helped her escape after four 
NPFL fighters raped and abducted her.142 The female combatant hid her and drove her to the 
Côte d’Ivoire border using an NPFL car.143 
One statement giver recalled her experience as a bush wife: 
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I was befriended by an elderly woman, Doreen, in the rebel camp. On August 
24, 1995, this older lady was sent to fetch water for the fighters. They trusted 
her not to run off. We determined to escape together, and on this particular 
day, we went out to fetch water together. Doreen simply said that she liked 
me and wanted to help me out. I think that Doreen was feeling sorry for me 
because I was new and was always crying and was one of the youngest girls 
to be taken as a bush wife at the camp. Doreen had a bit of money and we 
were able to get to Ivory Coast. But the rebels were coming back and forth 
across the border easily so we decided to move on to Ghana.144
Assistance was not always altruistic, however, and sometimes 
women harbored other motives. For example, there were 
accounts of women expecting services in return for their 
protection. One woman who cooked for Alhaji Kromah’s men 
took care of a teenage girl, but only if she had sex with her son.145
Finally, civilian women also played roles of protector and 
caretaker of others. As they fled, many women found children 
who needed protection and took them out of the country to keep 
them safe. One statement giver described her sons’ experience 
after she became separated from them during an explosion.146 
The 12-year-old boy ran in one direction, where the statement 
giver’s friend took him in and cared for him over the next two 
years in Kakata. The other three boys, six, seven and eight years 
of age, walked from Monrovia to Gbarnga without money or 
food.147 They met a woman along the way who gave them food 
and took care of them for one week until they hitched a ride on 
a truck.148
gender-BaSed violence in flight from the conflict
Many women experienced extreme violence in flight from the conflict. Numerous statement givers 
reported beatings, rape, and other sexual violence as they fled their homes and the country. Women 
were particularly vulnerable to violations at checkpoints. One statement giver recounted her experience 
at a checkpoint when she was 14 years old:
A man took me out of the checkpoint queue and led me to the back of a 
little hut a short distance away. There, I saw the dead and bloody bodies of 
a number of young girls and I recall feeling petrified. I did not know what 
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had happened to the girls. The man told me to take off my clothes. I did as 
I was told and did not ask any questions. After I was raped, the man let me 
go. I waited until I crossed the checkpoint in Monrovia before crying. I was 
bleeding. After I crossed the checkpoint, I saw my friends and told them 
about the rape.149
Border crossings were another place for widespread human rights violations. A statement giver 
described her attack:
I am the victim. I was raped. I cannot remember the year but it was the last 
war. [Taylor’s rebels] raped me and beat me. It happened at the Liberian 
border before entering Côte d’Ivoire…They tied my hands at my back and 
also tied my two legs. They took all my clothes I was wearing from my body. 
They took me to a place like a kitchen and raped me. More than five of them 
raped me. They did it because I was alone…My husband who is still missing 
was not with me. It was me and my two little children.150
The consequences of rape were an additional burden for women to bear during their flight. One 
statement giver described how she was gang-raped by combatants when she was four months 
pregnant.151 She miscarried, but was unable to access treatment as she fled from Liberia.152 The fetus 
remained in her uterus until she arrived in Ghana.153 
diSplacement
While the Liberian conflict was devastating to the general population, its effects were acutely felt 
by women. More than 700,000 Liberians found themselves refugees in third countries, including 
Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria.154 The internally displaced numbered an 
additional one million Liberians.155 By the end of the first civil war, very few Liberians lived where 
they resided before the war began in December 1989.156 As of 1996, more than 200,000 civilians, 
out of a population of 2.3 million, had died.157 The trauma of such widespread family tragedy and 
dislocation had profound consequences for multiple generations of Liberians. In particular, their 
displacement and resettlement has had considerable impact, both positive and negative, on Liberian 
women. Chapter 13 of this report discusses these effects on women living in the refugee camps and 
in the United States.158
impact of Sexual violence
In particular, the prevalence of sexual violence during the civil war had physical, social, and emotional 
consequences for Liberian women. As a war tactic, rape attacks both the individual and community 
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through the destruction of familial and societal bonds.159 Rape incidents often culminated in divorce 
(in 25.8 percent of cases), unwanted pregnancy (15.1 percent), and stigmatization.160 A frail legal system, 
insufficient evidence, and social pressures against reporting sexual crimes rendered prosecutions a 
rarity. 161 Rape can compel communities to flee, thus eroding informal safeguards against rape and 
creating a vicious circle.162 Finally, the fact that statement givers reported physiological and other 
consequences years and sometimes decades after the attacks demonstrates the far-reaching impact of 
rape. 
Physical Consequences
Unwanted pregnancies were one of the many physical consequences of rape. They forced women and 
girls to become child-rearers when they may not have been physically, emotionally, or economically 
prepared. A pregnancy as a result of rape can also lead to stigmatization by community and family 
members. Multiple rapes and pregnancies may compound the problem for victims. For example, a 
statement giver described how his daughter had five children, four of whom were borne out of rape.163 
Another statement giver in the refugee camp described her experience:
Some time in June 1990 after NPFL fighters took control of Kakata, a group 
of them came to our house where they burst my fiancé’s head. That resulted 
in his death. Terrified, I ran to my father’s residence where I met another 
group of the fighters. I met them torturing my family which included my 
father who they later killed by shooting, and my two brothers. Four of them 
arrested me and tied my hands at my back. Then they led me behind the 
house where two of the fighters raped me, set the house on fire, released me 
and left...I conceived as a result of the first abuse and gave birth to a boy. 
The child died at the age of two...During the April 6, [1996] fighting, I was 
again raped by three NPFL fighters on the Old Road. I again conceived as a 
result of this gang rape. I gave birth to the child who is now eight years old 
and with me here in the camp.164
The sexual violence also left many women unable to bear children. One statement giver described 
how she had been raped for three weeks by a LURD soldier, resulting in severe reproductive injuries 
and a hysterectomy. She stated:
I feel so bad that I cannot have more children. This is not how a woman 
is supposed to be. I still suffer in my stomach from the injury and the 
operation.165
In addition to unwanted pregnancy and infertility, other physical consequences of rape include unsafe 
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abortions, various gynecological complications, and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), such as 
HIV. For example, one statement giver described how Krahn rebels raped her 11-year-old half-sister 
in front of their family and infected her with gonorrhea.166 Rates of STDs for Liberian women, 
particularly former fighters and bush wives, remain generally unknown since shame often prevents 
them from publicly seeking any treatment or reporting diseases related to their victimization.167 A 
“culture of silence” exists for victims of sexual violence because, as Belinda Bernhard suggests, “[w]
omen and girls who have been raped or suffered sexual abuse are reluctant to admit they have been 
victimized (even to their own families) for fear that they will be victimized again by the stigma 
attached to rape and sexual abuse.”168 
Women also suffer the long-term physical consequences of other forms of violence. One statement 
giver described how rebels kicked her stomach and rendered her unconscious when she was five 
months pregnant.169 She miscarried three days later.170 To this day, she reported she has “horrible” 
premenstrual pain and loses large clots of blood.171 
Psychological Consequences
The psychological effects of rape are 
both short-term and long-term.172 
Following an incident, women often 
feel what Shana Swiss and Joan E. 
Giller describe as “shock, a fear of 
injury or death that can be paralyzing, 
and a sense of profound loss of control 
over one’s life.”173 Longer-term effects 
include “persistent fears, avoidance 
of situations that trigger memories 
of the violation, profound feelings of 
shame, difficulty remembering events, 
intrusive thoughts of the abuse, 
decreased ability to respond to life 
generally, and difficulty reestablishing 
intimate relationships.”174 These feelings are manifested in such conditions as anxiety, depression, 
disturbed sleep, loss of self-esteem, sexual dysfunctions, suicide, stomach aches, headaches, back 
pain, and behavioral and eating disorders.175 A high percentage of victims report post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), or “rape trauma syndrome,” which is the multitude of emotional responses to the 
sexual assault, including hopelessness, loss of control, phobias, anger, and guilt.176 Treatment is difficult 
because some African cultures may not describe these symptoms in a psychological framework but 
rather as phantom physical complaints. Furthermore, rape trauma during the conflict was intensified 
by a backdrop of other psychological trauma stemming from the loss of loved ones, home, and 
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community displacement, as well as prevailing infirmities and injuries.177 
Statements revealed the severe short-term and long-term emotional consequences for victims of 
sexual violence. A public hearing witness described the shock and trauma immediately following a 
rape by an NPFL rebel:
After the pickup pulled away, I stood in the dark crying, reflecting on the 
ordeal. I didn’t know what to do. What came to mind was to commit suicide 
because I felt that I could not face my fiancé and the rest of the family to talk 
about the horrible experience. I could not face the community because there 
was going to be lots of talk about my being raped. It wasn’t easy, but I had to 
pull myself together and find a way out of the dark because I didn’t know if 
they would come back.178
She also described her fear of social contact and leaving the safety of her home in the months afterward. 
She was afraid to see anyone because a fear of the rebels consumed her.179 Her family persuaded her 
to begin working outside the home after a couple of months.180 Although her family accompanied her 
on her walk to work, the emotional trauma was very difficult for her to bear:
Fear penetrated me every morning after work and every night. It was a 
horrible experience, like a nightmare that would never go away. And because 
of this, I wasn’t regular at work. The trauma was too much.181
Statements also described the long-term psychological consequences of rape. A statement giver 
described the outcome after combatants forced his uncle to rape his eight-year-old daughter. Although 
the girl survived the rape, she became “mentally unhinged.” By the age of 12, she died.182 In another 
case, a statement giver described a woman who had been raped by ten of Charles Taylor’s rebels. The 
woman “never recovered psychologically and had begun to sleep with so many men that people had 
regarded her as if she was a prostitute.”183 In one example, a woman was gang-raped in her village in 
the early 1990s when she was 12 years old. The injuries caused were so severe that she continued to 
suffer gynecological problems. She described these long-terms effects of the rape as prohibiting her 
from developing normal relationships with men.184 
In other cases, the trauma is so difficult for victims that they would prefer never to speak of it. One 
statement giver who was raped at the age of 14 summarized: 
I do not like to talk about the rape and, apart from telling friends who were 
at the checkpoint with me, I have only ever told a support worker here in 
England. I don’t want any counseling or other support because I want to 
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move on and forget the terrible memories.185
Social Consequences 
The social consequences of rape often compound the physical and psychological consequences of 
rape. Survivors face stigmatization by family and community, familial disintegration, alienation, and 
social retreat.186 It is often difficult for victims to resume their relationships with intimate partners 
and friends.187 In some cases, a rape would fracture a family as the victim chose to cut off all ties. One 
statement giver described how rebels raped his eldest daughter. She was so ashamed that she fled from 
the village. It was not until much later that the statement giver discovered his daughter had made her 
way to the United States.188 Another statement giver described the stigmatization she faced from her 
community and fiancé following a rape:
Everybody in the school and in the community knew that I was raped. The 
Liberian community is very small and tight-knit. I felt ostracized, could not 
go to any social activities, and just wanted to die. In addition, my fiancé 
blamed me for being raped. He told me I should have resisted more fiercely. 
But I said it was impossible to resist because my hands were tied, and the 
rebels were all armed with guns. Later, I became pregnant…I am convinced 
this was my fiancé’s child. But my fiancé blamed the child, and thought that 
it was the result of the rape, and pressured me to terminate my pregnancy. I 
refused, and now my daughter is sixteen-years-old. Although my fiancé and 
I eventually got married, our marriage fell apart because of the rape, because 
my husband kept blaming me, and also because I could not have a normal 
sexual relationship.189
Services Available to Women
Liberian women, both in Liberia 
and in the diaspora, still face many 
challenges resulting from the 
long-term effects of the conflict. 
Women in Liberia face challenges in 
accessing the health care needed to 
address the physical consequences of 
sexual violence. The United Nations 
describes Liberia’s health facilities 
as among the worst in the world, 
making it rare that a victim will 
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receive adequate treatment following an episode of sexual violence.190 The mental health services that 
are needed to address these issues are also extremely limited in Liberia. As Liberia recovers, the health 
sector and civil society organizations must be strengthened, and they must pay particular attention to 
the long-term impact of the war on women.
Women in the refugee camps also have particular difficulty with the long-term effects of sexual 
violence. According to a survey of Liberian women in refugee camps in Sierra Leone, 98 percent 
who were victims of rape needed medical treatment for the physical injuries and sexually transmitted 
infections resulting from the rapes.191 Many women reported ongoing gynecological problems as a 
result of rapes that occurred both in Liberia and in Buduburam. At the time statements were taken 
at Buduburam, there were only two doctors for the nearly 38,000 residents of the camp. As a result, 
many women have not gotten proper medical treatment to address these problems. 
StatuS of women in liBeria today
Despite the brutality of the conflict, some improvements in the social status of women are perceptible 
in post-conflict Liberia. The war may have diminished certain harmful traditional practices by 
weakening the systems that facilitated them. For example, the conflict may have undermined the 
secret societies that performed female genital mutilation, though that practice is once again on the 
rise.192 
Women have made progress in the political sphere since the conflict ended. In 2006, Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf became the first elected female president in Africa. Her inaugural speech stressed women’s 
rights as a top priority.193 Thirty-one percent of the cabinet and 14 percent of the legislature are 
composed of women; by comparison, 16.3 percent of the 110th U.S. Congress is female.194 After 
the conflict, the government began actively recruiting women into its new armed forces, a process 
previously open only to men.195 While women have encountered economic and educational obstacles 
to their advancement, they have begun to join the ranks of Liberia’s most central institutions. Also, 
new legislation and government policies, including an amended rape law, offer greater protection 
and opportunities for women and girls.196 In March 2008, the Liberian Government created a new 
criminal court to specifically handle cases of rape and other acts of violence against women.197 In 
addition, the Act to Govern the Devolution of Estates and Establish the Rights of Inheritance for 
Spouses of Both Statutory and Customary Marriages addresses the practice of regarding widows as 
property by conferring upon women the right to an inheritance.198 
Civil society organizations play an important role in advocating for women’s human rights. 
Women’s organizations gained prominence through their efforts in the peace process during and 
after the war, staging peaceful demonstrations, mediating between warring factions, and promoting 
sophisticated agendas at diplomatic delegations. 199 Following the establishment of the 1990 interim 
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government, women were instrumental in 
forming organizations to help war victims.200 
The Liberian Women’s Initiative, an umbrella 
group of religious and social organizations, 
advocated a permanent solution to the 
conflict rather than an interim government 
at the 1994 Liberian National Conference.201 
Today, Liberia’s civil society, concentrated 
in urban areas, provides a counterweight to 
discriminatory practices by promoting women’s 
rights.202 Non-governmental organizations in 
Liberia currently work on issues relating to 
violence against women, skills training, HIV/
AIDS, and the rule of law.203 Organizations 
advocating against female genital mutilation, 
however, are few.204 
While these important efforts are resulting in progress for women, there remain many disparities 
between men and women in Liberian society that continue to harm women. Prevailing cultural, 
historical, political, legal, and economic forces make gender inequality a daily reality for many 
women.205 Many of these conditions existed prior to the conflict and continue today. For example, 
although some non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations in Liberia 
currently address violence against women, criminal proceedings against offenders are rare.206 The 
lack of prosecutions not only leaves the violence unaddressed but also adds a long-term imprint of 
impunity. 
The pivotal role women play in household earning, childrearing, education, and social cohesion 
indicates that the continued subordination of women hinders Liberia’s recovery from the war.207 
Economically, Liberian women remain in an inferior position to men. Liberia’s high unemployment 
rate often forces women to turn to transactional sex for subsistence income208 or for money for tuition 
fees.209 Women continue to constitute the majority of Liberia’s subsistence farmers.210 Approximately 
80 percent of subsistence agriculture output is produced by women.211 Conversely, women accounted 
for only 11.4 percent of non-agricultural wage employment in 1999.212 The informal sector continues 
to be an important source of income for many women in Liberia; approximately one-third of women-
headed households depend on the informal sector as their primary revenue source.213 Women 
also make up a significant percentage of small-scale market traders. Formal employment, which is 
comparatively rare for women, is concentrated in traditionally female-dominated professions, such as 
nursing, teaching, and the clerical professions, which offer few avenues for advancement.214
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security “[c]alls on all actors involved, 
when negotiating and implementing peace 
agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, 
including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women 
and girls during repatriation and resettlement and 
for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict 
reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local 
women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes 
for conflict resolution, and that involve women 
in all of the implementation mechanisms of the 
peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the 
protection of and respect for human rights of 
women and girls, particularly as they relate to the 
constitution, the electoral system, the police and the 
judiciary.”
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external actorS
The Liberian war was complicated by regional politics, personal connections, and insecurity. Former 
U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman Cohen (1989-1993) testified, “We knew that 
these guerilla fighters had been trained in Libya and that their arms had come from Burkina Faso, and 
they were getting full support from Côte d’Ivoire.”1 For example, in the first civil war, Taylor’s forces 
secured experts from Libya and Burkina Faso to embed land mines in Liberia.2 Côte d’Ivoire served as 
a transit way for equipment and personnel sent from Burkina Faso and Libya.3 Qadhafi loaned Taylor 
planes for use by the arms dealers with whom Taylor dealt.4 
Libya
While the full extent of Libya’s involvement in the Liberian conflict may never be known, non-
governmental organizations and scholars have documented Libya’s role in facilitating the Liberian 
civil war, particularly through the actions of Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi.5 A portion of the resources 
and training that fueled the war is believed to have been supplied by Libya.6 
When Doe took power in 1980, Libya was the first to recognize the new regime and readily acted to 
foster diplomacy between the two states.7 In addition to establishing diplomatic ties with the Doe 
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regime, Libyans had also established a business presence in Liberia during the 1980s, owning the Pan-
African Plaza office block and Monrovia’s bottling plant.8 But the relationship cooled as Doe accepted 
U.S. support – including a purported ten million dollars in cash on condition that Doe would cancel 
his scheduled visit to Libya.9 Liberia’s diplomatic overtures toward Israel further abated relations 
between Liberia and Libya, leading to the expulsion of Libyan diplomats and Libya’s severance of 
ties to Liberia.10 In 1985, however, as his relationship with the United States soured, Doe re-initiated 
dialogue with Libya and paid the country a visit in 1988.11 
Even with reestablished ties 
and warmer relations with the 
Doe government in the mid- 
to late-1980s, Qadhafi pursued 
other avenues of influence in 
Liberia and supported Liberian 
dissidents. 12 Moses Blah, who 
served as Charles Taylor’s Vice 
President, testified that Qadhafi’s 
Libyan government ran training 
camps, which taught fighters 
how to use AK-47 assault rifles 
and surface-to-air-missiles.13 In 
response to Doe’s deepening 
relationship with the United 
States, Qadhafi directed Libyan 
agents to begin recruiting, arming, and funding Liberian dissidents throughout the region, including 
Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Ghana.14 It has been reported that “several hundred Liberians 
were training in Libya in at least three different terrorist camps.”15 Perhaps the most important figure 
to be trained in Libya was Charles Taylor himself. Taylor was reportedly trained in one of Libya’s 
camps at Mathaba in 1985.16 Following Taylor’s release from a Ghanaian jail,17 he began traveling 
between a new home in the capital of Burkina Faso, paid for by Libyan funds, and Tripoli.18 
The al-Mathabh al-Thauriya al-Alamiya (“World Revolutionary Headquarters”) was an operation set 
up by the Libyan secret service to provide training on counterinsurgency warfare.19 Thus, when the 
Libyan government chose to support the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Taylor found 
himself suddenly with access to a foreign government with the finances to support a large-scale 
insurgency.20 Taylor was reportedly personally encouraged by Qadhafi to recruit fighters in preparation 
for the December 1989 assault against Doe.21 Libya furnished Taylor with a cache of weaponry and 
millions of dollars to support his insurgency.22 
The relationship between Qadhafi and Taylor apparently continued up to and throughout Taylor’s 
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presidency. After his inauguration, President Taylor made several trips to Libya for talks with Qadhafi. 
Even in the closing days of his presidency, Taylor received support from Libya, reportedly flying to 
Libya to obtain weaponry in 2003.23 Just before Taylor stepped down in 2003, Nigerian peacekeepers 
controlling the airport confiscated a shipment of weapons rumored to be from Libya.24 
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso played a supporting role to Taylor and the NPFL, and the president of Burkina Faso, 
Blaise Compaore, was a significant figure in the events leading up to Taylor’s rebellion.25 It is likely 
that at least part of the motivation for Burkinabe support for Taylor was personal. Accounts suggest 
that Compaore ordered former Burkinabe President Thomas Sankara’s assassination26 and that 
Taylor, who arrived in Burkina Faso at approximately the time of President Sankara’s assassination 
in October 1987, was involved in the murder.27 Compaore was also married to Ivorian President 
Houphouet-Boigny’s daughter, the widow of Adolphus Tolbert. Given the strong relationship between 
Compaore and Houphouet-Boigny and their shared hostility toward Doe,28 a perception exists that 
Houphouet-Boigny persuaded Compaore to support Taylor’s efforts to overthrow Doe as revenge for 
Tolbert’s murder.29 Compaore continued his support for Taylor despite international pressure and the 
humanitarian disaster that ensued in Liberia: “He kept going because he had an investment in Charles 
Taylor, and he wanted absolutely for Charles Taylor to win, and he did not trust the West African 
forces because he opposed the operation.”30
Perhaps one of Compaore’s most significant acts was his introduction of Taylor to the Libyan leader 
Colonel Muammar Qadhafi.31 It was Compaore who convinced Qadhafi that Taylor possessed the 
military and diplomatic skills necessary to overthrow the Doe government.32 Also, Burkina Faso 
helped facilitate arms transfers to Taylor by serving as a transfer site for weapons en route to Liberia.33 
Despite assurances to the United States in 1991 that he would stop supplying arms to Taylor, Compaore 
continued his support for Taylor.34 Burkinabe banks also harbored diverted funds for Taylor, who had 
at least two Burkinabe bank accounts under the name of Jean Pierre Somé.35 
Burkina Faso served as recruiting grounds for the NPFL’s ranks as well. A generation of young 
Burkinabe men were alienated during the country’s economic crisis in the mid-1980s, and it was 
largely these disaffected youth who traveled to the NPFL training camps in Libya and Burkina 
Faso.36 In fact, Taylor’s 1989 invasion involved not only Liberian combatants, but also Burkinabe 
soldiers.37 Statement givers corroborated the view that Burkina Faso’s support enabled Taylor to train 
his soldiers.38 
Côte d’Ivoire
The backing of Côte d’Ivoire was politically, personally, geographically, and financially important to 
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Taylor. Côte d’Ivoire’s combination of geographical convenience and unstable government provided 
Taylor the platform he needed to eventually gain power in Liberia. The president of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, was one of the principal regional supporters of Taylor.39 
Côte d’Ivoire was geographically strategic for Taylor to establish his base, given that its “corridor...
provided convenient, regular passage for truckloads of arms, ammunitions destined for Taylor’s rebel 
forces.”40 Its border with Liberia allowed the NPFL to recruit fighters along the Ivorian frontier in 
preparation for its attack on Liberia.41 
Côte d’Ivoire’s political leverage was also a significant factor in Taylor’s war efforts. At the time of 
Taylor’s campaign, Côte d’Ivoire was France’s most prominent ally in West Africa.42 Arguably, this 
international recognition, along with Côte d’Ivoire’s political connections and diplomatic facilities,43 
was one of the most important benefits to Taylor. One possible factor affecting the onset and duration 
of Liberia’s war was the French influence in the region.44 France’s wariness of Nigeria’s rise as a 
regional power led to chilly relations between the two states.45 As a result, France had discouraged its 
former colonies, such as Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, from engaging in any peace agreements that 
would have raised Nigerian influence in the region.46 
The Ivorian government also provided Taylor and his rebels with other material goods and services, 
including cantonment (quartering of troops),47 “military intelligence, transportation facilities, safe 
haven for retreating rebels, and medical assistance for wounded rebels.”48 It also played a role in 
Liberia’s diamond and arms trade. Côte d’Ivoire facilitated the smuggling of diamonds from Liberia,49 
as well as weapons shipments.50 Also, Taylor’s financial backers used Abidjan as a venue to convene 
and to cut their deals on arms, communication resources, and training.51 Further, Côte d’Ivoire 
provided protection to Taylor’s relatives who resided there.52 
After Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993, Taylor maintained close relationships with both his successors, 
Henri Konan Bedie and Robert Gueï, which enabled him to continue the arms transfers and other 
activities.53 When Gueï was ousted from the presidency after the 2000 elections, the alliance shifted 
toward plotting a coup against Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo.54 Taylor opposed Gbagbo, who 
had developed relationships with and recruited combatants from Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD), and Taylor sought to destabilize Côte d’Ivoire.55 Also, Taylor purportedly 
wanted to establish a base in Côte d’Ivoire should he need to leave Liberia; gain control over Ivorian 
seaports that were vital to Liberia’s timber exports;56 and establish an armed line of defense to stop 
LURD and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) incursions into Liberia.57 Thus, Taylor 
supported two Ivorian rebel groups, the Popular Movement of the Ivorian Great West (MPIGO) and 
the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP), which launched an offensive on Danané from Liberia on 
November 28, 2002.58 While the Liberian government denied any involvement, Danané residents 
reported that Liberian security, the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), or former NPFL fighters constituted 
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90 percent of the rebels.59 
conflict reSourceS
The Liberian civil wars were complicated by economic actors interested in Liberia’s natural resources. 
In particular, economic factors and policies had a major impact by providing the funds and resources 
to fuel the war. The rubber, timber, gold, and shipping industries served as the means for Taylor to 
obtain resources and weapons. Many countries directly and indirectly funded the Liberian war, but 
most of such financing went unrecorded.60 
Exploitation of Liberia’s econo-
mic landscape began as early as 
Taylor’s control over Greater 
Liberia. The significance of the 
NPFL’s territorial control and 
its impact on the war cannot be 
overstated. During this time, 
Taylor ran a relatively sophisti-
cated financial apparatus, the 
revenue of which helped fi-
nance the war. Being a rebel 
group rather than a recognized 
government provided the NPFL 
two advantages. First, it was 
unencumbered by debt.61 Unlike 
the Interim Government in 
Monrovia, which had inherited 
four billion dollars in debt, the NPFL enjoyed a clean financial slate.62 Second, the NPFL’s offensive 
had driven the civil service apparatus from the country, thus allowing the NPFL to start anew, 
unencumbered by bureaucracy.63 Importantly, Taylor was also able to assume control over the port of 
Buchanan,64 thus ensuring his ability to engage in foreign commerce.65 Taylor increased exports of 
natural resources from Liberia through NPFL control of the Bong Mines, the Firestone Plantation 
at Harbel, and the port of Buchanan. He also found other ways to garner revenue from Greater 
Liberia. For example, the NPFL imposed a standing order that all marine commerce, including 
food, should move through the port of Buchanan,66 thus ensuring that no NPFL wealth would pass 
through Monrovia, which was under the control of the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The NPFL, acting as a government, accepted bids for management 
of the port, while a private company collected customs and duties on behalf of the NPFL.67 Even 
equipment from the industries in Greater Liberia afforded revenue, as Taylor began his rule of Bong 
Mines by selling off a good deal of the machinery.68 
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Endemic corruption during the civil war and Taylor’s administration helped drive this exploitation. 
Following the launch of the war, Taylor accumulated millions of dollars within months.69 He was able to 
exploit existing industries through activities such as levying fees for industry rights and appropriating 
a portion of the profits,70 selling off deserted equipment in NPFL territory,71 and making demands for 
equipment, foreign currency, electricity, fuel, and oil from timber and mining companies.72 The NPFL 
took over rubber plantations at various stages of the two civil wars to obtain other commodities, and 
corporations allegedly collaborated by paying rebels for protection and providing them with logistical 
and other assistance.73 Other rebel groups later emulated this tactic of taking over rubber plantations. 
When MODEL took over the Liberian Agricultural Company plantation, Liberian Agricultural 
Company staff offered the rebels money, vehicles, and electronics in an effort to keep the rebels from 
devastating the plantation.74
In addition to controlling government coffers and engaging in private procurement activities, Taylor’s 
exploitation of natural resources to fund wars is well documented. Often referred to as “conflict” or 
“blood” resources, these natural resources provided the revenue, logistical means, or camouflage to 
obtain weapons and to fund wars.75 
Timber, iron ore, and gold are among the natural resources abundantly occurring in Liberia.76 
Importantly, however, the origins of these resources that funded the conflict were not confined 
to Liberia but were instead international in scope. For example, while Liberia has some naturally 
occurring diamonds, these are few in number,77 of low quality, and command a price of $25 to $50 
per carat on the world market.78 Most diamonds exported from Liberia were mined elsewhere, most 
prominently in neighboring Sierra Leone, but also in Russia and Angola, or they were smuggled 
into Liberia to enter the international stream of commerce bearing the Liberian name.79 It was a 
complicated network involving multiple actors and countries in addition to Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Notwithstanding any argument from Taylor to the contrary,80 these diamonds represent significantly 
more carats on the whole than Liberia-mined diamonds, and were of much higher quality, commanding 
prices between $200 to $250 per carat. Some diamonds that bear the Liberian name never actually 
passed through Liberia, but merely took advantage of the Liberian government’s involvement in the 
illicit diamond trade and its unwillingness to combat the situation.81 Taylor’s desire to dominate trade 
in the area was one reason behind the RUF invasion of Sierra Leone. In fact, RUF and NPFL soldiers 
bragged they had attacked Sierra Leone to obtain and to sell loot.82 As with the origin of these sources, 
the trade, shipments, destinations, and other related aspects were likewise international in scope and 
involved many players and countries. Investigations have found that the illegal trade in Liberia’s 
natural resources “fueled and prolonged the country’s civil war.”83 
While the primary objective of trade in these resources was to obtain weaponry, the trade involved 
other purposes beyond just their purchase. For example, Global Witness found that the timber industry 
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was involved in the “financing and importing of weapons, in violation of UN sanctions,” specifically 
“[paying] for weapons delivery;” expediting “sanctions-busting arms transfers to Liberia;” facilitating 
arms shipments within Liberia and to Sierra Leone using roads commissioned for the timber industry; 
organizing the “logistical aspects of many of the arms deals;” and enabling shipments, such as through 
the use of a timber company owner’s private jet “to ship weapons from Niger and from Burkina Faso 
to Liberia.”84 
Liberia traded its timber for arms and funds to purchase arms.85 An alleged key player in this trade 
was Guus van Kouwenhoven, a Dutch arms dealer who headed the Oriental Timber Company as well 
as the Royal Timber Company.86 Throughout the two civil wars, the Oriental Timber Company held 
the largest logging concessions in Liberia.87 Records reveal that the Oriental Timber Company was the 
major source of Liberian timber imports for China during the war.88 China’s imports were triple those 
of Liberia’s second biggest trading partner.89 Although China’s role may appear minor in comparison 
with other nations, its offering of guns and money in exchange for timber helped sustain rebel groups 
in Liberia, thus contributing to the continuation of the Liberian conflict.90
These resources garnered significant revenue for Liberia both during the civil war and under the 
Taylor administration. One scholar approximates the total value of “warlord trade” in Liberia from 
1990 to 1994 at $100-150 million in diamonds; $121.6 million in timber; $81 million in rubber; and 
$95 million in iron ore.91 Following the 1997 elections, the trade was still highly lucrative, although 
official figures are likely lower than actual as a result of corruption, tax-evasive practices, and the 
trade’s underground nature. A 2001 U.N. report described the income generated by diamonds, rubber, 
and timber. In 1999, Liberia officially exported 8,500 carats of diamonds,92 an amount estimated to 
constitute only 10-15 percent of the actual exports.93 Timber production was valued at $46.2 million 
USD between January and June 2001, but estimates mark the actual value of exports to be 50 percent 
to 200 percent higher.94 The value of rubber totaled $33.3 million in 1999 and $53.2 million in 2000.95 
While foreign companies generally exerted greater control over the rubber industry, the U.N. report 
acknowledged it was unclear how the Liberian government spent the profits once received.96 
Ultimately, the trade in conflict resources led to U.N. sanctions against diamond and timber exports. 
On March 7, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution imposing sanctions on “the direct 
or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated 
in Liberia.”97 While it significantly reduced the flow of conflict diamonds out of Liberia, it failed to 
address a major gap in the industry by not providing for an international monitoring system.98 The 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a multilateral initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, 
did not enter into effect until 2003.99 U.N.-imposed sanctions against the export of Liberian timber 
came into effect on July 7, 2003.100 In October 2001, the United Nations contemplated sanctions on 
Liberia’s rubber industry, but U.S. lobbying on behalf of Firestone and the potential economic impact 
deterred the Security Council from taking further action.101 
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A final complicating factor in the conflict resource trade was its end objective: the arms trade itself. Illicit 
arms brokering involved the transfer of weapons without government authorization (i.e., black market 
trade), but because most countries do not have laws regulating the act of brokering, most brokering is 
considered to be in the grey market.102 The central orchestrator is the arms broker, or the middleman 
involved in “negotiating, arran-
ging or otherwise facilitating 
the transfers of weapons.”103 
Brokers generally connect sellers 
and buyers, engage in weapons 
acquisition, facilitate deals, 
carry out logistics, and ensure 
the necessary documentation—
legitimate and otherwise—is 
procured to allow transport of 
weapons.104 Brokers can avoid 
capture and prosecution by 
performing their functions from 
within the confines of a house 
or hotel room in any country 
that does not legislate against 
brokering.105 With extensive 
networks of corrupt government contacts and transportation resources used for delivery, the brokers 
can complete a sale of weapons from start to finish without ever meeting the sellers or purchasers 
and without being in the same location as the weapons. In this way, the exploitation of international 
criminal networks enables arms brokers to evade the scope of domestic jurisdictions.106 The arms 
trade in Liberia has been shaped by a number of factors, including historical events, a multitude of 
sources and networks, and a dearth of prosecutions. 
First, the demise of the Soviet Union provided a lucrative opportunity and an established infrastructure 
for arms brokers.107 Small arms and military transport aircraft became widely available as they were 
relatively unattended or not needed, thus ending up in the hands of profiteers willing to sell to the 
highest bidder.108 Arms brokers thus acquired “fully operational systems of clandestine transport, 
replete with money channels, people who understood how to use them, and, most important, 
established shipping pipelines…”109 The logistical pipelines once used by the Soviet bloc countries 
were transformed into tools for individual weapons brokers.110 These channels served specific 
purposes in the illegal arms trade, from supplying once legitimate weapons stockpiles to the grey and 
black markets, to providing government contacts willing to sell falsified end-user certificates111 that 
provided the cover of legitimacy to an illicit arms shipment.112 These falsified documents facilitated 
the brokers’ acquisition of arms from sanctioned dealers, as well as their sale to a diverse customer 
base that spanned from governments to rebels.113
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Second, the vast number of sources in the arms trade hinders effective control of the weapons trade 
in Africa generally and Liberia specifically. Many of the weapons are left over from the Cold War 
era, during which period large amounts of arms were sent to rebel movements; other states, seeking 
to further the position of rebel groups and governments they support, continue to instigate such 
traffic.114 Most weapons have likely traded hands many times over the course of several decades, either 
through seizure or theft from owners, captured or killed soldiers, or the sale by individual soldiers 
to competing groups.115 Liberia specifically has experienced a flow of weapons from governments 
and armed rebel groups in surrounding countries that had a stake in arming one faction or another 
for political purposes.116 For example, there is evidence of the transfer of Chinese arms to Liberia, 
including “Chinese-made AK-47s, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.”117 Another 
significant but less discussed source of weapons in Liberia is unauthorized gunsmiths who had the 
capacity to manufacture an estimated 200,000 small arms annually.118 The 1996-97 disarmament 
reveals the high numbers of weapons present during the first conflict. The disarmament, which lasted 
from November 22, 1996, until February 9, 1997,119 resulted in the registration of approximately 
10,000 weapons and some 1.24 million rounds of ammunition.120 Subsequent disarmament activities 
resulted in the surrender of additional weapons.121 Of an estimated 33,000 combatants, the program 
demobilized 21,315, including 4,360 children and 250 women.122
Third, international efforts to stem the illicit arms trade to Liberia proved largely ineffective. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) established an embargo on all weapons and military 
equipment shipments to Liberia.123 The sanctions were relatively successful in blocking participation 
by the legitimate arms-selling market, such as the large U.S. and European weapons manufacturers. 
Overall, however, the embargo proved to be less effective as the demand for weapons in Liberia 
and surrounding nations increased while traditional supply channels were cut off. This economic 
reality caused the grey and black markets to be flooded with weapons from various sources.124 From 
1989 to 2003, a number of countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Russia, Libya, and Nigeria, were involved along the chain of illicit 
arms trade to Liberia.125 Furthermore, not one person has been successfully prosecuted for violating 
the terms of the embargo.126 
Overall, few statements reference the role of economic actors in the conflict, and the majority of 
those that do so are primarily in the context of seeking refuge.127 One statement giver reflected on 
foreign companies’ general disregard for Liberia’s development. He stated that foreign investors 
in Liberia “keep all the desirable jobs for their own nationals, and give only menial work to the 
Liberians.”128 If given the opportunity, however, Liberians would quickly learn the technical aspects 
of the investment activities.129 He concluded by faulting the Liberian government for being so anxious 
to bring in foreign investment that it failed to impose conditions to bring about technology transfer 
to Liberian nationals.130 Other statements referring to economic actors focused on their connection to 
development rather than their role in the conflict. For example, one statement giver opined: 
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Liberia was the largest producer of natural rubber in the world; yet the 
profit from the country’s resources were being stolen instead of reinvested 
in development, infrastructure and education…[W]ith a small population 
of 5.1 or 5.2 million, Liberia’s vast natural resources should be more than 
enough to support a small population and provide well for them. The way 
multi-national companies treated Liberia made it into a sort of “American 
colony.”131
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Chapter Twelve. Role of the United States
Our fathers brought them here, and we are bound if possible to repair the 
injuries inflicted by our fathers. Could they be sent to Africa, a three-fold 
benefit would arise. We should be cleared of them; we should send to Africa 
a population particularly civilized and Christianized for its benefits; our 
blacks themselves would be put in better condition.1
- Letter from Robert Finley, founding member of the American Colonization Society, 
dated Feb. 15, 1815, on the subject of “deportation” of “Negros” from America back to 
Africa
In 1822, the U.S. government and many of its most prominent citizens became responsible for 
the creation of the nation known as Liberia. In the decades since, the United States has alternately 
supported, exploited, welcomed, and abandoned Liberia and Liberians. While the relationship 
over time has been complex, during several key periods the U.S.’ actions and omissions have led to 
disastrous results for Liberians.
Liberia was one expedient solution to America’s domestic crisis concerning slavery. In 1815, 
prominent whites advocating for a return of America’s Negro population to Africa were known as 
“deportationists.”2 They created an organization called the American Colonization Society (ACS) to 
coordinate their efforts. They lobbied Congress and solicited the support of faith groups, humanitarians, 
business leaders, and politicians all in an effort to, as Thomas Jefferson put it, “gradually [draw] 
off” America’s black population.3 The “deportation,” or “colonization,” effort received funding from 
Congress, procured in part through the efforts of James Monroe. American ACS agents selected 
which settlers would be permitted to travel to establish the colony. 
In 1822, a permanent ACS settlement was established at Cape Mesurado4 in the territory of the 
indigenous West African Dei tribe.5 This settlement would later develop into Monrovia. Other 
settlements supported by colonization societies in several states in the United States (Maryland, 
Georgia, Pennsylvania, for example) followed the initial settlement, establishing themselves in the 
traditional territories of other indigenous African ethnic groups such as the Vai, Bassa, Grebo, Gola, 
and Kru.6 
For the first 25 years of their existence, the ACS settlements were governed by white agents from 
the United States.7 Today in Liberia, landmarks and streets still bear the names of these agents and 
founding ACS members.8 But in light of dwindling support from the ACS in the 1840s, and to secure 
their ability to levy customs and duties on trade routes, the settlers declared Liberia to be a free 
republic in their Declaration of Independence of 1847. 9 
The new republic established a constitution patterned after the U.S. constitution,10 and created a 
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national seal with the motto “The Love Of Liberty Brought Us Here.”11 When the Liberian settlers 
declared independence, however, the U.S. government refused to establish diplomatic relations 
because Southern states objected to the presence of a black ambassador in Washington, DC.12 Even 
though other nations, including Great Britain and France, swiftly recognized Liberia, it took 15 years 
for the United States to do so. Ultimately, in the midst of the Civil War and concerns that Liberia 
would levy duties and taxes on U.S. commercial shipping if diplomatic recognition were not granted,13 
Abraham Lincoln extended formal recognition in 1862.14
our fair Share: u.S. commercial intereStS in liBeria
Every day adds to our knowledge of the moral and physical powers, 
capacities, and productions of the inhabitants and soil of this region, and 
no doubt is entertained that the returns must soon reach tens of millions 
of dollars per annum. If we desire to obtain our fair share of its benefits, 
let our rulers avoid no opportunity to uphold and cherish the trade of this 
important region.15
- The Philadelphia North American (1862)
A significant driver in the relationship between the United States and Liberia has been U.S. commercial 
interests. Commercial relations between the United States and Liberia often benefited U.S. interests 
at the expense of the majority of Liberians. In the 1920s, U.S. demand for rubber was growing in 
conjunction with the growth of the U.S. auto industry. To break British dominance in the global rubber 
market, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (“Firestone”) sought, with assistance from the U.S. 
State Department,16 a concession from the Liberian government to tap Liberia’s significant rubber 
resources. In exchange for a five million dollar loan from Firestone (which Liberia subsequently used 
to settle its foreign debt), Liberia leased one million acres for 99 years at a price of six cents per acre. 
According to some scholars, Firestone never carried out many of its promises to develop Liberia’s 
infrastructure, and the loan was designed to keep Liberia permanently indebted.17 In addition, the 
Firestone agreement gave the company ownership of any minerals or oil found in the leased area.18 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Firestone, along with other international entities, was implicated in 
a forced labor scandal that led to a League of Nations investigation. The Liberian government was 
ultimately found to have used slavery-like practices to supply laborers to Spanish controlled plantations 
as well as to the Firestone rubber plantation.19 A League of Nations inquiry found, however, that there 
was “no evidence that Firestone Plantations Company consciously employs any but voluntary labour 
on its leased rubber plantations.”20
Almost a century after the League of Nations inquiry, Firestone remains under scrutiny for unfair 
labor practices amounting to forced labor and child labor. Firestone is currently the subject of a civil 
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lawsuit in U.S. federal court related to unfair labor practices.21 Nevertheless, the U.S. government 
has continued its support for Firestone. During the conflict period when most industries in Liberia 
were sanctioned to prevent use of resources to fuel the conflict, rubber remained in legal production. 
While the United Nations gave some consideration to imposing sanctions on Liberia’s rubber industry 
in October 2001, U.S. lobbying on behalf of Firestone and its strong condemnation of the potential 
economic impact prevented the Security Council from taking further action.22
In addition to rubber, mining of Liberia’s 
iron ore23 and diamonds brought a 
steady influx of U.S. dollars into Liberia 
and a steady profit to multinational 
corporations until the late 1970s. A U.S. 
government memorandum prepared in 
the late 1970s estimated U.S. economic 
interests in Liberia to be in excess of 
$300 million in assets.24 One of these 
significant assets included the Liberian 
Maritime Registry, which was run by a 
U.S.-based company that remitted profits 
to the Government of Liberia.
Liberia’s mineral wealth and its maritime registry benefited U.S. corporate interests up through the 
Taylor regime. For example, the American televangelist Pat Robertson’s Freedom Gold Ltd. signed 
an agreement with Taylor in 1999 to gain development rights to diamonds and gold in Liberia.25 
Despite the Liberian government’s refusal to ratify the agreement, Freedom Gold started a diamond-
mining venture in southeastern Liberian in 2000. Subsequently, it became known that Taylor had a ten 
percent ownership interest in Freedom Gold.26 In 1999, the Taylor government signed an agreement 
to transfer administration of the maritime registry to the Liberian International Ship and Corporate 
Registry (LISCR), a U.S. company run by Taylor associates.27 
This change provided Taylor with the opportunity to divert millions of dollars from the shipping 
industry. In addition to providing funds to Taylor, LISCR directly or indirectly aided Taylor and the 
civil war by agreeing to send registry revenue to non-governmental bank accounts.28 A U.N. Panel of 
Experts found that this money was used for the delivery of weapons.29
the height of u.S. involvement: military and foreign policy expediency
Apart from commercial benefits, the United States has played a significant military and policy role 
in Liberia, gaining important strategic benefits by doing so. In 1910, at the request of the Liberian 
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government, the U.S. Navy sent two war ships to the Liberian coast.30 Their presence assisted the 
Liberian Frontier Force in warding off attacks from indigenous armies.31 Later, from 1912 until 1922, 
the Frontier Force, which later became the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), was led by African-
American U.S. military personnel.32
The two nations maintained a bilateral military relationship, with the United States positioning its 
strategic interests and assets within Liberia, and Liberia posing a number of requests for military 
assistance. Such military agreements began early with a 1942 defense pact between Liberia and the 
United States.33 In 1959, the United States and Liberia signed another defense pact, which provided 
Liberians with a sense of security and the belief that the United States would come to its aid in case 
of attack.34 The United States gained significant strategic assets based on its interactions with Liberia. 
These included use of Robertsfield International Airport “without restriction to support [U.S.] 
policy objectives,” a communications station that provided communications for 34 U.S. Embassies 
and Consulates in Africa, the OMEGA Navigational Station, the Voice of America transmitter and 
receiver facilities, and the right to establish military installations in the Monrovia port, according to 
a U.S. Embassy memorandum, “should they become necessary for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”35
During the latter part of the 1970s, 
however, the relationship between 
Liberia and the United States began to 
deteriorate as President Tolbert adopted 
a more conciliatory policy towards 
non-aligned countries.36 Immediately 
after the 1980 coup, the United States 
sought to protect important U.S. assets 
in Liberia and prevent the spread of 
socialism.37 Accordingly, the United 
States embraced the Doe administration 
so as to counteract the influence of the 
Ethiopians, Libyans, and Russians.38
Former Liberian Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Elwood Dunn has characterized the early 
years of the Doe administration as the height of U.S. involvement in Liberia.39 Between the 1980 coup 
and the 1985 elections, the United States contributed some $402 million in aid to Liberia, accounting 
for more than one-third of the country’s operating budget.40 Doe made abundant requests for military 
assistance, leading one State Department official to refer to them as “stock” (i.e., standard) requests.41 
Doe also ensured that Liberia supported U.S. policy objectives by closing the Libyan diplomatic 
mission in Liberia, ordering reductions in the size of the Soviet mission, and establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel.42
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Generally speaking, during the early Doe years the United States was relatively successful in extracting 
gains for human rights and democratic reforms in exchange for aid. Early efforts to encourage Doe to 
respect human rights included the condemnation by State Department officials of the 1980 executions43 
and continuous urging of respect for due process rights of political prisoners.44 State Department 
officials often attempted to leverage Liberia’s dependence on international creditors, stressing the 
relation between political legitimacy and private investment.45 The Reagan administration played an 
important role in pushing for the 1985 elections, assisting with constitutional reform, getting the ban 
on political activity lifted, and securing the release of political prisoners.46
After the contentious 1985 elections in which Doe declared himself the winner, however, the U.S.’ 
failure to withdraw support for Doe “shocked” many Liberians.47 According to some reports, Doe 
had been selected by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as one of a select group of foreign heads 
of state to benefit from a special security and intelligence assistance program that provided him 
with “head-of-state” protection.48 These operations gave the U.S. government access to important 
intelligence and thus a vested interest in keeping its friends in power.49 
It has also been reported that shortly after the 1985 elections, the United States provided intelligence 
to Doe warning him of a coup attempt that was being planned by Doe’s PRC co-founder, Thomas 
Quiwonkpa.50 Quiwonkpa’s coup attempt failed, Quiwonkpa was brutally murdered, and Doe 
unleashed a campaign of revenge attacks across the country. Although the United States decreased 
aid levels during the second half of the 1980s,51 the United States was still providing more aid per 
capita to Liberia than to any other West African nation.52 Despite condemnations from Congress 
regarding the conduct of the 1985 elections, the Reagan administration continued to recognize Doe 
as the legitimate leader of Liberia and continued to provide him with support.53 In the latter half of 
the 1980s, however, Congress also lost focus on human rights violations in Liberia in part because 
“Liberia [had] been eclipsed…by the question of sanctions against South Africa.”54
Betrayed twice: u.S. omiSSionS during the civil war
Statement givers frequently referred to the United States as Liberia’s “motherland”55 or its “big 
brother,”56 and spoke about the “special place United States holds in hearts of Liberians.”57 Others 
described how they see Liberia as the United States’ “child”58 or as a 51st state.59 Throughout the West 
African sub-region, Liberia was seen as the “Little U.S.”60
During the conflict from 1989-1997, however, White House officials dismissed the notion that 
the United States had a special relationship with Liberia. National Security Advisor Robert Gates 
described the historical relationship as “meaningless; it doesn’t govern us anymore; we treat Liberia 
just like any other country, and we have no real interest there.”61 Moreover, in the early 1990s, the U.S. 
public’s attention was focused elsewhere: on a war in the Persian Gulf.
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Nevertheless, diplomatic officials on the ground made efforts to secure an end to the fighting. 
Immediately after the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invasion and later during the 
civil war, State Department officials were in communication with faction leaders and attempted to 
mediate.62 The United States made an effort to persuade Doe to hold early elections,63 as well as a 
negotiated ceasefire based on an agreement for President Doe’s departure and exile into Togo.64 The 
White House, however, decided not to intervene, refusing to back the plan for Doe’s departure.65 
National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft was quoted as saying “It was difficult to see how 
we could intervene without taking over and pacifying the country with a more-or-less permanent 
involvement of U.S. forces.”66
The support for Taylor’s initial invasion, coming from the diaspora and other quarters, also created 
complexities in U.S. attempts to intervene. Following the NPFL invasion, President Doe asked the 
United States for military and financial assistance.67 Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, explained: 
Our first reports were that the Liberian army was trying to counter these 
guerrillas and that…wherever guerillas were spotted, they would – in a 
village, they would go in and burn down the whole village and kill all the 
people there, fellow Liberians. And this got us very upset.68
Upon hearing reports of AFL human rights violations in Nimba County, the U.S. government sent 
two U.S. Army officers to work with AFL forces and to advise them against further human rights 
abuses.69 The Liberian community in the United States contended, however, that sending these officers 
would signal support for President Doe, and the two Army officers were removed.70 This withdrawal 
effectively allowed the atrocities to continue, in the opinion of Assistant Secretary Cohen.71 
As the situation on the ground continued to worsen, the U.S. military role was limited to evacuating 
U.S. citizens and protecting the U.S. embassy. The United States sent troops to evacuate U.S. and 
third country nationals between August and December 1990, in October 1992, and between April and 
August 1996. The 1990 evacuations followed a threat by Prince Johnson to arrest and to detain any 
U.S. personnel. United States troops entered Monrovia to evacuate U.S. citizens, “but the Liberians 
were left behind.”72 In April 1996, due to the “deterioration of the security situation and the resulting 
threat to American citizens,” President Clinton ordered the U.S. military to evacuate “private U.S. 
citizens and third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound.”73 As 
one statement giver remarked (rhetorically), “How many American soldiers went to Liberia? Five 
– and they went to protect the Embassy.”74 In 1990, during some of the worst of the NPFL attacks 
on Monrovia, the White House spokesman made clear that the “United States had no intention of 
intervening militarily in the conflict,”75 a position that the United States maintained for the duration 
of the Liberian Civil War. 
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To many statement givers, however, 
it seemed clear that U.S. intervention 
could have swiftly brought an end 
to the carnage. One noted that the 
civil war could have been stopped if 
the United States, so highly regarded 
by Liberians, had simply demanded 
that the fighting factions set down 
their arms.76 This suggestion may 
indeed have been correct, given that, 
when the U.S. government contacted 
the AFL, NPFL and Independent 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL) to request a ceasefire in 
preparation for an evacuation in 
1990, all parties laid down their guns during the Marine helicopter flights.77 Another statement giver 
commented how the United States could have stopped the war because Taylor so feared the United 
States.78 Indeed, Taylor made overtures to the United States and would have accepted a U.S. brokered 
peace deal.79 The Catholic Archbishop of Monrovia, Michael Francis, was quoted as saying that a few 
well trained U.S. soldiers would have made the rebel soldiers terrorizing the capital “just throw away 
their guns and run away.”80
Liberians resorted to desperate measures to plead for U.S. intervention. One statement giver told the 
TRC that:
Liberians were throwing dead bodies over the embassy wall to appeal to 
the sympathy of [the] United States government and to make sure that they 
couldn’t ignore the Liberians who were dying on the other side of their 
wall.81 
Although the United States refused to intervene, it did attempt to provide humanitarian assistance. 
In 1996, the United States opened its Greystone Compound, across the street from the U.S. Embassy 
in Monrovia, to Liberians seeking safety.82 More than 20,000 sought shelter there.83 By June 1996, 
many whose homes were destroyed remained in displaced persons centers, including in the Greystone 
Compound.84 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in coordination 
with multi-lateral government agencies and non-governmental organizations, delivered food and 
water to the refugees staying in the Greystone Compound.85 Many statement givers described seeking 
refuge in the Greystone Compound,86 which they perceived to be safe from the war.87 Statement 
givers reported stays at the compound ranging from a few days88 to a month-and-a-half.89 Still, the 
compound was not completely safe, and at least two statement givers reported rebel attacks by rockets 
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and shootings that resulted in deaths.90 
Others sought safety at the Voice of America compound,91 which was occupied by U.S. Marines.92 One 
statement giver estimated that nearly 30,000 Liberians sought protection there.93 Another reported 
that Americans at the Voice of America took in Liberians and provided them with food and shelter.94 
Statement givers reported staying at the compound from four to five days95 to up to two weeks.96 
Stays at the Voice of America were cut short once the U.S. personnel evacuated in 1990 and the rebels 
moved in.97
While U.S. personnel provided some assistance, Liberians also describe instances where U.S. 
actors denied them help. At least one statement giver stated he was denied entry into the Greystone 
Compound.98 Another statement giver described the U.S. response to Liberians seeking safe refuge 
at the embassy:
[W]hen Monrovia was under siege, and many Liberians were helpless, they 
were shot at by U.S. Marines who wanted to prevent crowds from getting 
near the embassy.99
Another statement giver described how, during his stay at the U.S. Embassy, he discovered that the 
embassy staff destroyed a reserve of canned food, claiming it had expired.100 Given the starvation in 
Monrovia, this destruction greatly upset the statement giver, who chose to leave the embassy’s safe 
haven.101 In another case, a woman called the U.S. Department of State out of concern for her brother, 
who was being targeted. “My concerns fell on deaf ears. No one called me back. They probably just 
thought I was this crazy woman.”102
The U.S. policy decision not to intervene in the conflict left many Liberians feeling betrayed.103 As 
one statement giver pointed out, the Americans had a role to play in Liberia. “[T]hey should have 
helped.”104 Statement givers often voiced their distress over the non-reciprocal view of the relationship 
between the U.S. and Liberia. As one statement giver asked, “Why can’t the United States love Liberia 
like Liberia loves them?”105 Another explained that he did not blame the United States for Liberians 
killing each other, but did fault the United States for failing to help.106 Instead of stepping in, the 
“American warships sat in the water and watched Liberians slaughter each other.” What help the 
United States did provide was “too little too late.”107 
As one statement giver noted, people felt betrayed twice: first when the United States failed to intervene 
in the conflict, and again when it sent ships in to save Americans but not Liberians.108 
Liberians looked up to the United States as a savior. And I can assure you 
that if you talk to many Liberians, that they were very much disappointed 
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with the way the United States dealt with the issue of war that was going on 
at this time. For example, while Liberians were being killed, what the United 
States did was to send planes and get their own citizens out of the country 
and left Liberians to die…George Bush sen[t] the Coast Guard, the – the 
Coast Guard right there by the seashores of – of Monrovia, and they did not 
come out to save Liberian life. So as a result, many Liberians do have a really 
distaste[ful] feeling about the United States.109
Because of the long history of Liberia’s connection with the United States, there were many Liberian 
families in which some members had been born in the United States and were U.S. citizens. The 
evacuations had the additional impact of splitting up these families:
 [T]hey were pulling out only American citizens out of the country, dividing 
mothers and children. If you had three kids and one was born in the 
United States, that child was airlifted and the others were left to fend for 
themselves.110
As the conflict was nearing its close, in June 2003, West African leaders and the United Nations 
asked the United States to lead a peacekeeping force to Liberia.111 State Department representatives 
promised that the United States would “help the people of Liberia find the path to peace,”112 but 
conditioned the engagement of U.S. troops on several requirements.113 On June 30, 2003, during a 
closed door meeting, the U.S. government told the United Nations that there were three requirements 
for a U.S. engagement in Liberia: Taylor’s departure, a political agreement, and international support.114 
President Bush reiterated his call for Taylor to step down several times.115 On July 14, 2003, President 
Bush stated that the United States was committed to help bring peace to Liberia and, provided that 
Charles Taylor left Liberia, this support could include U.S. troops.116 
Despite the behind the scenes support, negotiations, and humanitarian assistance, the United States 
never sent a sustained peacekeeping mission to Liberia.
[M]y own personal feelings were that the United States had a very special 
capability there to really come in and do it fast. I was very impressed when 
Charles Taylor said to me, “If you send in a company of Marines, we’ll 
all surrender.” I know that Charles Taylor often didn’t tell the truth, but 
I think there he was telling the truth. And when the U.S. offshore forces 
sent the message that they were sending Marines to the center of Monrovia 
to bring in citizens, everybody stopped fighting immediately. So I knew in 
my own heart that the United States had the special capability because of 
the historical relationship. So I personally am very sorry that we did not 
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intervene and that we didn’t do it, because we could have.117
Even in August 2003, after the departure of Charles Taylor, hopes were raised that thousands of U.S. 
Marines waiting in ships off the coast of Liberia would be deployed. Two hundred did eventually land, 
but a few weeks later, the three warships off the coast sailed home, leaving a contingent of only 100 
Marines on the ground to protect the embassy and to work with West African peacekeepers.118 
In October 2003, Congress held a hearing on the future of U.S. foreign policy towards Liberia. Rep. 
Gregory W. Meeks, from New York, asked:
[A]re the people of Liberia suffering any less than those of Iraq?…We can find 
$87 billion to rebuild a nation that actually throughout history has not even 
made a fraction of the same contribution to America as those individuals 
from Liberia. The question is especially relevant when the estimated price 
tag for intervention in Liberia is only $275 million…[I]t becomes a question 
of value of lives on the African continent…particularly when you look at 
Liberia and the closeness that it has had with the United States of America.119
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Chapter Thirteen. “Everyone Scattered” 
Experiences of the Liberian Diaspors 
Diaspora: from the Greek, traditionally meaning to sow over or scatter, the 
modern meaning includes forced expulsion of a given population, dispersal, 
persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of return.1
It is estimated that of Liberia’s approximately three million people, nearly all fled their homes at some 
point during the civil war. Some left for a few months or years while others have yet to return. As 
many as 780,000 fled across an international border, becoming refugees.2 Hundreds of thousands of 
Liberians were internally displaced in any given year during the conflict.3 This population displacement 
created a Liberian diaspora on the African continent and around the globe. 
Displaced persons often experience what is known as the triple trauma paradigm. This longstanding 
paradigm posits that refugees experience trauma in the country of origin, during flight, and in the 
country of refuge.4 Each phase brings with it unique and recurring traumatic experiences. Whether 
witnessing atrocities while hiding in their houses, being targeted en route to internally displaced 
persons’ camps or neighboring countries of refuge, dealing with a seeming endless sojourn in a 
refugee settlement, or adjusting to life in a third country, the experiences of Liberians in the diaspora 
are a critical component of the TRC’s analysis. 
This report uses the triple trauma paradigm as a framework for considering the Liberian diaspora 
experience. The first part of this section addresses the mass population displacements that began 
in 1990 with Charles Taylor’s invasion of Liberia and which continued through 2003, focusing on 
why and how Liberians fled, as well as the trauma they experienced during flight within Liberia. The 
second part recounts the experiences of the refugee diaspora in the West African sub-region, with a 
particular focus on refugees in the Buduburam Settlement in Ghana. The third part addresses the 
experience of the Liberian diaspora outside of Africa, with a focus on immigrants who have settled in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. 
flight
The human rights abuses that forced Liberians to flee their homes between 1989 and 2003 – whether 
to a neighbor’s house or to a foreign land – were some of the most severe types of trauma imaginable. 
Although a significant number of Liberians fled their homeland after the coup that brought Samuel 
Doe to power, the vast majority of TRC statements from the diaspora focus on experiences of flight 
as a result of the civil war that began in December of 1989. Liberians were subjected to summary 
executions, rape, assault, torture, and other crimes against humanity. 
Forced to Flee
Statement givers described consistent patterns of human rights violations forcing them to flee. Many 
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families fled to avoid attack when they heard from informants that fighters were approaching their 
area.5 
My family had to flee our home in Monrovia because someone said the 
rebels were coming. My father, my two brothers, and I left to go to [Eternal 
Love Winning Africa] ELWA campus…I heard that the place at ELWA was 
taking in people who had nowhere to go, so my family sought refuge there.6 
A Mandingo statement giver from Nimba County recounted his efforts to get back to his home 
village to warn his family about the oncoming National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) advance.7 
Although he arrived too late to save all of his family members, he was able to send his remaining 
children away to towns on the border with Guinea.
Others fled because of specific threats against family members, generally a breadwinner who worked 
for the government, a prominent business person, or a community leader. 
During the Doe administration my father was the director of police and 
later joint security director at the Port Authority in Liberia before the war. 
Because of his status we were to be hunted. He fled the country and left us 
in Monrovia. When the rebels entered they started asking about our father’s 
house in the Red Light area and a neighbor came to tell us what they had 
heard. We fled to Fendell. While there we heard that the house was burned 
and everything looted.8 
Usually, however, there were no advance warnings or threats. Community leaders and elders, those 
associated with the government, those suspected of having money or other valuables, or those 
associated with opposing fighting factions were simply abducted, executed, or violently assaulted 
during surprise attacks on their homes. 
A statement giver in Ghana told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) what happened to 
her family in 1996 because of her grandfather’s role in the government and community:
My grandfather…was a tax collector in Buchanan, a party member in Doe’s 
party, and a chief…Somebody pointed out our house. They broke into the 
house and started shooting. My grandparents hid in the bathroom. They 
were beating everyone and dragging them outside. My great-uncle and step-
mother died…my grandfather was beaten until unconscious. His back and 
neck still have pain because of injury. He was chopped with knife and has a 
scar on his leg. The place was near an ECOMOG checkpoint so ECOMOG 
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people came and the attackers ran away.9
While many Liberians saw their loved ones killed and tortured, other statement givers came home 
to find their families had simply disappeared. Fearing for their own safety and hoping to find their 
families on the road, they fled. 
One day, I was out looking for food. When I came home, no one was there. 
The neighbors told me that Prince Johnson’s [Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia] (INPFL) men [came] to the neighborhood and were asking 
for Krahn people. They said that a stray bullet hit one of my daughters…
and she died. Since then, I have not seen my family and do not know what 
happened to them…[W]hen I learned of the death of my daughter and that 
the rest of my family was missing, I decided it was not safe to stay there. 
Starting then, I began hiding in other parts of Liberia – mostly in the bush 
in Grand Gedeh with some other relatives.10
The experiences of these statement givers were repeated on a massive scale. 
After a flight-triggering event such as those described above, displacement often proceeded in 
phases: hiding, internal displacement within Liberia, refuge in a neighboring country, and for some, 
resettlement in a third country. These phases generally were not linear, but were cyclical, with 
movement between the phases occurring along with the phases of the conflict itself. 
As the offensives of fighting factions spread in and out of Monrovia and through the outlying 
counties of Liberia, and as peace accords were signed and broken,11 individuals oscillated between 
being forced to flee and being able to return to relative calm. One statement giver, whose husband was 
a government official, described leaving their home in July 1990 to take refuge in the ELWA Christian 
radio station compound. 12 The family stayed there for approximately a week, until they received word 
that Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) forces were threatening to bomb the compound. The family 
then fled to the University of Liberia campus, where they were able to find a room. They stayed there 
until Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces entered 
Monrovia. In 1992, the statement giver and her family went into hiding again. In 1996, the family 
was staying with the statement giver’s mother when AFL forces entered the house and executed the 
statement giver’s husband. After the trauma of seeing her husband executed, the woman took the 15 
children staying with her and walked out of Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire.13 
During the first wave of fighting in 1990, as NPFL and AFL forces battled in Monrovia, many residents 
hid in the city and its nearby suburbs to attempt to wait out the fighting. Individuals described hiding 
in closets, on roofs, under beds, in swamps, in the “bush,” and in neighbors’ and family members’ 
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homes. 
One statement giver described being separated from her mother in July 1990 and staying with a family 
friend for several weeks.14 At one point she had to hide in a laundry basket in a closet for a couple of 
days to avoid being kidnapped by rebels. Later, she was taken by a different family friend to stay at the 
Sierra Leonean embassy in Monrovia. 
There was constant fighting, especially at night, between the government 
and rebel forces. The buildings were shaking and there was the sound of 
glass breaking. A lot of people were at the embassy. There were about 30 
people staying in one room the size of a bedroom. The guys would sleep 
one way and the women and kids the other way. I slept fully clothed with my 
nightgown on over my clothes. At certain times, the shooting would stop 
and then people would leave to search for food. Coal was not available so 
we would cut trees for wood. We would go in groups for safety. We would 
sometimes hear someone yell “Where are you guys coming from? What are 
you doing out?” You didn’t know where the voice was coming from. We 
would have to cook and eat fast. I had never had to do work at home, so I 
didn’t even know how to start a fire. People used to bathe in an unfinished 
house, using a bucket as a means for the pouring water to clean themselves. 
We would have to bathe quickly with no soap. I spent two months at the 
Embassy.15
Many in Liberia moved constantly so as to avoid being captured or killed. One statement giver 
described moving from Gardernsville, to the French Cable neighborhood, to Bushrod Island, 
then to Logantown to escape the rebel advances. 16 He finally returned to Monrovia proper after 
the deployment of ECOMOG.17 Another statement giver, who was seven years old during the 1990 
fighting, described his family’s movements during the summer of 1990 from their home near the 
beach on Ninth Street in Sinkor, to “Order” Road, to Twelfth Street, then to New Kru Town because 
food was getting scarce in Sinkor, and then finally back to their old home on Ninth Street.18 
The crisis in 1990 also impacted those outside Monrovia. Across Liberia, families suffered similar 
patterns of displacement. In July 1990, rebels attacked Kakata. Mandingos were specifically targeted.19 
One statement giver, in his 20s at the time, described hiding on the roof of his family compound while 
the rebels dragged his father into the street and killed him. The young man fled on foot to Monrovia, 
where he found his uncle’s family. He fled with his uncle’s family to Sierra Leone, where they stayed 
as refugees for six years.20 Another statement giver described rebel raids on Bopolu, in Bomi County 
in February and March 1990. The statement giver was a young girl at the time and remembers hiding 
with her cousin’s baby in a huge pot in her grandmother’s kitchen as the rebels searched through the 
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house and abducted her cousin.21 The next day, the family fled to the mountains of Lofa County, 
where they stayed for several months before returning to Bopolu. In September 1990, the NPFL 
attacked Pourtown in Grand Gedeh County. One statement giver who worked for the Ministry of 
Agriculture under Doe was targeted during the attack. He and his children fled into the bush and hid 
out for five days.22 Ultimately, they reached Côte d’Ivoire.
In 1991, with the installation of the interim government,23 some Liberians returned home.24 One 
statement giver described returning on a U.N. ship from Guinea, after seeing the interim president 
and his cabinet board an earlier boat back to Monrovia.25 Another statement giver who was a young 
child when the war broke out in 1990 was sent to live with his grandmother in Grand Cape Mount 
County in 1990. In 1991, however, his mother came from Monrovia to bring him back to the city.26 
Another noted that he decided to go back to Monrovia in 1991 because ECOMOG had established 
some control there.27 Many who returned however, were soon forced to flee again. 
The April 6, 1996, war forced another cycle of hiding, internal displacement, and seeking refuge. For 
example, the young boy who had moved between four different houses in Sinkor and New Kru Town 
during the summer of 1990, fled the country altogether when war broke out in 1996; he settled in 
Philadelphia with his brothers.28 
In August 1996, a ceasefire was declared and ECOMOG began disarming the fighting factions. 
Many Liberians returned home during this period around the 1997 elections. One statement giver 
summarized:
I was in Côte d’Ivoire for eight years. When they elected Taylor as President I 
went back [to] Liberia in 1998, June 20, thinking that things were fine in the 
country. Then war broke up in Sept. 18, 1998, [and that’s] how I came back 
to Côte d’Ivoire and I continue[d] my journey to Ghana.29
Some estimates indicate that more than 80 percent of displaced Liberians returned home when the 
civil war ended and Charles Taylor was elected.30 Large scale fighting broke out in September 1998, 
however, when Taylor’s soldiers tried to arrest Roosevelt Johnson. Fighting erupted between Johnson’s 
supporters and Taylor’s forces on Camp Johnson Road. 31 Taylor responded by increasing his efforts 
to eliminate suspected opposition, 32 including in his own administration. 33 While ethnic Krahn and 
Mandingo were often the target of these attacks, 34 many others fled to avoid the violence. This led to 
another cycle of hiding and flight.
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Everyone Scattered
When the rebels came everyone scattered…They beat and raped me. When 
the NPFL left, I ran.35 
Statement givers told the TRC again and again of the trauma of being separated from family members 
in the chaos of fighting and flight.36 For example, one statement giver described her mother going 
to Paynesville one day to run an errand, but the rebels invaded and cut her off from her family 
for the next several months.37 This experience was common as rebels established shifting lines of 
demarcation and zones of control throughout Monrovia and the surrounding areas.38 When routes 
between home, office, school, and market were cut off, families were separated without any advance 
warning. A woman who was a young teenager during the war spoke of her separation from her mother 
in June 1990.39 Upon learning that rebels were nearing their housing estate in Gardnersville, the 
statement giver’s mother decided to move the family into Monrovia to stay with an aunt. Her mother 
took the girls and the baby to town first and then returned to Gardnersville for the boys living in the 
household. She did not see her mother again for almost three years because her mother’s return to 
Monrovia was cut off by the rebel advance.40 
I was living in Refinery Junction, Monrovia, with my husband and my 
children. In 1990, Charles Taylor’s rebels arrived at our house and started 
shooting. My father, mother, husband, children and brothers and sisters 
were there. The rebels killed my older brother and raped my sister. Everyone 
scattered. I was only with my youngest child. I saw the rebels burn my house 
down. I went to Nimba County by car and then walked through the bush 
to Côte d’Ivoire. In Côte d’Ivoire I found the members of my family who 
survived.41
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While some families were ultimately reunited, many Liberian families have never been made whole. A 
Kissi statement giver now living in Ghana told the TRC that he and his wife and son sought refuge in 
the U.S. Embassy compound in 2003 after NPFL rebels had killed four of his Mandingo neighbors. 
“While we were at the American Embassy, rockets from [Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy] (LURD) rebels hit in and around the Embassy compound killing Liberians and, I think, 
some American Marines. As the crowd scattered, I lost track of my wife. I have not seen her since, but 
I have heard that she may now be in Guinea, though I don’t know where.”42
Although this statement giver was able to bring his son safely to Ghana, other children were not so 
lucky. Another statement giver told of being able to escape with only one child after her husband 
was beheaded in her presence – her other child was trampled to death in the confusion.43 If not 
killed, children often were cut off from parents, seemingly in an instant.44 One statement giver who 
was ten years old at the time told the TRC that he “ran with his neighbors when he fled; he didn’t 
end up running with his brothers and sisters. He doesn’t know what happened to his grandmother, 
his brothers…or his sisters…”45 While many children were able to take advantage of the Liberian 
extended family system and find refuge with relatives, many were left stranded with no one but 
strangers to assist them.
I was just eight years old in 1990…[My father] decided to take us to safety 
in Maryland County…While enroute…he was arrested and killed at the 
Toe Town Checkpoint by NPFL forces. After my father was killed I joined 
another family and followed them to Greenville, [Sinoe County]. I was 
abandoned by the family that took me to Sinoe County and was adopted by 
another family.46 
Another statement giver was in second grade when the war started in 1990. His mother was shot. As 
he huddled over her body, she was bayoneted by soldiers.47 This young boy’s father came to find him 
and took him to safety in Côte d’Ivoire. But after being in Côte d’Ivoire for several years, his father 
was killed in 2000 as a result of the conflict that engulfed that country.48 This statement giver, who 
eventually made his way to Ghana, was able to locate his two younger brothers in Guinea. He is trying 
to bring them to Ghana but does not have enough money to do so.49 
Many Liberians were forced to make impossible decisions in a split second. A statement giver from 
Zwedru who now lives in Ghana told the TRC that his mother had just given birth to twins when the 
war came in 1990. 
I had gone out as usual in the early morning to make a fire behind the house. 
Rebels came to the house and crashed in the front door. I crawled into the 
[babies’] room and was only big enough to take one. I grabbed one of the 
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babies and ran to the bush as fast as I could. I heard gunfire all over and 
later my mom told me my father was killed. She also said one of the babies 
had been killed. I spent three weeks in the bush with the baby, which was 
stressful especially when there was a need to be quiet. I made it to the Côte 
d’Ivoire.50
In the summer and fall of 1990, U.S. Marines evacuated U.S. citizens and those with green cards, as 
well as other foreign nationals who had taken refuge at the U.S. embassy.51 Describing her memories 
of the evacuations, one statement giver from the southern United States described how she was 
evacuated, but her sister, who did not happen to be at home at the time of the evacuation, was left 
behind.52 
The family, whether traditional or statutory, is the basic unit of social organization and social support 
in Liberia.53 Accordingly, destruction of the family structure undermined the entire Liberian social 
order. The impact of this trauma has had continuing repercussions in the diaspora.54 One such impact 
has been a multitude of informal adoptions as communities, extended families, and sometimes even 
perfect strangers attempted to protect orphaned and lost children. These informal adoptions are 
generally not recognized by immigration authorities in other countries, which has led to additional 
family separations.55
Travel Within Liberia
At first, the walking seemed normal. We all had shoes, tents, clothing, water 
and food. But conditions rapidly worsened. Our shoes were destroyed, 
and our belongings were taken from us. None of us could replace these 
items, as it was far more important to spend the little money we could 
obtain on food. Food and water were scarce, and my two young nieces 
died of starvation on the journey. I had to wait in long lines to get water 
from wells. Often, the water source was depleted by the time it was my 
turn to drink. And when I was able to get water, I often felt bad drinking 
knowing that there would be none left for the people waiting behind.  
 
Our family sometimes walked as part of a larger group; it was safer to travel 
this way. People were more likely to be accosted by soldiers and killed if 
traveling alone. Soldiers would take people away from their walking group 
if they wanted to kill or torture you, and were quick to shoot if they spotted 
anyone running. As my family walked from village to village, we were 
stopped at checkpoints, where soldiers would search our belongings and 
take what they wanted before letting us go ahead.56
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Once forced out of their homes and villages, many statement givers described traveling in large groups 
of extended family or following groups of strangers to get to a relatively safe destination. Liberians 
were forced to walk for days, weeks, and often months to get to safety. One statement giver described 
having to leave for Guinea after having lived in Nimba County all her life.57 She walked for nine days 
traveling with a group of some 30 family members. Another statement giver described her traverse 
to Guinea. She left Ganta in 1994 after being repeatedly raped and beaten while in rebel custody. 58
While walking in the forest I met a huge group of displaced people walking 
toward Ganta and joined them to walk to Côte d’Ivoire. I spent three weeks 
walking. No food. Starving. Another attack occurred with people being 
killed, raped.59
Food and water along the travel routes was scarce to non-existent. One statement giver described 
eating wild fruits to survive.60 Another statement giver remembered going for days and sometimes 
weeks between locating a source of clean water.61 As noted above, the lack of food and water led to 
death by starvation of vulnerable individuals such as children and the elderly. One statement giver 
now living in Ghana told the TRC that her three-year-old son had died one day (as she carried him 
on her back while trying to walk out of Liberia) because there was no food.62 A statement giver now 
in Atlanta told the TRC that:
Because I was unable to bring food with me, my daughter…died because of 
lack of nutrition and food. She died in Bomi. They couldn’t find anything 
to eat. I was looking for cassava to eat. People grew it and they left some 
behind. You see cassava leaf and you dig for the root. Otherwise there was 
nothing else to eat.63 
Numerous statement givers, and those traveling with them, were suffering from injuries and other 
illnesses as they tried to escape further harm. Medical care was difficult to find, as were medications 
and treatment for what should have been non-fatal illnesses. One statement giver who now lives in 
Ghana told the TRC that her mother died en route to Sierra Leone as a result of complications from 
hypertension.64 Another told of his mother treating his father’s heart condition with herbs because his 
father ran out of medication as they were fleeing the fighting.65 Another statement giver now in Ghana 
told the TRC about an attack by LURD in 2003 on her home in Duala, during which her husband and 
son were killed in front of her and she miscarried because of being beaten: 
My neighbor was leaving. I was still sick, but my neighbor brought me along. 
We walked to Guinea. We were on the road for months because my health 
was so bad and I had to rest a lot. We saw fighting as we were walking. 
We would hide in the bush. Shots were fired over our heads…My neighbor 
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helped me and paid for everything.66
Not everyone was fortunate enough to have a neighbor who could provide assistance. Those who 
were disabled or otherwise vulnerable often had to be left behind. One statement giver told the TRC 
about leaving behind her stepmother and others who could not walk in Lofa County in 1993:
The people in the town who could leave, and were physically capable of 
leaving, decided that they had to flee because the rebels were coming. The 
people in the town who could travel decided to put all of the people that 
couldn’t make the journey to Guinea, 230 old and disabled peasants, in a 
village together. We hoped that the rebels would respect the fact that the 
people in the town were handicapped and defenseless and pass it by.
The rebels killed everyone in the town, including my stepmother and brother 
(they both had had leg problems), [except for] one person who managed to 
survive. The survivor told me that the rebels put my brother in a house and 
set it on fire, and that they had beheaded my stepmother.67
Safety along the travel routes also was a critical concern. One witness in the U.S. public hearings told 
the TRC that he became responsible for leading his siblings out of Liberia during the war, although 
he was only a young teenager at the time. He told the TRC:
I would walk ahead of the group of my siblings. And when I walked ahead, I 
would make sure there ain’t no rebel ahead of us. Then I would come back, 
and then I would walk with my siblings. So every time, I will do that…[a] 
mile and a half I would walk and then walk back, and make sure for their 
own safety…At one point, I kind of walk[ed] ahead, and then when I came 
back, my siblings weren’t there.68 
This young man tried for a full day to find his siblings, but without success, and then was forced to go 
on alone to the Sierra Leone border.69 
The Checkpoint Experience
Trying to survive the maze of checkpoints established all over the country by warring factions was 
another virtually universal experience.70 Describing checkpoints on the road between Monrovia and 
the city of Buchanan, one statement giver said, “if it was here [in the United States], it would be like 
walking five blocks and a checkpoint. Two blocks and a checkpoint.”71
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Checkpoints were established along major travel routes throughout the country and at many border 
crossings. Moreover, informal checkpoints guarded by small groups of fighters, often child soldiers, 
sprung up across Liberia. The checkpoints were designed for extortion72 and to control any freedom 
of movement within the country. “Every checkpoint someone had to pay.”73 
My family had to run away from Monrovia. We went into Bomi County, 
district of Klay. We had to go through check points. As we were crossing, 
fighting started. A gun shot missed me, flew in front of my face. When we 
reached Bomi County, I decided to come back to Monrovia to my house 
to get my belongings. I stayed in Monrovia for three days. I met Taylor’s 
soldiers when I was coming back to Bomi. They said that I disobeyed the 
order. People were not supposed to leave the area. There was an order that 
nobody should leave. I was carrying food and they took food, shoes, made 
me lay on the ground for some time. They put me in a prison hole where I 
had to sit on a rug until next morning. Then they said “you can go to your 
village.” After I was released and before I could reach my village, I came to 
another check point. Area commander came…He ordered fifty-two lashes 
for disobeying the order (not to leave the area) and then they took me to 
another prison where I slept till next morning. Next morning they freed me 
and I went to my village in Bomi.74
Checkpoints were gruesome testaments to the atrocities committed by the warring factions. One 
statement giver, now residing in Minnesota, described a checkpoint near Kakata as “hell on earth. 
There were bodies in the water, and the scent was so strong [I] could not stand it. [My] sister had 
rice. One of the rebel women said, ‘if you give us the rice, we will let you pass.’ People were tied up, 
sitting and crying in the sun.”75 Another told the TRC that there “were dead bodies scattered all along 
the roads, many bearing marks of hideous violence. It was common practice for soldiers to tabay76 
their victims and cut out their hearts. I knew that many women were raped. At one checkpoint, I 
saw human intestines unraveled and used as a barricade to prevent people from crossing.”77 Another 
statement giver told the TRC that at “a checkpoint on the way…I saw a dead body. The body had been 
cut with knives around the chest. Two men were carrying the body and threw it into the bushes.”78 
Yet another described seeing the heads of his dead relatives on a checkpoint near his community.79
Checkpoints were used by warring factions to target people for execution, detention, assault, and 
torture. People trying to flee were “pulled off the line” because of their perceived tribal affiliation, 
perceived employment, perceived family relationship, or other perceived affiliation. “[E]very check-
point we met up with the question[s] [were] always: ‘Where are you going? What tribe are you? Where 
are you from?’ And many more crazy things.”80 
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Liberians engaged in an array of tactics to survive the innumerable checkpoints. One man noted 
that he survived because he knew many Liberian dialects and would speak whichever dialect he 
thought would be least threatening to the fighters he encountered.81 Another statement giver said 
that her “Auntie tried to keep everyone together and in the center of the groups moving through the 
checkpoints, because those on the edges were more likely to be pulled off the line.”82 Sometimes life 
or death was simple blind luck – a statement giver said that at one checkpoint “the soldiers shot every 
fourth person in line for no apparent reason.”83 
Most who were pulled off the line did not survive, but a statement giver now living in Ghana told the 
TRC of being pulled off the line and ultimately released at a checkpoint in Kakata.
The rebels told me to tell my family to go on ahead because I was going to 
die there. After my family left, I again pleaded with them not to kill me, 
saying, “I don’t think I deserve to die for no reason.” Finally, one of the 
rebels said, “Let’s leave him.” That rebel left and two others walked with 
me, telling me that if I was there tomorrow, they would kill me. At this time, 
my spirit left me, and I thought I was dead. I became mute, and was unable 
to speak for days.84
Checkpoints were also used for forced recruitment of 
adults and children as fighters, sexual slaves, and forced 
laborers. One statement giver now living in Minnesota 
recounted that her entire family was pulled off the 
line and “were sent to do forced labor, unloading the 
cargo at the port of Monrovia, which the rebels were 
systematically looting. One [of them] was told to stay 
behind to watch over the little children, while the rest 
of the family was forced to load trucks…[They] were 
forced to work unloading cargo for the rest of the day, 
and they had to sleep overnight at the docks. The next 
day, the rebel commander came down and ordered 
them all to get out of the area, and began beating 
people, so they ran away as fast as they could.”85
Another statement giver traveling from Monrovia to Buchanan with his family noted that it was 
dangerous for men to travel because of the risk of forced recruitment and dangerous for women 
because of the risk of rape and other assault.86 He had been pulled off the line at one checkpoint 
but was saved by a former student who was a young fighter. Forced recruitment along the highway 
between Monrovia and Sierra Leone was well documented.87 One statement giver now residing in 
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Minnesota told the TRC about approaching the Bo Waterside checkpoint while trying to escape to 
Sierra Leone.
When we got there it seemed like chaos, all the rebels were running all 
around and smoking and drinking…a young rebel named Small Soldier 
came over to me. I still had some clothes with me…Small Soldier wanted my 
clothes. He was smoking pot and had a gun and told me he would ‘zero’ me 
if I didn’t do what he said. He took my clothes and I started to cry because 
they were all that I had left. I kept arguing with him and spent forty-five 
minutes trying to get my clothes back. My cousin kept talking to me in Vai 
and telling me not to argue with them. Finally, Small Soldier came back and 
said that he thought I should not be let through but should be recruited as 
a small soldier like him. I said no that I would not be a small soldier. One 
of the other rebels spoke Vai and kept telling me to just go along and that I 
could get away later. We were so close; we could see Sierra Leone across the 
river. They detained us at the checkpoint and put us in jail.88
The Internally Displaced Persons’ Experience
Many who fled their homes found themselves in formal and informal internally displaced centers for 
weeks or months on end. Estimates of the numbers of internally displaced persons during the Liberian 
conflict are in the hundreds of thousands89 – sometimes more than a half a million90 – depending on 
the year and the source of information. Certain locations became major centers for displaced persons 
at the beginning of the conflict, including church compounds, embassy compounds, army barracks, 
sports stadiums, and university campuses. One statement giver now living in Minnesota told the TRC 
why he decided to take refuge at the Fendell campus.
Food was scarce; people boiled leaves for sustenance. Between June and July 
of 1990, I moved to Fendell camp on the outskirts of Monrovia. Fendell 
was part of the University of Liberia, but, when the war started, it became 
a shelter where a lot of people went to seek refuge. I believed this location 
would be better because from there, one could go into the bush and hunt or 
fish for food.91
At the beginning of the war, camps were informal and some were controlled by rebel factions. The 
Fendell campus, described above, was a major internally displaced persons’ center that came under 
the control of the NPFL.92 “[T]housands of refugees went there,” one statement giver now living 
in Atlanta noted.93 Many Liberians describe being forced to move to the Fendell campus during 
the summer of 1990. One statement giver whose family took refuge at the ELWA Christian radio 
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compound was later forced to go to Fendell.
The rebels told my family we had to leave ELWA. The rebels said “just 
follow us.” Everyone there, about two hundred people, had to pack their 
stuff, and start walking. We walked through bushes until, at night, we 
stopped at a big open field. The field was in the area of Duport Road, but I 
was not sure of its exact location. The rebels said everyone had to rest until 
the next day. Near the field was a big house. There was a fenced area around 
the house. The rebels were taking all the women and girls into a fenced 
area around the house. I saw girls that went into the house that were crying, 
saying they had been raped. My dad was scared for me, but I had to go inside 
the fenced area while the men in my family stayed outside in the field. I 
never went in the house—I stayed outside and hid beneath a flower bush. I 
was not raped, and I didn’t see anyone get raped, but I saw one girl come out 
with torn clothes, crying and saying she got raped by seven soldiers. In the 
morning the soldiers opened the gates and let people out. I was able to find 
my brothers and father.94
A statement giver now living in Ghana described trying to seek a safe refuge among the chaos in 
Monrovia in the summer of 1990: 
When the rebels…overran Paynesville, I fled from my home. That was 
during the earliest part of July 1990. My younger brother…also fled along 
with me to the ELWA compound. We stayed there for about two weeks. The 
U.S marines that were assigned there were recalled by their government. 
After their withdrawal, the NPFL rebels took over the compound. They 
beat and killed some people. They also forced us to go to Fendell.95
One statement giver noted that those fleeing the conflict were used as “human shields” and “slaves” 
at Fendell.96 News of the dangerous conditions at Fendell spread, and some Liberians sought to warn 
others to stay away.
The government told people to go to a college campus called Fendell in 
Cuttington, outside Monrovia. They were told that from Fendell they would 
be taken by bus to their hometowns so they would be safe, but the people 
taken away on the buses were killed. If we saw journalists on the road to 
Monrovia, we stopped the journalists and told the journalists, “If you see 
our friends, tell them not to come to Fendell. Tell everyone, it is dangerous 
here. It is not safe.”97
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Liberians also took refuge in the U.S. Embassy (Greystone) compound and the Voice of America 
compound, hopeful that a U.S. presence would lend some protection.98 One statement giver told of 
taking refuge in St. Thomas Church in Monrovia, but then being forced out by United Liberation 
Movement – Johnson faction (ULIMO-J) forces.99 Others sought shelter in Firestone’s vast rubber 
plantation near Harbel.100 Statement givers also report seeking shelter at Soul Clinic,101 Barclay Training 
Center,102 and other locations in and around Monrovia. After the death of Samuel Doe, the Barclay 
Training Center was a place of refuge for members of the Krahn tribe. “All the Krahn families were 
packed into Barclay Training Center – there were thousands of Krahn people there because there was 
no other safe place.”103
Eventually, some security was established in official internally displaced persons’ centers. By October 
2000, the World Food Programme reported that it was assisting 183,900 internally displaced persons 
living in 14 camps located around Monrovia.104 By the end of the conflict in 2003, at which point 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were more 
than half a million internally displaced persons in Liberia, Fendell was still housing many of them.105 
Major internally displaced persons’ centers outside of Monrovia included Maimu in Bong County and 
Basayma Camp in Buchanan.106 By 2004, there were at least 20 official camps within Liberia housing 
more than 261,000 people.107 These camps hosted not only Liberian internally displaced persons, but 
also Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees.108 But even when there was relative safety in the camps, 
conditions were often desperate. Liberians told the TRC of loved ones dying from cholera in the 
Barclay Training Center and other internally displaced persons’ areas during the conflict.109 According 
to one source, by the end of 2002 less than five percent of deaths in the camps were the result of 
violence, while 61 percent resulted from diarrhea, malaria, malnutrition, anemia, febrile disease, or 
respiratory infections.110
Crossing the Border
Hundreds of thousands of Liberians became refugees in surrounding countries in West Africa, with 
numbers peaking at more than 780,000 in 1996, according to U.N. estimates.111 Those Liberians who 
fled the conflict in the 1990s got out by any means possible. Often this meant walking for days, weeks, 
or months, hitching rides in vehicles, and traveling in boats – large and small. Liberians sought safety 
primarily in the neighboring West African countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. A 
significant number of Liberians also went to Ghana and Nigeria, although these nations do not share 
a border with Liberia. Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire received the largest groups of Liberian refugees over 
time, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, but Sierra Leone and Ghana also received large groups 
of Liberian refugees.112 The largest group moved from Nimba and Lofa counties into neighboring 
Sierra Leone and Guinea. Another huge group of refugees traveled from southeastern Liberia into 
Côte d’Ivoire.
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Physically crossing the border was a challenge described by many statement givers. Whether on foot, 
by car, or by boat, it was a journey fraught with danger. Many Liberians coming out of Grand Gedeh 
and Nimba counties crossed the Cavally River113 between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. They describe 
crossing the river by dugout canoe, floating on a tree, or swimming across.114 Several statement givers 
described losing family members during these crossings. 
The river was filled with water. My mother, brother, and sister got in [the] 
canoe. I was too afraid to get into the canoe, and stayed on shore. [The c]
anoe capsized, and only the canoe driver survived. My whole family died. 
However, other people still convinced me to cross the river.115 
Another statement giver described his ordeal getting into Côte d’Ivoire, which involved an escorted 
taxi run by soldiers trying to make an extra dollar. 
These soldiers would take passengers to their destination at a certain time of 
night; this was the only real method for escaping out of Liberia. The night I 
attempted to make the trip, a fire fight between two rebel factions took place 
and we were caught in the crossfire. That night I saw many innocent refugees 
trying to make their way into the Ivory Coast, many of them ultimately 
killed in their attempt to escape to the border.116
 Entering Sierra Leone was also treacherous. Crossing the Mano River at the Bo Waterside checkpoint 
often led to detention, forced recruitment, or death.117 One public hearing witness described his 
experience to the TRC:
Bo is a big town between Cape Mount and Sierra Leone…They were doing 
some investigation and interrogation in the desert huts. When you go in 
there, you most likely [don’t] come out. So I say…I’m going to sit here and 
wait for the group [coming] out, and then…I can probably try to slip my way 
through there. So I tried to do that the first time. Then people were looking, 
so I went back. So I tried the second time. People were looking; I went back. 
So the third time when I tried, no one was looking, so I joined the single-file 
line. So that’s how I crossed to Sierra Leone.118
Another statement giver described crossing by sea into Sierra Leone on a fishing boat, avoiding Bo 
altogether.119 
At the borders, refugees were still subject to human rights abuses as they attempted to flee to safety. 
Refugees reported extortion, arbitrary arrest and detention, and refoulement (forced repatriation or 
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being turned away at the border). According to Amnesty International, security forces at the Ivorian 
and Guinean borders harassed refugees or demanded fines to allow them to pass.120 “At the border, 
government soldiers acted as immigration officers…They requested money from people who were 
leaving the country. This was expensive for the large families. [I didn’t] believe they should make [me] 
pay to leave my own country.”121 Refugees were arbitrarily arrested and detained, some because they 
were accused of being members of a fighting faction122 and others because they had no documents.123 
A statement giver now living in Minnesota told the TRC he had been abused by Ivorian rebel forces 
in 1998 when trying to cross the border:
Ivorian soldiers arrested [us] four Liberians from the back of a truck at a 
checkpoint. They demanded money and water. The soldiers put rocks and 
sand on my back and beat me with a stick. They also twisted the stick into 
my skin. They had overthrown the Ivorian government and accused me of 
bypassing the gate.124 
Human rights groups docu-
mented refugees being denied 
entry at the border of neigh- 
boring countries, a measure 
which amounts to refoule-
ment.125 Refoulement is speci-
fically prohibited under inter-
national refugee law. Guinean 
security forces reportedly 
closed the border to refugees.126 
Sierra Leone also closed its 
border to Liberian refugees 
at various times, fearing that 
armed fighters were crossing 
the border.127 Moreover, fight-
ing spilled across borders and 
often was very intense at the border itself. A statement giver who fled to Côte d’Ivoire with her 
children after her husband was killed told the TRC that “there was killing at the border, and she lost 
track of [her children].”128 She described looking for her children along the border for three days but 
never finding them. 
Transport by ship out of the port in Monrovia was another major mode of border crossing. Both 
commercial and military vessels transported refugees out of the port. Liberians desperate to escape 
the atrocities overran ships. Although not designed to carry thousands of wounded and/or starving 
passengers, these ships were nevertheless a lifeline for many. 
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One statement giver who escaped Liberia by ship in October 1990 told the TRC that, using French he 
had learned in school, he lied to a peacekeeper and pretended to be Guinean so as to get into the port 
at all.129 Then he had to fight for hours to get on board the Tano River cargo ship.130 The statement 
giver said that, after an entire day fighting to get on the ship, he finally boarded at 3:00 AM.131 Another 
statement giver said that he was allowed on a ship first because he was in such a terrible wounded state, 
but that his family was not able to get on board until 12 hours later.132 “Many people died and were 
stepped over in the struggle to get on board.”133 Those who were able to make it aboard often had to 
turn over all their cash to be allowed to travel on crowded, under-supplied vessels.134 One statement 
giver told the TRC he was on board a ship bound for Ghana for five days with no food.135
On top of the conditions on the ship, neighboring countries refused to let ships dock, such as the 
infamous ships Bulk Challenge, Victory Reefer, and Zolotitsa.136 These three ships caught international 
attention in 1996 after no port would accept their passengers. The 2,000 Liberians, Ghanaians and 
Nigerians on board the Bulk Challenge were turned away by Côte d’Ivoire.137 Ghana also declared 
the ship to be non desiderata, only to ultimately allow the ship to land in Ghana after days at sea.138 The 
Victory Reefer was prohibited from docking in Sierra Leone, and the 450 passengers on the Russian 
Zolotitsa were refused by both Ghana and Togo.139 The Victory Reefer was eventually allowed to land 
in Freetown, Sierra Leone, after refugees spent six days at sea. Liberians were taken to a refugee camp 
outside of town, while other non-Sierra Leoneans were taken to their respective embassies.140 The 
Zolotitsa returned to Monrovia after being turned away by Ghana and being lost at sea for several 
days. 141
ECOMOG was also credited by numerous statement givers with helping them get to the port, receive 
medical treatment, and then get transport on a ship out of Liberia.142 A statement giver who was in 
Fendell described how ECOMOG attacked the rebels at the campus and eventually liberated those 
held there. “ECOMOG transported me and my family to barracks in Monrovia. After three days a 
ship came and transported us all to Ghana. I remember very clearly how crowded the ship was.”143
refuge
Now I am a refugee, because I had crossed an international border. It was 
so different. There were all kinds of non-governmental organizations there 
to process you and give you help, whereas just an hour ago you were fighting 
for your life.144
Persons who flee a conflict and cross an international border in the process become refugees and are 
protected by several international treaties; primary among them is the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.145 Once in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, or Nigeria, refugees were assisted 
at camps under the auspices of the UNHCR. Côte d’Ivoire followed a different approach. Even 
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though the government invited UNHCR assistance, it was opposed to camps. Instead, refugees were 
encouraged to settle among the local population in the western part of the country, called the Zone 
d’Accueil des Refugies.146
The various periods of turmoil, with intermittent times of peace, resulted in many changes over time 
in the number of Liberians living in one of the surrounding countries in West Africa, as demonstrated 
by the table below from the UNHCR statistical yearbook.147 
The numbers of refugees have been steadily decreasing since the end of the fighting in 2003. In 
February 2006, UNHCR noted that an estimated 160,000 refugees were still outside Liberia,148 and in 
2008 that number had dropped to just over 75,500.149
Intraregional Refugee Flow
The ongoing conflict in Liberia and the related conflicts that erupted in Liberia’s neighboring countries 
resulted in waves of Liberian refugees within countries in West Africa. When war broke out in Sierra 
Leone in 1991 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2003, many Liberians were forced to flee back to Liberia or to 
other countries in the sub-region. The statement giver, whose experience when his father took him to 
Côte d’Ivoire is described earlier, told the TRC that after his father was killed:
A nice Ivorian found me and helped me find my way back to Liberia. 
Just before I made it back to Liberia I was caught by unknown Liberian 
combatants. One of the combatants knew me, but didn’t try to help me. 
The combatants stripped me naked and were going to sodomize me, but 
then other rebels attacked and I escaped in the chaos. Barefoot and naked, I 
hiked most of the night, and slept in the bush for two nights. I pretended to 
be Ivorian, and worked as a porter in Ivory Coast and eventually made it to 
Abidjan and then Ghana.150
Another statement giver who now lives in Ghana told the TRC of transiting through Sierra Leone, 
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Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, and returning to Liberia at least once, before going to Ghana.
In 1990, we ran to Sierra Leone. We took a bus there and lived in Bo-
Waterside among the Sierra Leoneans for one year. When there was an 
attack on the border, we fled to Guinea. That was in 1991. We lived on a 
football field in Conakry for one month. We entered Côte d’Ivoire later that 
year. We went to Toulépleu and lived there with the Ivorians for six years. 
In 1997 we returned to Liberia. We went back to live in Sinkor right before 
the presidential election. We spent one year in Monrovia until we had to run 
again…We came back to Toulépleu in September 1998. In September 2001 I 
came to Ghana. I came alone, and then my family joined me here.151
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire, alone among 
the host countries for Li-
berian refugees, did not 
initially support camps. 
Instead, Liberians were inte- 
grated with the local popula-
tion in the Zone d’Accueil 
des Refugies.152 The Zone 
d’Accueil des Refugies 
was made up of the four 
departments of Danané, 
Toulépleu, Guiglo, and 
Tabou communities on the 
Ivorian/Liberian border.153 
In 1995, one camp was 
established at Nicla after an 
armed incursion from Liberia into Taï, during which Liberians and Ivorians were killed.154 In 2001, to 
qualify for assistance, UNHCR required incoming refugees to settle at Nicla, rather than integrating 
within the Zone d’Accueil des Refugies.155
Because ethnic groups exist across national borders in the sub-region, many refugees who fled to Côte 
d’Ivoire settled in ethnic enclaves. For example, the Gio settled in the area of Danané and the Krahn 
settled in the area of Guiglo where Ivorians of the same ethnic group were living.156 As of 2001, more 
than 122,000 Liberians were living in Côte d’Ivoire.157 
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Many Liberians adjusted to life in Côte d’Ivoire. For example, a young woman now living in Ghana 
told the TRC that she arrived in Côte d’Ivoire as an eight-year-old. In the UNHCR camp, she “was 
able to get rice and other aid, including a chance to further her education at a U.N. school.”158 But 
difficulties remained. Life in Côte d’Ivoire was described as very difficult for those refugees who 
did not speak French.159 Liberian refugees faced continuing safety issues because of cross border 
incursions from Liberian rebel factions. 160 When many Liberians returned to Liberia after the election 
of Charles Taylor, Ivorians accused Liberian refugees of burning the houses and the rice they had 
planted.161 When these same refugees sought to return, local chiefs were less welcoming.162 
Liberians also complained of harassment by security forces in the Zone d’Accueil des Refugies as 
well as in other parts of Côte d’Ivoire.163 One statement giver described how refugees were attacked 
by NPFL forces from Liberia if they stayed near the border, but, if they went to the interior of Côte 
d’Ivoire, they were harassed by the Ivorians.164 Human rights groups reported that Ivorian security 
forces often would force Liberians to pay bribes or would subject them to arbitrary arrest and beatings 
as they tried to travel within Côte d’Ivoire.165 
The situation became more complicated as fighting spread throughout the sub-region. Ivorians 
increasingly viewed Liberians as potential rebels or fighters trying to destabilize Côte d’Ivoire.166 
Fighting broke out in 2002 in Côte d’Ivoire, after a failed coup attempt against President Laurent 
Gbagbo.167 Life in the Nicla camp near Danané became dangerous as rebels gained control of the 
area.168 In 2003, refugees had to be evacuated from the western part of the country to escape more 
fighting.169 Tens of thousands of returning Liberians as well as Ivorian refugees entered Liberia to 
escape the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.170 One statement giver described how the Ivorian army blamed 
Liberian refugees for rebel incursions into Côte d’Ivoire and began to kill the Liberians.171 He stated 
that more than 20 of his friends were killed in Taï, Côte d’Ivoire.172 The young woman described above 
who had gone to school in Côte d’Ivoire, said that she “couldn’t stand the tension in Côte d’Ivoire by 
2003, [so] she decided to go to Ghana.”173 Another statement giver summarized her experience:
I and my baby sister lived in la Cote d’Ivoire from 1990 to 2002. I was in 
Danané, Cote d’Ivoire, when the Ivorian civil conflict broke out. The war 
there started a day after I arrived in Danané. I left Cote d’Ivoire to go to 
Ghana because of the outbreak of the war there. I have not seen my baby 
sister since I left that country…174 
Statement givers also reported that Ivorian fighting factions recruited Liberians to fight in their civil 
conflict. One said that Ivorian rebels wanted Liberians to fight for them because “Liberians know 
about fighting.”175 When the statement giver refused to fight, the rebels punished him by hanging him 
in the air and tying his penis to a stake, until the group leader ordered them to release him.176 The 
constant threat from rebel raids and the growing resentment of the Ivorians was cited by numerous 
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statement givers as the reason they left Côte d’Ivoire.
Sierra Leone
Tens of thousands of refugees from Liberia fled to Sierra Leone, particularly during the second civil 
war. During the 1990s, there were fewer than 14,000 Liberians in Sierra Leone, but starting in 2002, 
more than 60,000 people had sought refuge there.177 Nearby Lofa County produced the majority of 
Liberians who left to live in Sierra Leone as refugees.178 Accordingly, some chose not to move into 
UNHCR camps because they could integrate into the local community and wanted to be near the 
border to tend fields back home.179 But when fighting arose in March 2002, many Liberians who had 
settled in villages in Sierra Leone along the border with Liberia were moved by UNHCR further 
inland.180 
One statement giver described his memories of life as a refugee in Sierra Leone to the TRC:
Life in Bo was very difficult for us. We and the other Liberian refugees were 
often mistreated by the Sierra Leoneans and discriminated against. On one 
occasion, my male cousin got into a fight at the village water pump after 
one of the local residents had cut him in line for water. During the fight, the 
cousin was badly injured. Instead of investigating the incident and punishing 
the individual who had instigated the fight, the police arrested my cousin 
instead…
One night after living in Bo for approximately eight months, I awoke to 
hear gunshots being fired. I jumped out of bed and started running into the 
woods with my brother. As I was running, a bullet passed between us and 
came within inches of hitting us. While fleeing, we were separated from the 
rest of our family…We traveled for a week on foot from Bo to Freetown. 
As we traveled, we encountered many more people fleeing the violence and 
eventually were reunited with some of our family members including my 
aunt and her three children, two brothers, and another cousin. The refugees 
traveled together as a group, sleeping on the ground, drinking river and rain 
water, collecting cans of food that [we] found along the way, and begging for 
rice and other food when [we] would encounter villages on the way. During 
this time, only one family allowed the group to stay temporarily with them. 
On one occasion [we] encountered a Red Cross mobile unit, but the unit had 
no plates or utensils, so [we] had to eat the food out of their hands. 
Eventually, we reached a refugee camp near Freetown. The camp had no 
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formal organization or protection and security measures, but it provided a 
safe community space for the refugees to live together.181
Other statement givers noted that they received services in the camps in Sierra Leone from non-
governmental organizations and UNHCR. Statement givers reported receiving medical care182 and 
that younger Liberians were able to continue their education.183 One statement giver, a young girl 
at the time, said that she stayed in Sierra Leone for a year so that she could go to school and that 
“everything was provided” by the United Nations.184
As the Liberian conflict spread to Sierra Leone, thousands of Sierra Leoneans became refugees in 
Liberia. The regional conflict pushed both Liberians and Sierra Leoneans back and forth across the 
border, as well as to other countries in the sub-region. The young girl described above noted that:
In Sierra Leone, Liberians were targeted because the [refugees] were thought 
to be rebels. Women were not targeted as much. She told her cousins to 
speak their own native language in Sierra Leone so that the rebels there 
wouldn’t think they were part of the conflict in Sierra Leone. She told the 
kids that they shouldn’t dress like Sierra Leone boys. Her cousins were at 
risk in Sierra Leone, and the tension was growing. They didn’t want to stay 
in Sierra Leone. She wanted to go back to Liberia.185
Guinea
In the late 1990s, Guinea, bordered by Liberia and Sierra Leone, found itself host to hundreds 
of thousands of refugees from both countries.186 Although numbers of Sierra Leonean refugees 
diminished starting in 2002, hundreds of thousands of Liberians remained in Guinea.187 Refugees 
were assisted by UNHCR in 60 camps as well as in border villages.188
According to one statement giver who now lives in Philadelphia:
Life in Guinea was hard. I did not speak French, and I did not have access 
to different things that I needed in life. Because of the way I spoke and the 
way I dressed, I stood out as Liberian, and people would not talk with me. 
Initially, the Liberians were not given ID cards, and the gendarmes would 
walk around asking for individuals’ ID cards and they would collect fines 
from those who did not have them. Ultimately, though, I was able to get a 
job with the IRC…189
One participant in a palava hut meeting in a suburb of Atlanta told the TRC that Liberians in Guinea 
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were rounded up and held in “concentration camp” conditions.190 He noted that in Kindia there 
was a military torture brigade similar to the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) that would torture 
refugees.191 “It didn’t matter where you actually were from, but if you were part of any Liberian tribe 
you were assumed to be a trouble maker.”192 
This statement reflects the security concerns created by a spreading sub-regional conflict. Ultimately, 
refugees were caught between rebel forces attacking across the border, civil dissidents in Guinea, and 
the Guinean army.193 Numerous reports emerged of killings and kidnappings in the refugee camps by 
rebel forces.194 “Guinea was not a safe place to be because it was too close to Liberia and people were 
being killed there as well.”195 One statement giver in Ghana described how she disguised herself as 
old to avoid being taken.196 Amnesty International reported that LURD was recruiting from among 
refugees in Guinea in 2001.197
LURD rebel activity created other problems for refugees. In 2002, the Guinean President made a 
radio broadcast “alleging that Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in the country were a source of 
insecurity and should be sent home.”198 This statement resulted in refugees becoming “the victims 
of numerous human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrest, harassment, sexual abuse, extortion, 
eviction and disappearances.”199 Guineans also became concerned about overuse of farm land because 
of the influx of refugees.200
Many of the refugees who left Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire because of security concerns, 
found their way to Ghana. Because Ghana does not share a border with Liberia, it provided relative 
calm in comparison to neighboring countries where cross-border incursions had become a problem. 
Moreover, the conflict in Liberia eventually engulfed Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, making Ghana 
one of the only safe options. 
To further examine the experiences of the Liberian Diaspora living in refuge in West Africa, the 
following section focuses in detail on the situation in the Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana. 
Buduburam is the largest remaining camp of the many Liberian refugee camps that were established 
in West Africa. Because of its size, and because many of the refugees who reside there spent time 
in other camps around the region, the Liberian TRC chose to focus statement taking efforts in that 
settlement.
Ghana 
Many refugees who left Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire because of security concerns, found 
their way to Ghana. Two refugee camps existed in Ghana, Krisan-Senzolli and Buduburam. In 1997, 
UNHCR reported that approximately 17,000 refugees were residing in Ghana.201 In 2007, when the 
TRC took statements in the camp, Buduburam was home to between 35,000 and 40,000 Liberians.202 
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A sizable number of those individuals 
were children who had been born 
in Ghana and who had never seen 
Liberia. 
In 1990, Liberian refugees began 
pouring off of ships into the port of 
Tema, near Accra, Ghana. Escaping 
the devastation in Liberia, they 
sought safe haven in Ghana’s relative 
stability. None of these Liberian 
refugees thought they would still be 
in Ghana almost two decades later. In 
the settlement, there is an overriding 
sense of languishing in limbo and 
deep frustration about what is seen as more than a decade of life wasted. Even so, refugees in Ghana 
expressed little interest in returning to Liberia at the time, often because of an abiding fear. Events in 
Ghana, however, pushed many to return home.
BuduBuram refugee Settlement – life in limBo
Buduburam was established, like most refugee camps, as a tent city to provide for the immediate 
needs and physical security of a war ravaged population. The settlement, approximately 35 kilometers 
(22 miles) outside of Accra, is adjacent to a Ghanaian village. A panoply of international agencies 
coordinated by UNHCR provided services in the early years of the camp’s existence. A statement giver 
told the TRC “first [we] lived in a shelter. The U.N. gave [us] a tarp and you cut your own sticks. People 
could build houses.”203 Another statement giver noted that in “Ghana there were many volunteers 
to help with food and supplies.”204 As a result of the more than a decade of conflict in Liberia that 
made return unimaginable for many, Buduburam became increasingly established. Residents replaced 
tents with more permanent structures of brick, tin, or wood. Today the settlement looks much like 
Ghanaian villages in the surrounding district, except that almost everyone living there is Liberian.205
Despite the surface similarities, life in Buduburam is not like life in other Ghanaian villages. Liberians 
live in a protracted state of limbo. As outsiders living in Ghana, but with nothing to draw them home 
to Liberia, they wait for something to force a change. Many Liberians in Ghana have a precarious 
legal status. Through the 1990s, UNHCR recommended prima facie refugee status determinations 
for Liberians entering other African countries.206 This determination enabled Liberians to access the 
valuable refugee identification card that entitled them to a number of services. In 2000, however, the 
Ghanaian government began processing refugee status determinations on an individual basis.207 This 
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change left many who arrived in Buduburam after the initial waves in the 1990s with an uncertain 
legal status in Ghana and without entitlement to assistance from UNHCR.208 A backlog of cases 
exists, and many Liberians are not even aware of whether their status determination has ever been 
made.209 Meanwhile, those in Buduburam try to make ends meet while dealing with their memories 
of war.
Every day at Buduburam is harder than the day before, and nobody at the 
camp can help me. When I first arrived, I sold bags of water so that I could 
go to school on the camp. Now, there are many days when I don’t bathe or 
eat, and when I beg for my food. I’m haunted and permanently depressed by 
the loss of my family, and feel deep sadness whenever I see other people’s 
kids on the camp.210
All those who fled Liberia have suffered the same devastating trauma described in the previous 
sections of this report. The mental health consequences of that trauma go largely unaddressed. The 
need for psychological counseling for refugees was clear in TRC statements, and statement givers 
themselves identified the need for counseling assistance.211 An illustrative case is that of a middle-aged 
Liberian man who had been a soccer player and had managed his family’s business before the war.212 
Two of his former employees led a raid on his home during which NPFL rebels killed his father and 
aunt, raped his sister, and beat his children and threatened to throw them into his burning house. The 
rebels repeatedly slashed him all over his body with a cutlass. He and his remaining family were saved 
only by an attack from an opposing rebel force.213
This man described the daily suffering and mental strain he endures as a result of the torture he 
experienced:214 
I am very nervous whenever I see people with [fire]arms, police on camp for 
example. I start to have flashbacks when I see them. I have nightmares over 
and over. I can’t trust anyone anymore because the people who did this were 
my employees. I get splitting headaches with the flashbacks that take days 
to go away. It happens every couple of weeks. The pain in my legs is pretty 
constant. It is triggered just from walking.215
This man’s situation is demonstrative of a high rate of psychosomatic illness and depression in 
Buduburam.216 Statement givers describe feeling “pressure,” chest pain, feeling weak or faint, night 
sweats, and other symptoms. One woman reported feeling “dead” ever since she saw her brother 
tied up and thrown into their burning home.217 A young man told the TRC that he used to work as 
a brickmaker but that now the pain from the beatings he received during the war keeps him from 
working.218 “The sounds of war, gunboats, and airplanes are always in [my] head. They are terrible.” 
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This statement giver told the TRC that he tried to drink kerosene one day in a suicide attempt.219 
A young woman living in Buduburam told the TRC that “sometimes she loses hope and wants to 
commit suicide. She has no education and no parents.”220
Living with the daily strain of this trauma, refugees in Buduburam also struggle to meet basic needs. 
Most in the camp are acutely aware of the obligations of the international community to protect 
refugees, yet they feel that they have been left to fend for themselves. Statement givers identified 
access to basic necessities as an ongoing issue 17 years after the camp had been established. Conditions 
at Buduburam are “very difficult…because we are not receiving adequate ration[s], sanitary condition 
is very poor, lack of proper health care, refugees are unemployed and opportunities for learning are 
lacking.”221 One camp resident who fled Liberia when he was ten years old described his situation 
and perceptions of life. After losing both his mother and father in the war, this statement giver was 
brought to Ghana by a Liberian woman who took him in. She was then resettled in the United States, 
however, and since then he has not heard from her. The following is his interviewer’s description of 
his concerns.
He has since done yard work to make money, and this has allowed him 
to pay for his education. He was able to afford tuition with the help of a 
sponsor, and he finished his Buduburam education in 2002. He did not 
take the national exam, however, until 2004 when the UNHCR came to the 
camp to sponsor the test.
In 2005 he learned about electrical installation at a technical school, which 
was sponsored by AGRE and UNHCR. One of his teachers hired him for 
electrical installation jobs around Accra, but in November 2006 the teacher 
left for the United States and this work was no longer available. [He] has 
since sold water in the camp.
[His] time at the camp has been very tough, as he is generally alone. It is 
difficult to maintain steady employment, so he cannot obtain food on a 
consistent basis. He would also like to continue his education, which he has 
not been able to do. He is very dissatisfied with the economic conditions.
He has numerous security concerns. The camp is disturbingly polluted, as 
there are few available [toilets] and no one cleans it. He is very fearful of 
contracting malaria, typhoid fever, or dysentery. In particular, the public 
toilets and ‘the gulf’ are extremely unhealthy. Those in charge of the toilets 
charge 500 cedis for each use, and they have told him that as they are unpaid 
otherwise, they use the money for personal use, not for cleaning the toilet.
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This leads [him] and others to use ‘the gulf’, an especially unsanitary field 
where residents go to ‘defecate for free.’ In addition to the health concerns 
posed by an open field of trash and feces, this is also where many robberies 
and beatings occur. [He] himself was attacked in July 2007 by two Ghanaian 
men in the middle of the day. Luckily for [him], two camp residents were 
nearby and prevented the attack from escalating.
[He] was also attacked in February 2007, when two camp residents and a 
Ghanaian man attacked him behind the internet café around 9 p.m. One 
of the internet café workers happened to come outside at that time, and the 
attackers – one of whom [he] often sees around camp – fled. The worker 
helped [him] inside, and he escorted [him] back to his home.
[He] explained that security conditions are very bad generally in the camp. 
He knows of three children that have gone missing in the past few years, 
only to turn up dead at various points within the camp. In 2002, a boy was 
found at ‘the gulf,’ and in 2003 they found a child at the dam. In 2004, a 
boy’s body turned up at St. Gregory College. Worst of all is the indignity of 
the deaths, as there is no way to properly bury them and no one bothers to 
investigate. He described a man named Miller, who was chopped to pieces 
in 2003. When the UNHCR showed up, they buried the body in a matter of 
hours and left without further investigation.222
This young man’s concerns were echoed again and again in statement taking in Buduburam. In fact, 
many residents are worse off because they have had no education and virtually no work. There is 
no freely available water in the settlement. All water for drinking, cooking, and bathing must be 
trucked in and then purchased on an as-needed basis.223 Food is available for sale in the markets 
in the camp and in various cook shops, but many cannot afford it.224 The World Food Programme 
provides food rations for individuals identified as vulnerable,225 but numerous statement givers stated 
that they could not get on the “list” for food, or that some refugees were on the list and others were 
not, with apparently little information available about the rationale for exclusion.226 Many complained 
that distribution of rice had been stopped and replaced with corn, 227 which is not a Liberian staple 
and was perceived by some Liberians to be comparable to animal feed. Like so many other programs 
in Buduburam, funding for the food distribution program had been dramatically cut over the years. 
In fact, the coordinator, a Liberian refugee, was volunteering his services and had not been paid for 
months.228 
Statement givers also repeatedly mentioned problems accessing adequate healthcare in the camp. 
This sentiment was echoed in interviews with staff from the St. Gregory Catholic Clinic, the only 
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health care facility in Buduburam.229 As of October 2007, UNHCR was paying for two physicians to 
work part-time at the camp, but does not fund any other clinic staff.230 The clinic is managed by a 
volunteer assigned by a French non-governmental organization. Out of the 34 staff at the clinic, 30 
were Liberians, all of whom were working without Ghanaian employment authorization.231 Fees are 
charged so as to keep the clinic running, but refugees are frustrated about the costs.232 
There are limited services avai-
lable to treat specific health 
issues in Buduburam. The 
UNHCR and the National 
Catholic Secretariat have 
operated an HIV/AIDS 
Program in Buduburam Camp 
since 2002.233 It offers walk-in 
HIV-testing, an anti-retroviral 
program, prevention of mother-
to-child transmission program, 
outreach and education, and 
post-exposure prophylaxis.234 
A small number of support 
services are available in Buduburam for women victims of violence, but as with the services for 
physical health needs, the mental health services do not begin to address the scope of the problem in 
Buduburum. 
Security, especially for such a severely traumatized population, is a critical concern. Liberians in 
Buduburam, although they felt safer for the most part than in Liberia, were clearly afraid for their 
security.235 Official crime statistics are not publicly available,236 but the Neighborhood Watch Team 
(NEWAT) notes in its literature that the group was “established due to the uncontrollable crime rate 
in the settlement; such crimes are as follows: robbery, juking237 of people at night, rape, abduction of 
children, illicit drugs, burglary, and kidnapping…”238 NEWAT also notes that, since its establishment 
in 2002, crime has been reduced to almost “zero level.” The Ghanaian police also maintain a 24-hour 
presence in the camp, with two to three officers present during each shift.239
Despite NEWAT’s assertion of a “zero level” of crime, security concerns remain for those who 
spoke to the TRC. Confrontations with Ghanaians including alleged abductions and ritual killings,240 
concerns about perpetrators from the Liberian civil war moving freely about the camp,241 and issues 
of sexual assault and domestic violence were consistently reported.242 A woman statement giver told 
the TRC that the female NPFL fighter who had facilitated her gang rape by the NPFL was still in 
the camp and that the statement giver saw her everywhere.243 Another statement giver noted that in a 
town near Buduburam she was approached on the road by a man who called her name and said, “So 
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[A], you’re still living. We will get you…”244 One statement giver noted that “Liberians know not to 
go out alone, but rather to travel in groups”245 because of fear of being targeted by Ghanaians. Ethnic 
tensions among Liberians, especially targeting those of Krahn ethnicity, remain a problem as well.246 
The Refugee Welfare Council previously hosted county league soccer tournaments, but the matches 
between Grand Gedeh (home of the Krahn tribe) and other counties became so heated that inter-
county competitions were discontinued. 
Because the Liberian conflict lasted so long, refugees in Buduburam have seen funding for settlement 
services ebb and flow, and have had to suffer firsthand the consequences of “donor fatigue.”247 Support 
from UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations continued through the early 1990s; after 
Taylor’s election in 1997, however, UNHCR initiated a policy of repatriation. UNHCR funding for most 
programs at Buduburam was eliminated, although funding continued for certain programs serving 
refugees identified as vulnerable.248 All services in the camp virtually ceased after the withdrawal of 
UNHCR funding, but only a few thousand Liberians were repatriated.249 Water supply to the camp 
ended in 1996.250 The camp clinic closed in 2000 because of lack of funds, ultimately reopening under 
the auspices of a Catholic charity.251 The implementing partner for the camp school pulled out in 2000 
because of lack of funds.252 The main result of the UNCHR funding withdrawal is that all services in 
the camp became fee-based.253 The overriding complaint from Liberians living in Buduburam is that 
life in Ghana was “hard” because they had to pay for everything, including food, water, medical care, 
use of the toilet, and school fees. One statement giver told the TRC that “he tries to eat one meal every 
day but sometimes does not eat. Everything on the camp costs money.”254
Wasted Years
Having to pay for these services would not be such a hardship if sufficient employment existed. But 
the lack of employment and educational opportunities led many to describe their time in Buduburam 
as “wasted” years.255 Liberians are legally entitled to work in Ghana if they obtain a permit.256 Even 
with the appropriate documents, however, jobs are almost impossible to come by. Subsisting off of 
remittances from family and friends abroad, or doing “small, small” work, such as petty trading or 
braiding hair, Liberians in the camp try to make ends meet.257 One woman told the TRC that she 
collects discarded plastic water sacs for recycling so as to make some money, but she still has to beg 
for food in order to eat.258 
The cycle of missed opportunities is evident to almost everyone. Many cannot afford to send their 
children to primary school because they cannot pay the fees.259 Those who can send their children 
realize that they may have limited opportunities in a land where they are foreigners. 
Our children who are here are not in school because we don’t have money to 
send them. We’re depending on them to rebuild. My children are just sitting 
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there with nothing to eat or drink. I want them to go to school anywhere – 
they have nothing to do here. They can’t get a job.260 
Some refugees attempt to get vocational training at one of the on-camp schools or in the neighboring 
Ghanaian schools, but complain that fees are high and, even upon completion of a degree, there is 
little work.261 A young woman statement giver who was in a beauty training program told the TRC 
that she “often walks to Accra or Kasoa to earn money by styling hair. On the trips she sleeps on the 
streets, often in the rain.”262 This statement giver said that, despite the money she makes, she often 
has no money to buy food or water and relies on the help of friends.263 Another young woman told 
the TRC a similar story:
I came from the fire to the frying pan at this camp. Life in the camp is very 
hard. I go to town to braid hair for money to buy food. My brothers and 
sisters sell small goods for money. One of my sisters began prostituting at 
the age of 13. I went to school in the camp and paid for it myself. I would go 
to town Friday after class and work braiding hair all weekend. I would sleep 
on the streets for the weekend and go back to camp Sunday night.264
Life as a Woman in Buduburam
As these last two statements demonstrate, life for women in Buduburam is particularly precarious. 
Liberian refugee women face tremendous economic hardship because of altered familial structures 
and a lack of economic opportunities and aid. Family separation and flight has left many women 
alone to raise children. One woman in Buduburam described how she and her family split up to 
survive in 1997.265 Her husband left by himself, because he did not want to put his family at risk while 
people were looking for him.266 She gave birth to their last child in October 1997 and has not seen 
her husband since then.267 She later discovered from friends that he is now re-married and living in 
the United States.268 Another refugee in the camp described her situation, “as a single mom, it is very 
difficult to afford to send the children to school and some days we don’t eat.”269
In many cases, women statement givers described taking responsibility for the children of others. 
These situations increased during the war. They included women who found and protected the 
children of neighbors or relatives during an attack or after fleeing violence, and other women who 
took care of the children their partners or husbands had with other women after the mothers were 
killed or lost in the conflict.
Refugee life is especially difficult without a husband. Since the September 
18, 1998 fighting in Monrovia, I have not seen my husband. I generate a 
meager income from pastry making and selling cold drinking water. I am 
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here with my children and step-children; five children of my own and four 
step-children. I am also catering to six of my grandchildren.270
Some women reported being forced by extreme poverty into prostitution. One woman whose parents 
were each killed during the war said that to make a living she worked in domestic labor and in sex 
work. She became pregnant as a result of her work in prostitution and had a son who lives with her in 
the camp. She stated, “life at the Buduburum Camp is very difficult; my son and I barely survive.”271
Violence against women is a serious problem in Buduburam. Many statement givers recounted 
incidents of rape and domestic violence. In one case, a woman who was raped as a child during the 
war was raped again in the camp:
The rebels raped my mother and me when I was six years old…We were 
helped by ordinary civilians to get to Ivory Coast where we stayed for five 
years. My mother sold produce to provide medical care for the infections 
I had. Then we went to Ghana. The abusers were in the camp. I was once 
attacked by the same group who had raped me in Liberia. My mother advised 
me not to bother with the rapist so I decided to put the first rape behind 
me. 272 
Then I was raped again in Ghana by a teacher. I passed out after the rape. 
I reported the rape to the Ghanaian police. The teacher has since been 
released and blames me for bringing disgrace upon him. My mother and I 
are still in Ghana. We fear for our lives because the rapists are on the camp. 
These people are dangerous and could harm us any time with impunity.273
Some statement givers describe receiving no assistance from police when they reported crimes. Others 
reported that it would be futile to even attempt to make a report to the police. One woman reported 
how boys wearing masks raped her in Buduburam, where she was living alone. She stated the reason 
she did not report the incident to the police is because she has no family with her in Ghana.274 Another 
Liberian woman summarized:
[T]he camp is difficult for single mothers. It is not safe. When their children 
are beaten they can’t protect them; some children have been killed, some 
men kill their wives and there are rapes, but the police do not respond.275 
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Taking Matters into their Own Hands
While there is significant frustration and hard-
ship in Buduburam, Liberians there have built 
a vibrant community and have developed 
structures to attempt to provide the support 
their community needs. There are no less than 
70 registered community-based organizations 
operating in Buduburam.276 These groups 
address many issues, including orphaned 
children, water, literacy, disability rights, 
peacebuilding and community reconciliation, 
and women’s rights. Many refugees have started 
training programs to help their fellow Liberians 
learn productive skills. Some of these organizations have external donor funding and significant 
international volunteer support. The faith community in Buduburam is also very strong.
Despite these community structures, life for many in Buduburam has been simply a nearly two decade 
waiting game. Although frustrated with life in Ghana, Liberians in Buduburam overwhelmingly told 
the TRC that they did not want to return to Liberia until they were certain that the security situation 
was improved and until they had had an opportunity to gain skills or savings to start over.277 Some 
noted they never wanted to go back.278
If I ever went back, I don’t know where I would live…I want to send my 
children to school, but I’m not able to. I know that my children are an 
investment in the future, but I cannot afford to feed them properly. I hope 
that one day my children will empower themselves and live somewhere else. 
Despite my problems, I feel I would suffer more in Liberia.279
Many said they did not want to return because they had no one and no place to go back to in 
Liberia.280 The young woman who spoke to the TRC about her sister engaging in prostitution stated 
that, although she wasn’t sure whether life in the camp was worse than in Liberia, “at least in the camp 
I’ve started, I know people. In Liberia I’d start all over.”281 Another noted, “how can we go home? We 
don’t even recognize it.”282
Statement givers also expressed fear of returning to a place where they had experienced so much 
trauma. Numerous individuals noted that they could not go back to a place where their loved ones had 
been killed and harmed in such terrible ways.283 Statement givers also expressed fear because faction 
leaders whom they viewed as responsible for the abuses perpetrated against themselves and their 
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families are now leaders in government or are known to be living freely in Monrovia. Others noted 
that they had heard perpetrators who had carried out attacks on them were now in other positions of 
power, such as in the police.284
While waiting for the situation in Liberia to improve, many in Buduburam also desperately hope for 
resettlement in a third country. A statement giver now living in the United Kingdom told the TRC 
she had lived in Buduburam for nine years before being resettled.285 Another statement giver now in 
Minnesota told the TRC that he was in Buduburam for almost ten years before being resettled in the 
United States 286 Both of these statement givers, like countless others, left family members behind who 
are still waiting.287 
As conditions in Liberia continued to improve, however, resettlement began to fade as a viable 
option.288 At the beginning of 2008, the Ghanaian government announced a multi-million dollar 
program to integrate Liberian refugees into Ghanaian society, as previous repatriation efforts had 
met with minimal participation. In mid-February 2008, a group of refugees delivered a petition to the 
UNHCR and the Ghana Refugee Board. The petition stated that they “strongly oppose” integration 
into Ghanaian society and that they were requesting to be resettled in a third country or to be given 
$1,000 USD (the standard repatriation allowance was $100 USD) in order to start a new life back in 
Liberia.289 In conjunction with this request, hundreds of Liberian refugees – primarily women and 
children – held a five-week long protest on the central sports field in Buduburam.290 
On March 17, 2008, Ghanaian authorities arrested 630 of the protesters,291 in some cases separating 
families when mothers or children were taken away while other family members were left behind.292 
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The detained protesters, virtually all women and children, were taken to Kordeabe Youth Camp in 
the Eastern Region of Ghana, a several-hour drive from Buduburam and held there for several days. 
The Ghanaian Minister of the Interior threatened to strip all the detained refugees of their status 
and summarily deport them back to Liberia within a week.293 Although that threat was never carried 
out, 16 detained Liberians, 13 of whom had valid refugee status, were summarily deported to Liberia 
without due process of law.294 
The Liberian government, the UNHCR, and the Ghanaian government began negotiations to 
resolve the standoff. Ultimately, the tripartite group came to an agreement to “close” the camp and 
repatriate the refugees back to Liberia. Reports from the camp as of early 2009 are that Liberians 
from Buduburam are registering for repatriation and are returning home, though there was no change 
in the stipend for returnees.295 Thousands of refugees still remain in Buduburam, despite the reality 
that almost no Liberians are being resettled out of Ghana to third countries at this time and that 
Ghana may no longer recognize Liberians as refugees.296
refugee reSettlement in the united StateS
Resettlement, along with repatriation and local integration, is one of three durable solutions to refugee 
crises.297 Throughout the Liberian conflict, thousands of refugees were resettled in third countries. 
Even so, this number of resettled refugees is an extremely small percentage of the total number of 
Liberian refugees. Between 1980 and 2007, the United States resettled approximately 31,500 Liberian 
refugees out of the estimated 500,000 who fled.298 The decision to offer third-country resettlement 
is complex, involving foreign policy, humanitarian, and practical considerations.299 Designation of 
third-country resettlement can result in a “magnet” effect of new migration and may be resisted by the 
host country government.300 The durable solutions often are in tension with one another, and the offer 
of resettlement may disrupt efforts seeking repatriation – long considered the most desirable solution 
by UNHCR301 – or local integration.302 
The United States’ Refugee Program resettles refugees in the United States.303 The United States’ 
Refugee Program coordinates with the UNHCR, and private organizations referred to as Overseas 
Processing Entities and Voluntary Agencies. Using a priority system, cases are designated into categories, 
Priority One through Five. Priority One cases (P1) include those most in need of resettlement and are 
referred by the UNHCR or the local U.S. Embassy. Priority Two (P2) cases include those of special 
humanitarian concern. The remaining priority categories are for family members of refugees or 
asylees living in the United States. Priority Three (P3) cases have been open to Liberians sporadically 
during the past decade, allowing some spouses, minor children, and parents of Liberian refugees to 
join family in the United States. Priority Four and Five categories, which allow resettlement of more 
distant relatives, have been closed to all resettlement since 1999.304 
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Refugees entering the United States through the United States’ Refugee Program have legal status 
as refugees upon their admission. Refugees are authorized for employment and have limited access 
to certain public assistance programs. Local resettlement and assistance programs, affiliated with 
the national Voluntary Agencies and funded on a per capita basis by the federal Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, provide short-term practical and financial assistance to resettled refugees in the months 
immediately following their arrival. After one year, refugees are required to register for lawful 
permanent resident status; five years after admission, they may apply for citizenship. 
aSylum
My aunt left the children at the refugee camp and went into Freetown to call 
my parents in the United States. My aunt discovered that my parents had 
previously given a friend all their savings to come to Sierra Leone and find 
the family and return them safely to the U.S. Instead, this person had used 
the money to bring their own family members back to the US instead of me 
and my family. 
My parents were able to wire enough money to my aunt to get a car and bring 
all of us children to Freetown. My parents were then able to successfully send 
a member from their church in the United States to go to Sierra Leone and 
bring us to the United States…once we got to New York, we immediately 
claimed asylum.305
While more than 30,000 Liberians were resettled as refugees in the United States,306 thousands more 
sought asylum in the United States based on their fear of return to Liberia. Like refugee status, asylum 
may be granted to persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Unlike the refugee 
resettlement process, however, asylum applications are made by individuals who are in the United 
States. Those granted asylum receive similar, although not identical, protection from return to their 
home country as refugees, while those denied asylum ultimately face deportation from the United 
States.
I was already in America when Monrovia fell, and once the Liberians arrived 
here in the United States shortly thereafter in large waves, the system was 
not ready for them. It took almost four to five years for the processing of 
asylum applications, and [Temporary Protected Status] (TPS) did not come 
until maybe 1991. In the interim, the immigration service was not giving 
people asylum and not making decisions, it was simply accepting people’s 
applications, giving work authorization and then the files lingered. It 
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was later when the U.S. government established the asylum offices in the 
different districts that cases began to be processed.307
The number of Liberian asylum seekers rose dramatically as a result of the outbreak of war at the 
end of 1989. In 1989, the number of Liberians seeking asylum in the United States was 27. By 1990, 
that number had jumped to 1,572. Ultimately, more than 6,600 individuals were granted asylum by 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service between 1992 and 2007. An additional 1,789 individuals 
were granted asylum between 1997 and 2007 by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.308 Of 
the 1,309 Liberian asylum applications decided by Immigration Judges between 1994 and 1999, 44.5 
percent were denied.309
I struggled to get my own immigration status in the United States. When 
I applied for asylum, the asylum office lost my application and they could 
not locate it. Going through all this by myself, it made me realize that I had 
lost my own innocence as a young woman and now had to do things on my 
own.310
It took ten years for my asylum status to be granted, and another five or six 
years until I was granted my green card.311 
Liberian asylum seekers, like all asylum seekers in the United States throughout the 1990s, faced a 
difficult and lengthy process. By 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agency then 
responsible for adjudication of asylum cases, had a backlog of more than 425,000 pending asylum 
claims.312 In some cases long processing delays led to changes in circumstances in Liberia or in the 
United States that affected pending asylum claims. 
I graduated from high school in Staten Island and I have worked in the 
USA and paid taxes but I have had difficulty acquiring permanent resident 
status. I came to the U.S. with my mother in 1988, but my mother’s asylum 
application was not approved until 1996. By that time it was too late for me 
to be approved under my mother’s application because I was already 21. I 
had to begin my application all over again.313 
Delays in asylum cases often meant prolonged separation from families left behind in Liberia or in 
refugee camps in the sub-region. While asylum seekers are permitted to remain in the United States 
while their cases are pending, they cannot petition for their immediate families to join them until they 
are granted asylum.314 One statement giver described a common story: “By August 1997, I left Liberia 
and came to the United States and applied for political asylum. My family had been living in the Ivory 
Coast, but they joined me in the United States after four years.”315 
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Some asylum seekers have been unable to reunite with their families due to the limits on family 
relationships recognized under U.S. immigration law. One statement giver’s story is common: “After 
I obtained asylum in the United States I was able to bring two daughters here. My four other children 
were denied visas on grounds that they were not my biological children, so they remain in Guinea.”316
Many asylum claims by Liberians were denied.317 For some Liberians, this denial has meant remaining 
legally in the United States under TPS,318 now Deferred Enforced Departure (DED).319 For others, it 
has resulted in arrest, detention, or deportation by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.320
I filed for political asylum in New Jersey. The case was decided by a court in 
Minnesota, where I had moved. Before moving back to New Jersey, I filed 
an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and notified the 
BIA in writing of my change of address. In March 2006, I was arrested for 
overstaying my visa and was taken to a prison in York County, Pennsylvania. 
It was only then that I found out that the BIA had entered an order for 
deportation after not receiving my appeal. I was detained in York County 
prison until September 2006, when I was taken to Virginia to see the Liberian 
consulate. I was then moved to a prison in Louisiana. In October 2006, I 
filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that I had been unfairly detained. 
In total, I was imprisoned for nine months. I was released in December 
2006 under an order of supervision and have continued to report to my 
immigration officer. My immigration status has yet to be determined.321
temporary protected StatuS
So many Liberians have been unable to straighten out the mess with 
immigration that [Temporary Protected Status] has created. Now there are 
Liberians in the United States with 18 or 19 years of TPS.322
Beginning on March 27, 1991, the United States extended TPS323 to Liberians then present in the 
United States because of the conflict raging in Liberia.324 TPS provides a blanket temporary safe 
haven to eligible nationals of designated countries in 12- or 18-month increments.325 People on TPS 
are not subject to removal and are authorized to work during the designated period. Approximately 
15,000 Liberians in the United States registered for TPS at the height of the program. By design, 
TPS does not lead to permanent resident status.326 When TPS ends, beneficiaries revert to the same 
immigration status they held before TPS (unless that status had since expired or been terminated) 
or to any other status they may have acquired while registered for TPS. Those with a final order of 
removal (deportation) may be deported without further hearing.
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Although Liberians were not required to choose between TPS and other, more permanent immigration 
options such as asylum or family-based immigration, in practice Liberian asylum cases often were 
“administratively closed” by immigration judges or de-prioritized by overburdened Asylum Offices 
because TPS was available to them. People in this position were permitted to work and to remain 
in the United States, but they were unable to reunite with family members who remained outside 
the United States or to secure the more permanent asylum status which leads to lawful permanent 
residency and, eventually, citizenship.
Each year, Liberians on TPS were required to re-register for TPS, paying filing fees to renew their 
status and work permission. In September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced 
the termination of Liberian TPS, effective October 1, 2007. On September 12, 2007, President Bush 
announced that Liberians who were registered under TPS would be permitted to remain and to work 
in the United States under DED, a similar status to TPS, until March 31, 2009. On March 20, 2009, 
President Obama extended DED for Liberians for an additional 12 months from March 31, 2009. 
The termination of Liberian TPS caused great anxiety throughout the Liberian community in the 
United States. Social workers and police officers reported increases in truancy among Liberian 
students because parents kept children home out of fear they would be deported while at school.327 
One social worker reported that clients were hoarding food out of fear that their work authorization 
would end.328 After many Liberian families had experienced traumatic family separations during the 
conflict, Liberians on TPS feared the same fate. One community leader stated:
[W]e have a situation where some people have been on TPS now for eighteen 
years. We have families that came from Liberia with two children, they had 
two children here, and they’re on TPS. The American-born children can 
stay, but the Liberian-born children have to leave.329 
The termination of TPS coincided with dramatic increases in immigration enforcement generally and 
with a contentious Congressional immigration debate, further exacerbating community fears. A faith 
leader in the Liberian community noted that it has been “disappointing, considering the historic ties 
between Liberia and the United States for Liberians to be begging to stay in the United States.”330
The Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 656, was introduced in the Senate on 
February 16, 2007. The House companion, the Liberian Refugee Immigration Protection Act of 2007, 
H.R. 1941, was introduced on April 19, 2007. This legislation, if passed, would have allowed eligible 
Liberians living in the United States, to apply for lawful permanent resident status.331 
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life after reSettlement 
The length of the conflict and the multiple changes of government resulted both in an extended 
period of emigration from Liberia as well as the emigration of specific groups as their political, 
social and economic fortunes changed. Resettlement, while clearly a desirable and safe outcome for 
many, has stresses of its own. This section of the report considers the experiences of Liberians in 
the third phase of the paradigm, resettlement 
outside their country of origin, and will focus 
specifically on the experiences of the diaspora 
community in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.
Successive waves of emigration to the United 
States by various groups are reflected in the 
statements of those who fled the Doe regime in 
the period 1980-1990, and the Taylor regime in 
the period 1997-2003, as well as those who left 
the country in the intervening years between 
the two regimes. Many early arrivals in the 
United States were not driven by the need to 
escape violence or persecution, but rather left 
Liberia for political or economic reasons,332 
to further their education333 or to work.334 In 
the 1970s there were only about 25 Liberians 
in Minnesota.335 “Most came to attend…a 
technical college in the Minneapolis Uptown 
area that was providing training in mining 
technology…”336
In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, emigration to escape violence and persecution or to ensure personal 
safety increased and continued until the end of the conflict. “1980 came, the coup came, and Liberia 
became uninhabitable for a lot of people. And many of them found their way to [a third country], and 
it became sort of a temporary but permanent home, hoping that conditions in Liberia would change.” 
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As war broke out, Liberians who were already abroad were sometimes stranded in their host countries. 
One Liberian now living in the United Kingdom noted that he had arrived in the United Kingdom on 
a scholarship in 1989.338 He had been planning to travel back to Liberia to see his family when Charles 
Taylor’s and Prince Johnson’s forces began fighting for control of Monrovia. 
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My bags were packed when I received a fax through the student union 
stating that all Liberian students were to remain in the country because 
it was not safe to return to Liberia. At this point, I thought the restriction 
would only apply for a week or two. I waited with my suitcase packed but no 
one would tell me what was going on and there was no information coming 
out of Liberia. It was only when The Guardian newspaper started to report 
the events in Liberia that I became fully aware of the situation.339
During the civil wars, a majority of those arriving were refugees.
We had the post-1990 migration…except now the conditions in Liberia 
were so terrible, people came fleeing the war. Some had already given up on 
Liberia because [of] the trauma they faced, and some hope and want, [that] 
one day they will be able to return to Liberia.340
Post-conflict emigration has been driven in part by family reunification efforts. The demographics 
of the diaspora community in the United States thus show a community that is not monolithic, but 
rather includes members of different ethnic groups,341 as well as persons who describe their tribe or 
ethnicity as “multiple tribes.”342 This dramatic change in population “represent[s] different challenges, 
different opportunities, different demographics.”343 One community leader described the situation in 
this manner:
The group that came prior to the 1980s knew exactly what they were coming 
for, were focused, tended to have an education. The group that came …
between 1980 and 1990, was sort of a mix…the post-1990 migration pattern 
presents a different set of circumstances…We had families that relocated 
simply because…there was a refugee program. But the issues of cultural 
assimilation [were]…more difficult for those families and it’s been a 
challenge for our community.344
The assimilation process begins as soon as new immigrants arrive and often starts with attempting to 
adjust expectations to the realities of life in a new land.
Arrival: Expectations vs. Realities in the United States
After a year [in Ivory Coast], we were interviewed by the Lutheran Church 
Family Refugee Program for eligibility to leave West Africa for refuge in the 
United States. I passed the interview and I and my wife soon boarded a plane 
which took us to JFK airport in New York. We were lent the money for the 
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plane tickets, which we would later slowly pay back to the Lutheran church 
in small monthly payments.
We suffered very much during our first three months in the United States. 
While we began the slow process of filing for relief funds, we lived in a 
homeless shelter with very little food. Later we were able to become eligible 
for the monthly refugee funds and move to Park Hill, Staten Island, where 
we now reside. 345 
While statement givers in the Buduburam refugee settlement overwhelmingly desired resettlement in 
the United States or in another English-speaking country outside of Africa, life for resettled refugees 
and other immigrants does not always match expectations, as described by the statement giver above.346 
“[W]hat I experienced in the United States is not what I had heard before I arrived, and expected 
to experience.”347 Some statement givers described the fact that Liberians in Africa saw the United 
States as “paradise.”348 Another noted that Liberians see the United States as the iconic “land of milk 
and honey.”349 Resettled Liberian refugees and other immigrants have “very high” expectations that 
everything in their new country will be easy – it will be easy to find a job, easy to make money, easy 
to find a place to live.350 On the contrary, newly arrived refugees confront an array of issues including 
trouble finding housing,351 food insecurity,352 and difficulty finding sufficient employment.353 Even 
for immigrants who have traveled extensively, have visited the United States on previous occasions, 
or have heard from relatives and friends about the challenges of adaptation, high expectations often 
persist.354 “You can tell them, but they don’t believe you – they want to experience it for themselves.”355 
Liberians noted that high expectations, particularly for life in the United States, come in part from a 
perception that there is a special relationship between the United States and Liberia, and accordingly, 
Liberians will be well-treated when they come to the United States 356 When Liberians arrive and 
discover that most Americans have never heard of Liberia, it is a shock:
There is no ‘special relationship’ between Liberia and the United States. 
When living in Liberia your perception of America is completely different. It 
was very easy for Americans to move around Liberia. This is not reciprocal. 
This is something that Liberians learn only once they arrive in America.357 
Another interviewee in Rhode Island noted that the “U.S. views anyone from a third world country 
with suspicion.”358
Adaptation to Life in a New Land
After the initial shock of arrival, Liberians must find their way into the American system. Experiences 
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of Liberians emigrating to the United States often mirror those encountered by other immigrant 
groups. Among these many challenges for Liberians adapting to life in the United States, key themes 
emerged as affecting the entire community. Most critical are concerns about immigration status, 
particularly the recent termination of TPS for Liberians. Apart from immigration concerns, many 
Liberians discuss a feeling of isolation and loss of cultural identity in America, partly as they deal with 
issues of race in America.
In addition, Liberians often discuss the notion of America as a great “equalizer.” One Liberian 
academic described the phenomenon this way: “When there is displacement…[t]here is an involuntary 
migration. They are leaving a 
place of comfort without a plan 
and leaving abruptly, leaving 
resources behind. When you 
do this every person leaving 
enters the new country at 
the same level. They have no 
material assets to travel with, 
but there are other assets that 
they do travel with that do not 
normally get tabulated. These 
are immaterial assets such 
as education.”359 This notion 
expresses itself in many ways 
including through employment 
and education, changing gender 
roles, and changing age roles, 
especially between parents 
and children. There is no doubt that the Liberian conflict upended the Liberian social and cultural 
structure, forcing Liberians into a new landscape where they must take on new roles. Those who 
were in positions of power and influence in Liberia may find themselves underemployed and living in 
obscurity in the United States. For those who may have had little opportunity in Liberia, life in the 
United States presents a chance to get an education, make money, and get the material things that 
were available only to the very few in Liberia. One interviewee reported: 
Coming to America used to be reserved for the elite, the city people, or 
those with education. But truth be told, the war has brought everybody to 
America – I don’t blame people if they feel empowered and equalized.360 
This phenomenon has been clearly observed by community members who have watched gender 
and age roles, among other roles, alter substantially in the United States. One interviewee stated, 
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“Even your younger brother will try to measure up with you when you are in America, while in 
Liberia they always used to respect you.”361 Moreover, legal regimes in the United States that protect 
women and children through active enforcement have contributed to equalizing power relationships 
in the community, among men and women and among parents and children. All of these aspects of 
adjustment to life in the United States – employment, isolation, race, as well as gender and youth issues 
– will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
Underemployment
Statement givers in the United States describe again and again suffering from “underemployment.”362 
Numerous statement givers report that their professional degrees and credentials are not recognized 
in the United States, forcing them to accept employment at jobs far below their qualifications and of 
lesser prestige and pay.363 In one case, a statement giver who holds a Liberian college degree reported 
working only at “menial” jobs.364 A focus group participant in Rhode Island described the situation 
in this way:
Many educated Liberians come to the United States and are looked upon as 
not intelligent…For example, medical doctors who leave Liberia and come 
to the United States are not employed as doctors. They reduce themselves to 
jobs as medical assistants. That is true for other competent individuals, such 
as engineers. The community does not absorb them.365
One statement giver who is a Liberian and Canadian-trained physician confirmed this assertion, 
noting that she had never been able to successfully integrate into the U.S. healthcare system, despite 
experience working with the World Health Organization in Liberia.366 Another noted:
When I was in Liberia I had an undergraduate degree in business management. 
I worked as a junior project economist. I worked for an oil company and an 
electric company. However even that experience wasn’t considered when I 
applied for jobs in the United States.367
An interviewee with a master’s degree from Indiana University and a World Bank fellowship stated 
that her first job in the United States was cleaning the house for a female college student.368 
Obtaining a job can be difficult for various reasons. According to some members of the diaspora 
community, their Liberian accents posed an obstacle to them in finding employment. One interviewee 
who has been in Atlanta since 1985 noted that when she first arrived, it was easier to find a job than 
it is today, which she attributes to increased hostility towards illegal immigrants and increased focus 
on securing necessary legal documentation as a prerequisite to employment.369 The pressure to send 
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money home right away can also lead Liberians to get the first job that comes their way regardless of 
its relevance to their professional skills. One interviewee noted:
When I got here, I was forced by the people I was stopping with to go into 
the nursing home because there was this notion that this is where you make 
the money. Every time I left work I was sick. I was lucky to have a professor 
who talked to me and actually asked me what I had done for a profession 
in Africa, and then she helped steer me to other training. I was able to get 
a job…that was actually related to what I had done in Liberia because I had 
that help, but hardly anyone does. 370
Statement givers also report, however, that educational and employment opportunities that were not 
available to them in Liberia can be pursued in the United States, and that many have moved to 
mainstream careers after graduating from high school, obtaining a GED,371 or obtaining associate, 
undergraduate, or graduate degrees from U.S. colleges and universities. Careers cited by statement 
givers include, but are not limited to, law and medicine,372 nursing,373 home health care,374 business 
owner,375 security services,376 and restauranteur.377 One statement giver, a former child soldier, 
observed that, had he remained in Liberia, his only option would have been to become a farmer.378 
Another young Liberian woman in California noted that she has just completed her LPN degree and 
she sees herself as a more empowered woman than she would have been had she stayed in Liberia.379
African American – African Race Relations in the United States
Immigrants from any non-white background often confront for the first time racial discrimination 
in the United States. Institutional racism and systemic xenophobia are a longstanding problem in 
the United States. Members of the first African diaspora, African Americans, have confronted and 
challenged white racism for decades. Although important gains have been made, racism continues to 
manifest in acts of discrimination by institutions and private actors. The history of deeply entrenched 
racial politics in the United States provides a backdrop for a phenomenon that was often raised by 
interviewees and statement givers as a problem in the Liberian diaspora – the negative interactions 
between African immigrants and African Americans.
Some Liberians also described unexpected conflicts with African Americans. One Liberian journalist 
in Minnesota described his perceptions: 
We get this negative look from our African American brothers because there 
is this feeling that we came from the jungle and everything is about disease, 
violence, and civil war. There is a constant attempt by them to draw a line 
of demarcation – there is not a cordial relationship. Even in the classroom 
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in a university. We are looked at as if we came here to take from them what 
belongs to them.380 
Another interviewee noted that there is a perception that African Americans “accused us of taking 
over their community.”381 “African Americans are always afraid that Africans coming here will take 
their jobs and that white people like Africans better. It’s a myth…it’s a divide-and-rule tactic.”382 
Conflicts between recent African immigrants and African Americans can become very dangerous 
when played out amongst youth. Interviewees in Minnesota reported these conflicts as a problem in 
schools, and this very serious concern for youth was documented in other sources as well.383 “African 
pupils are singled out because of their accents and non-trendy dress and…the harassment exceeds 
normal middle-school-age teasing…”384 In Staten Island, a service provider noted that relations got 
so bad that a group of African children formed a group for protection. One member of that group, a 
Liberian, shot another student in 2005 and was convicted of murder.385
An African American community leader in Minnesota noted that, although initiatives to bring 
African immigrants and African Americans together have been undertaken, they are often “one-shot” 
efforts and there is little sustained opportunity.386 He noted that the African American community 
does sometimes perceive immigrants, whether from Africa or elsewhere, as “taking something” such 
as opportunities, from established communities. 387 He noted that African immigrants and African 
Americans have common problems as people of color. According to him, those mutual concerns 
should lead to mutual understanding and collaborative work on issues such as education, health 
disparities, and other social and economic rights.388 
Gender Role Reversals
Liberian women in the United States have found new economic and educational opportunities. They 
have found increased job prospects, thus garnering greater economic power and independence for 
themselves. Furthermore, because many Liberian women work in the health care industry, they have 
the opportunity to work overtime and possibly make more money than their partners.389 
New opportunities in the diaspora have led to a shift in gender roles from traditional lifestyles in 
Liberia where, according to one community leader, “our moms were the ones who were involved in 
our lives…dad brought home the money.”390 Here in the diaspora, “most women in our community 
make more money than men” and they work more hours, meaning that “they’re not home to take care 
of kids, not home to cook for their husbands.”391 
Both men and women interviewees reported that some Liberian men find the altered gender roles and 
power structure in the United States difficult to accept.392 “The men feel less of a man…it is about 
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male ego.”393 This interviewee noted that he himself had been ashamed to take work in a factory or a 
nursing home when he first came to America because his family had been well-off in Liberia. “They 
have more opportunities for women here than for men. The notion that husbands have to be bread 
winner and the inflexibility associated with that has forced them to keep looking for jobs that are 
comparable to that in Liberia instead of taking lesser job and working their way up.”394 One Liberian 
community leader saw this gender role reversal as a particular issue with younger women of child 
bearing age.
Well, what I see happening in the community…a lot of women are in control 
and the men are not in favor of that, but they just, they just go with it. And 
what I see happening more and more…the women have been left alone to 
raise their children because most men, especially African men, they were 
raised to be head of the household, and if they’re not, I’ve seen a lot of them 
just leaving, leaving thinking they leave and go to the next person it’s going 
to be different…So I see more and more women and girls having babies by 
these men thinking that he will be there to help them raise these children. 
And it’s not happening. And so therefore most of these women are taking 
control…going to school, getting their education and raising their children, 
pretty much by themselves.395
Another community leader found a similar issue among older women in the Liberian community. She 
described a female client who sought literacy and functional skills training: 
We’re all working together with this lady, she’s coming to the literacy 
class and we’re working with her to learn how to catch the bus…And I 
just never understood, the lady couldn’t understand, why her husband was 
so resistant to his wife learning anything to become independent. He just 
fought everything we did. So I think at the end we just realized that it was 
more about control…she has always looked up to him, for everything. She 
didn’t know how to read and write, she didn’t know anything. She was there 
and he was a knight in shining armor, a hero. Now all of the sudden there is 
this opportunity for her to learn to read, to catch the bus, she’s going to go 
to work, she’s going to be independent, and he just fought against it…And 
every time she had to come to school, he found an excuse, he didn’t want her 
there. So we just drew a conclusion that he was very controlling. There is a 
lot of this, where men are having a hard time adjusting to the women being 
independent and having financial independence.396
According to the interviewee, the struggle to accept Liberian women’s independence has at times 
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given rise to problems within the home.397 For example, dynamics of power and control become 
apparent in domestic violence in Liberian families after they resettled in the United States: “[M]
ost Liberian women did not work. The men did. In a way, they controlled the women. Then war 
came. Everything changed. Men found 
themselves humiliated whether in 
refugee camps or in America. They no 
longer had the means to support families 
properly.”398 Men perceive that women 
now are “disobeying” and are resisting the 
traditional systems of power and control 
that were prevalent in Liberia.399
Violence during war furthers the mis-
conception that violence against women 
is acceptable.400 In describing domestic 
violence in the Liberian community, one 
public hearing witness stated:
The effect of the war on domestic violence is that for an already-existing 
problem that we have in the Liberian culture, where we consider domestic 
problems as something that only the family deals with, the war has actually 
aggravated that problem, because rather than finding ways – rather than 
finding peaceful ways to solve problems…perpetrator[s] of these problems, 
just go ahead and they become aggressive towards their domestic partners…
And when they are arrested, they don’t realize how aggressive the laws are in 
this country against domestic violence perpetrators.401 
Relatives see domestic violence as a family issue and generally discourage Liberian women from 
reporting these circumstances.402 Furthermore, strong, enforceable laws that protect victims and hold 
offenders accountable contrast sharply with the lack of enforcement in Liberia. As one interviewee 
noted, the “protections existed back home but no one cared to enforce those laws.”403 A male 
community leader recounted the following to the TRC: 
[T]here is a story about…a young man who came from Liberia. He had 
an argument with his girlfriend so he got mad. He stopped the car on the 
side of the highway and began to beat her, and the police stopped him and 
went to intervene. He told them, ‘I’m beating my momu.’ He was promptly 
arrested, of course, and he learned a lesson in American culture and the legal 
system.404 
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With regard to victims, a public hearings witness stated that “They’re so used to these things that 
they’re in a state of learned helplessness. They think there is no recourse, they have nothing – no way 
out.”405 Thus, she works with an organization that seeks to raise awareness about legal recourse for 
domestic violence victims.406 
Young, illiterate adult women between 20 and 40 years of age comprise a particularly vulnerable 
population.407 Traditionally, there is a greater proportion of elderly women among the illiterate due to 
historical trends relative to gender and education.408 An interviewee observed, however, a recent trend 
of increasing numbers of younger women with little to no education. She attributed this to relocation 
from the war, changed familial structures, and unwanted pregnancies from early sexual exposure 
or rape. These women drop out of school, and with no support and a child to raise, their education 
ceases.409 These young women may blend in, be well-spoken and well-dressed, but they are unable to 
fill out a job application.
Raising Children in a New Cultural Landscape
Within the diaspora community, there are youth who have grown up largely in the United States, 
having arrived at young ages, as well as youth who arrived at older ages. The experiences and views of 
those who have been primarily raised in the United States are, in many respects, different from those 
who arrived at later ages. For this former group, their stories are often indistinguishable from many 
young persons born in the United States. One statement giver who arrived in the United States at age 
four reports that he self-identifies as American, that most of his friends are non-Liberians, that he is a 
high school graduate and college bound, and that he plans a career in business.410 For the other group, 
many of whom have experienced trauma in Liberia or in the emigration process, life in the United 
States can be more complicated.
Liberian youth who arrived at older ages face significant challenges. For these young persons, school 
issues predominate. Multiple statement givers and interviewees reported that school age Liberians 
are initially placed in classrooms based on age, rather than academic level. As many of these young 
persons have not attended school continuously because of the conflict, their academic status lags 
behind their biological age.411 A refugee resettlement educator summarized: 
Imagine an eighteen-year-old at a fourth grade level. The schools put them 
in classes based on their age and it’s a real problem – they can’t be with the 
little kids but they can’t manage academically as a senior in high school 
either.412 
While some students ultimately may catch up to their age peers, one statement giver reported that in 
his community Liberian youth are graduating from high school by memorizing material rather than 
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by learning the material.413 Additional school-related problems reported are that Liberian students 
may have difficulty in adjusting to the behavioral expectations of schools in the United States;414 
Liberian students are subject to ridicule about their accents415 or are placed in English as a Second 
Language (ESL) classes;416 many students lack family support and financial resources to engage in 
extra-curricular activities;417 and some of the students live in unstable homes with unrelated sponsors 
who provide little or no emotional or financial support.418 Many Liberian students also have unmet 
needs for counseling and other mental health and social services to address their traumatic histories.419 
Parents’ involvement with the educational system is also a concern. Service providers and Liberian 
community leaders from across the country report that illiteracy, particularly amongst Liberian women, 
is a problem that needs to be addressed. It hampers many aspects of life, including communication 
with the school system. “[If ] you can’t…read and write, you [can’t] know, what’s going on…looking 
at [a] grade sheet or [a] report card – you won’t know the difference. But if [you] go and talk to the 
teacher, it’s not writing, it’s speaking, which most Liberians speak English.”420 
The heavy work-load that many Liberians maintain to support extended family in the United States, 
Liberia, or in refugee camps can prevent parents from actively participating in the education of their 
children. “Well, the school district [is] having [a] problem too, because they are not being able to get 
the parents to come to the parents and teachers meeting because the parents have to go to work, so 
you have to schedule the meeting at a time when the parents will be home.”421 Liberians also report 
that expectations for behavior in school are different in Liberia from here in the United States. “Some 
parents are getting calls from the school wanting to prescribe for [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder] ADHD. The system doesn’t understand how Liberians behave and that there are different 
customs.”422
Within the diaspora community, concern is expressed about the corrupting influence of U.S. culture 
on Liberian youth, including loss of traditional cultural values such as respect for elders.423 Because 
of the financial demands on new immigrants, all adults in a household may be working one or more 
jobs, leaving children alone much of the time.424 Other statement givers’ descriptions of their concerns 
about youth include the prevalence of trauma, anger, and feelings of displacement among young 
Liberians;425 lack of services for youth;426 use of drugs by youth;427 involvement in criminal activity;428 
and lack of educational and employment prospects.429 
There are also concerns specific to Liberian girls in the United States. Interviews revealed that teenage 
pregnancy among young Liberian girls is a serious problem. A Liberian women’s advocate reported 
that of the 30 immigrant teenagers who were pregnant at a Minnesota high school in 2008, the 
majority were Liberian girls.430 Counselors at a Minnesota high school confirmed that teen pregnancy 
in the Liberian diaspora community is high.431 They stated that, while assistance is available for these 
teenage mothers, they encounter difficulties finishing their high school education unless they have 
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child care resources at home.432 Teenage mothers are encouraged to attend an alternative school, but 
limited space and transportation pose hurdles.433 
Changed Community Structure
Compared to life in Liberia, the greater isolation that Liberians experience in the United States is also 
a significant challenge. One interviewee living in Minnesota stated: 
When I came here I thought it would be just like back home, where I could 
see my friends all the time, where the community would be so close. But 
people don’t realize how spread out everyone here is. It’s easy to get isolated 
– I have friends I haven’t seen in ten years.434 
Isolation from others and loss of regular community support falls particularly heavily on elderly 
members of the Liberian diaspora. Older members of the community report feelings of isolation and 
longing for the social interaction common in Liberia. They report that many members of the diaspora 
community have adopted an American lifestyle of keeping to themselves and not becoming involved 
with their neighbors.435 
Elderly Liberian women are particularly vulnerable to hardship in adjusting to an American lifestyle. 
Because they may be illiterate and lack a formal education, they tend to be more disconnected 
from society. Even if they do attend community events, full participation remains a challenge. The 
programs may be printed in English and exclude those who cannot read.436 Even basic tasks involved 
in attending public events may present an obstacle. A community service provider described the social 
experiences of one of her literacy students:
[A]ll the time she went to events, she had to ask a child to take her to the 
bathroom, because she did not know if it was a woman or man’s bathroom, 
so she couldn’t distinguish between bathrooms.437 
Elderly women often live with their adult children and tend to assume the role of homemakers and 
child caretakers. Within the home, illiteracy and adjustment issues continue to pose a challenge for 
this population. For example, elderly women may not know how to use the telephone, dial 911, or call 
for help in an emergency.438 As caretakers, elderly women are isolated within the confines of the home. 
This circumstance is especially difficult as it represents a major shift from their lifestyles in Liberia. 
According to one community leader, many of these women formerly were respected leaders with 
pivotal roles in the family, community, and the marketplace.439 In the United States, one interviewee 
stated, “they’re just lost.”440 
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Liberians also reported concerns about losing traditional community supports for childrearing and 
adapting to a legal system that is more protective of the rights of children. One focus group participant 
stated: 
In Liberia, if two parents are working, the neighbor will step in as a parent. 
Here a neighbor will not do that. Consequently, one cannot leave a 9 or 13 
year old at home in America, but can in Liberia.441 
This issue is particularly critical for single parents in the Liberian community.442 One service provider 
noted that she has encouraged clients to enroll their children in after-school activities so that they do 
not have to stay home alone.443
The U.S. legal system provides protections for children against abuse and other forms of negligence. 
But, in Liberia, practices that may be considered abuse in the United States were accepted as forms 
of discipline. Many believed that “if you spare the rod, you spoil the child.”444 For example, one 
statement giver reported that during his youth in Liberia he was locked in a closet with no food for 
a day as a punishment.445 Another interviewee noted that a traditional punishment was to rub hot 
pepper juice all over parts of the body so that it would burn with pain.446 “In Liberia, parents were 
not afraid to punish their children. Here there is a fear that children will tell the guidance counselor if 
they are punished, and that the punishment will be considered child abuse.”447 While many reported 
this as a concern in the diaspora community, Liberians and law enforcement authorities are working 
together to address the issue. Police efforts at educating the community were reported as having 
helped to mitigate the problem, and Liberians are growing increasingly aware that they need to find 
alternative means to discipline their children in the United States. According to one community 
leader, however, “it’s a challenge for Liberian parents to find a way to keep the kids in line without 
using these practices.”448 
One Liberian academic in Minnesota summarized the situation: 
The struggle that we have is…in our country where we don’t have law 
enforcement in child protection. Instead we have a hierarchical system, where 
you are supposed to yell at your kids, but kids now say you cannot do this…
In the old days you have children to help you on the farm, but that is not 
their obligation anymore. Your responsibility as a parent is to provide them 
an environment conducive to them being competitive…[Some families] in 
the community have kids before they are prepared, and these conditions 
lead to social stressors that lead to abuse of kids. We need to intervene in the 
lives of brothers and sisters so we can help them.449
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Adjustment to Life in the United Kingdom
The Liberian community in the United Kingdom is much smaller than that in the United States,450 
and accordingly, many fewer TRC statements were taken there. Nevertheless, these statements reflect 
similar patterns of adjustment and adaptation. A small community of Liberians lived in the United 
Kingdom before the war, and as in the United States, those individuals generally left Liberia for 
educational or professional reasons.451 Once the war began, however, these Liberians were forced to 
stay. Thereafter, some Liberians arrived in the United Kingdom as refugees from the war and were 
resettled through the U.K.’s Gateway Protection Programme.452
Liberians in the United Kingdom who found themselves separated from their families back in Liberia 
noted the extreme difficulty of getting information about their loved ones. One statement giver noted 
that, after the 1980 coup, she did not hear from her family for several months.453 When she finally 
got a letter, she was shocked to see a clipping of her sister’s husband in shackles being taken to jail.454 
Thereafter during the years of civil conflict, she was lucky to hear from her family once a year.455 
Another statement giver told the TRC that she had left her four young sons in Liberia when she had 
gone to work in the United Kingdom.456 Once the conflict started, she could not get any news about 
her sons for seven years. She reported being so worried that she often could not eat or sleep; she even 
had trouble cooking because she felt so guilty about having food when she thought about what was 
happening in Liberia.457 When she later found out that her family’s home in Bong County had been 
targeted, she told the TRC that she believed it was targeted because rebels in the area knew she was 
working in the United Kingdom and thus assumed that her family had a lot of money. 
Liberians in the United Kingdom in general reported a somewhat easier time adjusting to resettlement, 
in part because of the strong social safety nets in place there. In fact, the United Kingdom had such a 
strong policy in favor of Liberian refugees that many other West Africans came there under the guise 
of Liberian nationality.458 
A higher percentage of the Liberians in the United Kingdom had arrived there prior to the war. 
According to the president of the U.K. Liberian community organization, “Most of the Liberians 
here came here before the war started to go to school. So most of them went to school in the British 
society and so have been integrated into the British community quite easily. But those who came after 
the war are not having the easiest time integrating.”459
The system of government support for U.K. residents also helps to mitigate some of the phenomena 
that have been major stressors for the Liberian diaspora in the United States. For example, Liberians 
in the United Kingdom report that, while underemployment is a problem,460 is it not as severe as 
in the United States. “In the U.K., if you are a professional, you will be able to get a job according 
to your status. If you have no skills you will be at that level and working for the bare minimum.”461 
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For example, foreign medical professionals are readily integrated into the U.K. healthcare system, 
according to interviewees.462 Although Liberians noted that professionals outside the medical field 
have more difficulty, they are generally able to find some form of professional work, as opposed to 
more menial labor.
In turn, the fact that Liberian men in the United Kingdom are able to find higher level employment 
also appears to mitigate the dramatic gender role reversals that many Liberians describe taking 
place in the United States.463 Interviewees noted that, while 
women are also well employed in the United Kingdom and 
may indeed make more than their spouses, “the pressure is 
not as much.”464 They attribute this directly to the fact that 
in the United Kingdom “families are looked after” by the 
state.465 This high level of social welfare, however, along with 
a strong child protection regime, can exacerbate problems 
in childrearing, according to some. One community leader 
reported that children were aware that the government 
provided monetary support to families with children and 
thus felt they could “have their way.”466
Like their counterparts in the United States, Liberians in the 
United Kingdom have built a strong structure of community 
organization that encompasses the United Kingdom and 
Europe, as described below.
Building a New Community
Although some Liberians report feelings of loss of community and concerns about isolation from other 
Liberians, the diaspora community has developed numerous structures that provide opportunities 
to interact with other Liberians. These structures include political organizations, ethnic and tribal 
associations, women’s groups, alumni associations, social clubs, and faith-based groups.
Liberians also socialize and stay connected through a network of list serves, blog postings, websites, 
news magazines, journals, and chat rooms. At times, the array of diaspora organizations can add 
pressure to the lives of new and established immigrants:
Take for instance, a friend of mine living in Philadelphia. He is a Mandingo 
from Lofa County and has been living in the city of brotherly love ever since 
late 1990s. This friend is part of the Lofa county organization; he is part of the 
Mandingo organization; he is part of Liberian Mandingo of Pennsylvania; 
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he is also part of the Quardu Borni Chiefdom Mandingo Association; he is 
a part of the Liberians in Pennsylvania-ULAA467 chapter; and, obviously a 
part [of] the umbrella ULAA. Beside these six organizations with almost 
the same objectives (development back home), this friend is also [a] member 
of the Movement for Political Reform in Liberia and his high school alumni 
association. Let us not forget that he is [a] family man and part of a local 
congregation in addition to attending graduate school and working a full 
time job.468 
This quote not only illustrates the complexity of Liberian diaspora socialization and accompanying 
responsibilities, it also demonstrates the proliferation of groups based on ethnic, regional, and political 
persuasions in the Liberian diaspora.
Umbrella Political Organizations
In the early 1970s, Liberian students across the United States organized an umbrella organization to 
advocate for the interests and welfare of Liberian students and immigrants throughout North America 
as well as to provide a sense of a national community in the Americas and to impact economic 
and political decisions in their homeland.469 This organization ultimately was named the Union of 
Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA).470 Many key figures in Liberia’s civil crises were also 
key leaders in ULAA. Today, ULAA has remained active throughout the United States, with chapters 
and branches in most states where Liberians are populous.471 
Organization of the Liberian community in the United Kingdom and Europe is similar to that in 
the United States. For example, the European Federation of Liberian Associations is analogous 
to ULAA.472 Liberians in Europe have also established country-based umbrella organizations, for 
example the Union of Liberian Organizations in the United Kingdom (ULO-UK)473 and the Liberian 
Association of Belgium,474 which are analogous to state-based entities in the United States.475
County and Ethnic Organizations
Liberian counties are organized in large part based on traditional home territories of particular ethnic 
groups. For example, Grand Gedeh County is traditionally the home of the Krahn people, Maryland 
County is traditionally home of the Grebo people, and Grand Kru County is traditionally the home 
of the Kru people. For every major county in Liberia, an association exists in the United States. 
Where counties are not surrogates for ethnic associations, such as for Mandingos who are settled 
across Liberia, an association in America represents that ethnic group.476 These associations are one 
of the mainstays by which members socialize and network in America.477 In these groups, members 
enjoy their traditional practices unique to the individual ethnic group. For example, on Mandingo 
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association websites in the United States and the United Kingdom, there are announcements of births 
and naming ceremonies, traditional weddings, and funerals.478 County and ethnic organizations also 
hold national conventions, meetings, and major gatherings so as to address issues affecting the group 
or to focus on development projects for their local communities back in Liberia. 
High School Alumni Associations
Another major area of the Liberian diaspora socialization network is the network of high school 
alumni associations across the United States. Like county and ethnic organizations, for every major 
high school, especially for those in Monrovia, there is an alumni association in the United States .479 
These alumni associations are mainly organized for social and developmental purposes.480
If only for psychological purposes, alum groups are a great means of 
socializing in the Liberian communities in America. People reconnect; 
establishing serious relationships at these events, some times leading to 
marriages, business partnerships, and so on. They look forward to it every 
year.481
Religious Institutions/Affiliations 
Many Liberians like to say that, “[w]e are a religious people,”482 and “whether you are a Christian 
or Muslim, or neither of the two, we revere our religious leaders and institutions.”483 Aside from 
the family unit, arguably the most commonly available means of Liberian diaspora socialization are 
religious institutions, such as the church, mosque, or other types of spiritual venues. In every major 
U.S. city with a large Liberian diaspora population, there are Liberian churches, as well as associations 
of faith leaders. In Minnesota alone, there are more than 35 community churches with sizable Liberian 
congregations.484 In addition to regular church services, weddings, and funerals, serious matters of 
community concern are often referred to the church, a pastor, or an imam for intervention.485 One 
statement giver said in a follow-up interview: 
[W]ithout this kind of well structured system of socialization via religious 
authorities, co-existence in the Liberian diaspora would be impossible, for 
people brought with them the vestiges of the problems that ignited the 
war.486
Aside from the organized church or mosque, Liberians also maintain prayer chains, faith networks, 
and spiritual social groups. 
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Little Liberias in the Diaspora
The waves of emigration of Liberians in the early and late 1990s have led to the creation of Liberian 
settlements in the United States. Within the diaspora community, the most clustered of these 
communities have been given names of Liberian towns and cities. The Park Hill neighborhood on 
Staten Island, New York, is home to a large Liberian community. This neighborhood is often called 
“Little Liberia,” 487 as are communities in Bridgeport, Connecticut,488 and Albany, New York.489 The 
suburbs of Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center, Minnesota, are home to one the largest Liberian 
populations outside of West Africa. Liberians call these Midwestern neighborhoods “New Kru 
Town.”490 
Liberians also refer to a 
popular Liberian enclave 
on Woodland Avenue in 
northwest Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, as “Little 
Monrovia,” whereas Liberian-
Americans have named 
Providence, Rhode Island, 
after an infamous business 
district of Monrovia called 
“Waterside.”491 And finally, 
although not as famous by 
its name as the other U.S.-
based Liberian areas, the 
Washington, DC, metro area 
is often referred to as “Oldest 
Congo Town,” because of its status as the oldest place of residence for Liberian students, diplomats, 
and other privileged visitors and immigrants.492
Many Liberians in these communities enjoy meeting and socializing at Liberian-owned food stores, 
restaurants, barber shops, and other Liberian owned and operated entities.493 Liberians congregate 
at these shops to not only buy familiar African food items, but also to engage in political and social 
discussions pertaining to events back in Liberia. By doing so, they provide the necessary social 
support to one another, as well as promote the business and financial interests of the owners of those 
businesses or organizations to sustain them in the community. 
Liberian communities in the United States are also engaged in nonprofit work. While there is a dearth 
of data to accurately reflect the number of Liberian-operated nonprofit organizations (or, for that 
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matter, for-profit businesses), certain Liberian demographics, such as the elderly and the youth, benefit 
from social services programs designed and run by other diaspora Liberians.494
Families, Family Reunions, and Foundations
Although adapting to a new culture has been difficult for Liberian immigrant families in many respects, 
the family, family reunions, and in limited instances, family foundations have been a principal source 
of diaspora socialization and comfort.495 Even the most distant relative, or a familiar person from the 
same town or village from back home, can be a source of relief and social interaction in the United 
States. Some families meet every year for a reunion. These reunions and annual family gatherings 
provide opportunities for psychosocial support, guidance, nurturing follow-ups, and other necessary 
support.496 It is at these gatherings that serious family matters, whether achievements or failures, are 
reassessed and discussed.497
Clubs: Susu, Sports Clubs or Associations 
Liberians turn their passion for football (soccer) into a social support mechanism.498 They also socialize 
and network through traditional social support venues for economic, sports, and social institutions 
such as Susu clubs,499 football clubs,500 and musical groups, among others. Around the sporting events, 
Liberians in the diaspora organize county leagues, tournaments, and meets. One of the organizers 
and club owners in New York stated, “it is mainly for family recreation.”501 Another interviewee, 
however, suggested that the benefit of these events runs deeper. According to the interviewee, these 
county meets represent every county in Liberia and help to heal some of the wounds and ethnic 
hatreds that started the violence in Liberia.502 
Major football tournaments are held annually on July 26, which is Liberia’s Independence Day. 
The July 26 tournaments bring together Liberians from all walks of life.503 There are also kickball 
teams for girls and women.504 The love of football is not limited to the young people, and there are 
major clubs all throughout the diaspora known as old-timers associations. These older Liberian men 
come together not only to enjoy the games, but also to support one another in matters ranging from 
personal to professional concerns.505 “We use the games to mentor young people and keep them out 
of trouble.”506
Communication and Media Socialization
Computer-literate Liberians have used the Internet to lessen some of the isolation inherent in life 
in the diaspora.507 They use the Internet to share information about their community including 
births, weddings, deaths, conventions, anniversaries, and social, economic, and political news or 
commentaries from both the diaspora and Liberia.508
361
In addition to online news magazines,509 chat rooms, blog postings, and other social networking sites, 
the Liberian diaspora has also developed a number of sophisticated email listservs, through which 
they engage in sometimes acrimonious exchanges. For example, the Organization of Liberians in 
Minnesota runs a well-established listserv.510 Phone tree and mobile phone messaging are also used 
to keep the community connected and to invite people to major community events.511 In Atlanta, 
Georgia, for instance, there is a longstanding community phone line which provides daily updates of 
community news to people who use the service.512
These social networking and support mechanisms provide a reserve of community support for 
Liberians separated by distance and oceans. These mechanisms can also play a divisive role, however, 
as they reflect and magnify tensions in a community dealing with the effects of a devastating conflict.
damaging the faBric of liBerian Society: ongoing impact of the war
Many of the challenges and coping 
strategies in the Liberian diaspora 
community are similar to those evident 
among other immigrant populations. 
But the trauma that Liberians faced 
during more than fourteen years of 
civil war poses unique challenges as 
the community builds a new life in the 
diaspora. The legacy of the Liberian 
war impacts the Liberian diaspora at all 
levels, from the individual, to the family, 
to community-level structures. 
Individual-Level Impact
The diaspora community includes many individuals who have experienced significant personal trauma, 
and for many, their traumatic history has exacerbated the difficulties experienced in the resettlement 
process. One interviewee noted that little effort has been made by the U.S. government to understand 
Liberian culture and how deeply Liberians have been affected by their war experience.513 Liberians 
in the United Kingdom also described dealing with issues of retrauamatization upon arrival. For 
example, one statement giver mentioned that she arrived in the United Kingdom around the time of 
Bonfire Night and everyone was setting off fireworks.514 The noises terrified her because she had no 
idea what was happening and it brought back memories of the war.515
Another interviewee described trying to support two young women who had been through extreme, 
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yet typical, trauma by the time they arrived in the United States as refugees:
I used to be an aunt for two Liberian girls…[b]y the time they got refugee 
status, one had a three-year old baby. They came to the United States, and I 
was contacted by a Catholic relief organization, and they told me they were 
coming and they found foster parents for them…Well, one thing I saw was 
that they were not prepared for these children. The girls were [children] 
when the bomb fell in their yard and killed their ma, and they ran…They 
had a five-year-old brother, and their father was executed. Their five-year-
old brother got lost, so they were very traumatized, their father was executed 
in their presence, and they lost their brother and were raped constantly for 
five years. They went through five African countries. They were 13 and 15 
years old when they got here, with a baby, having run for years. I told the 
people these children are very traumatized, and they need counseling…So, I 
looked at them, and they were not prepared for these children. If you bring 
traumatized people here, then they need proper psychological counseling.516
Numerous statement givers and interviewees report that mental health issues are prevalent in the 
diaspora community, including Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome,517 depression, and feelings of 
inadequacy. Some feel these issues are of particular concern among Liberian men because of their 
dramatic change in status.518 One interviewee in Minnesota told the TRC that he saw his friends 
turning to drugs and alcohol as a coping mechanism to deal with the stress of past trauma and 
adjustment to life in the United States.519 
Physical health concerns are ongoing as a result of trauma and often are linked to mental health issues. 
Liberians suffer from all manner of physical disability resulting from the conflict, including chronic 
pain, scarring, vision problems, dental pain, loss of limbs, hearing loss, and traumatic brain injury.520 
Women in particular suffer from the long term consequences of rape and sexual assault as well as 
traumatic pregnancies and miscarriages during the conflict. In addition, health care providers also 
report that many Liberians are dealing with the after-effects of malnutrition and that older Liberians 
are dealing with hypertension and diabetes.521 Statement givers also were likely to describe physical 
manifestations of mental health concerns, such as feeling “pressure,” chest pain, feeling weak or 
faint, and night sweats. Nightmares and flashbacks also are commonly reported. Within the diaspora 
community, youth and former child soldiers are specifically cited as being in need of mental health 
treatment to assist in their recovery from their war experiences.522 
There is general consensus both within the diaspora community and among those providers who 
work with the community that few Liberians receive appropriate mental health treatment, due both 
to a strong cultural bias on the part of Liberians against therapy and mental-health treatment523 and 
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to a lack of culturally-appropriate resources and services.524 According to a Liberian service provider 
in the community:
[I]f you come at it straight…if you come in and say ‘Oh, I think you need to 
go talk to Doctor So-and-So in mental hospital’ she wouldn’t have gone. She 
wouldn’t have. Because [among] Liberians…it’s not something that’s talked 
about. ‘Cause crazy is not a word that they want to hear.525 
Liberians often have alternative explanations for why mental and other health problems are afflicting 
them based on their traditional cultural practices. These rationales may include “violation of natural 
or traditional laws (e.g., inappropriate relations with kin, stealing, etc), not performing expected 
rituals (e.g., ritual for a deceased elder), mental poisoning by an enemy, a curse by an aged elder for 
serious traditional violation (e.g., disrespect, abandonment, etc.), or bad luck leading to possession by 
evil spirit.”526 These beliefs can lead to alternative care seeking, as opposed to formal counseling or 
therapy.527
Perpetrators in the Community
Like refugees in Ghana and elsewhere in the sub-region, individuals in the United States also report 
encounters with those who perpetrated crimes against them during the war. 528 This experience can 
re-traumatize individuals finally beginning to adjust to life in a new country. 529 Encounters with 
perpetrators are reported to lead to changes in victim behavior, increased isolation, or other changes 
such as moving.530 
One young woman saw another Liberian who had committed crimes against her family in the parking 
lot of her apartment complex in Minnesota. She later discovered that he was living on the floor above 
her. She went to the apartment management, and they helped her to move. She did not, however, 
report the encounter to anyone else. A social service provider described why:
[T]hey made eye contact and she had the feeling that he doesn’t know her, he 
doesn’t know it’s her. But just the fact that, it’s him and not recognizing what 
he had done. First of all he doesn’t know who she is so how can he recognize 
what he had done…And I think her issue was she was helpless, how can they 
hold him accountable, what she can do, who will she go to to believe what 
[she is] saying. It’s her word against his, especially here, so what [is she] going 
to do? Talking to him and maybe seeing him more often would just keep 
bringing everything back to [her] and [she] didn’t want to go through that.531
A community leader in Minnesota told the TRC that “I’ve seen people move, I know of a family that 
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actually moved out of state. I know a family that left a job because [one member] ran into another 
person that actually killed somebody in her sight.”532 Victims generally do not report these encounters, 
leading to an accountability vacuum.533 Another Liberian professional living in Minnesota recounted 
his encounter with a perpetrator in a newspaper interview: “[w]hen he was least expecting it – at a 
peaceful Liberian community meeting in Minnesota – he saw the man who, years earlier, had tortured 
him…After the confrontation years later in Minnesota, [the] torturer apologized. But…he’s not ready 
to forgive.”534
Family-Level Impact
The war has also severely affected families. Because of deaths of family members during the war and 
the vagaries of immigration policy, roles within Liberian families have been forced to change. “The 
division of families occurs in several ways. Often families were divided during the war. Also, it costs 
a lot to bring a whole family to the United States. Many times one person will come to work with the 
hope that they can later pay to have the whole family arrive.”535 
Some youth are in the diaspora with no adult members of their families or with no other family 
members at all. Both during the conflict and now in the diaspora, “kids have to grow up fast…
they’re becoming breadwinners.”536 Accordingly, they are less willing to respect elders and traditional 
structures, when they view themselves as independent of them.537 This view is a major change from the 
Liberian extended family system in which aunts and uncles have the same power and responsibilities 
as parents and in which there is virtually no distinction between cousins, half-siblings, step-siblings, 
foster-siblings – all are brothers and sisters.538
One interviewee in Minnesota noted that:
When I grew up…my parents were there, we didn’t have war, we had 
stable community, day-in, day-out…structure was there, rules are the same, 
discipline, respect, that kind of thing. But all of that was taken away and 
these kids were just thrown from one place to another, some of them don’t 
have any parent around, so in some families, some homes, they don’t have 
any real structure. They’re just there, existing.539 
Another interviewee in Providence expressed the concern that this lack of structure is “damaging the 
fabric of Liberian society.”540
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Community-Level Impact
As noted elsewhere in this report, the Liberian diaspora was established before the Liberian civil war 
that began in 1989. The composition of the diaspora has undergone significant change, however, as a 
result of the conflict.
As the conflict progressed, the diaspora 
changed from a relatively homogeneous 
community of elites with connections 
to the United States, to a very diverse 
community reflecting the ethnic, 
class, and political divisions that were 
the roots of the conflict itself. Ethnic 
divisions are regularly cited by statement 
givers as a continuing problem in 
diaspora communities around the 
United States.541 A community leader 
in Washington, DC, told the TRC that 
“differences among Liberian tribes 
became more visible during the civil 
war…the Liberian community began to 
sectionalize to the point where certain members of the community were only comfortable dealing 
with their tribesmen.”542 A community leader in Minnesota observed the same phenomenon, noting 
that just as during the war, factions developed and split off in Liberia, one saw the same phenomenon 
in the United States, with new organizations splitting off to protect specific interests.543 This statement 
giver also observed that in the 1990s, there was a significant Krahn-Nimba divide in Minnesota, 
which hurt the community. According to this statement giver, as the community has become larger 
and as more perceived perpetrators have been coming into the community, the diaspora community 
has drifted apart.544
One statement giver opined that Americo-Liberians in the United States continue to discriminate 
against Liberians of indigenous heritage.545 By contrast, a statement giver with ties to the Congo/
Americo Liberian elite reported feeling “ostracized” by the diaspora community, in part because she 
was not in Liberia during the war and did not suffer personal trauma.546 Another statement giver who 
acknowledges that such tensions exist recommended that the community should organize, reconcile, 
and engage in mediation among ethnic groups, as most members of the diaspora community will not 
be returning to Liberia in the near future.547
Other statement givers noted, however, that among younger Liberians in the diaspora, much more 
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inter-tribal mixing occurs than ever before. Focus group participants in Providence believe that, as a 
result of the war, there have been more inter-marriages, which, they say, is a good thing.548 A Krahn 
statement giver living in Minnesota told the TRC:
My niece has a child by a Gio man here in the United States. I talked to her 
and asked her how she could date a Gio man, and have his baby, after a Gio 
had killed her uncle. She said that she couldn’t hold against her boyfriend 
what some other Gio person did – he “didn’t know anything about it.” This 
is an example of how things are different here in the United States – the 
younger generation is not as concerned with tribal divisions…549
The fracturing of the Liberian community since the war has also occurred along political lines. In 
the past five years, national ULAA elections,550 as well as community elections in Staten Island, 
New York,551 in Minnesota,552 and in Atlanta, Georgia,553 have been extremely divisive. In each 
community, election results were contested and legal action was pursued or threatened. Leaders in 
Washington, DC, also noted that “in the past, some members of the Liberian community did not 
accept local community association election results because they felt it was not free and fair.”554 These 
controversies in some cases appear to be related to undercurrents of mistrust as a result of the conflict 
in Liberia. In the 2007 election for the leadership of the Organization of Liberians in Minnesota, the 
ultimate winner was accused of being a “warlord” by his opponents, based on his admitted role as 
a spokesperson for one faction that emerged during the civil war.555 No evidence of the candidate’s 
participation in any fighting was ever produced, but the accusation led to extensive controversy within 
the community, as well as negative media attention for the candidate and the community. In the 2008 
ULAA elections, one of the candidates was accused of being a rebel leader and was compared to the 
likes of Charles Taylor and Robert Mugabe.556
The successful candidate in the Minnesota election, Kerper Dwanyen, appeared at the public hearing 
in Minnesota and gave lengthy testimony concerning his work for the Nimba Redemption Council 
during the war and the emotional impact he suffered due to the allegations against him:
If you’re running for president of the United States…it’s somewhat easier 
to understand because the stakes are high, but when you’re trying to lead 
your community on a volunteer basis and people engaged in these tactics it’s 
somewhat befuddling. For me it was like grabbing my father and killing him 
right before me once again. That was the most painful part of it. That was 
the very painful part of it.
… 
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And it’s sad what we are doing to each other here in this Diaspora, fighting 
this war in ways which are very, very unhealthy and very, very unhelpful to 
our country.557
From their perspective, Dwanyen’s former opponents point to his acknowledged association with the 
Nimba Redemption Council and repeat allegations that this organization was associated with violence 
or human rights abuses. Such continued and highly emotional conflicts and confusion or disagreement 
over what happened and who is responsible are a significant challenge for continuing progress in the 
Liberian diaspora. The strains in the community have made mobilizing around important issues, such 
as extension of Liberians’ temporary immigration status,558 unduly difficult.
“a houSe with two roomS”
Liberians, like many other forced migrant communities, maintain close relationships with Liberia.559 
This relationship exists at the individual, local community, and national levels. The relationship 
expresses itself primarily through remittances, diaspora philanthropy targeted at development and 
rebuilding, as well as extensive diaspora involvement in the national politics of Liberia both during 
and after the conflict. 
Diaspora Remittances
It was so heartbreaking, to see everyone on the streets begging. To see people 
who had nothing. Even people who used to be okay now have nothing. My 
friends, my family, people I knew who were fine before, would come round 
where I was staying and I went broke. I gave them all that I had, and I went 
broke.560
The pressure on Liberians living outside of West Africa to support and to assist those in Liberia or 
in refugee settlements in the sub-region is an omnipresent aspect of life for Liberian immigrants in 
the United States. One academic study reports that more than 72 percent of Liberian households 
send remittances;561 community leaders report that the number is even higher.562 The pressure to 
remit reportedly falls on everyone in the Liberian community, regardless of whether they are earning 
a wage. A high school-based social worker who works with Liberian students reports that even her 
students are subjected to pressure to support relatives – primarily mothers – who remain in Liberia.563 
One study noted that the amount remitted to relatives in Liberia by an average Liberian household 
in Minnesota was between $3,700 and $4,150 per year.564 Based on that average, remittances in total 
from the United States to Liberia annually amount to between $19 million and $23 million dollars 
annually with another $10 million to $13 million annually going to Liberians in the rest of the West 
African sub-region.565 
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A researcher interviewing Liberians in Providence, Rhode Island, documented Liberians getting calls 
daily, sometimes five or six times, often from people who simply got their number from someone 
in Liberia who knows them.566 In keeping with the broad concept of “family” in Liberian culture, 
remittances are often paid to multiple generations of extended family, including spouses, parents, 
children, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins.567 Remittances from a single individual in 
the United States often support between 10 and 20 people back in Liberia.568 The Providence study 
described the following typical remitting pattern:
The participant sends around $300 every month to his wife and three 
children in Ghana. Bi-monthly he also sends up to $300 dollars to a brother 
in Liberia and the money is shared between this brother and his wife and 
family, an uncle and his wife and family, and sometimes other siblings. He 
sometimes sends extra for his father. Each month he may send up to another 
$200 in response to specific requests he receives from siblings, cousins, 
uncles, aunts as well as from unrelated friends in Ghana, Liberia and Cote 
D’Ivoire. At Christmas and for Liberia’s Independence Day (July 26th) he 
sends money particularly extensively, including extra money to be shared 
among more people in his transfer to his brother. On top of this personal 
sending, he has donated money to a collection for orphaned children in 
Liberia.569
Attempting to save money to send home can have a significant impact on the quality of life of Liberian 
immigrants, many of whom also support large extended families in the United States. 
[T]hat’s what we get when we’re there and everybody else is sending money 
– your family is sending money, and then when you get here and you’re 
not able to do that for your family right away – it becomes a problem. Our 
people think, oh, I’m a failure to my family because I’m not able to help 
them right away. So they face a lot of issues going through that. Whenever 
they get a job all they think about is to send money, they’re not thinking 
about maintaining your apartment here, maintaining a phone line which is a 
necessity, is not a luxury.570
A police liaison officer in Minnesota who has worked extensively with the Liberian community 
observed that it is not unusual for a single wage-earner to be supporting ten dependents here in the 
United States.571 One statement giver reported that the stress of working multiple jobs to support 
relatives in Liberia has left her little time or resources for her children living with her in the United 
States;572 another statement giver described the impact of remittances to Liberia as forcing her to live 
“paycheck to paycheck.”573 
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Liberians report that they save money to remit by lodging with other family members (saving rent 
money), by collecting cans for recycling refunds, or by limiting their own educational opportunities 
(choosing to pay for education of family in Liberia rather than their own).574 The plight of relatives 
living in refugee camps is well understood by members of the diaspora, many of whom lived in the 
same camps prior to emigrating to the United States.575 The perception of many family members who 
receive remittances that relatives living in the United States are well-off and can thus afford to make 
the payments is at painful odds with the reality for many Liberians in the diaspora.576
The ability to remit also impacts one’s standing in the community, both in the diaspora and in Liberia. 
This is how they judge you in the family. If you are here and you don’t send 
money back then they will classify you as unimportant, and they will not 
respect you if you go back. Because if you can’t send money it is a kind of 
disgrace to your family, people will laugh at them and say “you have family 
in America but you are still poor!577
As described above, remittances play a critical role in maintaining links between the diaspora and the 
population in Liberia. Remittances also play an important role in meeting the needs of Liberians who 
may be overlooked or outside the mandate of large international non-governmental organizations 
and other donors.578 One Liberian interviewed for an academic study noted that he remits to keep his 
brothers, who were former fighters, from returning to that lifestyle.579 Lubkemann has posited that 
remittances may even “mitigate some of the forms of social antagonism and conflict that repatriation 
and other forms of targeted humanitarian assistance have…been documented to generate.”580 In this 
way, remittances may play a key role in Liberia’s transition out of conflict. 
Diaspora Philanthropy and Entrepreneurship
Apart from involvement at the individual level through remittances and other support, resettled 
Liberians also are very involved in communities to which they have ties in Liberia. Whether through 
helping with projects in their home villages, working through a high school alumni organization, or 
by starting their own non-profit organizations, a number of statement givers reported specific plans 
to assist in the rebuilding of Liberia, both in the present and the future. These statement givers reflect 
the view that the diaspora community must assist if conditions in Liberia are to improve581 and that 
Liberia can benefit from what those in the Diaspora have learned.582 “[W]e all think we have a solemn 
responsibility to be a part of the economic revival of Liberia, because ultimately…the issue of reviving 
Liberia’s economy is very, very critical to this whole issue of reconciliation.”583 Projected contributions 
include sharing knowledge about starting and operating businesses,584 operating children’s clinics,585 
and teaching.586 
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Several statement givers and interviewees reported that they are currently working with groups on 
specific projects to rebuild Liberia through non-profit organizations and foundations based in the 
United States.587 For example, the Grand Gedeh Association in the Americas, Inc., the primary 
association for those who identify themselves as Krahn, reports that it has run programs that put 
“students on scholarships in various colleges, universities and technical institutions in Liberia, supplies 
hospital beds and medications, repairing public buildings, schools textbooks/materials etc.”588 The 
National Association of Cape Mountainians in the Americas recently raised $13,000 from a U.S.-
based foundation and matched that through fundraising from its members to rebuild a bridge in Cape 
Mount County.589 The President of the Organization of Liberians in Minnesota told the TRC that 
the Minnesota community is working “with institutions that can help us in the relief area as it relates 
to two particular [issues]…revitalizing the health care and revitalizing the educational sector.”590 A 
Liberian living in Washington, DC, told the TRC that he funds a rebuilding project through a “clan” 
association. The organization has “completed the reconstruction phase of a clinic in its community at 
home and been involved in supplies of textbooks and school’s materials, provid[ing] monthly stipend 
for teachers in its clan” as well as other activities.591 A Liberian woman in Atlanta told the TRC 
about a foundation she and her sister started to provide scholarships to young women and girls in 
Liberia. Liberian Women’s Initiatives – Minnesota was founded to send money and supplies back to 
Liberia and now provides services in the diaspora. Numerous other philanthropic endeavors were 
also reported, including a school supplies and sanitation project in Buchanan organized by the Bassa 
Action Group, for example.592 The European Federation of Liberian Associations has instituted “The 
Development Challenge for Liberia” and held a conference on the issue in Paris in summer 2008. 
Proposed projects focus on health, education, agriculture, and resettlement and integration.593 
Focusing on economic opportunity is also a key part of much work among resettled Liberians. A 
statement giver living in North Carolina told the TRC about his plans to begin the LIGREEID 
Corporation which would build small business infrastructure and work to empower small business 
start-ups in Liberia.594 The Organization of Liberians in Minnesota and several other state and 
European associations have brought Liberian ministers of trade to their states and have worked to 
organize trade missions to Liberia.595
Some individual Liberians are contributing without any organization behind their efforts. An academic 
researcher documented this anecdote about a diaspora “philanthropist”:
His first visit to find relatives had required several days of journey by car, 
by boat, and by foot because bridges and roads had been destroyed by the 
war. During his visit it became clear that the greatest needs of the village 
stemmed from its problems with lack of outside access, primarily because 
the old road had been mined and three small bridges destroyed. With a 
contribution of $800 USD this individual provided the villagers with tools 
and resources they needed to clear a new road and build three rudimentary 
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bridges over streams that would allow a four-wheel vehicle to reach the 
community–if not during the entire year, at least during the dry season. 
Indeed, when Edward visited them the following year he was able to hire 
a car that took him all the way to the village itself in considerably less time 
than his first trip had taken. 
On this second trip community leaders asked for Edward’s assistance in 
establishing a small-scale lumber extraction business. Above all they needed 
a chainsaw and funds to pay for a truck to take their first shipment of 
lumber to the nearest market. On his return to the U.S. Edward purchased 
a chainsaw and sent it back through relatives in Ghana. When the villagers 
communicated back to him that the chainsaw was breaking down he paid 
for a Ghanaian operator to go and instruct the villagers in the chainsaw’s 
use and to repair the machine. Once he was notified that the first load of 
lumber was ready to be sent to market he had a relative in Monrovia hire 
an independent truck driver to go to the village. By his account a total 
investment of $1500 USD had provided the village with the means to now 
run a self-sustaining small-scale lumber extraction and milling business.596
Diaspora Involvement in Liberia’s Political Fortunes 
Liberia researcher Mary Moran 
has opined that, to ignore 
the role of the diaspora, par- 
ticularly in the United States, 
is to “tell only half the story” 
when it comes to Liberia’s 
decline into conflict and its 
road to peace.597 TRC state-
ments from the Diaspora 
reflect a sentiment that many 
Liberians in the diaspora 
played a role in fomenting and 
funding the conflict in Liberia. 
One community leader in 
Washington, DC, said that 
“some Liberians blame ULAA 
for the war” because it was founded by individuals who later played significant roles in Liberia’s civil 
crises.598 According to him, in the early days, ULAA collaborated with and “agitated” along with 
home-based student organizations such as the Liberian National Student Union (LINSU), Progressive 
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Alliance of Liberia (PAL), and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA). 599 ULAA called on the 
Liberian authorities to implement fundamental changes in the social, political, and economic systems 
of the country.600 
One month before the coup in which President Tolbert was killed, ULAA representatives were in 
Monrovia to meet with Tolbert at the Executive Mansion. The delegation included Charles Taylor.601 
Then-president of ULAA, Bai Gbala, presented Tolbert with a statement that is instructive about 
the way in which members of the diaspora saw themselves interacting with the political situation in 
Liberia. 
[C]an it not be argued, and persuasively so, that those Liberians such 
as we are, who have traveled and lived abroad, and who have had the 
opportunity to observe and experience the mechanics and dynamics of 
other social, economic, and political systems…have a clear and inescapable 
responsibility…to deal with and speak out unequivocally on the multiple 
problems that now grip our common country and people?602
The statement outlined three major concerns, including “Freedom of Speech and Press,” “Suffrage,” 
and the treatment of Liberians by U.S. immigration authorities.603 The document also described 
several other meetings that had taken place between ULAA representatives and Liberian government 
officials in the United States and proposed a constitutional amendment to address some of ULAA’s 
concerns about voting rights in Liberia.604 At public hearings in St. Paul, Minnesota, a ULAA board 
member told the TRC that “ULAA has a history of being in the vanguard of changing the political 
landscape. They consistently advocated for social justice…ensuring that there was a political change 
in Liberia that reflected the aspirations of the majority of the Liberian people.”605
A public hearing witness, the President of the Organization of Liberians in Minnesota, testified that 
the diaspora has had a major impact on events in Liberia, both positive and negative:
People in the diaspora have been a part of this. What we have to understand 
is that diaspora Liberians beginning from the seventies have been at the 
forefront of advocating for human rights in Liberia speaking out against the 
ills of the society throughout. Then we have the component in the diaspora 
who felt like dialogue was not the answer, military action is the answer…I 
know that as the result of the atrocities against the people of Nimba, the 
Nimba organization in this country did raise money to give to the NPFL.
After the fall of Doe, the Krahn and Mandingo organizations raised 
money…to fund LPC and LURD and MODEL. But that’s one component, 
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but the diaspora community has also been actively involved in resolving the 
conflict. The 1990 Banjul Conference was brought about because people 
in the diaspora lobbied along with people in Liberia. I don’t want to have 
people in the diaspora take total credit for this, but diaspora Liberians have 
been a part of finding solutions to the conflict. Ironically, some of the same 
people who have been involved in looking for solutions have been involved 
in instigating the crisis as well.606
After the coup and as the civil war progressed, there was also a perception that Liberians abroad 
were supporting various factions, sometimes with funding. Although this link between diaspora 
funding and fighting factions was often mentioned, specific information was very difficult to obtain. 
Most statement givers echoed an interviewee living in Arizona who noted that he “believes that the 
diaspora has played a significant role in the Liberian conflict…[but] [h]e cannot give specific examples 
of funding or identify individuals who headed up that effort.”607 
Not only did diaspora Liberians strategize about and take part in events that affected the course of 
the Liberian war, diaspora Liberians have also played an active role in steering the nation toward 
peace. In January 2003, for example, a meeting of prominent diaspora Liberians was held at Indiana 
University (an institution with 
which former interim president 
Amos Sawyer has had a long term 
relationship). The stated intent was 
to “begin a discussion designed to 
provide a deeper understanding of 
Liberian governance institutions 
and their potentials to contribute to 
peace and democratic governance in 
Liberia.”608 In August 2003, another 
“workshop” of prominent diaspora 
Liberians was held at the University 
of Pennsylvania under the auspices 
of the Solomon Asch Center for the 
study of Ethnopolitical Conflict and 
the Liberty Center for Survivors 
of Torture.609 The product of that 
workshop was an extensive report intended to influence the course of peace processes in Liberia. In 
addition to these gatherings, Liberians in the diaspora also organized protests in Washington, DC, 
to demand assistance and military intervention from the United States.610 ULAA also continued to 
be involved by sending a delegation to the Accra Peace Conference and participating in election 
monitoring.611
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After the establishment of peace in Liberia, members of the diaspora continued to play a role in 
politics back home. In 2004, Liberians in the diaspora participated in a virtual town hall meeting with 
transitional government chairman Gyude Bryant.612 Statement givers reported actively campaigning for 
various candidates in the 2005 elections. Moran notes that the Liberian government issued a directive 
that campaigning outside of Liberia was prohibited by Liberian election laws in response to the “very 
active organizing being waged by candidates for the 2005 elections in diaspora communities.”613 
Diaspora Liberians consider themselves to have “long-term commitments and responsibilities to both 
a country of origin and a country of resettlement,” effectively making them “transnationals.”614 This 
transnational identity inevitably leads to the question of a return home, a topic discussed by many 
statement givers in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
the return
Concerning a return to Liberia, members of the diaspora community express many views about 
whether they wish to return and under what conditions. An issue that looms large for both Liberians 
in the diaspora and those back home in Liberia is the issue of dual citizenship.615 Liberia does not 
allow dual citizenship. Accordingly, those immigrants who wish to become citizens in their countries 
of resettlement must give up their Liberian citizenship. Some resettled Liberians view their lack of 
citizenship as tantamount to being wrongly disenfranchised.616 Although many Liberians are seeking 
citizenship in other countries, some choose not to become citizens so that they can remain Liberian 
citizens.617 For example, one Liberian living in the United Kingdom noted that he resisted taking on 
British citizenship for more than a decade because “I felt that if I took on British citizenship I was 
selling out.”618
Many resettled Liberians see themselves as entitled to citizenship in Liberia and to its benefits, such as 
land ownership or government jobs. “Over the years we’ve sustained them, advocated for them over 
the course of the war…became the economic lifeline of the country over the course of the war.”619 But 
not everyone is in favor of allowing dual citizenship because, in one interviewee’s opinion, it “defeats 
nation-building and only ensures the continuance of incompetence and corruption as dual nationals 
leave the country at the first sign of trouble…”620 Still others see the Liberian citizenship regime as 
antiquated and violating human rights. 
Most diaspora Liberians would appreciate and want to see dual citizenship 
happen. I strongly believe that one of the main forces that kept us in the 
dark is this question of only people of negro descent to own property and 
have a government position. I think our constitution prior to the war was a 
racist constitution because only someone of Negro descent can do certain 
things…There should be no restrictions on a man who has been out of his 
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country through no fault of his own on going back and wanting to help his 
country and also taking a spouse and children who may be of different race; 
there should be no question about their ability to contribute to Liberia and 
be a part of the nation.621
Apart from feeling entitled to dual citizenship, many diaspora Liberians feel that they have something 
to contribute to Liberia after having been abroad and having gained new education and experiences 
that would aid Liberia’s rebuilding. “There is an economic argument to be made that what you do 
with dual citizenship is that you are benefiting from both sides. If our kids are prohibited from having 
dual citizenship then they will not forgo the United States for Liberia. So the benefits that would have 
been accrued to them will not happen, they will not want to take their business to Liberia and/or to 
go back to Liberia, this is the economic argument.”622 Another Liberian living in the United Kingdom 
noted that “I want to go back to Liberia at some point, so you are going to tell me that because I have 
British citizenship you aren’t going to let me come there and work with the skills that I have. I think 
I owe a debt to my country and I want the opportunity to go and pay back at some point. Because I 
have British citizenship or American citizenship I can’t do certain things? Many of us have argued 
that point. Hopefully I think the government should realize it.”623
Some statement givers are clear that they do not want to return to Liberia under any conditions.624 
Others report a wish to be able to return to the country for a limited period to attend to the burial of 
loved ones,625 attend life cycle events, visit family, or take care of property, but do not see themselves 
as returning permanently.626 Several older Liberians expressed a general wish to “go home and be 
in peace.”627 Many others say they consider returning to Liberia, but only under certain conditions. 
These conditions range from a requirement that there be “less corruption and a better mentality in 
Liberia”628 or an opportunity for someone who has completed his education to be able to “help the 
Liberian people,”629 to being able to “lead a normal life,”630 have sufficient funds to live and travel,631 
and “live like an American does.”632 
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Chapter Fourteen. Recommendations Submitted to the 
Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Liberia
Introduction
The Advocates for Human Rights presents these recommendations to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) of Liberia. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is difficult to prioritize recommendations 
in this context. The Advocates heard many pressing needs and competing demands from statement 
givers, public hearings witnesses, interviewees, and other Liberian community members throughout 
the course of its work. In heeding their requests, The Advocates has identified what it considers 
priority recommendations for implementation and set them forth in Chapter 2. This chapter contains 
the full list of recommendations made by The Advocates, in response to the TRC’s request to provide 
the full scope of international human rights standards.
Many recommendations can and should be implemented immediately. Others will take time and 
the investment of substantial resources. The recommendations reflect the urgent need to address 
the immediate physical and mental health problems of victims and other vulnerable populations. 
The organization of this section, however, is not intended to convey the priority or importance of 
any particular recommendations. Rather, we seek to coherently present the recommendations—
all of which are integral to recognizing the needs of Liberians and promoting “peace, justice, and 
reconciliation.” 1
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liBeria’S international legal oBligationS
The Advocates based its recommendations on an international human rights and humanitarian law 
framework. Liberia has ratified many important human rights treaties. These include the: 
•	 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
•	 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
•	 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
•	 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
•	 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), 
•	 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
•	 International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 
•	 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
•	 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
•	 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
•	 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, and
•	 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
Likewise, Liberia has ratified important humanitarian law instruments, including the Geneva 
Conventions, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Criminal Court. Other relevant ratifications include the U.N. Convention against 
Corruption, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Convention for 
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
and Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. A more comprehensive 
list of Liberia’s ratification status is available in Appendix B. 
The Government of Liberia should take all appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that 
the provisions of these treaties are fully reflected in domestic law and practice. The government 
should pay particular attention to reviewing the current status of its laws to ensure compliance with 
these treaties. 
Periodic reports describing Liberia’s treaty compliance were due on the dates indicated to the treaty 
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bodies and are now overdue: 
•	 Committee against Torture on Oct. 22, 2005;
•	 Committee on Civil and Political Rights on Dec. 22, 2005;
•	 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Aug. 16 of 1985, 1989, 
1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005;
•	 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Dec. 5 of 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007;
•	 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on June 30, 2006;
The Government of Liberia has signed, but neither ratified nor acceded to the following treaties:
•	 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,
•	 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families,
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict,
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography,
•	 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
•	 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others,
•	 Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
•	 Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926,
•	 Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 and amended by the Protocol,
•	 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery,
•	 Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union,
•	 Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
•	 African Youth Charter, 
•	 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and 
•	 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union.
The Government of Liberia has neither signed nor ratified the following treaties: 
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•	 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
•	 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
and
•	 International Labour Organisation Plantations Convention (No. C110) (ratified on July 22, 
1959 but denounced on Jan. 22, 1971),
•	 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity.
The Advocates makes the following recommendations with regard to Liberia’s international and 
regional obligations:
•	 The Government should ratify or accede to the treaties mentioned above. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all appropriate legislative and other measures to 
ensure that the provisions of these treaties are fully reflected in domestic law and practice.
•	 The Government of Liberia should dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit all 
due and overdue periodic reports to the U.N. treaty bodies without delay. The Government of 
Liberia should include in its reports to the treaty bodies appropriate information as required 
by the treaty as well as the directions set forth in general comments and recommendations of 
the treaty committees. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should continue to work toward the full implementation of 
the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 2004 Concluding 
Observations and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its 2003 
Concluding Observations. 
•	 As a State Party to the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
Government of Liberia is bound to submit a periodic report every two years, describing “the 
legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms 
recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter.”2 The Government of Liberia should 
dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit all due and overdue periodic reports 
with regard to its compliance with the Banjul Charter. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit 
a report describing the legislative and other steps taken to give effect to the rights set forth 
in the: 
o Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa in its report submitted under Art. 62 of the Banjul Charter;3 
o African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;4 
o African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and;5 
o African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, as required 
through communications to the Advisory Board on Corruption.6
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Section i. reparationS for affected individualS and communitieS 
Individuals and communities affected by the events in Liberia can never be made whole. Any scheme 
to provide them with some measure of redress will be incomplete at best. Nevertheless, governments 
around the world have attempted to provide redress for gross violations of human rights law or 
serious violations of humanitarian law committed in the past. In general, victims are entitled to 
vindicate the right to truth, the right to justice, and the right to reparation. This section focuses on 
the right to reparation, which can include restitution (restoration of rights, return of property, etc.), 
compensation (monetary damages), rehabilitation (medical care, rebuilding things that were destroyed, 
etc.), and satisfaction (apologies, public acknowledgements, memorials, etc.). 
Victims are defined in international law as:
persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment 
of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute 
gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations 
of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance 
with domestic law, the term ‘victim’ also includes the immediate family or 
dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.7 
The definition of a victim is independent of whether the perpetrator has been identified, apprehended, 
prosecuted, or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the 
victim.8 Under international law, victims have the right to remedies for gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provide a guiding framework with 
regard to addressing the needs of victims.9 The Advocates makes the following recommendations 
to the TRC, as well as the subsequent recommendations to the Government of Liberia, concerning 
specific populations.
General Recommendations for a Reparations Program 
The TRC has the authority to make recommendations to the Government of Liberia regarding 
“[r]eparations and rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators in need of specialized psycho-social and 
other rehabilitative services.”10 Any reparations plan proposed by the TRC to the Liberian government 
should include specific suggestions from civil society organizations and victims groups and should 
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include suggestions for making the reparations program viable. The Advocates makes the following 
recommendations:
•	 The TRC should provide general recommendations for a reparations program and specifically 
recommend that an independent post-commission body be created to implement the 
reparations program and manage the distribution of any reparations funds.11
•	 The reparations program should utilize the definition of “victim” set forth in Article V of the 
U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on Reparation.12
•	 In addition to individual victims’ rights of access to justice, adequate provisions should also 
be made to allow groups of victims to present collective claims for reparations and to receive 
reparation collectively.13
•	 Reparations should be in the form of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, 
and guarantees of non-repetition.14
•	 Rehabilitation of victims should include the search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, 
for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed. It should also 
include assistance in the recovery, identification, and reburial of the bodies in accordance with 
the expressed wishes of the victims or the cultural practices of the families and communities.15
•	 Reparations should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered, 
and should be made to victims regardless of whether the violations were committed by the 
government forces or combatant groups.16
•	 A reparations program should include a public awareness campaign to inform the public and 
victims about the program and about how to access available funds and services that are part 
of the program.
Family Tracing and Reunification
The central place of the family in Liberian life, and the scattering of families during the wars, was a 
dominant theme in the TRC statements. The Government of Liberia has ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions, and is therefore bound to the obligations set forth in them. Under these treaties, the 
family is recognized as the “natural unit and basis of society” and is entitled to protection by the state.17 
Key components of the right to family under international law include the right to be informed of the 
fate of missing relatives,18 assistance with family tracing, and ultimately, with family reunification.19 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Additional Protocol I, International 
Committee of the Red Cross resolutions, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
documents provide a guiding framework on family reunification. The Advocates recommends the 
following:
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•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that 
information in TRC archives is made accessible 
to the Liberian public and to relevant non-
governmental organizations for purposes of family 
tracing as well as locating the dead. In this effort, 
the Government of Liberia should coordinate 
closely with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and victims’ groups both in Liberia and 
in the diaspora.
•	 The Government of Liberia should take “all 
necessary measures to trace and re-unite children 
with parents or relatives where separation is caused 
by internal and external displacement arising from armed conflicts or natural disasters.”20
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all necessary measures to facilitate and expedite 
family reunification and “actively encourage the work of humanitarian organisations engaged 
in this task.”21 
•	 In order to facilitate unification, the Government of Liberia should promptly issue passports 
or other travel documents at no cost or a reasonable cost.22
•	 The Government of Liberia should prioritize assistance for vulnerable groups such as 
unaccompanied children, unaccompanied elderly, handicapped, and chronically ill, as well as 
meet specific needs of unaccompanied women and single heads of households.23
•	 The Government of Liberia should develop and implement policies that promote family 
reunification of non-Liberians who may be in Liberia as a result of the widespread sub-
regional conflict in West Africa.
•	 The Government of Liberia should utilize available media resources such as national radio 
and/or television stations to provide families or individuals searching for a missing relative 
the opportunity to send out a search notice. 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Refugees United
The Government of Liberia and the 
Liberian Refugee Repatriation and 
Resettlement Commission may wish 
to coordinate with Refugees United, a 
nonprofit organization that provides 
a free web-based service for refugees 
to find family members who are 
dispersed globally. See http://www.
refunite.org/31914/. 
Potential Implementation Strategy: The International Commission on Missing Persons
The Government of Liberia may wish to collaborate with the International Commission on Missing 
Persons (ICMP) which provides technical assistance in locating, recovering, and identifying the mortal 
remains of persons missing because of armed conflict, crimes against humanity, and other violations 
of human rights. ICMP assists governments in the process of locating, recovering, and identifying 
these missing persons through the use of forensic archaeology, anthropology, and DNA science. In 
Bosnia, for example, almost 12,000 different individuals have been identified. ICMP provides policy 
assistance to governments in the establishment of appropriate laws and mechanisms to address the 
missing persons issue, and it strengthens the ability of civil society groups and family members of 
victims to engage in this important humanitarian and human rights issue. See http://www.ic-mp.org/
about-icmp/.
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•	 Given the extent of the Liberian diaspora in West Africa and other parts of the world, the 
Government of Liberia should work in collaboration with the governments of countries 
where members of the Liberian diaspora have been reported in order to match the names 
with those of the missing family members. The creation of a National Information Bureau, 
as recommended by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Resolution 14, 1986)24 
could serve as an appropriate source of the missing persons name collection and matching.
•	 The Government of Liberia “should closely co-operate with competent intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations and in particular the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.”25
•	 The Government of Liberia should adopt a policy across ministries of assisting relevant 
entities, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and victims groups, in 
locating the graves of the dead and in accounting for the missing and the dead.26 The Liberian 
Refugee Resettlement and Repatriation Commission should play an important role in tracing 
activities, given its role in registering returning refugees. Tracing should be done even when 
individuals believe that their family members are most likely dead – TRC statements from 
the diaspora and experience in other countries suggests that some family members still may 
be alive.27
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that parties to the conflict, such as the Armed 
Forces of Liberia, the Liberian National Police, and other state entities assist in the search for 
persons reported missing.31 
•	 The Government of Liberia should adopt appropriate legislation or official policy as necessary 
to facilitate the issuance of death certificates for the dead and those missing who are presumed 
dead.
Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Victims of Sexual Violence
Sexual violence was widespread throughout the conflict and was perpetrated against both men and 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Facilitating Family Reunification
The government should “recognize the right of [internally displaced persons] to family unity, including 
both the right to remain together in displacement and the right to domestic reunification when 
separated.”28 It should “facilitate inquiries and tracing requests and establish a centralized database 
or registry for the collection, coordination, management, and protection of all information relating 
to missing persons and requests for reunification.”29 The Government of Liberia may wish to consider 
working in conjunction with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to launch a widespread 
campaign similar to that carried out in Columbia to issue identification documents to internally 
displaced persons.30
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women. The U.N. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, resolutions of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, the Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women provide a guiding framework for the effective promotion 
and protection of the human rights of victims of sexual violence. The Advocates recommends the 
following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should evaluate current programs and establish new programs 
as needed to provide victims of conflict with medical, psychological, and social assistance 
by qualified personnel aware of and trained in the specific issues involved.32 Such assistance 
can include rehabilitation, assistance in child care and maintenance, treatment, counseling, 
and health and social services facilities and programs, as well as support structures, and 
all other appropriate measures to promote victims’ safety and physical and psychological 
rehabilitation.33
•	 The Government of Liberia should give special attention to the health needs and rights 
of women in vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as migrant women, refugee and 
internally displaced women, girl children and older women, women in prostitution, indigenous 
women, and women with physical or mental disabilities.34
•	 The Government of Liberia should promote the availability of and access to reproductive 
health clinics to diagnose and treat sexually transmitted infections and to provide counseling 
for victims of sexual violence.35 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Working with Communities to Support Victims of Sexual Violence
In Sierra Leone, the non-governmental organization Christian Children’s Fund (i) analyzed the general 
situation of girl victims of sexual violence in ten villages, ii) assessed the availability of resources for 
victims to recover and reintegrate, and (iii) used focus groups to determine the scope of rape and 
abduction as perpetrated against village girls.36 The Christian Children’s Fund developed the “Sealing 
the Past, Facing the Future” program, which had the following three main objectives: (1) reduce stress 
and enable psychosocial recovery; (2) promote community awareness of the impact of sexual violence 
on young girls and to change community attitudes and behaviors about sexually abused girls; and (3) 
provide opportunities for the economic development of female ex-combatants.37 Examples of some 
of the components of the “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future” program include: (1) the creation of a 
“purification” ritual for sexually abused girls that was based on local practices and which apparently 
reduced social isolation and enabled girls to reintegrate into the local community; (2) the involvement 
of local leaders on sexual violence committees, which conducted activities such as coordinating regular 
meetings to discuss consequences of sexual violence and to establish rules to protect girls from physical 
and verbal abuse (and to work with the “chief” to levy fines for violations of such rules); and (3) the 
implementation of bi-weekly recreational activities that coach the girls on interpersonal skills with the 
overall aim of their re-integration into society.38 According to the Christian Children’s Fund website, this 
program “has successfully reduced stigma, and four out of five girls who worked with [the Christian 
Children’s Fund] have been returned to and been accepted by their families.”39 
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•	 The Government of Liberia should: 1) give special attention to the rights and needs of 
women and children, and to the factors relating to the reproductive role of women and 
their subordinate position in some societies, which make them especially vulnerable to HIV 
infection; 2) increase its public 
education efforts regarding 
the risk and effects of HIV/
AIDS, especially in women 
and children; and 3) take steps 
to promote the role of women 
in the health care sector.40 
•	 The Government of Li-
beria should establish and 
strengthen mechanisms to 
investigate, bring to justice, 
and punish those responsible 
for committing acts of sexual violence.43
•	 The Government of Liberia should establish a fund to assist victims of sexual violence 
without delay.44
Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Elders
Liberians regard elders in their communities as individuals deserving particular respect and protection. 
During the conflict, many of the social patterns of reverence for elders were undermined as armed 
groups specifically targeted elder leaders when attacking communities. The U.N. Principles on Older 
Persons, the U.N. Proclamation on Ageing, and the relevant General Comments by the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provide a guiding framework for the effective promotion 
and protection of the human rights of Liberian elders.46 The Advocates recommends the following:
Potential Implementation Strategy
In its report on reparations for victims of sexual violence 
in Sierra Leone, Amnesty International made several 
recommendations that the Government of Liberia may 
wish to consider in addressing the needs of victims. Among 
others, the report recommended the inclusion of a gender 
component, including consultation and expertise, in the 
creation and implementation of any reparations program,41 
as well as the issuance of a public acknowledgement or 
apology for the suffering of women and girls.42
Potential Implementation Strategy: Resource Directory for Victims of Sexual Violence
In its final report, the TRC of Sierra Leone recommended the creation of a resource directory for 
women and girl victims of sexual violence.45 The Government of Liberia may wish to consider creating 
a directory of skills programs, service providers, and donor agencies in Monrovia and rural Liberia 
available to victims of sexual violence for dissemination, taking into account the needs of illiterate 
populations. 
While such programs are important for facilitating re-integration, other long-term programs should 
aim at eradicating misperceptions that victims of sexual abuse are somehow tainted and in need of 
purification. Such perceptions are erroneous and perpetuate harmful stereotypes about women and 
girls.
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•	 The Government of Liberia should seek to create national support mechanisms to promote 
policies that address aging.47 Also, it should integrate national policies regarding the elderly 
into development programs48 and facilitate collaboration between the non-governmental 
and governmental sectors to develop “primary health care, health promotion and self-help 
programs for the elderly.”49 
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
ensure that elderly women are 
free from violence and age-based 
discrimination and are treated with 
dignity.52 This requires providing 
protection to elderly women taking 
into account their socio-economic 
and physical needs, as well as their 
access to the workforce and training.53 
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
ensure “access to adequate food, 
water, shelter, clothing and health 
care through the provision of income, 
family and community support and 
self-help” and to ensure that elderly 
persons “have the opportunity to work or to have access to other income-generating 
opportunities.”54
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure elderly people have “access to social and legal 
services to enhance their autonomy, protection and care.”55
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide “guidelines on health policy to preserve the health 
of the elderly and take a comprehensive view, ranging from prevention and rehabilitation to 
the care of the terminally ill.”56
Potential Implementation Strategy: Addressing the Post-Conflict Needs of Older Persons
A World Health Organisation report on older people in emergency situations notes that the post-conflict 
phase should focus on establishing and executing mid- to long-term health policies. At the same time, 
this recovery process provides an opportunity to remedy the challenges that older persons face in this 
stage. It outlines four objectives for this stage:
Objective 1: Build institutional capacity and commitment to ensuring the health and safety of older 
people in emergencies.
Objective 2: Strengthen the capacity of ministries of health and health care systems to meet the needs 
of older people in emergencies.
Objective 3: Develop mechanisms to ensure continuing development and the exchange of expertise as 
these relate to older people in emergencies.
Objective 4: Promote active ageing as a strategy to reduce vulnerability and develop resiliency to 
disasters.”57
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing
The Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing 
sets forth principles and recommendations for 
action on health and nutrition, protecting elderly 
consumers, housing and environment, family, social 
welfare, income security, and employment and 
education.50 Also, the plan highlights the important 
role of governments in setting short-term, medium-
term, and long-term goals, monitoring the aging 
process, paying attention to improving the status of 
elderly women, establishing machinery, and striving 
for coordinating across sectors and levels.51 
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•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure access to health care to help the elderly to “maintain 
or regain the optimum level of physical, mental and emotional well-being and to prevent or 
delay the onset of illness.”58
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide specific training on gerontology, geriatrics, and 
psychogeriatrics to health and social welfare personnel, as well as education on self-care to 
the elderly.59
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide elderly people with access to suitable education 
programs and training on the basis of their 
preparation, abilities, and motivation.60
•	 The Government of Liberia should recog-
nize and utilize the position of respect, 
influence, and knowledge of elderly people 
in the development of future programs and 
planning.61
Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Children
Children suffer disproportionately during all armed 
conflict. Many statement givers told the TRC of the 
extreme suffering of children as a result of preventable 
disease, malnutrition or outright starvation, family 
separation, forced conscription, and targeted violence 
against these most vulnerable members of Liberian 
society. The Government of Liberia has ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and 
International Labour Organisation Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention and is therefore bound 
to the obligations set forth in them. In order to strengthen its commitment to the protection of 
children, the Government of Liberia should:
•	 Ratify both optional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and International 
Labour Organisation Minimum Age Convention without delay.
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its report to the Secretary-General of 
the African Union describing the measures taken to give effect to the rights set forth in the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.63
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its required reports to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child. 
The treaties and instruments described above provide a guiding framework for the effective promotion 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Addressing Multi-Generational 
Relationships
The Conceptual Framework for the 
International Year of Older Persons (1999) 
suggests that communities play a central 
role in facilitating multi-generational 
relationships. Youth and elder groups can 
together address issues of common concern, 
including “safety, environmental protection, 
cultural enrichment, income-generation and 
others.” The Conceptual Framework also 
notes the role of communities in bridging 
older and younger generations through the 
sharing of new/old technologies and new/
traditional lifestyles.62
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and protection of the human rights of children. The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize the right of the child to education.64 (See also 
Recommendations relating to education). With a view to achieving this right progressively 
and on the basis of equal opportunity, the Government of Liberia should:
o Make primary education compulsory and 
available free to all;
o Encourage the development of different 
forms of secondary education, including 
general and vocational education, make them 
available and accessible to every child, and 
take appropriate measures such as introducing 
free education and offering financial assis-
tance in case of need;
o Make higher education accessible to all on 
the basis of capacity by every appropriate 
means; and
o Take measures to encourage regular atten-
dance at schools and to reduce drop-out 
rates.
•	 The Government of Liberia should take “all appro- 
priate legislative, administrative, social and educa-
tional measures to protect children from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect 
or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, 
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), 
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the 
care of the child.”66 These measures may include 
“effective procedures for the establishment of social 
programmes to provide necessary support for the 
child and for those who have the care of the child, 
as well as for other forms of prevention and for 
identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child 
maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.”67
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Peace and Human Rights Curricula
The Government of Liberia may 
wish to consider incorporating 
human rights, peacebuilding, and 
conflict resolution into school 
curricula. In 2004, working with 
the Ministry of Education, UNICEF 
assisted with the implementation 
of a new “Peace and Tolerance” 
curriculum that seeks to advocate 
peace among children who likely 
were impacted by the Côte 
d’Ivoire’s civil unrest.65 Also, 
The Advocates has developed a 
curriculum, The Road to Peace, 
for ninth-graders through adult 
learners on conflict resolution 
and restoration of justice in the 
aftermath of war, emphasizing the 
processes that countries coming 
out of conflict undertake to seek 
resolution, address past human 
rights abuses, reform their societies, 
and heal from violence. 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Enacting Legislation that Promotes and Protects Children’s Rights
The Government of Liberia should consider enacting legislation similar to that of South Africa’s Child 
Care Act, 1983.68 The Child Care Act 1983 of South Africa incorporates many of the African Charter 
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•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize the “right of every child to a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.”71 The 
government should take “appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for 
the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and 
support programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”72 
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize the “right of the child to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and 
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or 
her right of access to such health care services.”73 The government should take appropriate 
measures “to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all 
children with emphasis on the development of primary health care.”74
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide “special protection and assistance” to children 
who have been deprived of their family environment, including alternative care in accordance 
with national legislation.75 
•	 The state should pay “due regard” to “the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and 
to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.”76
•	 The Government of Liberia should take “effective and appropriate measures with a view 
to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.”77 This may include 
enacting appropriate legislation prohibiting such harmful practices as female genital 
mutilation and forced or early marriage, as well as conducting public awareness campaigns. 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child principles.69 The Child Care Act provides for the creation of 
children’s courts and governs the appointment of commissioners of child welfare and the treatment of 
children.70 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Gambia’s BAFROW programs
The Government of Liberia may consider working to train village leaders and councils on educating 
others in the community on the issue of forced/early marriage.78 Such efforts should include efforts 
to devise a different rite of passage that excludes female genital mutilation (FGM). Guidance may be 
found from a program implemented by the Foundation for Research on Women’s Health, Productivity 
and the Environment (BAFROW) in Gambia.79 The BAFROW program had five objectives:
1. Assess the occurrence of FGM and social attitudes;
2. Educate key individuals, including decision-makers, community leaders, and those who perform 
FGM, about re-designing existing rituals that use FGM;
3. Develop curriculum on a new ritual that does not include FGM;
4. Train those who traditionally perform FGM on using the new curriculum;
5. Carry out public education aimed at parents of girls at-risk of FGM.80
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•	 The Government of Liberia should “recognize the right of the child to be protected from 
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral or social development.”81 The government should take measures to ensure 
this right, including setting minimum age(s) for employment, appropriately regulating hours 
and conditions of employment, and imposing appropriate sanctions as enforcement.82 
•	 The Government of Liberia should prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms 
of child labor using measures outlined in International Labour Organisation Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention, Art. 7(1)-(2).83
•	 The Government of Liberia should designate one governmental body to be responsible for 
formulating a coherent policy on child exploitation, which includes a component to educate 
the public about combating child exploitation.84 
•	 The Government of Liberia should establish a code of conduct for staff working with 
children; violations of the code of conduct should be criminal offenses under national law.
•	 The Government of Liberia should continue to work toward the full implementation of 
the recommendations set forth by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 2004 
Concluding Observations.
Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Orphans & Children Separated from their Families
In addition to general human rights protections for children, specific international standards 
govern the rights of orphans, children deprived of their family environment, and unaccompanied 
or separated children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and related Comments and 
Concluding Observations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
related Comments, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provide a guiding 
framework for the effective promotion and protection of the human rights of orphans, children 
deprived of their family environment, and unaccompanied or separated children. The Advocates 
recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should take special measures to protect and assist children and 
Potential Implementation Strategy: The Sankhu-Palubari Community School
The Advocates for Human Rights partners with the non-governmental organization Hoste Hainse in 
Nepal to provide free elementary education to Nepalese girls and boys to promote education as an 
alternative to harmful child labor. These girls and boys would otherwise be subjected to child labor. 
In addition to their lessons in reading, writing, and arithmetic, the children receive a free meal—a 
very important and popular part of the program. The teachers have been trained in human rights 
awareness and are incorporating human rights into the curriculum. The school also currently provides 
immunizations for all of its students. The Advocates has worked with volunteers, individual donors, and 
school groups to support the school in Nepal. For example, U.S.-based school groups have collected 
school supplies and organized fundraisers to benefit the school.85 
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young persons, without discrimination for reasons of parentage, to ensure their protection 
against exploitation and harmful employment, and to establish a minimum working age.86
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize that all children, born in or out of wedlock, are 
entitled to the same social protection.87
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that special protection and assistance, including 
alternative care, is provided to children who are temporarily or permanently deprived of 
their family environment.88 Such alternative care should aim toward continuity in a child’s 
upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background.89
•	 The Government of Liberia should be guided in its efforts to trace and reunify by the Inter-
agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children.90 These principles 
emphasize family unity and the best interests of the child, as well as family reunification, and 
provisional and long-term responses in emergency situations.91 In addition, The Advocates 
suggests that the Government of Liberia seek to implement the recommendations on Family 
Reunification set forth in this report.92
•	 The Government of Liberia should urgently adopt relevant legislation in order to issue 
quality standards and establish a monitoring system for institutional homes and, in particular, 
orphanages, as well as to increase allocations available to these institutions and to provide 
training for their staff. 93
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all appropriate measures to ensure that non-
orphan children living in institutional homes are brought back to their families, taking into 
consideration the best interests of the child.94 
•	 The Government of Liberia should evaluate and ensure that conditions in orphanages comply 
with basic human rights standards set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child.95 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that in cases of adoption, the child’s best interests 
are of highest consideration. It should ensure that such adoption is authorized by competent 
authorities and is permissible in view of the child’s status regarding parents, family members, 
and guardians.96 The Government of Liberia should seek to comply with the standards set 
forth on adoption in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, including the following:
o Establish competent authorities to oversee adoption matters and ensure they conform 
with relevant laws and regulations;97
o Ensure that safeguards and standards equal to those for national adoption are 
available to a child undergoing an inter-country adoption; and98
o Take all appropriate measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions do not lead to 
trafficking or improper financial gain for the potential adopters.99
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Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
The Government of Liberia has ratified International Labour Organisation Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, and is therefore bound to the obligations set forth in it. The Government 
of Liberia has signed, but not ratified, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Advocates recommends that the 
Government of Liberia:
•	 Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement 
of children in armed conflict without delay.
The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups 
and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention provide a guiding framework with regard to 
rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers. The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all appropriate measures to promote physical 
and psychological recovery and social reintegration. Some children may require particular 
support, including children with a disability or a serious health problem, including drug and 
alcohol abuse, survivors of sexual abuse, and those whose families have died or rejected them. 
•	 Children accused of crimes under international or national law allegedly committed while 
working with armed forces or armed groups are entitled to be treated in accordance with 
international standards for juvenile justice, including the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the U.N. Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency, and the U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty. 
They should not be prosecuted or punished or threatened with prosecution or punishment 
solely for their membership in those groups. Alternatives to judicial proceedings should be 
sought for children at the national level. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that programs working with former child 
combatants are based on child rights and humanitarian principles, that applicable minimum 
standards of programs are met, and that systems for accountability are developed. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should facilitate coordination among programs working with 
former child soldiers. 
•	 The Government of Liberia and all other relevant authorities should treat personal information 
relating to violations of children’s rights, including unlawful recruitment or use by armed 
forces or armed groups, as confidential. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize that education, vocational and skills training, 
and/or opportunities to gain a livelihood are essential elements for reintegration.100 Accelerated 
learning programs suitable for adolescents and adults who have missed years of school should 
be compatible with and recognized by the formal system of education.101 Alternative forms of 
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education, such as adult literacy classes or evening classes, should be offered to children who 
cannot or do not wish to enter the formal educational system.102
Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Girls Associated with Armed Groups
The Advocates suggests that the Government of Liberia implement the following measures with 
regard to Girls Associated with Armed Forces. The following recommendations are drawn from The 
Paris Principles103 and reports produced by Amnesty International104 and Development Alternatives, 
Inc.105 Additionally, The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 Ensure that staff working with girls associated with armed forces “are familiar with Security 
Council Resolution 1325, as well as, relevant international guidelines to provide for a gendered 
approach to both implementation and planning;”106
•	 Ensure that gender appropriate information campaigns as well as access to female employees 
are made available to women and girls by collaborating with women’s organizations.107 
•	 Ensure that specific gender dynamics regarding access to accommodations are considered,108 
including reproductive health care, separate washing facilities, hygiene kits, and clean birthing 
kits. Measures should be taken to provide and guarantee safety and protection, including 
proper lighting as well as regular surveillance and patrolling by security forces. 
•	 Ensure that psychosocial counseling is made available in communities to all who need it.109 
Care should be taken to assist girls in addressing whether they desire to recognize or reject 
relationships established with a member of an armed group.
•	 Ensure that education and training programs related to parenting skills and child health, as 
well as training unrelated to reproductive status, be made available and accessible.110
•	 Provide nutrition and health care for infants and young children, as well as child care, to 
allow women and girls to participate in training and education.111 
•	 Ensure that communities are part of the reintegration, reconciliation, and healing process.112 
Work with community leaders and groups to establish a forum to address stigmatization 
and increase public awareness of reintegration issues, including substance abuse, HIV/AIDS, 
STIs, obstetric fistula, and sexual violence.113 
•	 Use business and skill training to improve the overall livelihood of women. Ensure that 
access to credit and/or capital is available to supplement these trainings.114 
•	 Ensure that women and girls have access to quality career counseling which allows them to 
make choices that will maximize their options and lead them to choose marketable vocational 
skills.115 
•	 Adopt flexibility to adapt to the range of needs specific to each victim, and ensure that 
programs are accessible to women experiencing particular health problems related to their 
experience of the conflict.116 
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Programs for Vulnerable Groups: Internally Displaced Persons 
Displacement was a defining characteristic of the Liberian civil wars, with hundreds of thousands 
displaced over time. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, as well as relevant treaty 
body documents, provide a guiding framework for the effective promotion and protection of the 
human rights of internally displaced persons. The U.N. principles note that national authorities hold 
the primary responsibility for rendering humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons.117 The 
Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide 
internally displaced persons with protection 
and humanitarian aid, without persecution or 
punishment for such requests for assistance, 
and taking into account the needs of 
vulnerable internally displaced populations, 
including children, unaccompanied children, 
pregnant women, disabled persons and the 
elderly, females with children, or heads of 
households.118 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure 
that humanitarian aid for displaced persons 
is rendered without discrimination and is not 
diverted to political or military purposes.119
•	 The police force of Liberia should have an 
explicit mandate in national law to protect 
civilians, including internally displaced 
persons and humanitarian aid providers.121 
•	 The Government of Liberia should enact 
legislation which recognizes internally 
displaced persons’ right to freedom of 
movement and the right of all internally 
displaced persons to make a voluntary and 
informed choice between return, integration 
at the location of displacement, or resettlement 
or relocation in another part of the country.122 
•	 The Government of Liberia should provide 
information to internally displaced persons 
regarding the viability of return, local 
integration, and resettlement or relocation 
options. To facilitate an internally displaced 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Clear Policies for Providing Humanitarian 
Assistance to the Displaced
The Government of Liberia should: 
1. Assign to relevant authorities or 
organizations at the national and local 
levels clear and specific obligations in 
the area of humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced persons, and provide 
them with the necessary means to do so.
2. Establish mechanisms and procedures 
to identify beneficiaries of humanitarian 
assistance on the basis of need and 
particular vulnerability.
3. Determine criteria for the delivery 
of humanitarian goods and services in 
accordance with recognized international 
minimum standards.
4. Eliminate any obstacles hindering the 
provision of humanitarian goods from 
domestic sources.
5. Facilitate the import and internal 
transport of humanitarian goods not 
sufficiently available domestically.
6. Provide for the criminalization of attacks 
by state as well as non-state actors against 
humanitarian relief personnel and their 
material, transport, and supplies when such 
attacks would amount to a war crime under 
the Rome Statute.120
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person’s choice, the government should provide physical security, humanitarian access, 
transportation, and access to the law.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that lack of access to documentation does not 
prevent internally displaced persons from exercising the right to freedom of movement 
within the country or right to leave the country. Further, the Government should facilitate 
access to documentation.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that internally displaced persons are able to enjoy 
freely their right to participate fully and equally in public affairs and have access to all public 
services.123 Specifically, the government should assist internally displaced persons obtaining 
or recovering all documents required to exercise their legal rights such as birth certificates, 
passports, voting and military registration cards, marriage certificates, and other personal 
identification.124 
•	 The Government of Liberia should implement the recommendations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child in its 2004 concluding observations relating to internally displaced 
children, especially in regard to articles 7 and 22 specifically, the Government of Liberia 
should:
o Strengthen its efforts to provide adequate assistance to the internally 
displaced children, including access to food, education, and health services 
and to support their return and reintegration into their communities;
o Prevent sexual assaults and other exploitation of refugee and internally 
displaced children, with particular attention to girls, and provide for their 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society; and
o Prevent forcible conscription of refugee and internally displaced children 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Brookings Institution Policy Manual
The manual, entitled Protecting Internally Displaced Persons: A Manual for Law and Policymakers, 
outlines strategies Liberia can implement to promote the rights of internally displaced persons. The 
government may consider the following suggestions: 
- “institute a universal and mandatory birth registration system;” 125
- “identify and, when necessary, modify documentation requirements in domestic legislation relevant 
to the exercise of [internally displaced persons’] rights;” 126
- “permit [internally displaced persons] to vote in elections related to (1) the constituency from which 
they were displaced, or (2) in the constituency in which they found refuge without unreasonable 
restrictions and ensure that in the latter case they do not lose eligibility for humanitarian aid or other 
benefits;”127 
- “inform voters, including [internally displaced persons], in a language they understand about the 
electoral process and facilitate adequate and safe access to information about the political platforms of 
the parties to the election.”128
421
and provide for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.129
Restitution & Compensation for Property
Because of the massive displacement of the Liberian population, many individuals were forced to 
abandon their land, farms, homes, and other property. The U.N. Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (The Pinheiro Principles) provide a guiding framework 
for the right to restitution of housing, land, and/or property. Importantly, all refugees and displaced 
persons have the right to restitution of “any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily 
or unlawfully deprived.”130 While the preferred remedy is restitution, refugees and displaced persons 
also have the right to be compensated for the loss of such property as adjudicated by an independent 
and impartial court.131 Other international documents, including General Recommendation 22 by 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, and women’s human rights treaties likewise address land rights and provide a guiding 
framework. The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should establish national procedures, institutions, and 
mechanisms that are “equitable, timely, independent, transparent and non-discriminatory,” to 
address claims for restitution.132 These procedures should be age- and gender-sensitive,133 have 
adequate resources and support,134 be directed by guidelines to ensure effectiveness,135 draw 
upon the technical assistance 
of appropriate international 
organizations as needed,136 
and be included in voluntary 
repatriation agreements.137 
Alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms may be used 
providing they comply with 
international human rights 
standards, particularly free-
dom from discrimination.138
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should ensure that restitution 
claims procedures are “just, 
timely, accessible, free of 
charge, [and are] age and 
gender sensitive” and without 
prerequisites.141 
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should ensure such processes 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Decentralized District Land Boards in Uganda
Uganda’s 1998 Land Act created District Land Boards to 
administer land as well as 4,500 local land committees to 
support the Boards.139 According to one scholar, the Act’s 
purpose was to develop a land tenure system through 
decentralized administration. Uganda’s 1998 Land Act 
contained considerable rights for women regarding their 
ability to own and control their land. This was particularly 
relevant to rural women. Customary laws are null and void if 
they prevent women and children from inheriting land. Land 
committees are specifically charged with protecting “the 
interests of women, children and persons with disabilities.” 
To ensure this duty is carried out, women are allotted at 
least 25% of the positions on the land committees and 
tribunals. Furthermore, in order to transfer land on which 
a family lives or farms its own food, both the husband and 
wife must provide written consent. 140
Chapter Fourteen
422
are accessible to vulnerable populations, including women (through positive measures to 
ensure women’s equal participation); separated and accompanied children (as guided by the 
“best interest of the child”); illiterate and disabled persons (through special assistance); and 
users, including tenants (through the availability of collective claims).142 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that claims forms are easy to understand and 
available in Liberian English or Liberian indigenous languages through translators when 
needed.143 
•	 The Government of Liberia should increase public knowledge about the claims process both 
throughout Liberia and in the diaspora, ensure the availability of legal aid, locate claims 
stations in areas of claimants’ current residence, and provide internet based, proxy, and in-
person submission options.144 
•	 The Government of Liberia should take steps to prevent the persecution or punishment of 
claimants for submitting a claim.145 
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should use the remedy of 
compensation only when: “the 
remedy of restitution is not 
possible, or when the injured party 
knowingly and voluntarily accepts 
compensation in lieu of restitution, 
or when the terms of a negotiated 
peace settlement provide for a 
combination of restitution and 
compensation.”147 In some cases, 
however, a combination of both 
compensation and restitution may 
be appropriate.148 
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should ensure that the right of 
refugees and displaced persons to housing, land, and property restitution is incorporated 
into legislation, which should be internally consistent and compatible with other agreements 
and international human rights law, clearly demarcate all affected and eligible persons or 
groups, and fully protect women and girls against discrimination.149 Laws that prejudice the 
restitution process or are discriminatory should not be adopted or should be repealed.150 
•	 The Government of Liberia should delegate enforcement of restitution decisions to specific 
public agencies.151 The government should take steps to educate secondary occupants of their 
rights and legal ramifications of refusing to comply with restitution decisions, and prevent 
the obstruction of enforcement of restitution decisions, as well as the “destruction or looting 
of contested or abandoned housing, land and property,” such as by inventorying contents.152
•	 The Government of Liberia should establish a registration system for housing, land, and 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Food and Agriculture Organization Land Tenure 
Studies: Access to Rural Land and Land Administration 
after Violent Conflicts
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations has promulgated a guide on addressing post-
conflict access to rural land and land administration. 
The guide includes a section on the development of 
policies related to access to land, specifically restitution, 
resettlement, establishment of an operational 
system, and coordination and communication. Also, 
the document discusses implementation of policies, 
including evaluations.146 The Government of Liberia may 
wish to refer to this guide when developing its policies 
on land reform and administration. 
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property rights; such a system should have the capacity 
to recognize and record collective possession of land by 
traditional or indigenous communities.153 
•	 The Government of Liberia should adopt measures 
to prevent the destruction of records, furnish copies 
of documentation in its possession upon request by a 
claimant, and seek to collect relevant information from 
refugees and displaced persons.155 The government 
should adopt measures to ensure legal security of tenure 
following any decision regarding rights to housing, 
land, and/or property.156 
 
Satisfaction & Commemoration
Remembering the victims of the conflict and memorializing 
the suffering of the Liberian people was described by many 
statement givers as an important part of the national healing 
process. International standards provide little guidance in this 
regard, as the process of remembering is specific to each nation, 
culture, community, and individual. Statement givers provided 
some important suggestions in this regard.
•	 The Government of Liberia should collaborate with 
the TRC to designate a specific body to work nationally, 
at the community level, and with the diaspora to solicit recommendations for memorials to 
victims of the Liberian civil crises.
•	 The process of developing memorials and commemoration programs should be inclusive, 
transparent, and participatory.
•	 As expressed by statement givers, memorials to specific groups such as youth, women, and 
other vulnerable populations should be considered.
•	 Public apologies and acceptance of responsibility from those who were involved in commission 
of human rights and humanitarian violations should be actively encouraged.
•	 Some statement givers expressed their perception of an Americo-Liberian bias in the 
national holidays and names of public streets, institutions, holidays, and other locations. The 
government should consider creating new national holidays and renaming these locations, 
institutions, and holidays to dispel notions of bias and honor Liberia’s diversity. 
Potential Implementation 
Strategy: Monitoring and 
Evaluating Land Reform Policies
In creating procedures for 
monitoring and assessing its 
policies regarding access to 
land, the Government of Liberia 
will need to develop evaluation 
indicators. The FAO has outlined 
examples of indicators to assess 
implementation of land policies:
- Land legislation
- Adjudication procedures for land 
claims and disputes
- Existing land administration 
systems
- Housing strategies
- Evictions procedures
- Administration of state-owned 
land
- Administration of private 
abandoned land
- Transparency154
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Potential Implementation Strategy: Addressing Post-Conflict Restitution 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has outlined steps to take in addressing 
restitution of land following a conflict, which the Government of Liberia may wish to follow: 
Creation of organizational bodies:
- Legal aid units
- Claims processing centers
- Decision-making structures, including mediation facilities, adjudication bodies, specialized land courts, 
mobile courts and an enforcement unit
 Rules for adjudicating claims:
- Types of eligible claims
- Scope of eligible people
- A date past which the owner had been dispossessed of the property at issue
- Admissible evidence for restitution claims
Accessibility:
- Facilitate ease of submission of claims, without sacrificing quality through decentralization 
- Ensure forms and information are available in appropriate languages and take into account literacy 
levels
- Ensure the system is affordable to both the potential claimants and the government
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Section ii. recommendationS related to refugeeS in the weSt african SuB-region
Refugees in Ghana and the West African Sub-Region
Refugee situations in Africa are governed by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1969 
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, as well as the panoply of international and regional human rights instruments including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. In Ghana, site of the largest Liberian refugee settlement in the sub-region, the Refugee Law 
of 1993 governs many aspects of the situation.
International refugee law and Ghanaian law contain three fundamental principles – the right to 
return to one’s own country, the prohibition of refoulement, and the absolutely voluntary nature of 
refugee repatriation. States are prohibited from expelling or returning a refugee to the frontiers of 
territories where he or she would be threatened with persecution.157 “Even when the circumstances 
in the country of origin have undergone a fundamental change, individual refugees may continue to 
have a well-founded fear of persecution or compelling reasons not to return arising out of previous 
persecution. [When this has] been determined, the ‘ceased circumstances’ cessation clauses should 
thus not apply to them.”158 Moreover, refugees are entitled to basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The Advocates recommends that the Government of Ghana and other West African host 
nation governments comply fully with their obligations under domestic and international refugee law 
as well as international human rights law. The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Ghana and other host countries should immediately cease any activities 
with respect to Liberian refugees that impose physical, psychological, or material pressure on 
individuals duly recognized as having refugee status to return.159
•	 Despite changed country conditions in Liberia, the Government of Ghana and other host 
countries should recognize that compelling reasons may, for certain individuals, support the 
continuation of refugee status. 
o Host countries, in collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
should facilitate ongoing asylum applications and timely refugee status determinations, 
specifically, “Asylum requests of Liberians should be examined thoroughly in fair 
and effective individual refugee status determination procedures with the necessary 
procedural safeguards, taking into consideration the individual merits of their 
asylum claims, based on the criteria in the 1951 Convention, and where applicable, 
Article I.1 of the 1969 [African Union] Convention…Additionally, in light of the 
particularly violent nature of the armed conflict in past years, asylum claims of 
victims of particularly atrocious forms of persecution suffered in the past should be 
examined taking into account the consequences and effects of such persecution on 
Chapter Fourteen
426
the victims concerned where the continuing impact of the past persecution could put 
the individuals at risk of serious harm to their well being if returned.” 160
o Host countries should expedite status determination procedures to ensure that 
Liberians who wish to stay in Ghana can acquire legal status, including but not 
limited to, a residence permit.161
o The Government of Ghana and other host countries should consider appropriate 
arrangements, which would not put into jeopardy their established situation, for 
those persons who cannot be expected to leave the country of asylum because of 
a long stay in that country resulting in strong family, social, and economic links 
there.162
•	 The Government of Ghana should increase its efforts to assist recognized refugees in seeking 
employment or education inside Ghana.163 
o A process should be developed to allow Liberians to obtain work permits despite the 
fact that they may not have appropriate documents, such as a passport, as required 
under Ghanaian law for other immigrants.
o Recognized refugees remaining in Ghana should be eligible for enrollment in 
Ghanaian public schools and for participation in the Ghanaian National Health 
Insurance program.164
•	 The Government of Ghana and other West African host countries should fully respect their 
obligations to treat refugees in accordance with international human rights law as long as 
refugees remain in their territory, paying specific attention to the right to work, the right to 
health, the right to property, and the right to education.
•	 In fulfillment of its duty to establish the voluntary nature of repatriation and to provide 
refugees with appropriate information about country conditions in Liberia, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees should ensure dissemination of accurate information regarding 
the repatriation process and the right to claim asylum in the host country to Liberians in 
Liberian English and in indigenous languages when necessary.
•	 In the interest of finding durable solutions for refugees who do not voluntarily repatriate, 
UNCHR should accelerate processing for refugees eligible for third country resettlement.
Refugees Recently Repatriated or in Process of Repatriation
For those Liberians who do wish torepatriate, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, host 
country governments, and the Government ofLiberia must ensure that refugees can return in safety 
and dignity. As noted in the Organizatoin of African Unity Convention Covering the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa, “the essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected 
in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will.165 The Advocates recommends the 
following:
•	 The Government of Ghana, the Government of Liberia, and the U.N. High Commis-
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sioner for Refugees should ensure that the repatriation process is carried out 
in consideration of the policy guidelines contained in the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees Hand-book on Voluntary Repatriation, specifically taking into account:
o refugees’ physical safety at all stages during and after their return 
including en route, at reception points, and at the destination,
o the need for family unity,
o attention to the needs of vulnerable groups,
o the waiver or, if not possible, reduction to a minimum of border 
crossing formalities,
o permission for refugees to bring their movable possessions when 
returning,
o respect for school and [agricultural] seasons in the timing of such 
movements, and
o freedom of movement.166
•	 The Government of Liberia should “allow its nationals to return in safety and with dignity 
without any fear of harassment, discrimination, arbitrary detention, physical threat or 
prosecution on account of having left or remained outside the country, and should provide 
guarantees and/or amnesties to this effect. It should also take all measures to ensure the 
restoration of full national protection.”167
•	 Where refugees have lost their nationality, the Government of Liberia should arrange for its 
restoration as well as for its granting to children born outside the territory and, as appropriate, 
to non-national spouses.168
•	 The Government of Liberia and the international community should prioritize support for 
the Liberia Integration Program, specifically funding for: non-food items, shelter, agricultural 
training and supplies, skills training, a cash grant program and other high priority areas as 
Potential Implementation Strategy:
Refugee Repatriation Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone
In coordinating the return of refugees from Ghana and other West African host nations, the Government 
of Liberia (in collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees) may wish to consider the 
following lessons learned from refugee repatriation programs in Sierra Leone.
- Transport for refugees to rural communities was one of the greatest challenges. Government-backed, 
regularized transport to rural communities may be one method of assisting refugees who wish to return 
to rural areas and ensuring that they are not victimized en route.
- Trucks should be used as the primary means of transport due to their luggage capacity. Proper tagging 
systems should be implemented to ensure that refugee possessions are not lost en route.
- Provide incentives for families to repatriate together and to continue to register as a family on a 
regular basis to discourage the practice of abandoning children.
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identified by the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission. 
•	 In fulfillment of its duty to monitor the situation of returnees in their country of origin,169 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees should engage in monitoring of Liberia Refugee 
Repatriation and Resettlement Commission activities with relation to returnees, focusing 
specifically on ensuring non-discrimination and protection of vulnerable groups in the 
repatriation and reintegration process. 
•	 In recognition of the right of refugees to return to their country in safety and in dignity, the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the Government of Liberia, and the international 
community should support expansion of services for returning refugees to include mental 
health screening, service-provider referral information, security information, employment 
referral, etc.
•	 The Government of Liberia, Liberian civil society, and the international community should 
promote establishment of a legal aid regime for returning refugees to adjudicate property 
claims.
•	 The Government of Liberia, Liberian civil society, and the international community should 
promote identification of international law and human rights violations against refugees in 
their host country, either while in residence or during the process of resettlement, so as to 
facilitate non-repetition in future sub-regional refugee crises and to effectively advance the 
humane application of refugee policy in the West African sub-region.
•	 Because of the protracted nature of the Liberian conflict, many refugees have buried deceased 
family members in their host countries. Host governments, the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees, and the Government of Liberia should engage in a consultation with refugee 
families to ensure that repatriated refugees maintain access to the gravesites of family 
members and that the graves remain protected and undisturbed.
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Section iii. civil and political rightS
Liberia’s constitution currently includes important protections for civil and political rights, such as the 
right to life, liberty, property, due process, equality before the law, freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion, as well as freedom of expression. Throughout the Liberian conflict however, these 
protections were disregarded, and the rights of the Liberian people were abrogated. Re-establishing 
protection of these fundamental freedoms in Liberia was an important theme enunciated by statement 
givers in their TRC statements.
Apart from its constitutional commitments, the Government of Liberia is bound by several 
international treaties related to civil and political rights. Primary among these are the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as 
the Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Several 
other important international treaties ratified by Liberia are discussed in each section below. With 
regard to general international legal obligations, The Advocates recommends that the Government 
of Liberia:
•	 Ratify the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
or Prostitution of Others without delay;
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its report describing the measures 
taken to give effect to the rights set forth in the Banjul Charter;
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit all due and overdue periodic reports 
describing its compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee and its compliance with the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Committee against 
Torture.
Personal Integrity & Dignity 
The Government of Liberia is under an immediate obligation to take whatever measures are necessary 
to respect and ensure fundamental rights including the right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and prohibition of slavery. During the Liberian conflict, the 
right to life of many Liberians was completely disregarded. Liberians were tortured and subjected to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. They were also abducted and held in slavery by fighting factions. 
Effective protections against these abuses must be integrated into all aspects of Liberian national 
life to ensure non-repetition of these types of violations and to eliminate impunity for those who 
perpetrate these most severe violations of human dignity. 
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Personal Integrity & Dignity: The Right to Life 
In 2005, Liberia acceded to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which obligates each state party to ensure that no one within its territory is 
executed and to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction. In 
2008, however, Liberia passed new legislation authorizing the death penalty for certain crimes,170 and 
individual Liberians have been sentenced to death by Liberia’s courts.171 Apart from legally-sanctioned 
executions as a criminal punishment, Liberia has a long history of extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary 
executions. The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides a guiding framework on the right to life. The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 In compliance with its obligations, the Government of Liberia should immediately repeal 
provisions of its criminal code, and any other legislation, that authorize capital punishment. 
It should immediately commute the death sentences of any inmates to a punishment that 
complies with international standards. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that no individual within its jurisdiction is executed 
through state sanctioned judicial procedures.
•	 The Government of Liberia should prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary 
executions and should ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences in the 
criminal code, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the 
seriousness of such offences.172 The law should make clear that exceptional circumstances, 
including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public 
emergency, should not be invoked as a justification for such executions.173 
Personal Integrity & Dignity: Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman & Degrading Treatment
TRC statements from the diaspora reflect that torture and other inhuman and degrading treatments 
were endemic during the Liberian conflict. The Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment requires that Liberia “take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”174 The 
Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Punishment in Africa (The Robben Island Guidelines) provide a framework for protecting Liberians 
from these practices. The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that acts that fall within the definition of torture, 
based on Article 1 of the U.N. Convention against Torture, are offenses within the national 
legal system.175
•	 The Government of Liberia should pay particular attention to the prohibition and prevention 
of gender-related forms of torture and ill-treatment, as well as the torture and ill-treatment 
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of young persons.176
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that Liberian courts have jurisdictional competence 
to hear allegations of torture in accordance with Article 5(2) of the U.N. Convention against 
Torture.177
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that the trial or extradition of those suspected of 
torture takes place expeditiously in conformity with relevant international standards.178
•	 Circumstances such as state of war, threat of war, internal political instability, or any other 
public emergency should not be invoked as a justification of torture, cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.179 Nor should notions such as “necessity,” “national 
emergency,” and “public order” be invoked as a justification for torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.180
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that superior orders never provide a justification 
or lawful excuse for acts of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.181 
Moreover, no one should be punished for disobeying an order to commit acts amounting to 
torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.182
•	 The Government of Liberia should prohibit and prevent the use, production, and trade of 
equipment or substances designed to inflict torture or ill-treatment and the abuse of any other 
equipment or substance to these ends.183
•	 In order to combat impunity with respect to acts of torture and ill-treatment, the Government 
of Liberia should: 
o Ensure that those responsible for acts of torture or ill-treatment are subject to legal 
process. 
o Ensure that there is no immunity from prosecution for nationals suspected of 
torture, and that the scope of immunities for foreign nationals who are entitled to 
such immunities be as restrictive as is possible under international law. 
o Ensure expeditious consideration of extradition requests to third states, in accordance 
with international standards. 
o Ensure that rules of evidence properly reflect the difficulties of substantiating 
allegations of ill-treatment in custody. 
o Ensure that, where criminal charges cannot be sustained because of the high 
standard of proof required, other forms of civil, disciplinary, or administrative action 
are taken if it is appropriate to do so.184
•	 The Government of Liberia should cooperate with the United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, as well as with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ thematic and country specific 
special procedures, including the issuance of standing invitations for these and other relevant 
mechanisms.185
•	 The Government of Liberia should support the adoption of an Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture, which would create an international visiting mechanism with 
the mandate to visit all places where people are deprived of their liberty by a government 
actor.186
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Personal Integrity & Dignity: Prohibition of Slavery
Despite a clear prohibition of slavery in Liberia’s constitution,187 Liberia’s history includes documented 
forced labor, slavery-like practices,188 as well as a “ward” system.”189 In addition, factions during the 
civil war employed forced recruitment, forced labor, and sexual slavery. As a result, the Government 
of Liberia must adopt an effective anti-slavery regime including national legislation, policy, and 
programming. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provide a guiding framework on the elimination of slavery and involuntary servitude. The 
Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all practicable and necessary legislative and other 
measures to abolish the following institutions and practices where they still exist and whether 
or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in Article 1 of the Slavery 
Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926:
o Debt bondage;190
o Serfdom;191
o Any institution or practice whereby:
	A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on 
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, 
family, or any other person or group; or
	The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan has the right to transfer her 
to another person for value received or otherwise; or
	On the death of her husband, a woman is liable to be inherited by another 
person;
o Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years 
is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another 
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or 
young person or of the child’s labor.192
•	 The Government of Liberia should support Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) initiatives to continue to establish legal and regulated migration between 
countries in the sub-region.193 
•	 In consideration of the fact that modern forms of slavery are directly related to poverty, 
the international community must fully support Liberia’s plans for poverty eradication with 
funding, technical, and logistical support.
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Administration of Justice
Liberians in the diaspora expressed important concerns about the Liberian judicial system’s ability to 
provide access to justice for all Liberians, including equality before the law, the right to due process of 
law, the presumption of innocence, and protection against self-incrimination. 
In addition to core human rights treaties, the following documents provide a guiding framework for 
the effective promotion and protection of the rights to a remedy, due process, and equal protection 
of the law:
•	 U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
•	 Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 
•	 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
•	 U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, and findings from 
relevant monitoring bodies. 
Administration of Justice: Safeguards in Criminal Proceedings
In order to comply with the Liberian constitution as well as its international legal obligations, the 
Government of Liberia must ensure that:
•	 No one is subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and no one is deprived of his or her liberty 
except as in accordance with established law.194
•	 Anyone who is arrested is informed at the time of arrest of the reasons for the arrest and is 
promptly informed of any charges.195
•	 Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge is brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and is entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release. It should not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained 
in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of 
the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.196
•	 Anyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention is entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, so that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of the 
detention and order release if the detention is not lawful. 197
•	 Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention has an enforceable right to 
compensation. 198
•	 All persons deprived of their liberty are to be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. 199
•	 Accused persons should be segregated from convicted persons and are subject to separate 
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treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.200
•	 All persons must be immediately informed by the competent authority of their right to be 
assisted by a lawyer of their own choice upon arrest or detention or when charged with a 
criminal offence.201 
•	 Any detained or arrested person who does not have a lawyer is, in all cases in which the interests 
of justice so require, entitled to have a lawyer of experience and competence commensurate 
with the nature of the offence assigned to him or her in order to provide effective legal 
assistance, without payment if the person lacks sufficient means to pay for such services. 202 
•	 All persons arrested or detained, with or without criminal charge, have a right to prompt access 
to a lawyer, and in any case not later than 48 hours from the time of arrest or detention.203 
•	 All arrested, detained, or imprisoned persons are to be provided with adequate opportunities, 
time, and facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult with a lawyer, without 
delay, interception, or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within 
sight, but not within the hearing, of law enforcement officials. 204
•	 No one is to be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation.205
Administration of Justice: Judicial Independence
•	 The Government of Liberia should support amendment of the constitution of Liberia to 
include an explicit guarantee of judicial independence. 206
•	 A judicial code of conduct should be written, disseminated, and enforced.207
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure judges and lawyers receive appropriate training.208
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that the term of office of judges, their independence, 
security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions, and the age of retirement 
are adequately secured by law.209
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that promotion of judges is based on objective 
factors, in particular ability, integrity, and experience.210
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that judges are subject to suspension or removal 
only for reasons of incapacity or behavior that renders them unfit to carry out their duties. 
All disciplinary, suspension, or removal proceedings must be determined in accordance with 
established standards of judicial conduct. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension, or removal 
proceedings should be subject to an independent review.211
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that all individuals appointed to judicial office are 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Reforming the Judiciary
Relative to rebuilding confidence and trust in the judiciary, in a 2006 report the Liberian Governance 
Reform Commission suggested that a permanent judicial training institute should be established to 
address the training needs of all levels of the judiciary.212 The Government of Liberia and international 
donors should continue to support efforts to establish such an institution. 
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appointed through the appropriate process of law and as their qualifications merit.
Administration of Justice: Access to Lawyers & Legal Services
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that efficient procedures and responsive 
mechanisms for effective and equal access to lawyers are provided for all persons within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, without distinction of any kind, such as discrimination 
based on race, color, ethnic origin, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth, economic, or other status.213
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure the provision of sufficient funding and other 
resources for legal services to the poor and, as necessary, to other disadvantaged persons. 
The Liberian Bar Association should cooperate in the organization and provision of these 
services, facilities, and other resources.214
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that lawyers:
o are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, 
harassment, or improper interference;
o are able to travel and to consult with their clients freely both within their own country 
and abroad; and
o shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic, 
or other sanctions for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional 
duties, standards, and ethics.215
•	 The Government of Liberia should support policies to assist prosecutors when appropriate 
in waiving prosecution, discontinuing proceedings conditionally or unconditionally, or 
diverting criminal cases from the formal justice system, with full respect for the rights of 
suspects and victims. For this purpose, the Government of Liberia should fully explore the 
possibility of adopting diversion schemes not only to alleviate excessive court loads, but also 
to avoid the stigmatization of pre-trial detention, indictment, and conviction, as well as the 
possible adverse effects of imprisonment.216
Administration of Justice: Juvenile Justice
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that prosecution of juvenile offenders is undertaken 
consistent with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice.217
•	 Accused juvenile persons should be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible 
for adjudication.218
•	 Juvenile offenders should be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate 
to their age and legal status. 219
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Security Sector
Liberians living in the diaspora expressed grave concerns about the security situation in Liberia. 
Improved security, both in relation to domestic crime and with regard to national security, was a 
condition for return mentioned by many in the diaspora. Military and police reform was an important 
part of improving the security situation, specifically ensuring professionalized and representative 
police and military forces that can carry out their duties while respecting the human rights of all 
Liberians.
Security Sector: Armed Forces of Liberia
Throughout Liberia’s history, the Armed Forces of Liberia has been an entity used less for defense 
against foreign threats but more as a means to quell civil unrest and to enforce policies of the central 
government in greater Liberia. The Armed Forces of Liberia was a major actor in the civil crises 
that plagued Liberia between 1979 and 2003. Much work has already been undertaken to rebuild 
and reform the Armed Forces of Liberia. The recommendations that follow do not endorse or argue 
against programs currently in place but seek simply to highlight the concerns of statement givers from 
the diaspora. The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should maintain a long term focus on ensuring positive and 
timely reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia.
•	 The Government of Liberia should collaborate closely with the U.N. Mission in Liberia to 
maintain a rigorous vetting process for all recruits to ensure that perpetrators of human 
rights violations do not become members of the newly constituted Armed Forces of Liberia.
•	 The Government of Liberia should work closely with international donors to ensure that, 
upon U.N. Mission in Liberia drawdown, a clear plan for ongoing reform and training of the 
Liberian military is in place, including sufficient funding. International partners, in particular 
the United States, should recognize their responsibility in this regard and make a long-term 
commitment to development and rebuilding of the Armed Forces of Liberia.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that recruiting policies of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia will lead to the creation of a military force that is representative of the diversity, both 
geographic and ethnic, of the Liberian people.
Potential Implementation Strategy: Training for Judicial Officers
The government may wish to implement the U.N. Mission in Liberia’s proposal to provide continuous 
training in the provisions of the Juvenile Court Procedural Code (JCPC) and child protection issues to 
all judicial officers. The Chief Justice should consider providing written instructions to Magistrates 
regarding the procedure for handling cases involving juvenile offenders.220
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•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that extensive training in humanitarian law and 
human rights principles and practices is a fully integrated component of basic and recurring 
training for Armed Forces of Liberia members at all levels. Specifically, training on the rights 
of women should be a priority. 
•	 Recruitment of women into the Armed Forces of Liberia should be a government priority as 
part of an overall plan to increase opportunities and eliminate discrimination against women 
in Liberia.
Security Sector: Liberian National Police
Liberian National Police were victims of human rights violations during the conflict, often because 
of their affiliation with the government, but they were also perpetrators of human rights abuses. 
The national police force must be reformed to ensure the trust of Liberian citizens and effective 
implementation of the rule of law. Much work in this area has already been carried out in coordination 
with the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
and The Robben Island Guidelines provide a guiding framework with regard to police conduct. The 
Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia, the U.N. Mission in Liberia, and the Liberian National Police 
should continue to work together to ensure that all Liberian law enforcement officials are 
trained and can effectively:
o respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of 
all persons,221 specifically the rights of traditionally marginalized groups, including 
women and ethnic and religious minorities;
o use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance 
of their duty;222
o refrain from inflicting, instigating, or tolerating any act of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;223
o keep matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law enforcement officials 
fully confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice require 
otherwise;224
o ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, 
take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required; and225
o oppose and combat corruption both within the police and in the society at large226
•	 The Government of Liberia should work closely with civil society to ensure effective civilian 
oversight of the police and to ensure the availability of procedures for Liberians to make 
complaints about police misconduct to an independent investigatory body.227
•	 The international community and the Government of Liberia should provide ongoing 
support to the Liberian National Police in the areas it has identified as critical challenges, 
including training, infrastructure development, logistics, and information technology.228
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Security Sector: Combating Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, & Summary Executions
The U.N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions229 and the United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation 
of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions230 provide a guiding framework for addressing 
these practices. The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure strict control, including a clear chain of command 
over all officials responsible for apprehension, arrest, detention, custody, and imprisonment, 
as well as those officials authorized by law to use force and firearms.
•	 The Government of Liberia should prohibit orders from superior officers or public 
authorities authorizing or inciting other persons to carry out extralegal, arbitrary, or summary 
executions. All persons should have the right and the duty to defy such orders. Training of 
law enforcement officials should emphasize these rights and duties.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure thorough, prompt, and impartial investigation 
of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary executions, including cases 
where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death in the above 
circumstances. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should maintain investigative offices and procedures to 
undertake such inquiries. The purpose of the investigation should be to determine the cause, 
manner, and time of death, the person responsible, and any pattern or practice which may 
have brought about that death. It should include an adequate autopsy, collection and analysis 
of all physical and documentary evidence and statements from witnesses. The investigation 
should distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide, and homicide.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that the investigative authority has the power 
to gather information necessary to the inquiry. Investigators should have at their disposal 
all the necessary budgetary and technical resources for effective investigation. They should 
also have the authority to oblige officials allegedly involved in any such executions to appear 
and testify. The same should apply to any witness. To this end, they should be entitled to 
issue summonses to witnesses, including the officials allegedly involved, and to demand the 
production of evidence.
•	 The Government of Liberia should pursue investigations through an independent commission 
of inquiry or similar procedure in cases in which the established investigative procedures are 
inadequate because of lack of expertise or impartiality, because of the importance of the 
matter, or because of the apparent existence of a pattern of abuse, and in cases where there 
are complaints from the family of the victim about these inadequacies or other substantial 
reasons. Members of such a commission should be chosen for their recognized impartiality, 
competence, and independence as individuals. In particular, they should be independent of 
any institution, agency, or person that may be the subject of the inquiry. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that bodies of deceased individuals are handled 
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in accordance with the guidelines in the United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention 
and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions and that autopsies are 
conducted in an impartial and independent manner. The family of the deceased should have 
the right to insist that a medical or other qualified representative be present at the autopsy. 
When the identity of a deceased person has been determined, a notification of death should 
be posted, and the family or relatives of the deceased should be informed immediately. The 
body of the deceased should be returned to them upon completion of the investigation.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that complainants, witnesses, those conducting 
the investigation, and their families are protected from violence, threats of violence, or any 
other form of intimidation. Those implicated in extra-legal, arbitrary, or summary executions 
should be suspended from any position of control or power, whether direct or indirect, over 
complainants, witnesses and their families, as well as over those conducting investigations.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that families of the deceased and their legal 
representatives are informed of, and have access to, any hearing, as well as to all information 
relevant to the investigation, and should be entitled to present other evidence. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that a written report is made within a reasonable 
period of time on the methods and findings of such investigations. The report should be made 
public immediately and should include the scope of the inquiry, procedures, and methods 
used to evaluate evidence as well as conclusions and recommendations based on findings of 
fact and on applicable law. The report should also describe in detail specific events that were 
found to have occurred and the evidence upon which such findings were based, and list the 
names of witnesses who testified, with the exception of those whose identities have been 
withheld for their own protection. The Government should, within a reasonable period of 
time, either reply to the report of the investigation or indicate the steps to be taken in response 
to it, including termination of anyone found to have engaged in summary executions.
Security Sector: Combating Torture
Because of the longstanding systemic use of torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading 
treatment in Liberia’s civilian and military detention systems, effective prohibitions against torture 
in the Liberian penal system are essential. The Robben Island Guidelines provide a guiding 
framework for protecting Liberians from these practices. The Advocates suggests that the preceding 
recommendations on torture set forth in this report also apply. The Advocates recommends the 
following:
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure the establishment of readily accessible and fully 
independent mechanisms to which all persons can bring their allegations of torture and ill-
treatment.231
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that whenever persons who claim to have been or 
who appear to have been tortured or ill-treated are brought before competent authorities an 
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investigation will be initiated. Investigations into all allegations of torture or ill-treatment 
should be conducted promptly, impartially, and effectively, guided by the U.N. Manual on 
the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (The Istanbul Protocol).232 
•	 The Government of Liberia should encourage and facilitate visits by appropriate non-
governmental and inter-governmental organizations to places of detention.233 
Security Sector: Bureau of Corrections Staff, Policies, and Facilities
Conditions of detention and treatment of prisoners was an important theme enunciated during TRC 
statement taking in the diaspora. Prisoners in Liberia prior to and during the civil crises were routinely 
held in inhuman conditions and were subject to torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment. The Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa and The Robben Island 
Guidelines provide a guiding framework for improving prison conditions in Liberia. The Advocates 
recommends the following:
•	 The international community and the Government of Liberia should work closely with the 
Liberian Bureau of Corrections to: 1) strengthen the bureau’s human resource capacity; 2) 
incorporate human rights and gender issues into training for bureau personnel; 3) improve 
and/or develop new policies and procedures that reflect international guidelines on the 
treatment of offenders; and 4) construct and refurbish prison facilities so as to provide 
humane custodial conditions.234
•	 Human resource capacity at the bureau should be developed in full consideration of the 
principles of the Kampala Declaration that provides that: 1) there should be a proper career 
structure for prison staff; 2) all prison personnel should be linked to one government ministry 
and there should be a clear line of command between central prison administration and the 
staff in prisons; 3) the State should provide sufficient material and financial resources for staff 
to carry out their work properly; and 4) the penitentiary administration should be directly 
involved in the recruitment of prison staff.235
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that: 1) the human rights of prisoners are 
safeguarded at all times; 2) prisoners retain all rights that are not expressly taken away by 
the fact of their detention; 3) prisoners live in conditions compatible with human dignity; 4) 
prison conditions and regulations do not aggravate the suffering already caused by the loss of 
liberty; 5) the detrimental effects of imprisonment are minimized so that prisoners do not lose 
their self-respect and sense of personal responsibility; 6) prisoners are given the opportunity 
to maintain and develop links with their families and the outside world; 7) prisoners have 
access to education and skills training in order to make it easier for them to reintegrate into 
society after their release; and 8) special attention is paid to vulnerable prisoners, and non-
governmental organizations are supported in their work with these prisoners.236
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that all persons who are deprived of their liberty 
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by public order or authorities should have that detention controlled by properly and legally 
constructed regulations. Such regulations should provide a number of basic safeguards, 
all of which should apply from 
the moment when they are first 
deprived of their liberty. These 
include: a) the right that a relative 
or other appropriate third person 
is notified of the detention; b) the 
right to an independent medical 
examination; c) the right of access 
to a lawyer; and d) notification 
of the above rights in a language 
that the person deprived of their 
liberty understands.238
•	 The Government of Liberia, with 
the full support of international 
partners including the U.N. 
Mission in Liberia, should ensure that basic health and sanitation practices are enforced at 
the level of each prison. Specifically: 
o Primary health care should be a priority. Prisoners should be allowed to take 
responsibility for their health.
o Each prisoner must have a confidential clinical health record giving all essential 
details of the individual’s health profile. It should record all incidences of illness and 
treatment. It should contain a fitness certificate on discharge.
o Health examinations and treatment should be conducted in privacy.
o Discipline regarding maintenance of hygiene and sanitation in institutional 
environment must be enforced.
o Professionally trained personnel, diagnostic facilities, and drugs should be available 
in adequate quantities at all times.
o Health education and counseling should form an integral part of the treatment for 
all health care management.
o There should be a public health program for staff and prisoners alike to prevent 
disease.239
Security Sector: Treatment of Juvenile Offenders
•	 Detention and incarceration of juveniles should be carried out in full compliance with the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The 
Beijing Rules)240 and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty.241
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Kadoma Declaration
Relative to ensuring justice with scarce resources, the 
Kadoma Declaration on Community Service Orders in 
Africa notes that the use of prison should be strictly 
limited as a measure of last resort. Prisons represent 
a waste of scarce resources and human potential. In 
consideration of Liberian tradition and the country’s 
development needs, community service should be 
effectively implemented and supervised and involve a 
program of work where the offender is required to carry 
out a number of hours of voluntary work for the benefit 
of the community.237 
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•	 Continuous training in the provisions of the Juvenile Court Procedural Code and child 
protection issues should be provided to all Liberian National Police officers and Bureau of 
Corrections staff.
Freedom of Expression 
Journalists, publishers, and those associated with media outlets in general were specifically targeted 
during the TRC’s mandate period. Government policies severely undermined freedom of press and 
freedom of expression. In addition, those attempting to exercise their rights were killed, detained, 
abducted, tortured, and otherwise harassed. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights requires the Government of Liberia to take all necessary measures to ensure the 
right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds through any media of choice. In addition to this core human rights treaty, the 
U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation Declaration of Windhoek on Promoting an 
Independent and Pluralistic African Press, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom 
of Expression, and Access to Information, and other relevant civil society and non-governmental 
organization reports cited herein provide a guiding framework for protection of freedom of expression 
in Liberia. The Advocates recommends the following: 
Freedom of Expression: Legal & Regulatory Reform
•	 The Government of Liberia should undertake a systematic review of laws pertaining to the 
media and freedom of expression with the goal of reforming existing laws or adopting new 
legislation so as to comply with the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom 
of Expression, and Access to Information.242
•	 Government influence over the media should be limited.243 Accordingly, the Government of 
Liberia should ensure that public officials and political appointees do not hold positions of 
influence in the Liberian media.
•	 Regulatory mechanisms should be developed to 
ensure quality, sustainable reporting.244 
•	 The Government of Liberia should support 
legislation that ensures that libel actions against 
journalists proceed only in civil court and 
cannot become criminal actions.245
•	 The Government of Liberia should adopt an act 
designed to extend the right of members of the 
public to access information in the possession 
of public authorities or private bodies and to guarantee the protection of individuals in 
possession of and providing information to members of the public.246
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Disciplinary Regulations
 Disciplinary regulations might require 
a journalist to issue an apology or allow 
the Press Union of Liberia to license and 
to suspend journalists for abuse of press 
freedoms.
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•	 The Government of Liberia should adopt an act designed to regulate and reform the national 
broadcasting system, in consideration of the recommendations issued at the National 
Conference on Media Law and Policy Reform in 2004247 and the African Charter on 
Broadcasting.248
Freedom of Expression: Capacity Building
The Government of Liberia, the Press Union of Liberia, civil society, and the international community 
should collaboratively focus on:
•	 Developing a long-term communications education program, as well as short-term training 
workshops for Liberian journalists. Trainings should emphasize the importance of freedom 
of expression, the role of the media in community and peace building, and ethical standards. 
Training on conflict reporting, especially safety training and risk-awareness for local 
journalists, who tend to be less equipped and more vulnerable than international journalists, 
can help strengthen media recovering from conflict.249 Workshops for trainers can expand 
these efforts even further. 250
•	 Establishing and financing an independent local “press aid” foundation, so as to ensure a 
means of assisting journalists to carry out their work long-term without a need to resort to 
activities that compromise the integrity of their reporting.251
•	 Encouraging media outlets to develop their own mission, code of ethics, and enforcement 
mechanisms in order to strengthen their commitment to professional and ethical journalism.252
•	 Promoting town meetings and open workshops to facilitate dialogue on democracy, civil 
rights, and ethical journalism.
•	 Educating journalists about what constitutes a violation of ethical and legal standards, as well 
as potential repercussions.253
Freedom of Expression: Privatization & Sustainability
The Government of Liberia, Press Union of Liberia, civil society, and the international community 
should collaboratively focus on:
•	 Developing exchange networks between editors, managers and publishers on local and 
international levels to raise awareness about press repression. Networks also promote 
exchange and competition regarding development issues.254
•	 Developing training programs that address business management issues in order to promote 
sustainability by helping media outlets manage their finances and development.255
•	 Financing a study on usership of independent media outlets to establish an advertising market 
that will stimulate the private, independent media.256
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•	 Ensuring that the government does not own media outlets. Instead, the Government of 
Liberia should support the development of a competitive and professional private media.
•	 Supporting expansion and development of infrastructure to remote areas of the country. 
Special attention should be paid to areas currently without access to the media. 
•	 Working together to foster connections and networking between rural and urban media 
outlets.257
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Section iv. ending impunity for violationS 1979-2003
The TRC has been charged with ensuring accountability for gross violations and abuses of human 
rights that occurred between 1979 and 2003,258 and it was envisioned that the TRC would make 
recommendations to the Government of Liberia for prosecutions and other anti-impunity measures.259 
The U.N. Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat 
Impunity provide a guiding framework for the post-TRC implementation of prosecution, amnesty, 
vetting, and civil claims against perpetrators. 260 There is no single model that will adequately address 
the many violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed during the conflict. The 
government of Liberia should take a creative, pragmatic approach to ensuring accountability with its 
limited resources and utilize all possible mechanisms on the international, national and local levels.
Prosecution 
The Government of Liberia has a legal duty to prosecute perpetrators from the conflict. It must 
ensure “that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and 
duly punished.”261 Although individuals cannot be prosecuted for actions that did not constitute a 
crime under law when the act was committed, numerous criminal laws apply to the time period of the 
Liberian conflict. These include Liberian domestic law,262 customary international law, the Geneva 
Conventions (ratified by Liberia in 1954), and Additional Protocols (ratified by Liberia in 1988), as well 
as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ratified by Liberia 
in 1950). The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should evaluate all possible options for prosecution, including 
existing bilateral and international options, domestic prosecutions, and prosecutions before 
a specially-authorized international or domestic tribunal. The Government of Liberia should 
also evaluate possible innovative options, including new bilateral agreements, multi-lateral 
agreements, and amendments to existing tribunals’ mandates. Such evaluation should be 
done in consultation with civil society, the international community, and other stakeholders.
•	 All prosecutions must comply with the minimum standards as set forth by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Thus, the Government of Liberia must ensure that any 
prosecutorial process: 
o operates with the highest standards of transparency, impartiality, and efficiency,
o includes specific mechanisms to involve victims in the process,263
o ensures the protection of victims and witnesses,264
o protects the human rights of accused persons,
o does not permit the death penalty as a sentence for offenders,
o engages appropriate investigation and evidence handling techniques,265
o does not restrict its facilities and activities solely to Monrovia,
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o incorporates capacity building of the Liberian judicial system in all of its policies and 
activities,266
o protects the due process rights of accused persons, including
	 the right to a presumption of innocence, 
	 the right to counsel, 
	 the right to translated documents, 
	 the right to be promptly informed of charges, 
	 the right to be tried without undue delay, 
	 the right to be present during trial, 
	 the right to a public trial, 
	 the right to confront witnesses and evidence, 
	 the right not to be prejudiced by choosing not to testify in one’s own defense,
	 the right to appeal, 
	 the right to proportionate and consistent sentencing in accordance with law, 
and 
	 the right to a remedy for breaches of process rights.267
•	 Specific care should be taken to protect the rights of any former child combatants who might 
be tried for their crimes. 
o Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release 
should be imposed for offenses committed by persons below 18 years of age.268
o Children accused of crimes under international or national law allegedly committed 
while associated with armed forces or armed groups are entitled to be treated in 
accordance with international standards for juvenile justice.269
o Individuals should not be prosecuted or punished or threatened with prosecution or 
punishment solely for their membership in those groups.270 
o Alternatives to judicial proceedings should be sought for children.271
•	 The Government of Liberia should immediately pass legislation criminalizing the destruction 
of or tampering with evidence and otherwise obstructing the process of evidence gathering 
related to war crimes and human rights violations committed during the TRC mandate period 
from 1979 to 2003.272
•	 The Government of Liberia should seek assurances from key African and non-African 
nations that those governments will not extend any protective status, including diplomatic 
asylum, to persons with respect to whom there are reasons to believe they have committed a 
serious crime under international law.273
•	 A key part of the Government of Liberia’s prosecution strategy should include appropriate 
use of existing international accountability mechanisms, such as the International Criminal 
Court, African regional bodies, and national courts in other jurisdictions. Coordinated and 
carefully planned use of these mechanisms can be cost-effective and can help build the 
capacity of Liberia’s legal and judicial sectors.
•	 In evaluating all bilateral and international options, the Government of Liberia should make 
447
efficient use of existing mechanisms with current jurisdiction over crimes committed during 
the TRC mandate period.
o The Government of Liberia should consider issuing an Article12(3) declaration of 
intent274 to accept International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes committed 
before Liberia’s date of ratification of the Rome Statute (September 22, 2004)275 but 
after entry into force of the Rome Statute ( July 1, 2002).276
o The Government of Liberia should assess the possibility of using existing regional 
mechanisms to pursue intergovernmental claims and to bring individual perpetrators 
to justice. 
	The Government of Liberia should ratify both the 1998 Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
	The Liberian government should consider seeking jurisdiction in the 
Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice for human 
rights claims against member states that may have arisen as a result of the 
conflict.277
o The Government of Liberia should coordinate with national prosecutorial and 
immigration bodies in the United States and European states to assess extraterritorial 
prosecution options for Liberian perpetrators physically present in another 
jurisdiction.
	The Government of Liberia should evaluate with U.S. authorities the 
possibility of bringing prosecutions using U.S. federal criminal laws.278 
	 The Government of Liberia should evaluate with European authorities the 
possibility of bringing prosecutions for serious violations of international 
law. Universal jurisdiction laws in several countries may provide options for 
trying perpetrators present in that territory under domestic legislation.279
•	 In carrying out any domestic prosecutions, the Government of Liberia should create a 
platform for reforming and building capacity in the judicial system, as well as entrenching the 
rule of law. Any additional infrastructure, such as courts, administrative staff, and computer 
systems, created for the purpose of prosecutions of individuals recommended for prosecution 
by the TRC should be transitioned to serve the basic needs of the Liberian justice system 
when the process is complete. 
o The Government of Liberia should only consider traditional and customary justice 
mechanisms that comply with international human rights standards in developing an 
accountability strategy for post-conflict Liberia. Traditional and customary justice 
mechanisms may be most appropriate for low-level perpetrators who participated 
in less serious offenses and for former child combatants. Special care must be taken 
that any traditional accountability mechanisms comply with international human 
rights standards including due process and other rights of the accused, as well as 
Chapter Fourteen
448
Potential Implementation Strategy: Prosecution Options under 
U.S. Law and Universal Jurisdiction
The following statutes allow prosecutions of foreign nationals for crimes committed abroad, although 
the individual must be in the U.S. for jurisdiction to apply. 
- Genocide Accountability Act of 2007: Applies to alleged perpetrators who are present in the United 
States and provides for penalties including life in prison for acts of genocide committed outside the 
United States. 
- Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008: The Act provides for up to 20 years in prison for any 
person who knowingly “recruits, enlists, or conscripts” a person under 15 years of age to the armed 
forces or compels such a child to engage in active hostilities. The act is intended to only affect adult 
perpetrators.
- War Crimes Act of 1996 (18 USC § 2441): This statute applies if the victim or the perpetrator is a U.S. 
citizent or member of the U.S. armed forces and provides for sentences including life imprisonment for 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
- Extraterritorial Torture Statute (18 USC § 2340A): The statute provides for sentences including life 
imprisonment for any person who commits torture abroad. Chuckie Taylor, former ATU leader, was 
recently convicted and sentenced in U.S. District Court to 97 years under this statute280
- Universal Jurisdiction: Investigation and prosecution of foreign nationals who were accused of 
committing serious crimes under international law have been undertaken in Belgium, France, the U.K., 
Spain, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. While actions in many of these countries could initially 
be commenced upon a complaint by a private individual, some laws – in Belgium, for example – have 
been amended to limit these types of privately initiated actions. Although changes such as these 
prevent victims from directly initiating a prosecution, they do not prevent victims from interacting with 
prosecuting authorities and advocating for an investigation and prosecution. Moreover, a coordinated 
strategy on the part of the Liberian government or Liberian civil society actors to work with authorities 
in Europe to initiate prosecutions of individuals believed to have committed genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes could be effective in ending impunity and reducing the burden on a special 
war crimes court. In most countries, a foreign national must actually be present or the individual’s 
presence must be anticipated in order to initiate an investigation. 
U.S. Prosecution Options 
European Prosecution Options
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protections against discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or religion. 
o The Government of Liberia’s prosecution strategy should not be dependent 
on the capacity of prisons in the country. The government should evaluate the 
appropriateness and feasibility of non-custodial sentencing in lieu of imprisonment 
for low-level perpetrators who committed less serious crimes or who did not hold 
command and control responsibility. Any such measures should uphold and respect 
international human rights standards. Alternative sentencing schemes should be 
implemented consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial 
Measures.281 
•	 The Government of Liberia should consider authorizing an international or special tribunal 
to exercise jurisdiction over violations of 
domestic law or other serious crimes under 
international law that took place between 
1979 and 2003. Such consideration should 
take place in consultation with civil society, 
the international community, and other 
appropriate stakeholders. 
o Any such special tribunal must 
meet the minimum standards for 
post-conflict states’ prosecution 
as set forth by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
o Any such special tribunal should be 
developed so as to build the capacity 
of Liberia’s judicial system.
o Any such special tribunal 
should leverage existing judicial 
infrastructure to the greatest extent 
possible. 
•	 The Government of Liberia may wish 
to consider, in consultation with the 
international community, new hybrid models 
that combine international prosecutorial 
mechanisms with internationally-assisted 
domestic prosecutions. Such examples may include:
o Operating an ad hoc international or regional tribunal in tandem with a special, 
internationally-assisted domestic court in Liberia. The domestic court would retain 
jurisdiction over lower-level perpetrators, while the international tribunal would 
have jurisdiction over the worst offenders. Such a mechanism would not only allow 
an international tribunal to try the most controversial cases outside the country, 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Incorporating Traditional Anti-impunity 
Mechanisms
Given the past marginalization of indigenous 
Liberian cultural practices, the Government 
of Liberia should consider incorporation of 
indigenous models of conflict resolution, such 
as palava hut mediation, into its anti-impunity 
strategy to the extent that these models 
conform to international human rights 
standards.
- The Government of Liberia must ensure 
that the fundamental human rights of 
Liberians are assured during any process that 
incorporates traditional practices. 
- The Government of Liberia should ensure 
that training for traditional leaders or other 
arbiters of informal or traditional mechanisms 
is effective in engendering protection for the 
fundamental rights of the participants, both 
victims and perpetrators. 
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but also retain the benefits to the Liberian judiciary and enhance visibility to the 
Liberian people through the domestic court. 
o Creating an ad hoc regional or international tribunal to act as a court of appeals. 
This tribunal would have limited jurisdiction to hear cases appealed from a special, 
internationally-assisted domestic court in Liberia. The responsibility and authority 
to try all conflict-related cases would rest on the Liberian judiciary, but retain an 
international mechanism for appeals. Such a tribunal could also serve as a permanent, 
regional appeals court for crimes of international law tried in domestic African 
courts. 
•	 In evaluating all bilateral and international options, the Government of Liberia should 
determine the feasibility of using existing mechanisms by seeking to expand their jurisdiction 
to encompass crimes committed during the TRC mandate period.
o The Government of Liberia should evaluate the possibility of proposing an 
amendment of the Rome Statute to grant jurisdiction to the International Criminal 
Court for crimes committed in Liberia before July 1, 2002.283 
o The Government of Liberia should evaluate the possibility of proposing an 
amendment to the Economic Community of West African States treaty to grant the 
Community Court of Justice authority to redress criminal violations of international 
law committed by nationals of Member States.284
o The Government of Liberia should explore, with international and regional 
actors, the possibility of a bilateral agreement to try perpetrators using an ad hoc 
prosecutorial mechanism. Such discussions may include amending the Special Court 
Tokyo Rules: Non-custodial Sentences for Low-level Perpetrators
According to the Tokyo Rules, sentencing authorities may dispose of cases in the following ways:282
- Verbal sanctions, such as admonition, reprimand, and warning;
- Conditional discharge;
- Status penalties;
- Economic sanctions and monetary penalties, such as fines and day-fines;
- Confiscation or an expropriation order;
- Restitution to the victim or a compensation order;
- Suspended or deferred sentence; 
- Probation and judicial supervision;
- Community service order;
- Referral to an attendance center;
- House arrest;
- Any other mode of non-institutional treatment; and
- Some combination of the measures listed above.
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for Sierra Leone’s statute to grant it jurisdiction over crimes committed in Liberia 
during the conflict, and using International Criminal Court facilities as a more secure 
mechanism to try perpetrators, as in the case of Charles Taylor. 
Amnesty
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that any grants of amnesty do not benefit perpetrators 
who violated international humanitarian law or who committed crimes against humanity, as 
specified in the TRC Act.285
•	 The process for requesting and the criteria for granting amnesty should be developed in 
consultation with civil society and victims groups. Criteria should be transparent and widely 
disseminated in a form that is accessible to all Liberians.
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that any grants of amnesty or clemency do not 
prejudice victims’ right to reparation or the right to know.286
Vetting
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure 
that public officials and employees who 
are personally responsible for violations of 
human rights do not continue to serve in state 
institutions.287 A vetting process is particularly 
important given that many individuals who 
participated in human rights violations may 
not realistically be subject to prosecution.
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that 
persons formally charged with individual responsibility for serious crimes under international 
law are suspended from official duties during criminal or disciplinary proceedings.288
•	 In undertaking vetting processes, the Government of Liberia should prioritize personnel 
reform in the military, law enforcement, intelligence services, the judiciary, and other 
institutions that are designed to uphold the rule of law.289 Because vetting processes are 
already under way with regard to the military and police, attention should rapidly focus on 
the judiciary and the legislature.
•	 Any vetting process for government office holders and personnel should be carried out under 
a legal mandate, be individualized, guarantee fundamental due process of law, involve a fair 
hearing, utilize a preponderance of the evidence standard, and entail a right to appeal.290 In 
any vetting process, a preliminary assessment of whether an individual was appointed in 
accordance with law should be undertaken, as that determination may eliminate the need 
for a vetting process because individuals who were illegally appointed can be immediately 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Vetting
Because of the deep divisions in Liberian 
society, the widespread involvement in 
conflict activities, and the fundamental lack 
of civic trust, it may be useful to engage a 
non-Liberian entity to implement a vetting 
process.
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removed.
Civil Claims
•	 The Government of Liberia should guarantee broad legal standing to any wronged party and 
to any person or non-governmental organization having a legitimate interest in pursuing a 
civil action on behalf of a wronged party.291
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that its policies do not impede the efforts of 
individual Liberians or groups of Liberians to file claims in foreign jurisdictions for human 
rights and humanitarian violations committed during Liberia’s civil wars, such as claims 
under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act or the Torture Victims Protection Act.
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Section v. corruption
Corruption, both real and perceived, has undermined the confidence of many Liberians in their 
government and other public and private institutions. The Government of Liberia has made combating 
corruption one of its top priorities. It must maintain vigilance in this regard in order to rebuild the 
confidence of Liberians inside and outside of Liberia. 
The Government of Liberia is a state party to the U.N. Convention against Corruption 292 and 
the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.293 Accordingly, the 
Government of Liberia is obligated to implement the provisions of these treaties, specifically ensuring 
the existence of an independent body, such as the newly established Anti-Corruption Commission, 
to oversee domestic implementation of the Conventions in the areas of conduct of public officials, 
public procurement, the judiciary, and prosecutors, as well as in the private sector. The Advocates 
recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
provide the U.N. Conference of 
the States Parties with information 
on its programs, plans, and 
practices, as well as on legislative 
and administrative measures to 
implement the U.N. Convention 
against Corruption.294
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should encourage the development 
of procedures for accreditation 
and active participation of relevant 
non-governmental organizations 
in the U.N. Convention against 
Corruption Conference of the 
States Parties.295
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
cooperate fully with the A.U. 
Advisory Board on Corruption.297 
 
In addition to these core treaties, relevant non-governmental organization and civil society monitoring 
reports provide a guiding framework in combating corruption. The Advocates recommends the 
following: 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
2004 Global Corruption Report
 In seeking to reduce corruption in the political sphere, 
the Government of Liberia may wish to consider 
the following strategies put forth in the 2004 Global 
Corruption Report:
1. Disclosure is one of the best methods to track 
corruption. The capacity to generate an audit trail is 
invaluable to both deterrence and accountability.
2. Enforcing asset disclosure laws is another means of 
countering the misuse of funds, as well as to facilitate 
and aid the work of enforcement bodies.
3. The Government of Liberia should aim for total rather 
than partial disclosure. Poor data quality or inconsistent 
interpretations thereof, limited access to data, and low 
quantity data constitute examples of partial disclosure 
and are to be avoided.296 
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•	 The Government of Liberia should provide the newly established Anti-Corruption 
Commission with the necessary resources and enforcement powers to effectively carry out 
its mandate.
•	 The Government of Liberia should pass legislation that establishes and provides penalties 
for criminal acts constituting corruption including bribery of national public officials, 
embezzlement or misappropriation of public property by a public official, abuse of functions, 
bribery in the private sector, illicit enrichment, embezzlement in the private sector, laundering 
of proceeds of crime, and obstruction of justice.298
•	 The Government of Liberia should actively prosecute individuals who commit crimes of 
corruption.
•	 The Government of Liberia should update criminal procedure laws to ensure that a longer 
statute of limitations is linked to discovery of acts of corruption and that whistleblower 
witnesses can be protected as they give evidence in court through the use of technology to 
shield their identity.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that public officials declare assets prior to taking 
office and continue to do so regularly during the course of their tenures so as to better 
monitor illicit enrichment.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure the dissemination of and adherence to its public 
officials’ code of conduct and rules and procedures for civil servants.
•	 The Government of Liberia should establish a Civil Service Commission and ensure timely, 
adequate remuneration of civil servants.
•	 The Government of Liberia should focus on strengthening and auditing both the internal 
control and the compliance culture in the entire system of public procurement and 
management of public finance.
Potential Implementation Strategy: 2007 Global Corruption Report 
In seeking to reduce corruption in the judicial sphere, the Government of Liberia may wish to consider 
the following strategies put forth in Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Report:
1. Development of an objective and transparent appointment process that will ensure that high quality 
candidates are selected without being indebted to an influential politician or senior judge. 
2. Introduction of laws to protect judicial salaries and working conditions in order to ensure that judicial 
rulings are free from manipulation and intimidation. 
3. Limits on judicial terms of ten years, not subject to renewal, so that judges do not allow anticipation 
of term renewal to affect their rulings.
4. Adoption of a confidential complaint procedure to trigger an investigation by an independent body 
to address claims of judicial corruption.299
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•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure transparency and competitive bidding in the 
process of public procurement and concessions.
•	 The Government of Liberia should develop a national policy on decentralization across 
ministries, as well as clear guidelines and a timeframe for implementation.
•	 The Government of Liberia should advance reforms that provide increased opportunities for 
political participation on the local and county levels.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that the tax system is structured so that a 
proportion of taxes stay in the county for the purposes of development, education, rebuilding 
infrastructure, etc.
•	 The Government of Liberia should develop sustainable mechanisms for local constituencies 
to play a role in decision-making about resource allocation and prioritization in their areas.
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
2005 Global Corruption Report
In seeking to reduce corruption in the sphere of public construction contracts as well as post conflict 
reconstruction, the Government of Liberia may wish to consider the following strategies put forth in 
Transparency International’s 2005 Global Corruption Report:
1. Opening of state awarded contracts to competitive bidding free of favor. A reasonable amount of 
time must be given between the selection and signing of the contract, so as to allow any aggrieved 
competitor an opportunity to challenge the decision. 
2. Provision of open access to all information regarding the contract, save what is legally protected, by 
the contracting authority. 
3. Decentralization to ensure that contractor selection, contracting supervision, and project control are 
based in separate offices. 
4. Adequate remuneration of and regular rotations for staff in sensitive positions.300
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Section vi. economic, Social, and cultural rightS
An overriding concern of statement givers in the diaspora was the sustainable and equitable 
development of Liberia’s people, infrastructure, and natural resources. Statement givers generally 
outlined rebuilding of schools, hospitals, and roads as paramount priorities. Sanitation, electricity, 
business investment, and agriculture were also important. The right to sustainable and equitable 
development is already enshrined in Liberia’s constitution, which states that the government “shall, 
consistent with the principles of individual freedom and social justice…manage the national economy 
and the natural resources of Liberia in such manner as shall ensure the maximum feasible participation 
of Liberian citizens under conditions of equality [so] as to advance the general welfare of the Liberian 
people and the economic development of Liberia.”301 In addition, the Liberian constitution provides 
for equal access to education and employment.302
Much action and planning related to sustainable and equitable development in Liberia, including 
education and healthcare, is already underway as part of the national Poverty Reduction Strategy. This 
strategy document provides policy guidance for development priorities in Liberia and should receive 
the support of national, regional, and international actors, donors, and policy makers. 
Apart from these domestic initiatives, the Government of Liberia has ratified the main international 
treaty that pertains to these issues – the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Although many of the international principles relevant to sustainable and equitable development 
and economic and social rights are not contained in any treaty, the Government of Liberia should 
undertake the following actions with regard to international treaties:
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its initial periodic report to the 
CESCR;
•	 Ratify and incorporate into domestic law International Labour Organisation (No. 117) Social 
Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention;
•	 Work toward the full implementation of the recommendations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child in its 2004 concluding observations relating to education; 
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its report to the Secretary-General 
of the OAU describing the measures taken to give effect to the rights set forth in the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;303
•	 Ratify and incorporate into domestic law the Convention on Technical and Vocational 
Education, which sets forth the standards relating to the development of technical and 
vocational education;
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit all due and overdue periodic reports 
to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
without delay, and dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit its second and 
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third periodic reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child describing the measures 
taken to give effect to the rights set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child by 
July 3, 2009; and
•	 Take all appropriate legislative and other necessary measures to ensure that the provisions 
related to health in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child are fully reflected in domestic law and practice.
The Liberian constitution, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, the Declaration on the Right to Development, 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, and Millennium Development Goals provide a 
guiding framework in making recommendations related to sustainable and equitable development in 
Liberia. The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should direct its 
policies toward the “well-being and development 
of the population and to the promotion of its 
desire for social progress,” with “due regard to 
[more general policies’] effect upon the well-being 
of the population.”304 When planning economic 
development, “improvement of standards of living 
[must] be regarded as the principal objective.”305
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize 
that everyone has the right to enjoy the “highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”307 The Liberian government should take 
steps to achieve realization of this right, including 
measures required for:
o The reduction of the stillbirth-rate and 
infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child;
o The improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene;
o The prevention, treatment, and control 
of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and 
other diseases; and
o The creation of conditions that would 
assure to all citizens medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Education and Agricultural 
Development
In Malawi, the Millennium Villages 
Project impacts the lives of people on 
many levels. The program provides 
fertilizer and maize seeds for cultivation 
on individual farms. Those who receive 
these supplies must contribute bags of 
maize to a community grain bank after 
cultivation. The community participating 
in the program also sets aside land to 
raise new trees and plants nitrogen-
fixing trees to ensure the sustainability 
of the program. Finally, the community 
grain bank allows the community 
not only to access maize at a price 
agreed upon by the community when 
government grain provision is running 
low, but also to use the maize as a part 
of a feeding program for the community 
schools. Community volunteers prepare 
the community maize to provide meals 
once a day to pupils; the provision of 
meals has greatly enhanced education 
performance in the area.306 
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or injury.308
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should ensure all necessary 
measures for the realization 
of the right to development, 
including equality of oppor-
tunity for all to access basic 
resources, education, health 
services, food, housing, employ-
ment, and the fair distribution 
of income. Effective measures 
should be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process. 
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all 
social injustices.310
•	 The Government of Liberia shall recognize the right of everyone to “enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications.”312 Cooperation between the private sector and the 
state should make available the “benefits of new technologies, especially information and 
communications.”313 
•	 The Government of Liberia, in concert with the international community, should take action 
to implement measures toward: 
o advancement of industrialization with due regard for its social aspects, in the interests 
of the entire population; 
o development of an adequate organization and legal framework conducive to an 
uninterrupted and diversified growth of the industrial sector; 
o measures to overcome the adverse social effects which may result from urban 
development and industrialization, including automation; 
o maintenance of a proper balance between rural and urban development; and 
o in particular, measures designed to ensure healthier living conditions, especially in 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Water Pumps as Toys
PlayPumps International has developed a roundabout 
(merry-go-round) toy that pumps water whenever children 
spin on it. The roundabout has the capacity to pump 1400 
liters of water per hour from underground into a storage 
tank. Furthermore, communities can use the 2,500 liter 
storage tanks to lease space for educational messages 
about health or consumer advertising—profits from which 
can finance the pump’s maintenance.309
Potential Implementation Strategy: Income Generation through the SEED Program
In Mozambique, the Sustainable and Effective Economic Development (SEED) Program aims to reduce 
poverty by diversifying both agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities and 
increasing local access to and control over these activities. The project “1) strengthens and increases 
farmers’ links with civil society, government, and private sector partners who can contribute to 
commercial opportunities; 2) builds farmers’ capacity to identify, develop, and manage agricultural 
activities with the greatest potential for commercialization; and 3) builds farmers’ capacity to identify 
and develop non-agricultural economic opportunities with the greatest income-generating potential.” It 
has included access to technical services for agricultural projects, training on techniques, and training on 
business topics.311
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large industrial centers. 
Education
Liberians again and again told the TRC that lack of education was a primary cause 
of the civil crises in Liberia and they recommended that education be the basis for 
Liberia’s development going forward. The Constitution of Liberia enshrines this 
national priority, stating that the govern-ment must provide “equal access to educational opportunities 
and facilities for all citizens” and placing emphasis on “the mass education of the Liberian people and 
the elimination of illiteracy.”314 In addition, the Government of Liberia has ratified the Convention 
against Discrimination in Education and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
which create legally binding obligations relative to the provision of free and compulsory primary 
education, access to education without discrimination, and making higher and vocational educational 
accessible and available.315 Drawing on these and other relevant international standards, The Advocates 
recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize 
that everyone has the right to education, which 
is to be directed to the “full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and 
shall strengthen the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…[E]ducation shall enable all 
persons to participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious 
groups, and further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace.”316
•	 The Government of Liberia should increase access 
to education by ensuring respect for the right 
to education without discrimination based on 
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, economic 
condition or birth.”319 
•	 In compliance with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, the Government of Liberia 
should eliminate discrimination against women in 
order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Increase Access to Primary Education 
through Elimination of User Fees 
Charged by Public Schools
The Government of Liberia should 
take measures to eliminate user fees 
charged by public primary schools 
by ensuring such institutions need 
not resort to charging fees to fund 
operations, which leads to large 
dropout rates due to economic 
hardship on their parents.317 
Nevertheless, as the World Bank 
notes, to ensure that the abolition 
of user fees does not adversely 
affect the quality of education, other 
revenue sources must be available to 
replace user fees.318 The role of the 
donor community is indispensable 
to achieving elimination of these 
user fees. The Government of 
Liberia should work with the donor 
community to eliminate user fees and 
find alternative funding for education.
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field of education and, in particular, to ensure on a basis of equality of men and women the 
“reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of programmes for girls and 
women who have left school prematurely.”320 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that educational quality not be compromised in 
the wake of increased enrollment under Liberia’s free and compulsory primary education 
policy.324 The Liberian government should assign high priority to earmarking an adequate 
proportion of the national budget for the development of education.325
•	 The Government of Liberia should take steps to improve Liberian teachers’ socioeconomic 
status, living and working conditions, terms of employment, and future professional 
prospects.326 
•	 The Government of Liberia should undertake “as a matter of urgency” to eradicate 
overcrowding, as well as shortages of educational materials and qualified teachers.327 
•	 The Government of Liberia should reform the salary and payment structure for teachers 
to ensure teachers receive adequate wages in a manner that is both timely and accessible. In 
particular, teachers’ salaries should reflect the importance of the teaching profession, teachers, 
and their responsibilities; correlate with other jobs’ wages requiring similar qualifications, as 
well as be commensurate with teachers’ certifications; and provide teachers “with the means 
to ensure a reasonable standard of living for themselves and their families as well as to invest 
in further education or in the pursuit of cultural activities, thus enhancing their professional 
qualification.”328 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Increasing the Enrollment of Girls in School
Efforts to increase girls’ enrollment should include not only gender-neutral measures to increase 
accessibility, but measures to address social and cultural practices that discriminate against women and 
girls. 
The Women’s Refugee Commission (formerly the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and 
Children) provides strategies in this regard, e.g. conduct public sensitization on education of girls, 
enforce prohibitions against early marriage, carry out reproductive health campaigns aimed at 
eliminating teenage pregnancy, ensure that school have adequate facilities including restrooms for girls, 
and prohibit and punish sexual violence against girls in schools. The government should explore, with 
donor agencies, the possibility of providing economic incentives or wage-earning opportunities to girls, 
particularly girl mothers, who attend school.321 
The Bangladesh Female Secondary School Assistance Program used the following implementation 
strategies when seeking to increase rural girls’ enrollment and retention in secondary schools: 1) 
providing scholarships that cover tuition, books, school supplies, and transport for rural girls; 2) 
increasing the number of female teachers; 3) educational/training programs to educate communities on 
the importance of girls’ education; and 4) the reformation of curricula to include relevant occupational 
skills to girls.322 
Other models include Canadian programs in Egypt that have created flexible schooling schedules to 
better enable girls in rural environments to attend school while still doing their work at home.323 
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•	 With regard to rural teachers, the 
Government of Liberia should take 
steps to accommodate their situation, for 
example, through the provision of free or 
subsidized housing, payment of travel and 
moving expenses, and provision of travel 
expenses to maintain their professional 
qualifications.331 
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
prioritize the recruitment, selection, 
training, and retention of teachers in 
Liberia. The Advocates recommends that 
the 1966 ILO/UNESCO Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Teachers and the 
1997 U.N. Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organisation Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher Education 
Teaching Personnel serve as the guiding framework with regard to this issue. In particular, 
the Government of Liberia should:
o Provide adequate spots for training teachers and incentives to complete teacher 
certification;332
o Require completion of secondary school and the teacher training institute to 
teach in Liberia, recognizing there may be exceptions for persons who possess 
valuable experience, especially in vocational and technical areas; and333 
o Work toward the creation of more teacher training institutions. To this end, refer 
particularly to the guidelines in the Teacher Preparation Programmes and Teacher 
Preparation Institutions sections of the ILO/UNESCO Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Teachers.334
•	 The Government of Liberia should identify strategies and implement programs and curricula 
for technical and vocational education designed for young people and adults, within the 
framework of their respective education systems. Such programs should enable them to 
acquire the knowledge and skills “essential to economic and social development as well as to 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Scaled Salaries for Teachers
The Kosovo government increased salaries 
for all teachers, varying those increases 
according to education credentials; the range 
of increases spanned from up to 22% for 
teachers with certification from a teachers’ 
college to up to a 47% increase for masters 
and Ph.D. level educators.329 Also, one agency 
coordinated the range of training initiatives 
launched by non-governmental organizations, 
communities, and agencies so as to provide 
clarity regarding the options and also to assist 
the Ministry of Education in developing its 
teacher training policy.330
Potential Implementation Strategy: Increase Female Representation in the Teaching Profession
Take active steps to increase recruitment and retention of females to the teaching profession. The 
Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children notes that this will require increasing female 
enrollment that stems largely from low enrollment of girls in higher primary and post-primary grades.335 
Thus, implementing recommendations related to education of the girl child is essential to achieving this 
goal. 
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the personal and cultural fulfillment of the individual.”336 
Healthcare
Much of the trauma Liberians experienced during the conflict has gone untreated or remains under-
treated, and Liberians remain in need of both basic and specialized health care services, including 
mental health services. The international instruments discussed at the beginning of this section provide 
a guiding framework for effective implementation of the right to health for Liberians, specifically 
making clear that every individual has a right to the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 
The Advocates recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that the right to health includes both “timely and 
appropriate health care,” as well as the “underlying determinants of health, such as access 
to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition 
and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related 
education and information, including education on sexual and reproductive health.”337 
•	 To fully recognize the right to health, the Government of Liberia should base activities on the 
premise that the right to health includes the following elements as defined by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 338
o Availability. Functioning public 
health and health-care facilities, 
goods, and services, as well as 
programs, have to be available in 
sufficient quantity. The precise 
nature of the facilities, goods, 
and services will vary depending 
on numerous factors, including 
Liberia’s developmental level. At 
a minimum, however, they will 
include the underlying deter-
minants of health, such as: 
•	 safe and potable drinking 
water and adequate sani-
tation facilities, 
•	 hospitals, clinics, and 
other health-related buildings, 
•	 trained medical and professional personnel receiving domestically competi-
tive salaries, and 
•	 essential drugs, as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs.
Potential Implementation Strategy: Coupling 
Health Education with Healthcare Packages
In Mexico the program Oportunidades included 
a component whereby health packages were 
provided to families, and those health packages 
included mandatory health promotion talks 
that educated families on issues of reproductive 
health.339 The Government of Liberia may 
consider similar education campaigns to help 
combat issues associated with reproductive 
health such as early pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, STI 
transmission, maternal care, and other health 
issues. 
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o Accessibility. Health facilities, goods, and services have to be accessible to everyone 
without discrimination within Liberia. Accessibility has four overlapping dimensions: 
•	 Non-discrimination: health facilities, goods, and services must be 
accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of 
the population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the 
prohibited grounds. 
•	 Physical accessibility: health facilities, goods, and services must be within 
safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially vulnerable or 
marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous populations, 
women, children, adolescents, older persons, persons with disabilities, and 
persons with HIV/AIDS. Accessibility also implies that medical services 
and underlying determinants of health, such as safe and potable water and 
adequate sanitation facilities, are within safe physical reach, including in 
rural areas. Accessibility further includes adequate access to buildings for 
persons with disabilities. 
•	 Affordability: health facilities, goods, and services must be affordable for all. 
Payment for health care services, as well as services related to the underlying 
determinants of health, must be based on the principle of equity, ensuring 
that these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for 
all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer 
households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses 
as compared to richer households. 
•	 Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas concerning health issues. Accessibility of 
information, however, should not impair the right to have personal health data 
treated with confidentiality.
o Acceptability. All health facilities, goods, and services must be respectful of 
medical ethics and respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and 
communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, and be designed to 
respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned.
o Quality. Health facilities, goods, and services must also be scientifically and medically 
appropriate and of good quality. This requires skilled medical personnel, scientifically 
approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, and 
adequate sanitation.
•	 Counseling and psycho-social support should be available to all victims and their dependents 
as needed. To this end, the government should collaborate with mental health organizations to 
provide training to religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, and community-
based groups on this issue.340 Mental health care should also be context-appropriate and 
gender- and culturally-sensitive, and it should avoid re-victimization and stigmatization.341 
The government should sensitize those working in services such as education and civil 
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society to mental health issues and care.342 It should also utilize and help rebuild traditional 
and community-based support mechanisms as a way of promoting mental health of the 
population.343 When addressing the mental health needs of people, the government should 
refer to the recommendations set forth in the Declaration of Cooperation in Mental Health of 
Refugees, Displaced and Other Populations Affected by Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations 
(2000) as a guiding framework.344 
•	 Health care to treat physical ailments should be 
available to all victims, in particular those who 
sustained injuries during the war and victims of 
sexual violence.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure 
the promotion of women’s right to health, 
including sexual and reproductive health.346 
This right includes: 
o the right to control fertility;
o the right to decide whether to have 
children, the number of children, and 
the spacing of children;
o the right to choose any method of 
contraception;
o the right to self-protection and to be 
protected against sexually transmitted 
infections, including HIV/AIDS;
o the right to be informed on one’s 
health status and on the health status 
of one’s partner, particularly if affected 
with sexually transmitted infections, 
including HIV/AIDS, in accordance 
with internationally recognized 
standards and best practices;
o the right to have family planning 
education; and347
o the right to maternal health and nutritional services.348
Potential Implementation Strategy: Public 
Education on Reproductive Health
Studies by the Guttmacher Institute 
looking at groups of African countries have 
found several implementation strategies 
that are particularly necessary or effective 
for addressing issues of reproductive 
health.345 For example, mass media--
particularly radio, and also television and 
newspapers--was found to be a major 
source of information for youth. Television 
shows or government newspapers with 
programs addressing issues of sexual and 
reproductive health had a positive impact. 
People in traditional roles had a large 
impact through disseminating information, 
and thus education and awareness 
programs targeted at these leaders are 
essential. Importantly, those interventions 
that were most comprehensive and relied 
on multiple sectors such as schools, 
health systems, and communities, had 
the greatest impact. The Government 
of Liberia may wish to consider similar 
strategies when seeking to promote and 
enhance reproductive health.
465
Section vii. non-diScrimination meaSureS related to minoritieS and women
Statement givers clearly identified discrimination as a major root cause of the conflict in Liberia. 
Protection of minorities both through assuring non-discrimination and through affirmative action to 
address past discriminatory policies should be the central tenets of regaining national unity. One of the 
key doctrines of protecting against discrimination is constitutionalization of an anti-discrimination 
norm.349 Liberia’s constitution already enshrines several important non-discrimination principles. 
Article 11(a) states that all “persons, irrespective of ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin 
or political opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, subject to 
such qualifications as provided for in this Constitution.” Also, the constitution specifically protects 
the right to equal employment regardless of membership in any of the aforementioned categories.350 
The constitution includes a policy directive to provide equal access to educational opportunities and 
facilities for all citizens.351 
Protection of Minorities
Minorities for the purpose of international human rights are groups in a non-dominant position 
relative to the state who possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of 
the population, and who demonstrate a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their distinctive 
collective identity.352 Targeting of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups during the conflict was widely 
reported by statement givers and must be addressed in order to rebuild national unity in Liberia.
Liberia acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1976 and is accordingly obligated to implement the terms of that international 
treaty. Liberia has never submitted a periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.353 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, relevant 
treaty body instruments, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, and the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief provide a guiding framework for the right to be free from discrimination. The Advocates 
recommends the following:
•	 The Government of Liberia should support an amendment to the Liberian Constitution to 
protect against discrimination based on ethnicity, tribe, and language.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that Liberia’s constitutional protections against 
discrimination are fully enforced through implementing legislation and national policy.354
•	 The Government of Liberia should take all appropriate legislative measures to ensure that the 
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are 
fully reflected in domestic law.355
Chapter Fourteen
466
•	 The Government of Liberia should undertake as quickly as possible to comply with Article 
9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requiring a 
“report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted 
and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention.” In submitting its report to the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Liberia should 
pay particular attention to reviewing the current status of its laws relative to the right to a 
nationality,356 the right to property,357 and the right to inherit,358 as well as the full scope of 
economic, social, and cultural rights.359
•	 The Government of Liberia should welcome the offer of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination to send a representative to visit Liberia and to initiate dialogue on 
full and effective implementation of its obligations under the Convention.362
Protection of Minorities: Education
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
ensure that its national educational 
policy is developed in compliance 
with international standards on 
non-discrimination, in particular 
the Convention against Discrimi-
nation in Education, which 
Liberia ratified in 1962.363 The 
policy should expressly include 
non-discrimination measures and 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Constitutional Protections against Discrimination
The Ugandan constitution provides for a wide array of protected classes. “(1) All persons are equal 
before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life and in every other 
respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law. (2) Without prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a 
person shall not be discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, 
creed or religion, social or economic standing, political opinion or disability. (3) For the purposes of this 
article, “discriminate” means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly 
to their respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, social 
or economic standing, political opinion or disability. (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament 
from enacting laws that are necessary for— (a) implementing policies and programmes aimed at 
redressing social, economic, educational or other imbalance in society; or (b) making such provision as 
is required or authorised to be made under this Constitution; or (c) providing for any matter acceptable 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”360 The constitution of Malawi prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of several enumerated statuses as well as “other status.”361 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Bilingual Education
Many children learn most effectively when they learn 
through the medium of their first language; however, 
providing primary education in all Liberian indigenous 
languages likely would prove an insurmountable barrier. 
U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation 
suggests that bilingual education in an official language 
and in an indigenous language is an appropriate 
strategy to ensure that children have equal opportunity 
to learn and maintain their cultural heritage.364 
467
should provide for effective individual complaint mechanisms to ensure enforcement of 
those measures.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that indigenous African traditional knowledge 
is a component of the national educational policy. The Liberian national educational policy 
should provide for inclusion of local knowledge and practices into the framework of the 
formal education system, 365 in compliance with international human rights standards.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that educational materials, teacher recruitment 
and training, and curricular development all promote intercultural education.366
•	 The Government of Liberia must ensure that persons belonging to minorities have adequate 
opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole, have the right to all levels and 
forms of education of the State without discrimination, and have access, when possible, to an 
education in their own culture and provided in their own language.367
Protection of Minorities: Land & Cultural Rights
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that commercial and development initiatives 
conduct pre-implementation assessments of proposed projects’ impact on traditional land use 
patterns and on marginalization of local communities. Where assessments indicate that there 
would be a negative impact, project redesign should be undertaken in consultation with local 
communities.
•	 The Government of Liberia should develop a national policy on protection of cultural rights, 
including measures detailing how Liberia will provide resources, and take other affirmative 
action to guarantee the exercise of cultural rights.368 
Protection of Minorities: Linguistic Rights
•	 The Government of Liberia should take measures wherever possible to ensure that persons 
belonging to minorities have “adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have 
instruction in their mother tongue.”371 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Using a Local-Knowledge Approach
Villages in both Guatemala and Bolivia take a local-knowledge approach in order to make learning 
more accessible and holistic. In a Guatemalan village, Save the Children’s Early Childhood Development 
project created lessons through the lenses of Mayan folklore, developing children’s cognitive abilities, 
communication, and problem solving skills.369 This encouraged respect for Mayan values, as well as for 
nature and family. Women in Bolivia gain literacy skills in their indigenous language as they read about 
relevant health issues.370
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•	 The Government of Liberia should engage in a national consultative process focused on 
developing a strategy for protection and promotion of indigenous languages as well as a 
framework for ensuring that linguistic barriers do not prohibit Liberians from effectively 
exercising their rights and benefiting from opportunities. 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that protection of indigenous languages is 
embedded in appropriate legislation, including the constitution. 
Protection of Minorities: Religion
•	 The Government of Liberia should “take effective measures to prevent and eliminate 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and 
cultural life”372 in full-consideration of the directives in the Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief as well as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.373
•	 The Government of Liberia should “make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where 
necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and…take all appropriate measures to combat 
intolerance on the grounds of religion or other.”374 In particular, national holidays and official 
government closures should be evaluated in light of discrimination on the basis of religion 
or belief.375 
•	 To ensure that the Liberian constitutional and legislative system provides adequate and 
effective guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief to all without 
distinction, the Government of Liberia should ensure provision of effective remedies in cases 
where the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, and the right to practice 
freely one’s religion, including the right to change one’s religion or belief, is violated.376
Protection of Minorities: Disability Access Rights
•	 The Government of Liberia should ratify and incorporate into Liberian law the Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities and 
its First Optional Protocol.377 
•	 The Government of Liberia should institute appropriate measures for the rehabilitation of 
mentally or physically disabled persons, especially children and youth, so as to enable them 
to the fullest possible extent to be productive and participating members of society. These 
measures should include the provision of treatment and technical appliances, education, 
vocational and social guidance, training and selective placement, and other assistance required 
to create social conditions in which the handicapped are not discriminated against because 
of their disabilities.378
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Women’s Human Rights
Women in Liberia experienced violence and other forms of discrimination as a result of their sex, 
prior to, during, and after the conflict. Many women spoke to the TRC about the structural societal 
constraints that impact their lives in Liberia. But women also play powerful social, economic, political, 
and other roles in Liberian culture. Ensuring their safety, health, participation, and empowerment in 
all aspects of Liberian society will be essential to developing the full potential of the Liberian nation 
in the post-conflict era. The Government of Liberia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and is therefore bound to the obligations set 
forth in those treaties. The Government of Liberia has signed, but not ratified, the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Making a commitment to women’s human rights through international instruments is an important 
component of protecting and empowering women in Liberia. Accordingly, The Advocates recommends 
that the Government of Liberia:
•	 Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women;
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit all due and overdue periodic reports 
to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 
•	 Dedicate appropriate and sufficient resources to submit a report describing the legislative and 
other steps taken to achieve the rights set forth in the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.379
The international treaties and declarations discussed above provide a guiding framework for the 
promotion and protection of women’s human rights in Liberia. In addition, many of the issues pertinent 
to women’s human rights intersect with other recommendations that are described elsewhere in this 
report. The Advocates makes the following recommendations:
Women’s Human Rights: Ending Violence against Women
•	 The Government of Liberia should condemn violence against women as defined in the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa and in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. Specifically, “violence against women means all acts perpetrated against 
women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm, 
including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions 
on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time and during 
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situations of armed conflicts or of war.”380 
•	 The Government of Liberia should “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”381
•	 The Government of Liberia should work 
toward the full implementation of the 
measures outlined in article 4 of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, specifically:
o Exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, and, in accordance 
with national legislation, punish 
acts of violence against women, 
whether those acts are perpetrated 
by the State or by private persons;
o Develop penal, civil, labor, and 
administrative sanctions in domes-
tic legislation to punish and redress 
the wrongs caused to women who 
are subjected to violence; women 
who are subjected to violence 
should be provided with access to the mechanisms of justice and, as provided for 
by national legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harm that they have 
suffered; States should also inform women of their rights in seeking redress through 
such mechanisms;
o Consider the possibility of developing national plans of action to promote the 
protection of women against any form of violence, or to include provisions for 
that purpose in plans already existing, taking into account, as appropriate, such 
cooperation as can be provided by non-governmental organizations, particularly 
those concerned with the issue of violence against women;
o Work to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible in the light of available resources 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Self-sustaining Shelters for Victims of 
Violence against Women
In Bulgaria, the organization Open Door Center 
provides legal and other assistance to women 
victims of violence. The Municipality of Pleven 
gave permission to the shelter to operate 
economic activities. The laundry service run 
by Open Door Center enables it to generate 
revenue that is re-invested into providing 
assistance to women victims of violence. This 
model enables the group to maintain a self-
sufficient shelter for victims of violence that 
is not dependent on external funding from 
governmental or international sources.382
Potential Implementation Strategy:  Gender Mainstreaming in Government-funded Programs
The Government of Liberia may wish to consider mainstreaming actions to combat violence against 
women into its government funded programs, projects, or loans. For example, the Inter-American 
Development Bank has developed loan practices that integrate gender concerns into its projects. 
When making loans that relate to citizen security, the relevant projects have included funding to 
raise awareness on domestic violence; funding for training of police and judges on issues of domestic 
violence; funding that enables government security information systems that contain relevant and 
accurate data on domestic violence; and funding to women’s non-governmental organizations with 
expertise in the area of domestic violence. 383
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and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation, that women 
subjected to violence and, where appropriate, their children have specialized 
assistance, such as rehabilitation, assistance in child care and maintenance, treatment, 
counseling, and health and social services facilities and programs, as well as support 
structures, and should take all other appropriate measures to promote their safety 
and physical and psychological rehabilitation;
o Include in government budgets adequate resources for activities related to the 
elimination of violence against women;
o Take measures to ensure that law enforcement officers and public officials responsible 
for implementing policies to prevent, investigate and punish violence against women 
receive training to sensitize them to the needs of women;
o Adopt all appropriate measures, especially in the field of education, to modify the 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, 
customary practices, and all other practices based on the idea of the inferiority or 
superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped roles for men and women;
o Promote research, collect data, and compile statistics, especially concerning domestic 
violence, relating to the prevalence of different forms of violence against women and 
Beijing Platform for Action: Twelve Areas of Concern
The Beijing Platform for Action reaffirms that the rights of women and girls are an “inalienable, integral 
and indivisible part of universal human rights.”384 The Platform for Action calls upon governments to take 
action in 12 areas of concern. The Advocates recommends that when designing national policies and 
programs to address women’s human rights the Government of Liberia take into account these critical 
issues:
- The persistent and increasing burden of poverty on women
- Inequalities and inadequacies in and unequal access to education and training
- Inequalities and inadequacies in and unequal access to health care and related services
- Violence against women
- The effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living under foreign 
occupation
- Inequality in economic structures and policies, in all forms of productive activities and in access to 
resources
- Inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels
- Insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women
- Lack of respect for and inadequate promotion and protection of the human rights of women
- Stereotyping of women and inequality in women’s access to and participation in all communication 
systems, especially in the media
- Gender inequalities in the management of natural resources and in the safeguarding of the 
environment
- Persistent discrimination against and violation of the rights of the girl child.385
Chapter Fourteen
472
encourage research on the causes, nature, seriousness and consequences of violence 
against women and on the effectiveness of measures implemented to prevent and 
redress violence against women; those statistics and findings of the research will be 
made public; and
o Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines to assist in the implementation 
of the principles set forth in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women.
Women’s Human Rights: Anti-discrimination Measures
Discrimination against women is pervasive in Liberia. As outlined in article 1 of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, discrimination 
against women means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction or any differential treatment based on 
sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment, or the exercise 
by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres 
of life. In order to begin to address the problem of discrimination against women in Liberia, the 
Government of Liberia should undertake to fully implement the provisions of the Protocol and of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
•	 In order to comply with article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the Protocol, the Government of Liberia should: 
o Support efforts to include specific language embodying the principle of equality 
between men and women in the national constitution;
o Adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
o Ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation;
o Take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization, or enterprise; and
o Take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs, and practices that constitute discrimination against 
women.
•	 The Government of Liberia should “prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices 
which negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognized 
international standards.”386 The Government of Liberia should take all necessary, appropriate, 
and effective measures to eliminate harmful traditional practices, which measures may include 
increasing public awareness about the harmful traditional practices, providing assistance 
(such as health, legal, judicial, emotional support, and vocational training) to victims of 
harmful practices, and protecting women at-risk of harmful practices. 387
•	 The Government of Liberia should prohibit and take appropriate steps to eliminate the 
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practice of female genital mutilation.388 
Such steps could include data gathering 
and dissemination, involving public 
figures and community leaders in 
shifting societal attitudes toward 
eliminating this practice, use of 
educational and training programs, and 
incorporation of appropriate strategies 
in national health policies.389
•	 The Government of Liberia should 
ensure the protection of the human 
rights of widows by, among other 
things, ensuring that: 1) they are not 
subject to inhuman, humiliating, 
or degrading treatment; 2) upon a 
husband’s death, the widow becomes 
the guardian and custodian of her 
children subject to the best interest 
of the child; 3) a widow has the right 
to remarry a person of her choosing; 
and 4) widows have the “right to an 
equitable share in the inheritance” 
of the husband’s property including 
continued residence in the matrimonial 
home.391 
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure the elimination of discrimination against women 
in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.392
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that national laws comply with standards set 
forth in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, including setting forth a minimum age of 18 years to marry, encouraging 
of monogamous marriages, promoting and protecting women’s rights in polygamous 
marriages, and providing for the written registration of all marriages for purposes of legal 
Potential Implementation Strategy:
De Jure Protection of Women’s Rights in Marriage
When drafting or modifying legislation to eliminate 
discrimination against women, the Government of 
Liberia may wish to consider Mozambique’s Family 
Law (2005) as a potential model for women’s 
protecting human rights in marriage. Some of the 
measures that the Family Law codifies include the 
following:
- Raising the minimum age of marriage for girls to 
18
- Permitting women to seek divorce in cases of 
domestic violence or infidelity
- Legally recognizing customary or non-formal 
traditional marriages
- Ensuring the right of women to create and 
enforce prenuptial agreements
- Protecting the right of women to work outside 
the home without the permission of a husband or 
male relative
- Ensuring the right of women to buy, own, and 
manage property or other financial assets
- Promoting the sharing of authority as head of 
household between men and women.390
Potential Implementation Strategy:  Long-distance Skills Training
The Gobi Women’s project, which took place in Mongolia, broadcasted radio programs as a means of  
providing informal skills training to women long-distance. The topics, based on a needs assessment con-
ducted in coordination with communities, included survival tools (making saddles, boots, etc., producing 
wool), health issues (family planning, first aid, nutrition), and commercial skills (price negotiating, hand-
ling money). Programs were broadcast twice a week at times most convenient for the women. If women 
were unable to tune in at that time, learning centers offered tapes of the program. Visiting teachers 
would come and answer any questions; guidance booklets were also provided.394
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recognition.393
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure that women in traditional marriages not 
recognized by formal legal systems are guaranteed equality with men in the family and 
a share of earnings and property.395 The Government of Liberia should ensure that laws 
protect and enforce a woman’s right to choose when, if, and whom she will marry.396
•	 The Government of Liberia should take appropriate measures to ensure the enjoyment by 
rural women of the rights under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, specifically ensuring their right to:
o participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all 
levels; 
o have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counseling and 
services in family planning; 
o benefit directly from social security programs; 
o obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including 
functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension 
services, in order to increase their technical proficiency; 
o organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to 
economic opportunities through employment or self employment; and 
o have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate 
technology, and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land 
resettlement schemes. 
Women’s Human Rights: Access to Equal Protection of the Law, Justice, and Right to a 
Remedy
In order to ensure true equality for women in Liberia, women must stand equal before the law. 400 The 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Diesel-powered Multifunctional Platforms
Rural women suffer a tremendous burden with respect to fuel collection – in terms of time, health, 
safety, and other issues. In Mali, the UN Industrial Development Organization and the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development developed diesel-powered multifunctional platforms to reduce the 
burdens on rural women.397 The platforms included a diesel engine that supplied power that assisted 
with labor-intensive work such as agricultural processing, welding, water pumping, and electricity.398 
The Government of Liberia may want to consider implementing similar labor-saving energy services/
devices to help reduce the onus of acquiring fuel. Additionally, the program in Mali further advanced 
women’s rights by involving women in the design, management, and implementation of the project of 
establishing the platform.399 Such involvement placed women in decision-making positions and allowed 
them to give input on the project.
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Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should accord to women in civil matters a legal capacity identical 
to that of men as well as the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, 
the government should give women equal rights to enter into contracts and to administer 
property and should treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.
•	 The Government of Liberia should implement a national policy that all contracts and all 
other private instruments of any kind with a purported legal effect of restricting the legal 
capacity of women shall be deemed null and void.
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should accord to men and 
women the same rights 
relating to the movement of 
persons and the freedom to 
choose their residence and 
domicile.
•	 The Government of Liberia 
should take steps to increase 
women’s access to free legal 
aid throughout Liberia.401
Women’s Human Rights: Economic Empowerment
In order to fully participate in Liberian society, women must have equal opportunities in the area of 
work, professional advancement, and economic opportunities. 403 The Advocates recommends the 
following: 
•	 The Government of Liberia should promote equality of access to employment; 
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize and enforce the right to equal remuneration for 
jobs of equal value for women and men;
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure transparency in recruitment, promotion, and 
dismissal of women;
•	 The Government of Liberia should combat and punish sexual harassment in the workplace;
•	 The Government of Liberia should guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation 
and protect them from exploitation by their employers;
•	 The Government of Liberia should create conditions to promote and support the occupations 
and economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal sector;
•	 The Government of Liberia should recognize and enforce the right of salaried women to the 
same allowances and entitlements for their spouses and children as those granted to salaried 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Training Paralegals to Raise Awareness
A Rwandan association, Haguruka, has organized training 
sessions for hundreds of paralegals who can educate and 
guide women on their rights with respect to property and 
other issues.402 The Government of Liberia may wish to 
consider facilitating similar resources to educate women 
and men on the rights of women and the recourses available 
where such rights have been violated. 
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men; 
•	 The Government of Liberia should take effective legislative and administrative measures to 
prevent the exploitation and abuse of women in advertising and pornography.
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Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Alternative Formats of the TRC Report
Distribution of the TRC report in video, audio, 
Braille, Liberian-English, indigenous dialects where 
possible, and in a children’s version should be 
considered. All formats of the TRC report should 
be made available in electronic form on the 
world wide web so as to facilitate diaspora and 
international engagement. Copies of the report 
in the appropriate format should be delivered 
to refugee settlements in the West African sub-
region. 
Section viii. implementation and international Support
Re-envisioning Liberia: Implementation of TRC Recommendations
The legislation creating the TRC specifies that “all recommendations shall be implemented”404 and 
that the “Independent National Human Rights Commission shall be seized with the responsibility 
to ensure that all the recommendations contained in the report of the TRC are implemented.”405 Past 
experience from similar truth seeking bodies around the world demonstrates that implementation 
of TRC recommendations is a critical phase of the process, but one that often stalls for a variety of 
reasons. While the development of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights will 
play a key role in the successful implementation of the TRC recommendations, the Independent 
National Commission on Human Rights will need the full support of government, civil society, the 
international community, and other actors to ensure that Liberia moves forward. The Principles 
relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)406 provide a guiding framework 
for the effective implementation of the recently inaugurated Human Rights Commission of Liberia. 
Other tools, including reports from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
U.N. Mission in Liberia, may provide additional guidance on the role of the Independent National 
Commission on Human Rights. The Advocates makes the following recommendations based on 
international standards.
Recommendations to the Government of Liberia
•	 The Government of Liberia and the 
Independent National Commission on 
Human Rights should ensure timely, 
wide, and accessible distribution of 
the report of the TRC of Liberia, 
in particular its recommendations. 
The report and recommendations 
should be made readily available to all 
stakeholders, in particular the Liberian 
diaspora community in the West Africa 
sub-region and around the globe. 
Moreover, the report should be made 
accessible to all Liberians regardless of 
language, literacy, age, or disability.407
•	 The Government of Liberia should move forward without further delay toward the 
establishment of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights. Based on 
selected provisions from the United Nations Principles relating to the status and functioning 
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of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights,408 the Independent 
National Commission on Human Rights should: 
o Be given a broad mandate, with rights and obligations clearly set forth in statutory 
and/or constitutional domestic law.409
o Be granted the power to, without endorsement or authorization from a higher 
government agency, review or investigate any human rights situation it so desires, 
and to submit to the government a report, recommendation, or opinion concerning 
such a situation, which it may then publicize at its discretion.
o Be responsible for monitoring and encouraging the observance of regional and 
international human rights treaties to which Liberia is a party.410 The Commission 
should also contribute to any human rights reports the government is required to 
submit under any treaty obligations.411
o Have the authority to hear individual complaints regarding alleged human rights 
violations, to advise the complainant of the available remedies, and to transmit the 
complaint to the competent authorities along with the Commission’s views and 
recommendations pertaining to the complaint.412
o Seek assistance in strengthening the capacity to promote and protect human rights 
in Liberia by participating in and seeking accreditation from the National Human 
Rights Institutions Forum, as well as the Network of National Human Rights 
Institutions in West Africa.
•	 As a matter of priority, the president should make 
appointments to the Independent National Commission 
on Human Rights and expedite its operations.413
•	 The Government of Liberia should formally direct all 
ministries and relevant government entities to provide 
full support to the Independent National Commission on 
Human Rights in its efforts to ensure implementation of 
TRC recommendations.
•	 The Government of Liberia should ensure sufficient 
time, staff, and budgetary resources to comply with the 
statutory directive obligating the Head of State to report 
to the National Legislature on a quarterly basis regarding 
implementation of the TRC recommendations.414 The 
process of reporting on implementation should be public, 
transparent, and undertaken in consultation with the 
Independent National Commission on Human Rights, civil society, and other relevant 
stakeholders.
•	 The Government of Liberia and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights 
should act immediately to facilitate the participation of Liberian civil society organizations in 
monitoring the implementation of TRC recommendations. 
Potential Implementation 
Strategy: Budgeting for the 
TRC Recommendations
Government ministries 
should consider including 
a line item in their budgets 
for implementation of TRC 
recommendations so as to 
recognize the obligation to 
facilitate implementation, 
even if the resources allocated 
are minimal.
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Potential Implementation Strategy: Monitoring Implementation of the TRC Recommendations
Following the model in Sierra Leone (see http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/index.shtml), civil society 
organizations in Liberia may wish to establish a coalition of groups to monitor TRC implementation 
of TRC recommendations, the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, as well as any 
prosecutorial processes that are established. A first step in this regard might be establishment of a 
Non-governmental Sectoral & Thematic Coordination Network relative to TRC implementation under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (see http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/
NGOPolicguidelines.pdf).
•	 The Government of Liberia and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights 
should request that regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights assist with monitoring the 
effective implementation of TRC recommendations.
•	 As the TRC ceases operations, the Government of Liberia and the Independent National 
Commission on Human Rights should ensure that a specific plan for archiving TRC 
records and for ensuring their availability to the public, as well as their confidentiality when 
appropriate, is in place.415 
Recommendations to Civil Society Organizations
•	 Civil society organizations should play an active role in monitoring and advocacy related to 
implementation of the TRC recommendations. 
•	 Civil society organizations should partner with the Independent National Commission on 
Human Rights to ensure that individuals who participated in the TRC process continue to 
receive support and continue to be engaged with implementation of TRC recommendations 
that they participated in crafting.
•	 In particular, civil society should be actively involved in advocacy, documentation, and 
planning of vetting and other personnel reform processes for public employees given the dire 
need for these reforms and given the difficulty of self-reform in this context.416
•	 Civil society and international organizations in Liberia should carry out their activities in 
compliance with Liberia’s National Policy on Non-governmental Organizations417 and 
in consideration of the International Non-Governmental Organisations Accountability 
Charter,418 specifically:
o Compliance with accreditation and reporting procedures, as well as the laws of 
Liberia;
o Transparency, non-discrimination, and respect for human rights at all levels of 
organizational activity;
o Formulation of projects should be guided by national development priorities;
o Projects should be designed and implemented in collaboration with target 
beneficiaries.
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Recommendations to the International Community: Accountability & Justice
The Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and principles of 
universal jurisdiction provide a guiding framework with regard to accountability and justice. Taking 
into account the obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, The Advocates 
recommends the following: 
•	 States Parties of the international community should “undertake to enact any legislation 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Incorporating Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Non-discrimination into National Institutions
The Independent National Commission on Human Rights should give due regard to documents 
promulgated by the treaty bodies specifically with regard to national institutions. This includes:
Mainstreaming economic, social, and cultural rights in all relevant activities, through measures such as:
 
“(a) The promotion of educational and information programmes designed to enhance awareness and 
understanding of economic, social and cultural rights, both within the population at large and among 
particular groups such as the public service, the judiciary, the private sector and the labour movement; 
(b) The scrutinizing of existing laws and administrative acts, as well as draft bills and other proposals, 
to ensure that they are consistent with the requirements of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; 
(c) Providing technical advice, or undertaking surveys in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, 
including at the request of the public authorities or other appropriate agencies; 
(d) The identification of national-level benchmarks against which the realization of Covenant obligations 
can be measured; 
(e) Conducting research and inquiries designed to ascertain the extent to which particular economic, 
social and cultural rights are being realized, either within the State as a whole or in areas or in relation 
to communities of particular vulnerability; 
(f) Monitoring compliance with specific rights recognized under the Covenant and providing reports 
thereon to the public authorities and civil society; and 
(g) Examining complaints alleging infringements of applicable economic, social and cultural rights 
standards within the State.”419
Mainstreaming the right to be free from racial discrimination, which includes the following steps:
“(a) To promote respect for the enjoyment of human rights without any discrimination, as expressly set 
out in article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
(b) To review government policy towards protection against racial discrimination; 
(c) To monitor legislative compliance with the provisions of the Convention; 
(d) To educate the public about the obligations of States parties under the Convention; 
(e) To assist the Government in the preparation of reports submitted to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.”420
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Potential Implementation Strategy: The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction423
Universal jurisdiction allows a court to prosecute alleged perpetrators of human rights violations 
even where there is no direct link between the court’s country and the alleged violation. The court’s 
jurisdiction stems from the nature of the crime and generally applies to violations of international 
humanitarian law, such as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, slavery, crimes against humanity, 
and torture.
Civil law jurisdictions and some common law jurisdictions have allowed privately initiated criminal 
prosecution for extraterritorial acts. For example, Spain and France have allowed victims to submit 
complaints directly to a judge or prosecutor, a right which has been extended to universal jurisdiction 
cases. Even the United Kingdom, a common law country, permits individuals to request arrest warrants 
when the police do not investigate a claim.424 The privately initiated complaint can be a useful tool in 
universal jurisdiction prosecution, as it allows for international crime investigations when domestic 
prosecutors may be reluctant to intervene or may be concerned about the foreign policy implications 
of their actions. The requests to extradite Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet from the United 
Kingdom to Spain and Chad’s former dictator Hissène Habré from Senegal to Belgium are two examples 
of universal jurisdiction cases stemming from privately initiated complaints. 
Some countries have created investigative mechanisms to facilitate prosecution of alleged international 
crime perpetrators after the complaint is filed. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and 
Ethiopia have established special units with police and prosecutorial powers, as well as experts on 
complex criminal cases and international criminal law.425 International cooperation networks may also 
be instrumental in the investigations of international crimes. For example, there are Interpol’s “Expert 
Meetings” and international crime “Working Groups” and the European Union’s “Network of contact 
points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” 
These bodies have the capacity to provide limited information on domestic laws, the establishment of 
specialized units, as well as advice on conducting extraterritorial investigations.426
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches” of the Geneva Convention.421 
•	 States Parties of the international community should “search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” or hand such persons over to 
another State Party for prosecution.422 
With regard to crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court:
•	 States Parties to the Rome Statute should “cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation 
and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”427 with due regard to the 
provisions set forth in the Rome Statute relating to international cooperation. 
Chapter Fourteen
482
Recommendations to the International Community: Development
With regard to development, the U.N. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, the U.N. 
Declaration on the Right to Development, and the Millennium Declaration and its associated 
documents provide a guiding framework. The international community should recognize that 
“[s]ocial progress and development are the common concerns of the international community, which 
shall supplement, by concerted international action, national efforts to raise the living standards of 
peoples.”428 Therefore, with regard to the development of international policies and cooperation, The 
Advocates recommends that:
•	 The international community should intensify international cooperation to ensure “the 
international exchange of information, knowledge and experience concerning social progress 
and development.”429
•	 The international community should “[c]o-operate with [one] another in ensuring development 
and eliminating obstacles to development. States should realize their rights and fulfil their 
duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign 
equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well as to 
encourage the observance and realization of human rights.”430
•	 The international community should take individual and collective steps in the development 
of international policies that facilitate the right to development, and ensure international 
cooperation to provide Liberia “with appropriate means and facilities to foster [its] 
comprehensive development.”431
•	 The international community should work toward the development of “international policies 
and measures to avoid the ‘brain drain’ and obviate its adverse effects.”432
Recommendations to the International Community: Financial Assistance
With regard to financial assistance and other support, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness may 
serve as part of the guiding framework in addition to the aforementioned and other documents.433 
The Advocates recommends the following: 
•	 The international community should base its support and conditions for implementation on 
Liberia’s national development strategies;434
•	 The international community should work together with Liberia to create frameworks for 
evaluating country systems, performance, accountability, and transparency;435
•	 The international community should employ existing systems and procedures as much as 
possible and should strengthen such systems through other measures where needed; it should 
avoid reliance on “creating dedicated structures” for managing and executing aid-funded 
projects;436 
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•	 The international community should harmonize activities and simplify procedures by 
cooperating to decrease the “number of separate, duplicative missions to the field and 
diagnostic reviews” and use joint trainings to build capacity.437 The international donor 
community should “align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-
led strategies,” “avoid activities that undermine national institution building,” and “use an 
appropriate mix of aid instruments.”438 The donor community should more effectively allocate 
responsibility by delegating authorities on the sectoral or national level, where appropriate, to 
direct the execution of such activities.439
•	 The international community should enhance aid predictability by scheduling how Liberia’s 
financial aid will be increased to better allow the Government of Liberia to plan for multi-
year projects.440 
•	 The international community should continue to fund and scale up assistance to Liberia.441 It 
should follow through on pledges and immediately appropriate outstanding funds and other 
assistance to Liberia.442 
•	 The international community should renew aid funding for long-term and unresolved 
displacement, with attention to vulnerable populations.443
•	 The international community should take steps toward facilitating Liberia’s development in 
economic terms, including: 
o “The laying down of economic growth rate targets…within the United Nations policy 
for development, high enough to lead to a substantial acceleration of [Liberia’s] rates 
of growth;
o The provision of greater assistance on better terms; the implementation of the 
aid volume target of a minimum of [one] per cent of the gross national product at 
market prices of economically advanced countries; the general easing of the terms of 
lending to [Liberia] through low interest rates on loans and long grace periods for the 
repayment of loans, and the assurance that the allocation of such loans will be based 
strictly on socioeconomic criteria free of any political considerations;
o The provision of technical, financial and material assistance, both bilateral and 
multilateral, to the fullest possible extent and on favourable terms, and improved 
co-ordination of international assistance for the achievement of the social objectives 
of national development plans;
o The provision to [Liberia] of technical, financial and material assistance and of 
favorable conditions to facilitate the direct exploitation of [its] national resources 
and natural wealth…with a view to enabling the [Liberian people] to benefit fully 
from their national resources;
o “The expansion of international trade based on principles of equality and non-
discrimination, the rectification of the position of [Liberia] in international trade by 
equitable terms of trade, a general non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory system of 
preferences for the exports of [Liberia] to the developed countries, the establishment 
and implementation of general and comprehensive commodity agreements, and the 
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financing of reasonable buffer stocks by international institutions.”444
•	 The international community should continue its commitment to the Millennium Declaration 
and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. This includes, in particular, those 
commitments to address the needs of least developed states:
o Adopt a “policy of duty- and quota-free access for essentially all exports from the 
least developed countries;”
o “implement the enhanced programme of debt relief for the heavily indebted poor 
countries without further delay and to agree to cancel all official bilateral debts of 
those countries in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty 
reduction;” and
o “grant more generous development assistance, especially to countries that are 
genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty reduction.”445
•	 Work toward full implementation of the Recommendations of the Millennium Development 
Goals Africa Steering Group.
The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights (the “Norms”) set forth provisions for transnational businesses and 
corporations to promote and protect human rights, which include rights related to equal opportunity 
and non-discriminatory treatment, security of persons, rights of workers, respect for national 
sovereignty and human rights, and consumer and environmental protection. The Norms provide a 
guiding framework with regard to transnational business entities, and The Advocates recommends 
that:
•	 The international community, as individual states, should promote and protect human rights 
as recognized in international and national law, which includes “ensuring that transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights.”446
o The international community, as individual states, should “establish and reinforce 
the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the Norms and 
other relevant national and international laws are implemented by transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises.”447
•	 The international community should conduct “periodic monitoring and verification” of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises that is “transparent and independent 
and take into account input from stakeholders (including non governmental organizations) 
and as a result of complaints of violations of these Norms.”448
The Advocates supports the recommendations made to the international community by the U.N. 
Mission in Liberia in its Report on the Human Rights Situation in Liberia: November 2007 – June 
2008 and recommends that:
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•	 The international community should continue to support and provide technical assistance to 
the domestic court system;449
•	 The international community should continue to support Liberia’s Ministry of Justice in 
improving conditions of detention and imprisonment through trainings, infrastructural 
improvements, and the provision of basic supplies; and450
•	 The international community should encourage the state and civil society to promote 
children’s human rights by increasing public awareness of the family and child neglect and 
work collaboratively with the state, non-governmental organizations, and inter-governmental 
organizations to develop guidelines and a framework on international adoption.451 
The international community should take steps to eradicate harmful traditional practices through 
public education campaigns and prioritization of the issue by the U.N. Country Team in its planning.452
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Section ix. recommendationS related to liBerianS reSiding in the united StateS
Protection of Refugees 
As a party to the Refugee Convention, the United States has a duty not to return refugees who 
face persecution in their home countries.453 Under international and federal law, the United States 
is prohibited from expelling or returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories where he or she 
would be exposed to persecution.454 “Even when the circumstances in the country of origin have 
undergone a fundamental change, individual refugees may continue to have a well-founded fear of 
persecution or compelling reasons not to return arising out of previous persecution. [When this 
has] been determined, the ‘ceased circumstances’ cessation clauses should thus not apply to them.”455 
Moreover, refugees are entitled to basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Advocates 
recommends that the Government of the United States comply fully with their obligations under 
domestic and international refugee law as well as international human rights law. The Advocates 
recommends the following:
 Despite changed country conditions in Liberia, the Government of the United States should recognize 
that compelling reasons may, for certain individuals, support the continuation of refugee status. 
o The United States should facilitate ongoing asylum applications and timely refugee 
status determinations. “Asylum requests of Liberians should be examined thoroughly 
in fair and effective individual refugee status determination procedures with the 
necessary procedural safeguards, taking into consideration the individual merits of 
their asylum claim, based on the criteria in the 1951 Convention…Additionally, in light 
of the particularly violent nature of the armed conflict in past years, asylum claims of 
victims of particularly atrocious forms of persecution suffered in the past should be 
examined taking into account the consequences and effects of such persecution on 
the victims concerned where the continuing impact of the past persecution could put 
the individuals at risk of serious harm to their well being if returned.” 456
o The Government of the United States should consider appropriate arrangements, 
which would not put into jeopardy their established situation, for those persons who 
cannot be expected to leave the country of asylum because of a long stay in that 
country resulting in strong family, social, and economic links there.457
 Protection of the Family
As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United States recognized 
that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State.”458 The unification of Liberian families is of primary concern, in particular 
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where lengthy family separation has been the result of U.S. immigration policy. The separation of 
families was consistently reported as one of the most traumatic outcomes of the Liberian conflict 
and has resulted in ongoing trauma for many Liberians. 
The conflict also resulted in the reorganization of many 
families. For example, statement givers frequently 
reported assuming responsibility for the children of 
their siblings who had been killed or gone missing 
during the war. In this regard, clearly identified needs 
in the Liberian community include assistance in caring 
for children when parents are working, assistance in 
developing discipline methods that comport with child 
protection laws, and support for families dealing with 
role reversals in a new culture.
The U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons has specifically 
recommended that governments take the necessary measures for the protection of a refugee’s family 
especially with a view to: 
(1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is maintained particularly in cases where 
the head of the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for admission to a particular 
country, 
(2) The protection of refugees who are minors, in particular unaccompanied children and 
girls, with special reference to guardianship and adoption.459 
The Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has recommended that coun-
tries of asylum apply liberal criteria in identifying those family members who can be admitted in order 
to promote a comprehensive reunification of the family.460 “When deciding on family reunification, 
the absence of documentary proof of the formal validity of a marriage or of the filiation of children 
should not per se be considered as an impediment.”461 The Executive Committee also noted that, in 
order to promote the rapid integration of refugee families in the country of settlement, close family 
members should in principle be granted the same legal status and facilities as the head of the family 
who has been formally recognized as a refugee.462 In appropriate cases, family reunification should 
be facilitated by special measures of assistance to the head of family so that economic and housing 
difficulties in the country of asylum do not unduly delay the granting of permission for the entry of 
the family members.463 
These principles are important guidelines, and The Advocates for Human Rights recommends that 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Enact the Child Citizen Protection Act
Passage of The Child Citizen Protection 
Act would amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in the case of an alien 
subject to removal, deportation, or 
exclusion who is the parent of a U.S. citizen 
child to authorize an immigration judge to 
decline to order such removal if the judge 
determines that such action is against the 
child’s best interests.
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the United States Government take the following steps to ensure their effective implementation 
relative to Liberian refugees:
•	 The United States Government should eliminate the two-year deadline for filing an I-730 
Petition for Refugee/Asylee Relative, to accommodate applications on behalf of the spouses 
or children of refugees or asylees whom the 
principle refugee or asylee could not locate 
because of the conflict. At a minimum, a 
workable waiver process should be created that 
permits the consideration of I-730 petitions 
after the two-year deadline in cases where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that he or she did 
not file because he or she could not locate the 
family members or required documentation of 
the relationship because of the conflict.
•	 The United States Government should 
amend the statutory definition of a “child” for purposes of U.S. family reunification visas, 
8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1), to reflect the reality of family structures that are altered by conflict and 
that vary based on cultural patterns, particularly foster or adoptive relationships that are not 
recognized by civil courts because of the lack of a functioning court system.
•	 The United States Government should ensure that the current statutory definition of “child” 
is properly applied, particularly in the refugee resettlement context. Although 8 U.S.C. 
§1101(b)(1) defines a “child” relatively broadly to include adopted children, step-children, 
and legitimated children, in practice 
these children, who may meet the 
statutory definition of a “child” but 
who are not biologically related to the 
rest of the family group traveling, are 
assumed to be engaging in fraud. The 
State Department’s reliance on DNA 
evidence, rather than on the statutory 
definition of “child,” has resulted in 
the suspension of the Refugee Family 
Reunification Program (P-3) for 
Liberians. 
•	 The United States Government should 
immediately review the decision of the 
State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration to suspend the Refugee 
Family Reunification Program for Liberian and other African refugees to ensure that bona 
fide family members of refugees are not being denied the ability to reunite with their families. 
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Youth Programming
Programming for newly reunified youth should 
include family counseling, information about 
immigration consequences of criminal behavior, 
and strategies to assist parents in adapting to the 
U.S. child protection regime. Modeling programs 
on efforts such as the Immigrant Law Center of 
Minnesota’s No Second Chance curriculum focusing 
on the immigration consequences to youth of 
criminal behavior could be an effective strategy.
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Review of the P-3 Process
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees should 
establish a dedicated review process for P-3 
refugee resettlement to allow for a more accurate 
assessment of family structure while effectively 
preventing fraud.464
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•	 The United States Government should immediately review the Refugee Family Reunification 
Program policy which renders entire family groups ineligible for resettlement when one 
member is found not to have a DNA match to the rest of the group.
•	 The United States Government should amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to restore 
discretion to immigration judges when considering the deportation of Liberians who are the 
parents of U.S. citizen children so as to ensure that Liberians with United States citizen 
children are not arbitrarily denied the protection of the family unit. 
•	 The United States Government should reform U.S. immigration policies which have resulted 
in lengthy backlogs for visas based on family relationships to expeditiously reunify family 
members.
•	 The United States Government should design and fully fund tailored programming for “newly 
reunified youth” (those young people who arrive in the United States on family reunification 
visas after lengthy separations) and their families. 
•	 The United States Government should support and expand training of social service 
providers, such as educators, police, and courts, on issues related to family reunification for 
Liberians.
Addressing the Legacy of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
Because of the extended duration of the Liberian conflict and its aftermath, protection from 
deportation from the United States was regularly extended from 1990 through 2009 through grants 
of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). During this period 
many Liberians were denied meaningful access to the asylum process due to the U.S. government’s 
failure to adjudicate their claims in a timely manner.465
•	 The United States Government should enact legislation pending in both the House (H.R. 
2258) and Senate (S. 656) that would allow Liberians who are (or should be but for some 
reason are not) registered under Temporary Protected Status/Deferred Enforced Departure 
to apply for lawful permanent resident status.
•	 The United States Government should amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to restore 
discretion to immigration judges when considering the deportation of Liberians who are the 
parents of U.S. citizen children. The Child Citizen Protection Act (H.R. 182) would amend 
the Immigration and Nationality Act in the case of an alien subject to removal, deportation, 
or exclusion who is the parent of a U.S. citizen child, to authorize an immigration judge to 
decline to order such removal if the judge determines that removal is against the child’s best 
interests. 
•	 The United States Government should enact immigration reform that includes legalization 
for Liberians who have been in the United States for a prolonged period of time under 
Temporary Protected Status/Deferred Enforced Departure or in undocumented status.
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Asylee-Refugee Parity
Liberian refugees and Liberian asylees fled the same brutal civil war and suffered the same human 
rights violations in Liberia. Although both refugees and asylees must prove they are “refugees” under 
the statutory definition found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), individuals who arrive in the United States 
through refugee resettlement are treated differently under the law from those granted asylum while 
in the United States. 
•	 The United States Government should eliminate the filing fees for adjustment of status to 
lawful permanent resident for asylees so as to create parity with refugees, who are not subject 
to a comparable fee.466
•	 The United States Government should amend federal regulations permitting termination 
of asylum to be consistent with regulations covering refugees. Current U.S. law permits the 
termination of refugee status only because of subsequently discovered fraud in the application, 
while asylum may be terminated because of discovery of fraud in the application or because of 
changes in the country conditions which no longer necessitate protection.467 
•	 In consideration of the right of all people to enjoy family life, the United States Government 
should support a change in International Organization for Migration policy to allow travel 
loans to be made available to relatives of asylees who are joining them in the United States.
Funding for Refugee Resettlement Services
The refugee resettlement system plays a critical role in assisting newly arrived refugees through initial 
reception and placement services and longer-term support. Statements and interviews indicate that the 
refugee resettlement system is a lynchpin in the service delivery network for many Liberian refugees 
in the United States. Appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of 
Refugee Resettlement’s resettlement and related services have been chronically under-funded and fall 
far short of the real need. Recommendations by the Refugee Council USA, provided below, address 
the details of specific programs and recommendations for funding to sustain this critical service 
delivery system. 
•	 The United States Government should provide adequate funding to rejuvenate refugee 
resettlement capacity and strengthen the community hosting model, which traditionally has 
served as the core of the refugee resettlement system. 
•	 The United States Government should fully fund the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s 
Transitional and Medical Services program, which provides reimbursement to states for 
transitional cash and medical assistance to refugees for up to eight months after their arrival 
in the United States 468 
•	 The United States Government should fully fund the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s 
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Matching Grant program, a public/private partnership to help refugees become self-sufficient 
and avoid the welfare system.
•	 The United States Government should fully fund the Refugee Social Services and Special 
Needs Program and the Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance Program as the funds for this 
line item are currently inadequate.469 
•	 The United States Government should increase funding for torture survivor services, which 
has remained static for more than five years despite continuing increases in demand.470 
Physical and Mental Health Services
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family, including ... medical care.”471 Liberians face significant barriers to accessing health services, 
including lack of insurance coverage, lack of culturally appropriate health services, and unfamiliarity 
with the U.S. health care delivery system. Many Liberians in the U.S. cannot access medical care 
because they lack insurance coverage. Federal or state medical assistance may be available, depending 
on the immigration status of the individual and other eligibility criteria. Refugees and asylees are 
eligible for refugee health screenings, administered through the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and 
for federal medical assistance for the first eight months after arrival (or the grant of asylum). Liberians 
who are on TPS/DED may not qualify for the coverage at all. Survivors of the Liberian conflict must 
have access to specialized programs for survivors of torture and war trauma that include medical 
and psychological treatment. Programs that support Liberians’ recovery from trauma benefit not 
only Liberians themselves, but also the communities in which they settle. Diverse programming is 
needed, including culturally relevant services and services for child soldiers, former combatants, and 
others who were held behind rebel lines. Accordingly, The Advocates urges state, federal, and local 
government entities, as well as community based organizations, to take the following actions to assist 
Liberians in accessing appropriate and effective mental and physical health care services.
Potential Implementation Strategies: Assistance and Support to Immigrants
In Minnesota, state law allows immigrants who have been accepted at a licensed torture treatment 
center to apply for and receive state-funded benefits to cover their care. Advocating for comparable 
legislation in other states with large Liberian populations might be an important strategy to provide 
services that are in the public interest.
The Center for Victims of Torture in Minnesota has implemented a “New Neighbors/Hidden Scars” 
project, designed to bring together Liberian and non-Liberian service providers to support the Liberian 
community in healing from trauma.472
The Extended Support Services for New Asylees program in Minnesota linked new asylees with the state 
department of health to ensure that they received free health screenings and other social services.473
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•	 The United States Government should expand federal funding for torture treatment under 
the Torture Victims Relief Act.
•	 The relevant government authorities should support the development of programs designed 
specifically to provide services to former combatants and others who were held behind rebel 
lines. Because torture treatment centers sometimes maintain policies that prohibit them from 
serving those who participated in fighting, this population is currently underserved.
•	 The relevant government authorities should support the development of programs to train 
and deploy Liberian community mental health workers in large diaspora communities. 
Training curricula should be based on a curriculum designed by specialists in the field.
•	 The relevant government authorities should increase efforts to support seeking mental 
health assistance and to decrease the stigma associated with mental health treatment from all 
sources in the community including peer-to-peer education, clear messaging from leaders, 
and increasing creativity in providing services so as to increase privacy and anonymity. 
•	 The United States Government should extend Medicaid or other comparable insurance 
coverage to Liberians to enable them to access appropriate mental health treatment, including 
prescription medication. 
•	 The relevant government authorities should support the development of pilot programs that 
specifically address cultural barriers to healthcare access in communities where there are 
large Liberian populations. 
•	 The United States Government should link access to health services with the refugee and 
asylum service systems to ensure that care providers are aware of arriving asylees and refugees 
and can provide them with information about available health services.
Employment Services
Liberians in the diaspora are under-
employed. Many with professional qual-
ifications are unable to work in their 
chosen fields due to lack of recognition of 
credentials or experience gained abroad.474 
Liberians with qualifications from U.S.-
based institutions may lack the job search 
and interviewing skills to effectively gain 
employment. Accordingly, The Advocates 
urges state, federal, and local government 
entities, as well as community-based orga-
nizations, to take the following actions to 
assist Liberians in preparing for the U.S. 
job market and securing employment.
Potential Implementation Strategy: 
Integration of Foreign-trained Health Professionals 
In Minnesota, the African-American Friendship 
Association for Cooperation & Development in 
collaboration with the International Institute of 
Minnesota provides programs to assist African-trained 
health professionals to integrate into the U.S. health care 
system.475 This program could be evaluated for potential 
expansion to other professions and other states with 
large Liberian communities. Moreover, a state pilot 
program helped support foreign-trained medical 
professionals as they pursued U.S. credentialing and 
licensure. 
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•	 The relevant government authorities should support and expand current programming that 
facilitates the integration and licensing of Liberian professionals into careers that match their 
skills and training.
•	 Government agencies should ensure that employment services, particularly those funded 
through the refugee resettlement reception and placement programs, maintain or develop 
career skills and job readiness programming designed to achieve employment in trades or 
professions in which the job-seekers have training and experience. Programs should ensure 
that Liberians can access peer-mentoring in resume review, mock interviewing, basic 
computer skills, and other skills needed to obtain employment in the United States. 
•	 Employment services programs to serve the Liberian diaspora should be expanded in general, 
rather than continuing to be limited to arriving refugees and asylees only.
Education
Despite access to free public education in the United States, statement 
givers, public hearing participants, and others reported that Liberian 
youth are struggling in the U.S. education system. Although some of 
these struggles may be related to mental health issues discussed above, 
many in the community attribute these challenges to interrupted 
education during the conflict. Accordingly, some Liberian youth 
are not prepared to enter a U.S. grade level appropriate for their age 
or are placed into English Language Learner classes. Additionally, 
many community leaders identified lack of parental involvement in 
the school system as a barrier to student success. Low literacy skills, 
especially amongst older Liberian women and young women whose education was interrupted, was 
also identified by many as a key issue in the diaspora. Accordingly, The Advocates urges state, federal, 
and local government entities, as well as community based organizations, to take the following actions 
Potential Implementation Strategy: Museums to Facilitate Community Remembering and Dialogue
Museums such as the District Six Museum in South Africa or the Rwanda Genocide Museum are possible 
mechanisms to facilitate community dialogue.477 Local or national governments should consider creating 
or promoting similar museums and exhibits as a way to build dialogue and educate the public. Such 
memorials have an impact on not only remembering the past but addressing the future in that they:
- claim public space;
- create physical reminders, conversation starters, or provocative history lessons;
- operate on the level of local culture; 
- demand that society remember what happened.478
Potential Implementation 
Strategy: Extended High 
School Enrollment Age
In Minnesota, students can 
attend high school through 
age 21.476 Other states may 
wish to implement similar 
policies to allow students 
to complete high school 
outside of the normal age 
range. 
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to ensure that Liberians are able to access educational services.
•	 School systems serving Liberians should reevaluate policies that may place English-speaking 
Liberian students into English Language Learner (ELL) programs with the goal of creating 
appropriate educational programs for native speakers of non-American English.
•	 Establish and/or evaluate the effectiveness of school-community liaison programs to engage 
Liberian parents in the educational lives of their children so that these programs meet the 
needs of immigrants who may have low literacy and who often are working multiple jobs. 
•	 Establish and/or evaluate the effectiveness of current literacy education programs for Liberian 
adults, especially women, to ensure that Liberian women in the diaspora can fully participate 
in the cultural, social, and political life of their new community.
Community Reconciliation
The Liberian community in the resettled diaspora is in recovery from the trauma and disruption of 
the war. Political, religious, ethnic, and interpersonal conflicts continue to permeate the community 
and hamper effective action. In many post-conflict societies, institutions that are tainted by their 
perceived or actual role in the conflict must be dismantled and reconstituted so as to regain integrity 
and social trust. Accordingly, the following recommendations to address community cohesion and 
unity are put forward.
•	 In consultation with traditional, faith, and political leaders in the Liberian community, a 
comprehensive community reconciliation needs assessment should be undertaken with 
the goal of developing a long-term program designed to meet the reconciliation needs of 
Liberians in the communities where they have resettled.
•	 Memorializing the sufferings of the past and recognizing their ongoing impact often forms 
a key part of reconciliation in transitioning societies. The Liberian diaspora community 
should embark on a broad consultative process to develop memorials to the Liberian diaspora 
experience. Memorials at the local (statues, building dedication, street renaming, etc.), state 
(proclamations, days of remembrance, annual cultural events, exhibits in state historical 
societies, etc.), national (national conferences, film festivals, essay contests, participation in 
National festivals such as the Festival of American Folklife, establishment of an African 
diaspora museum, etc.), and international (U.N. resolutions, using electronic media to engage 
a global audience, etc.) level should be considered.
Diaspora Interaction with Liberian Homeland
Liberians in diaspora expressed a clear desire to play an ongoing part in the rebuilding and reconciliation 
process in their native land. 
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Potential Implementation Strategy: Low-cost Money Transfers
 
Given the critical role that remittances play in the Liberian economy, the Government of Liberia may 
wish to work with international partners to facilitate official low cost money transfer schemes to enable 
the sending of remittances in the sub-region and internationally. One model is the system used by the 
Banque de l’Habitat du Senegal to transfer remittances from France to Senegal.479 
•	 The Government of Liberia should undertake a national consultative process on diaspora 
involvement in the future of Liberia with the goal of developing a national policy and 
structure, such as an office of diaspora affairs, for consulting, mobilizing, and partnering 
with the Liberian diaspora.
•	 The Government of Liberia should undertake a comprehensive review of Liberia’s citizenship 
regime, in consideration of international human rights standards and a specific focus on the 
availability of dual citizenship. (See also Recommendations on Non-discrimination)
•	 The Government of Liberia, the TRC, and the Independent National Human Rights 
Commission should maintain ongoing consultation with and integration of the Liberian 
diaspora in transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia, including a review of the TRC’s 
diaspora integration strategy to determine lessons learned and possibilities for application of 
the model in other contexts.
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concluSion
The Liberia TRC Diaspora Project was a historic first attempt to systematically engage a diaspora 
population in all aspects of a post-conflict truth seeking process. Diaspora Liberians played a role in 
the process at every stage, from membership on an advisory committee, to assisting with outreach, 
to giving statements, to testifying at public hearings held in the United States. The Liberia TRC 
Diaspora Project used hundreds of volunteers to take statements and provide other support for its 
work. Ultimately, more than 600 individual volunteers were trained as statement takers and many 
more were involved in outreach and support for the U.S. public hearings. The project documented the 
stories of hundreds of refugees, asylees, and other diaspora Liberians on three continents. 
The voices of diaspora communities present an important piece of the post-conflict puzzle in Liberia. 
For example, many individuals fled Liberia before the conflict and were living in the diaspora. 
These people held key information about the early years of the TRC mandate, such as the Tolbert 
administration and 1980 coup d’etat, that could help fill information gaps for the TRC. The experiences 
of Liberian refugees in Ghana highlight the regional implications of post-conflict transitional justice. 
Systematic documentation of the experiences of refugees highlighted the breakdowns in the system 
of international protection for refugees fleeing conflict. In Liberia and elsewhere, refugees must be 
considered part of the post-conflict transitional justice equation. Documenting their experiences 
provides important information about human rights violations that take place during flight and in 
refuge, and offer direction as to what actions must occur in order to secure a stable future in Liberia 
and the West African sub-region. 
As this report demonstrates, many diaspora Liberians outside of the sub-region see themselves as 
transnationals, living in “a house with two rooms.” Liberians in the United States and the U.K. have 
deep connections to both their country of origin and their country of residence. They struggle with 
the legacy of conflict on an individual, family, and community level. While dealing with the ongoing 
impact of physical and psychological trauma, they struggle to keep families together and endure 
the bureaucracy of immigration systems. Liberian youth, many of whom have grown up outside of 
Liberia, face a set of unique challenges in trying to define their identity and navigate between cultures. 
All the while, at the community level, the Liberian civil crisis drags on as community politics, social 
gatherings, and the internet become new fields to play out old battles. 
Powerful threads run from Liberia, through the refugee settlements in the sub-region, out into the 
United States and Europe, and back again to Liberia. For the most part, statement givers expressed 
their strong desire to return to Liberia and, at a minimum, to assist the nation’s development from 
afar. Many described the actions they are taking to do so. The desire to see Liberia thrive again 
is reflected in diaspora recommendations focusing on development, education, justice, and a new 
Liberia that provides equal opportunity to all. Equally clear from statements, however, is the view that 
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Liberia cannot rebuild without assistance.
The international community, and the United States in particular, share responsibility for Liberia’s 
traumatic past and, accordingly, for its future. The mass displacement caused by the international 
community’s failure to stem the bloodshed in Liberia means that nations across the globe have an 
even greater stake in Liberia’s peaceful and prosperous development. Liberians are members of 
communities in West Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other countries 
around the world. Because of improved communications—particularly the internet—what happens 
in Liberia affects those in diaspora communities more quickly and widely. What happens to an 
individual has an effect on the whole community, even when that community is thousands of miles 
from the shores of Liberia. 
Apart from being a historic effort to fully engage a diaspora in a truth commission, the Liberia TRC 
Diaspora Project has been a powerful opportunity for Liberians in Liberia, West Africa, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom to strengthen and build new networks that will support diaspora 
communities and Liberia as a whole. It has also been an important opportunity for non-Liberian 
volunteers to develop ties to their Liberian neighbors. As the TRC process comes to a close, the work 
to weave these many threaded connections into a more peaceful future is just beginning.
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Councillor Jerome J. Verdier, Sr., Chair
Councillor Jerome J. Verdier, Sr. is a practicing attorney, credited for rendering pro bono legal services 
to indigents, civil society activists and journalists, while also leading civil society adversarial legal teams 
in several successful lawsuits against the government of  Liberia. He holds a Bachelors of  Business 
Administration (BBA) from the University of  Liberia and a Bachelors of  Laws Degree (LLB) from 
the Louis Arthur Grimes School of  Law. Apart from working in the private and public sectors as a 
senior accountant, comptroller, and executive director, he has been instrumental in strengthening civil 
society advocacy. Cllr. Verdier served as executive director of  Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW), as 
chairman of  the board of  directors of  The National Human Rights Center of  Liberia (NHRCL), as 
board chairperson of  the Foundation For International Dignity (FIND), as senior staff  attorney for 
the Association of  Environmental Lawyers (Green Advocates), and as the first research and program 
officer of  the Catholic Justice & Peace Commission (JPC). 
Dede Dolopei, Vice Chair
Dede Dolopei is an administrator, manager, social worker and peace activist. She is a graduate of  the 
University of  Liberia, holding a Bachelors of  Business Administration (BBA) in accounting. She served 
as a member of  the board of  directors for NAWOCOL and the Christian Foundation for Children and 
the Aging. Commissioner Dolopei has been instrumental to the promotion and protection of  women 
rights in Liberia. She is well known for her efforts and expertise in peace building, conflict resolution, 
and psychosocial counseling.
Oumu K. Syllah, Treasurer
Oumu K. Syllah is a registered nurse, HIV/AIDS counselor, and social worker. She holds a Bachelor of  
Science degree in nursing from Cuttington University College, Bong County, Liberia, and a certificate 
in nursing as a state registered nurse (SRN) from the National School of  Nursing in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.  Commissioner Syllah has worked as a professional nurse and social worker at Cannaught 
Hospital in Freetown and St. Joseph Catholic Hospital in Monrovia. She has also acted as a trainer/
facilitator and participant in numerous workshops in the field of  social work.
Sheikh Kafumba F. Konneh, Member
Sheikh Kafumba F. Konneh is a leader in the Liberian Muslim community who has a long record of  
conflict resolution and peace building efforts. In addition to his theological (Al-Islamic) achievement, 
Commissioner Konneh studied secular law through apprenticeship. He held several positions in the 
Liberian civil service, including Justice of  the Peace, Associate Stipendiary Magistrate, and County 
Commissioner. He has also served as Secretary General and Managing Director of  the Liberian 
Muslim Union, as well as Secretary General and National Chairman of  the National Muslim Council 
of  Liberia.  Commissioner Konneh was born in Nimba County.
Councillor Pearl Brown Bull, Member
Councillor Pearl Brown Bull has been a lawyer and Liberian politician since the late 1970s. She has a 
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Bachelor of  Arts in political science from the University of  Liberia and a law degree from Quinnipiac 
University, USA.  Cllr. Bull also served as a professor of  Management & Supervision in Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Evidence at Shaw University, USA. In the public sector, Cllr. Bull served 
as a member of  the Interim Legislative Assembly, the Constitutional Advisory Assembly, the Public 
Procurement and Concession Commission, the Panel of  Experts for the Selection of  Commissioners 
of  the Independent National Human Rights Commission of  Liberia, and as Vice President of  the 
International Federation of  Women Lawyers. 
Reverand Gerald B. Coleman, Member
Rev. Coleman is an electrical engineer and project manager by training, having completed a masters 
degree in electrical engineering (M.S.E.E.) and post graduate studies at Northeastern University, USA. 
Rev. Coleman is the Spiritual Elder and founding national missionary of  the Unification Movement of  
Liberia and has worked with the mission for over 25 years. In 1996, he was commissioned Ambassador 
and Special Envoy of  the Government of  Liberia to the Far East. During this period, he worked 
for the peaceful transition to civilian government by facilitating several peace-building, scholarship, 
cultural exchange, and food-aid programs between Asia and Liberia. In 2000, Rev. Coleman helped 
launch the Inter-Religious & International Federation for World Peace of  Liberia (IIFWP-Liberia). The 
National Transitional Legislative Assembly asked Rev. Coleman to help facilitate the establishment of  
the current TRC, a process which culminated in the final passage of  the TRC Act of  Liberia in June 
2005.
John H. T. Stewart, Member
John H. T. Stewart is a Liberian journalist and activist in Liberia. He was educated at the University of  
Liberia and has held numerous positions including local consultant for the Media Foundation for West 
Africa, reporter for Channel Africa, regional coordinator for the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, 
information assistant for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and National Assistant Field 
Security Advisor to the United Nations Development Program. Commissioner Stewart’s advocacy 
efforts include work with the Citizens of  Liberia Against Gambling (COLAG), Citizens of  Liberia in 
Defense of  Albert Porte (COLIDAP), and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA). He has been 
an advocate for the past 30 years and has suffered imprisonment as well as physical and mental torture 
as a result of  his efforts. As a journalist, he served as associate editor of  the New Democrat Weekly 
and presenter of  the Radio Veritas Topical Issues program.
Massa A. Washington, Member
Massa A. Washington is a journalist with more than 20 years of  experience. She holds a B.A. 
in mass communication from the University of  Liberia and took a leave from graduate studies at 
Temple University School of  Social Administration and Management, USA, to take up her post as a 
commissioner. Her past positions include Public Relations Officer of  the Liberian National Red Cross 
Society, Senior Reporter for the New Liberian Newspaper, and News Editor for the Independent 
Inquirer. Commissioner Washington covered the Liberian crises extensively, reporting in a column in the 
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Inquirer dedicated to Liberian women. She is a women’s rights and civil society activist and is a member 
of  the Liberian Women Initative (LWI) which has been at the vanguard of  peace advocacy in Liberia. 
She has represented the women of  Liberia at peace conferences including the Accra Clarification 
Conferences and the Abuja Conference. Commissioner Washington has worked with Liberians in the 
diaspora, serving as Chairman of  the Association of  Liberian Journalists in the Americas (ALJA), 
Delaware Valley Chapter, and co-owned and published the Iwina Heritage Newspaper targeting the 
African immigrant community in the United States.
Bishop Arthur F. Kulah, Member
Bishop Arthur F. Kulah is a well-known Methodist prelate who traveled throughout Liberia during the 
civil war, spreading hope to the people. He holds many degrees in theology and other disciplines from 
Cuttington University College, Bong County, Liberia; St. Paul Theology Seminary, Kansas City, MO, 
United States of  America; and Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, DC, USA. Commissioner 
Kulah began serving as pastor of  the United Methodist Church in Liberia in 1980, and held numerous 
prominent positions until his retirement in 2000, including Resident Bishop of  the Liberia Annual 
Conference/United Methodist Church. As an educator, administrator and author, Bishop Kulah has 
served as Dean of  the Gbarnga School of  Theology, and Dean and Principal of  the Theological College 
and Church Training Center in Freetown, Sierra Leone. He has written several books and articles 
including Liberia will Rise Again and Theological Education in Liberia: Problems and Opportunities. 
In June 1990, Bishop Kulah and others organized a sixty thousand person peace march that initiated 
the creation of  an interfaith committee and helped build a foundation for the 2003 peace process 
in Liberia. *Bishop Kulah resigned his position on the Liberian TRC in March 2008, to become the 
Interim Bishop of  the United Methodist Church of  Nigeria.
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I. Introduction
International human rights and humanitarian law developed largely in response to monumental 
human tragedies in the modern era. International humanitarian law (IHL) is older than human 
rights law and traces its roots to the middle of  the nineteenth century. IHL, commonly called the 
“law of  war,” applies in specifically defined instances of  international and internal armed conflict.  
IHL regulates the conduct of  hostilities and aims to protect victims of  war (e.g., civilians, wounded 
and sick, prisoners, displaced persons, etc.) and prevent excessive human suffering and material 
destruction. 
   
International human rights law (IHRL), which developed primarily after the Second World War, 
generally provides broader protection than IHL.  IHRL protects a number of  individual rights, 
including freedom of  movement, liberty and security, freedom of  association, and freedom of  
speech. Under IHRL, however, certain human rights may be suspended in limited circumstances, 
such as in times of  public emergency that threaten the life of  the nation, but only to the extent 
required by the exigencies of  the situation. Still, not all human rights may be suspended, and, 
importantly, IHL and IHRL apply simultaneously to limit the suspension of  an individual’s right to 
exercise his or her basic human rights. Together, IHL and IHRL establish an essential set of  human 
rights that cannot be suspended under any circumstances.  These core protections include the right 
to life, the prohibition of  slavery and servitude, the prohibition of  torture and inhumane treatment, 
and the prohibition of  any retroactive application of  the law.
The core IHL and IHRL protections apply in Liberia.  In fact, Liberia has joined most of  the treaties 
and conventions that comprise the foundations of  IHRL and IHL, either through ratification or 
accession, or by signature only.  Liberia did not ratify many of  these conventions, however, until 
after the exile of  Charles Taylor in 2003. For example, Liberia signed the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1967, but did not ratify those 
instruments until 2004. Likewise, Liberia joined the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment in 2004, after having taken no action on it for 
twenty years, and did not sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of  the Child 
on the involvement of  children in armed conflict until 2004.
This section will discuss the sources of  international law, the major instruments of  IHRL, including 
universal and regional instruments, and the major instruments of  IHL.
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II. Sources of  International Law
Article 38 of  the Statute of  the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) is generally regarded as a 
complete statement of  the sources of  public international law.1  Article 38 defines four primary 
sources of  public international law:2   
1. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
2. international custom, as evidence of  a general practice accepted as 
law;
3. the general principles of  law recognized by civilized nations;
4. subject to the provisions of  Article 59 [decisions of  the Court 
have no binding force except between the parties and in respect 
of  that particular case], judicial decisions and the teachings of  the 
most highly qualified publicists of  the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of  rules of  law.3
1.  International treaties, such as conventions, covenants,4 protocols,5 or pacts, are an important 
source of  international law.  A treaty is generally a legally binding, written agreement concluded 
between states or between the United Nations and a state.6  At the international level, a state 
establishes its consent to be bound through ratification,7 acceptance or approval,8 or accession.9  
Law-making treaties establish general norms for the future conduct of  the parties, and the 
obligations are basically the same for all parties.10  States may sign treaties; however, until the treaty is 
ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to by domestic legislation, a state’s signature serves only as 
an expression of  the state’s intent to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of  
the treaty.11  Once a human rights treaty has entered into force, states have an obligation to strictly 
perform their treaty obligations in good faith.12  Examples of  influential treaties in the human 
rights area include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.13
2. Customary international law is derived from the actual conduct of  states.  The existence of  a 
custom is shown by two factors:  (1) “settled practice,” and (2) “opinio juris.” 14  Settled practice may 
be established even after relatively little time has passed so long as state practice is “both extensive 
and virtually uniform in the sense of  the provision invoked.”15  Opinio juris may be established by 
“evidence of  a belief  that [a certain] practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of  a rule of  law 
requiring it.”16  “It is thus beyond doubt that basic human rights obligations form part of  customary 
international law. . . .  [T]he [ICJ] has expressly mentioned the crimes of  genocide and aggression, as 
well as the prohibition of  racial discrimination, slavery, arbitrary detention and physical hardship as 
forming part of  a universally binding corpus of  law, [but] it has not limited the scope of  [customary 
international] law to these elements.”17
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3.  General principles of  law are legal propositions so fundamental to human existence that they can 
be found in all major legal systems world-wide.18  For example, if  there is evidence that domestically 
states adhere to a legal principle providing for a right or that is essential to the protection of  a right, 
this illustrates the existence of  a legally binding principle under IHRL.19
4.  Judicial decisions and the teachings of  the most highly qualified publicists may also constitute 
binding public international law.  In the IHRL area, a wealth of  international caselaw now exists, and 
it must be regarded as authoritative evidence of  the state of  IHRL law.20  Domestic judicial decisions 
may also be used as evidence of  binding IHRL.21  The writings of  international legal commentators 
and scholars may also inform IHRL, but “it is advisable to exercise considerable care before relying 
on legal articles and principles and comments adopted by private bodies outside the framework of  
the officially established treaty organs.”22
III. Major Instruments of  International Human Rights Law
Effective protection of  human rights promotes peace and stability at the national level and is an 
essential precondition for peace and justice at the international level.  Protecting human rights at the 
domestic level and providing a framework within which domestic conflicts can be resolved peacefully 
eases social tensions before they can create a threat to international peace and security.   
 A. United Nations Charter
IHRL as we know it today began in 1945 with the Charter of  the United Nations.  The preamble 
to the United Nations Charter “reaffirm[ed] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of  the human person, [and] in the equal rights of  men and women and of  nations large and 
small,” and it established the United Nations’ goal “to promote social progress and better standards 
of  life in larger freedom.”23  To this end, one of  the four main purposes of  the United Nations is 
to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of  an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”24
Articles 56 and 55(c) of  the Charter require Member States “to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of  . . . universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”25  Although this language is generally regarded as vague, the obligation imposed by Article 
56 “provided the United Nations with the requisite legal authority to embark on what became a 
massive lawmaking effort to define and codify [IHRL].”26  The centerpiece of  this effort was the 
1948 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights.  Then, in 1966, two international covenants on human 
rights were adopted. “These two treaties, together with the human rights provisions of  the [United 
Nations] Charter and the Universal Declaration [of  Human Rights], constitute the International 
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Bill of  Rights.”27  In turn, this International Bill of  Rights represents a codification of  international 
norms of  conduct into a statutory treaty system designed to protect human rights.
 B. International Bill of  Rights
  i. Universal Declaration of  Human Rights
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights (UDHR) to give meaning to the “human rights and fundamental freedoms” protected 
in the United Nations Charter.28  The UDHR “recognizes civil, cultural, economic, political[,] and 
social rights, and, although it is not a legally binding document per se . . . the principles contained 
therein are now considered to be legally binding on States either as customary international law, 
general principles of  law, or as fundamental principles of  humanity.”29  Indeed, on the twentieth 
anniversary of  its adoption, the U.N. General Assembly declared that the UDHR “states a common 
understanding of  the peoples of  the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of  all 
members of  the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of  the international 
community.”30  Moreover, all significant human rights treaties adopted after 1948 recognize the 
UDHR in their preambles.  The ICJ also has recognized that the UDHR is a part of  customary 
international law.31  Thus, it may be argued that the UDHR is binding on a state even if  the state has 
made no effort to adopt its provisions.
The UDHR applies without regard to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin and secures the 
right to life, liberty, and security of  person.32  It prohibits slavery or servitude; torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; discrimination based on race, color, sex, or religion; 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; ex post facto laws; interference with travel; and arbitrary deprivation 
of  property.33  It also protects the right to recognition before the law; to an effective remedy by 
competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights; to a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal and a presumption of  innocence for persons accused of  a 
crime; to seek asylum; to a nationality; to marry; to freedom of  religion; to freedom of  thought and 
expression; to freedom of  association; to equally participate in government; to social security; to 
work; to an adequate standard of  living; and to an education.34
The UDHR provides “that human rights should be protected by the rule of  law.”35 Thus, the UDHR 
envisions an international legal system in which domestic legal systems directly provide for the 
protection of  a person’s human rights. The UDHR does not specifically recognize a state’s right to 
derogate from (i.e., suspend) their obligations under the UDHR but allows only “such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of  securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of  others and of  meeting the just requirements of  morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society.”36
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From an ethical perspective, the rights provided in the UDHR and further developed in other 
human rights treaties spring not from positive law but rather are a component of  “the inherent 
dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of  all members of  the human family.”37  The 
American Convention on Human Rights also expressly recognizes “that the essential rights of  
man are not derived from one’s being a national of  a certain state, but are based upon attributes 
of  the human personality.”38  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognizes 
“that fundamental human rights stem from the attitudes of  human beings, which justifies their 
international protection.”39  In this respect, states must provide human rights to all individuals within 
their jurisdiction, and these rights cannot be suspended even in emergency situations.  For example, 
the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights found that the rights provided under the American 
Convention on Human Rights cannot be suspended even in emergency situations because they are 
“inherent to man.”40
 
  ii. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in January 1976.41 As of  June 11, 
2009, 160 states are party to the ICESCR.42  The U.N. Economic and Social Counsel (ECOSOC) 
is formally entrusted under the ICESCR with the task of  monitoring compliance by state parties 
but since 1987 this task has been carried out by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.43
The ICESCR addresses a state’s obligation to provide certain economic, social, and cultural rights 
to its citizens.  Each State Party to the ICESCR “undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of  its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of  the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of  legislative measures.”44 The ICESCR also provides that state parties agree “to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the . . . Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of  any kind as to race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”45
The ICESCR guarantees, inter alia, the following rights: 
•	 the equal right of  both women and men to the enjoyment of  all rights set forth in the 
convention; 
•	 to work in just and favorable conditions; 
•	 to form trade unions; 
•	 to social security and social insurance; 
•	 to marriage; 
•	 to an adequate standard of  living; 
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•	 to the highest attainable standard of  physical and mental health; 
•	 to an education and the enjoyment of  the benefits of  cultural freedom and scientific 
progress; and
•	 recognition of  protection and assistance to the family, in particular mothers, children, and 
young persons.46
The ICESCR contains a general limitation in article 4: recognizing “that, in the enjoyment of  those 
rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such 
rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible 
with the nature of  these rights and solely for the purpose of  promoting the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”  Satisfying the general limitation is a difficult task.  Otherwise, the only specific 
derogation allowed is provided in article 8(1)(a), (c) with respect to trade unions and allows for 
limitations on this right as prescribed by law “which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of  national security or public order or for the protection of  the rights and freedoms of  
others.”47 Liberia ratified the ICESCR on September 22, 2004. 
  iii. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) went into effect on March 23, 
1976, and as of  June 11, 2009, 164 states have ratified or acceded to the ICCPR.48  The Human 
Rights Committee monitors the implementation of  the ICCPR.49  
The ICCPR addresses the state’s responsibility for administering justice and maintaining the rule of  
law.  The ICCPR is not “confined to the respect of  human rights, but . . . States Parties have also 
undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of  these rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction.”50 States 
Parties have a legal duty to ensure that (1) domestic laws are modified where necessary in order to 
comply with the state’s international obligations, and (2) domestic laws are effectively implemented in 
practice by all public organs and officials, such as courts, prosecutors, police officers, prison officials, 
schools, the military, and hospitals.51
The ICCPR guarantees the following rights: 
•	 to life; 
•	 to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
•	 to freedom from slavery, servitude, or forced labor; 
•	 to liberty and security of  the person; 
•	 to liberty of  movement and freedom to choose one’s residence; 
•	 to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal; 
•	 to freedom from ex post facto laws; 
•	 to recognition as a person before the law; 
•	 to freedom of  thought and expression; 
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•	 to peaceful assembly; 
•	 to association; 
•	 to marriage; 
•	 to participate in government; and 
•	 to a nationality.52  
The ICCPR also prohibits, among other things, war propaganda and advocacy of  national, racial, or 
religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.53
The ICCPR has two Optional Protocols.54  The first establishes the procedure for dealing with 
communications (i.e., complaints) from individuals claiming to be victims of  the violation of  any 
right set out in the ICCPR.55 The second abolishes the death penalty.56  
Unlike the UDHR and the ICESCR, the ICCPR authorizes a state to suspend the enjoyment of  
certain rights in times of  an officially declared public emergency that threatens the life of  the 
nation.57 Such limitations are permitted only to the extent that they are prescribed by law and strictly 
necessary under the circumstances.58  Furthermore, any suspension must be consistent with the 
state’s other international legal obligations and cannot be for the purpose of  discriminating on the 
basis of  race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.59  Derogations also must be reported to 
the United Nations.60 Some provisions, however may never be suspended, such as the rights to life, 
freedom from torture, slavery, ex post facto laws, recognition as a person before the law, and freedom 
of  thought and religion.61 The right to access the courts may not be suspended to the extent that 
a judicial system is required to enforce and protect these rights. For example, article 2(3) requires 
Member States:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of  the State, and 
to develop the possibilities of  judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted.62
The rights provided in these universal international instruments must be enforced by domestic 
legislation. It therefore follows that, before a state, or in certain circumstances an individual, may 
enforce human rights instruments at the international level, all domestic enforcement avenues must 
be exhausted unless they are unavailable or ineffective. Liberia ratified the ICCPR on September 24, 
2004. 
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iv. Specific Application of  International Bill of  Rights to Police and Law Enforcement, Judicial, 
and Legislative Branches 
Generally, international human rights instruments apply to all public authorities, including the 
judicial and legislative branches and police and law enforcement, by their own terms. In other words, 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention provided in the UDHR applies with equal 
weight to the branches of  the national and local governments and to the individual police officers 
working within a state.  The United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights has produced 
a pocket book for police describing the application of  international human rights to police and 
law enforcement officers specifically.63  Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights also has produced a background guide for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, detailing 
the application of  IHRL to the coordinate branches of  a national government and police and law 
enforcement.64 
The concept of  state responsibility under international law is expansive, and it is generally recognized 
that human rights law applies even to “private” conduct. Specifically, states are not only obligated 
to refrain from committing human rights violations themselves, but may also be responsible for 
failing to exercise due diligence toward otherwise “private” acts when they fail to fulfill their duty to 
prevent, investigate, or punish such acts.65
C. Other Major Universal International Human Rights Instruments
In addition to the UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR, several other major universal international human 
rights instruments are especially relevant.
  i. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide
 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide (Genocide 
Convention) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and entered 
into force on January 12, 1951.66  As of  June 11, 2009, 140 states were parties to the Genocide 
Convention.67  The parties to the Genocide Convention “confirm that genocide, whether committed 
in time of  peace or in time of  war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
prevent and to punish.”68  Thus, the Genocide Convention recognizes that genocide is likely already a 
crime under customary international law. 
The Genocide Convention does not have an international body charged with the implementation 
of  the Convention; rather, the parties “undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective 
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of  the…Convention, and, 
in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of  genocide” or of  conspiracy to 
commit, incitement or attempt to commit, or complicity in, the crime of  genocide.69  The Genocide 
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Convention defines genocide as “any of  the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of  the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of  the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of  life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of  the group to another group.”70
Liberia ratified the Genocide Conventions on June 9, 1950. 
Tribunals have been established to prosecute various large-scale human rights abuses that constitute 
grave violations of  the laws and customs of  war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.71  In 
Africa, for example, an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by the U.N. Security 
Council.72 Additionally, on July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was adopted by the U.N. Conference of  Plenipotentiaries.73 The ICC is competent to try national 
persons irrespective of  their official capacity, but will not have jurisdiction over legal entities, such as 
states and corporations.74  The ICC Statute went into effect on July 1, 2002.75 
ii. The International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 21, 1965, and entered into 
force on January 4, 1969.76 As of  June 11, 2009, 173 states were parties to it.77  The term racial 
discrimination means “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of  nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of  human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of  public life.”78 The States Parties to 
the Convention “condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means 
and without delay a policy of  eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting 
understanding among all races.”79  They agree not to practice racial discrimination and to prohibit 
public institutions from practicing the same, not to support racial discrimination by any persons 
or organizations, to take effective public policy measures to eliminate racial discrimination, and to 
encourage multiracial organizations and movements permitting integration.80 They also agree to 
assure that adequate remedies exist in their jurisdictions for acts violating the Convention.81 The 
Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination is tasked with monitoring and implementing 
the Convention.82 Liberia acceded to CERD on November 5, 1976. 
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iii. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1984 and 
entered into force on June 26, 1987.83 As of  December 16, 2008, 146 states were parties to the 
Convention.84 Under the Convention “torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of  having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of  any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of  or with the consent or acquiescence of  a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”85 “Each State Party [to the Convention] shall take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of  torture in any territory under 
its jurisdiction.”86  
The Convention also expressly specifies that torture is not justified in any circumstance 
(e.g., internal political instability, public emergency, etc.) or for any reason (e.g., order from superior, 
order from public authority, etc.).87  The fact that international protection against torture may not be 
suspended is consistent with the ICCPR, which also does not permit suspension of  the right to be 
free from torture.88
 The Committee against Torture was established to supervise and implement the 
Convention.89  The Committee receives reports from states and considers communications (i.e., 
complaints) from states and individuals.90  The Convention only authorizes the Committee to visit 
countries where torture is practiced with the consent of  the State Party concerned, but efforts have 
been made since 1991 to draft an optional protocol that would establish a preventive system of  
regular visits to places of  detention.91 Liberia acceded to CAT on September 22, 2004. 
iv. The Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women
 The Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1979 and entered 
into force on September 3, 1981.92  As of  June 11, 2009, 186 states are party to the Convention.93  
The Convention defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of  sex which has the effect or purpose of  impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of  their marital status, on a basis of  equality of  men 
and women, of  human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field.”94 States Parties agree to embody the principle of  equality of  gender in 
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their national laws, to adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination against women, to establish equal 
rights for women, to refrain from discriminating against women, and to take appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise.95 States also 
agree to modify the social and cultural patterns of  society that are based on the idea of  superiority 
or inferiority of  the sexes or stereotyped roles for men and women, to ensure that family education 
includes a proper understanding of  maternity as a social function and recognizes the common 
responsibility of  men and women in raising children, and to take all appropriate measures to 
suppress all forms of  traffic in women and exploitation of  prostitution of  women.96
 
CEDAW established a monitoring committee called the Committee on the Elimination of  
Discrimination against Women.97  The implementing Committee receives reports from States Parties 
and makes recommendations.98  The Committee is also restricted to meeting for no more than two 
weeks annually.99  An Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  
Discrimination against Women entered into force on December 22, 2000.100  The optional protocol 
allows the committee to consider petitions from individuals or groups and to conduct confidential 
enquiries into grave or systematic violations of  CEDAW.101 Liberia ratified CEDAW on July 17, 1984. 
 
v. The Convention on the Rights of  the Child
The Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1989 and entered into force on September 2, 1990.102 As of  June 11, 2009, 193 states are parties to 
the CRC.103  The Convention has two optional protocols that entered into force in 2002, one relating 
to the involvement of  children in armed conflict, and the other relating to the sale of  children, child 
prostitution, and child pornography.104
The guiding principle of  the CRC is that “in all actions concerning children . . . the best interests 
of  the child shall be a primary consideration.”105  The Convention protects certain general rights, 
including non-discrimination and equality of  opportunity; the right to life, survival, and development, 
including physical, mental, emotional, cognitive, social, and cultural development; and the freedom 
to express opinions and have those opinions taken into account, depending on the child’s age and 
maturity level.106  Other rights of  children include free and compulsory primary education; protection 
from economic exploitation; protection from sexual abuse, child prostitution, and child pornography; 
protection from physical and mental harm and neglect; special treatment and education for disabled 
children; and protection of  children affected by armed conflict.107  A Committee on the Rights of  the 
Child was established “for the purpose of  examining the process made by States Parties in achieving 
the realization of  the obligations undertaken in the . . . Convention.”108 Liberia ratified the CRC on 
June 4, 1993. 
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 D. Regional Human Rights Instruments
Regional instruments also protect human rights.  For example, both the European Convention for 
the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) (entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1953) and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) 
(entered into force July 17, 1978) recognize and give effect to the human rights principles established 
in the UDHR.109  In Africa, a specific regional charter protects human rights.
  
i. African Charter of  Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Charter of  Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) was adopted in 1981 and 
entered into force on October 21, 1986.110  As of  June 11, 2009, 53 African states were parties to 
the African Charter.111  Liberia ratified the African Charter on August 4, 1982. While it was inspired 
by the UDHR, the two international covenants, and the other regional human rights charters, the 
African Charter reflects a high degree of  specificity due in part to the African conception of  the 
term “right” and its meaning in reference to the responsibilities of  human beings.112  State parties 
undertake to “recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in [the Charter] and . . . to 
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.”113  State parties also “have the duty to 
promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of  the rights and 
freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well 
as corresponding obligations and duties are understood” and “to guarantee the independence of  
the Courts and . . . allow the establishment and improvement of  appropriate national institutions 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of  the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter.”114  Thus, the African Charter places an especially strong emphasis on the need for an 
independent administration of  justice to protect human rights.115
The African Charter recognizes the following civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of  
individual human beings: 
•	 freedom from discrimination; 
•	 equality before the law; 
•	 respect for one’s life, personal integrity, and inherent dignity, including freedom from slavery, 
slave trade, and torture, and from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment; 
•	 the right to liberty and personal security, including freedom from arbitrary arrest or 
detention; 
•	 access to the courts for redress of  grievances; 
•	 presumption of  innocence and the right to a defense, to be tried within a reasonable time, 
and to be free from ex post facto laws; 
•	 freedom of  conscience, profession, thought, and religion; 
•	 the right to receive information; 
•	 freedom of  association; 
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•	 freedom of  movement; 
•	 the right to participate in the government; 
•	 the right to own property; 
•	 the right to work and to receive equal pay for equal work; 
•	 the right to enjoy the best attainable state of  physical and mental health; and
•	 the right to an education; 
•	 and the right to family.116  
Also recognized are the peoples’ rights to equality, existence, and self-determination; right to 
dispose of  wealth and natural resources; economic, social, and cultural development; national 
and international peace and security; and “a general satisfactory environment favorable to their 
development.”117 
Uniquely, the African Charter also imposes certain general duties on individuals in regard to 
groups, including “family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the 
international community,” and toward other individuals.118  In particular, “every individual shall have 
the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations 
aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.”119  The African 
Charter requires every individual to preserve the harmonious development of  the family, serve 
one’s national community, not compromise the security of  the state, preserve and strengthen the 
social and national solidarity, work to the best of  one’s abilities and competence, pay taxes, preserve 
and strengthen positive African cultural values, and contribute to the best of  one’s ability to the 
promotion and achievement of  African unity.120
Unlike the ICCPR and the American and European Conventions, the African Charter does 
not explicitly provide for any derogation of  rights in times of  public emergency.  The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) has interpreted this to mean 
that derogations are not permissible under the African Charter.121  Rather, the African Charter states 
that the “rights and freedoms of  each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of  
others, collective security, morality and common interest.”122  In specific instances, states may place 
restrictions on certain rights as “provided for by law for the protection of  national security, law and 
order, public health or morality.”123
The African Charter created the African Commission “to promote human and peoples’ rights and 
ensure their protection in Africa.”124  The African Commission may study particular problems and 
make recommendations to states, “formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal 
problems relating to human and peoples’ rights,” and cooperate with other African and international 
institutions to promote human rights.125  The African Commission is also empowered to consider 
disputes between states but only after all domestic remedies have been exhausted “unless . . . the 
procedure of  achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.”126  Individual communications 
534
(i.e., complaints) may also be sent to the African Commission under certain narrow, well-defined 
circumstances.127  Finally, the African Commission is charged with issuing a report detailing its efforts 
every two years.128
  ii. Additional African Regional Instruments
Protocols and subject-specific charters also regulate human rights in Africa.  For example, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of  the Child was adopted in 1990 and entered into force 
in 1999; it spells out a long list of  children’s rights and establishes an African Committee of  Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of  the Child.129  It defines a child as any person below the age of  18 years 
(Art. 2) and enumerates rights, including the right to an education (Art. 11), protection against child 
abuse, torture (Art. 16), economic exploitation (Art. 15), and sexual exploitation (Art. 27). The treaty 
also calls upon States Parties to ensure respect for international humanitarian law pertaining to the 
child and to “ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from 
recruiting any child” (Art. 22). It also ensures that the child refugees or children seeking refugee 
status are accorded protection and assistance as provided for by the treaty and international law (Art. 
23). Also, any child who is deprived of  a family environment, whether permanently or temporarily, is 
to be afforded protection and assistance (Art. 25). Liberia ratified the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of  the Child in 2007.
A specific African convention also deals with women’s rights and refuge problems.130 The Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of  Women in Africa enumerates 
several rights and obligations of  States Parties. It requires States Parties to eliminate discrimination 
against women (Art. 2), as well as ensure equal protection for women before the law (Art. 8), equal 
rights in marriage (Art. 6), and women’s increased participation in the peace process (Art. 10). The 
Protocol also requires States Parties to respect international humanitarian law, particularly with regard 
to women, and to protect civilians, including women, during armed conflict (Art. 11). The protocol 
affirms the right of  women to life, respect and security of  person (Art. 4), and it requires States 
Parties to pass laws prohibiting violence against women and to punish perpetrators who violate such 
laws (Art. 4(2)(a), (e)). Liberia ratified the protocol in 2007. 
Finally, a protocol to the African Charter establishes a regional court, the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, to rule on compliance issues raised under the African Charter.131  The African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights, created in 2004, is composed of  eleven judges, and is currently 
in the process of  merging with the African Court of  Justice, following a decision by the African 
Convention states at a June 2004 summit. Liberia has only signed the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights, which it did in 1998. 
IV. Major Instruments of  International Humanitarian Law
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The evolution of  warfare and weaponry since the beginning of  the twentieth century has resulted 
in very high civilian casualty rates (heavily comprised of  women, children, and elderly) and ever 
increasing dangers to humanitarian workers in situations of  armed conflict.132  In recent years, the 
increasing impact of  war on vulnerable civilian populations and humanitarian workers has driven the 
development of  more detailed and concrete rules of  warfare.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the law of  war or armed conflict, aims to 
place restrictions on the conduct of  hostilities (namely on the use of  certain weaponry and means of  
warfare), protect those who are not or who are no longer participating in the conflict (e.g., civilians, 
prisoners of  war, wounded and sick, and humanitarian workers, etc.), and confine the use of  violence 
to the achievement of  the objectives of  the conflict.133  IHL’s goal is to “protect human dignity and 
to limit suffering during times of  war.”134
The rules of  IHL differ in content and application depending upon the type of  conflict.  First, the 
most comprehensive IHL rules apply to situations of  “international armed conflict” (i.e., conflicts 
between states).135  It is not surprising that the bulk of  IHL applies to this type of  conflict because 
states can more easily sign and enforce agreements regulating the conduct of  their wars.  Second, 
less extensive rules cover situations of  “internal armed conflict” (i.e., those that take place within a 
country and involve one or more groups and possibly the state government).136
A. Background and Differences Between IHL and IHRL
There are two major differences between international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and international 
human rights law (“IHRL”).  First, while both bodies of  law share a common goal of  protecting the 
rights and dignity of  individuals, they pursue that goal in different ways.137  IHL operates in a specific 
emergency situation – armed conflict; IHRL applies more broadly and seeks generally to protect the 
rights of  individuals regardless of  the presence of  conflict.138  Second, no derogations are allowed 
from IHL rules;139 however, states may suspend some IHRL rights during a public emergency that 
threatens the security of  the state.140
IHL applies to international armed conflict and internal armed conflict, but it does not apply to 
internal disturbances, such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of  violence.141 There is no formal 
system, however, for determining whether a conflict is an “internal armed conflict” or an “internal 
disturbance.”  State sovereignty concerns may induce a state to evade the requirements of  IHL 
by characterizing internal conflict as an “internal disturbance” or some other national emergency 
to which IHL does not apply.142  The state also may be concerned that designating the situation 
as “internal armed conflict” would give legitimacy to the opposition and implicitly recognize its 
existence.  Accordingly, it is often difficult to persuade a state to accept the application of  IHL to a 
violent conflict occurring within its borders.143  As a result, situations arise where IHL does not apply 
because no actual conflict has been declared.  Additionally, provisions of  IHRL may be suspended 
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due to the national emergency.  In such situations, individuals are left with only limited international 
humanitarian and human rights protections.144
B.  Principal Instruments of  IHL145
i.  The Early IHL Instruments
The Hague Convention (including the Convention for the Protection of  Cultural Property)* (1899; 
1954).  In 1899,146 at the First Hague Peace Conference, a group of  nations met with the primary 
goal of  establishing a system for resolving disputes without resorting to warfare and a secondary goal 
of  setting rules regarding the conduct of  war.147  The notion of  agreeing prospectively to submit 
disputes to arbitration proved to be unpopular, but the Conference’s attendees were more willing to 
discuss proposals related to the conduct of  war.148
 
The result of  this conference was a set of  regulations addressing land combat between nations 
at war.149  Section I attempted to draw the lines between “belligerents,” “prisoners of  war,” and 
others, and established rules for how prisoners of  war and the sick or wounded should be treated 
(the goal being “humane” treatment).150  Section II set limits on the means and practice of  warfare, 
including conduct during hostilities, and practices concerning spies, surrender, and armistices.151  
Certain practices were specifically banned, including the use of  poison, “kill[ing] or wound[ing] 
treacherously,” killing or wounding an enemy who has surrendered, using any weapon that would 
“cause superfluous injury,” giving orders not to take any prisoners, and attacking  undefended towns 
or villages.152  Section III requires that occupying forces restore public order and refrain from looting 
or pillaging; most interestingly, this section states that life and religion must be “respected.”153  Finally, 
Section IV allows neutral states to detain “belligerent” forces (it also requires the detaining state to 
provide food and clothing for detainees) and permit sick and wounded into their territories.154
In 1954, an additional instrument titled the Convention for the Protection of  Cultural Property 
(“CPCP”) was added to the Hague Convention regime.  Prompted by the massive destruction of  
cultural properties in World War II and other conflicts, the CPCP sought to protect cultural property 
of  all kinds, including buildings with historical and/or architectural value.155  The CPCP is one 
of  the few instruments that applies to non-international armed conflicts, unlike the 1899 Hague 
Convention, which binds only states involved in international conflicts.156  Specifically, Article 19 of  
the CPCP states that “in the event of  an armed conflict not of  an international character” occurring 
within the territory of  a State Party to the CPCP, any party to the conflict is bound by the CPCP 
provisions mandating respect for cultural properties.157
ii.  The Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols
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Spurred to action by the violence and horrors of  the Spanish Civil War and World War II, members 
of  the international community drafted the four Geneva Conventions during 1949.158  The Geneva 
Conventions are the most widely recognized of  any IHL or IHRL instruments, and their provisions 
cover the treatment of  combatants on land and sea, prisoners of  war, and civilians.159  Over the years, 
as advancements in weaponry, changes in combat tactics (guerrilla tactics, etc.), and changes in the 
context of  war (i.e., the rise of  intra-state civil conflict and the severity of  its consequences upon 
civilian populations) resulted in new problems in the conduct of  war, another diplomatic conference 
was called in 1974, resulting in two Additional Protocols being added to the Geneva regime in 
1977.160  
Convention I (1949).  Convention I creates obligations relating to the treatment of  wounded or 
sick members of  armed forces on land.  Article 12 dictates that all wounded and sick who are 
in the power of  any party to the conflict must be given medical care, and forbids murdering or 
experimenting upon the wounded or sick.161  All parties to a conflict must make all possible efforts to 
search out and take custody of  any sick or wounded regardless of  their affiliation.162  Medical military 
services and Red Cross societies are also given protection, and medical units may not be attacked by 
any party.163  Interestingly, civilians are given the ability to take in and care for wounded soldiers.164  
Finally, this Convention makes it clear that reprisals against forces that are not or have not been 
following this Convention are forbidden.165
Convention II (1949).  Convention II creates similar obligations as Convention I, except in the 
context of  sick, wounded, or shipwrecked armed forces at sea.166  Like Convention I, it prohibits 
reprisals against parties protected by the treaty.167
Convention III (1949).  Convention III deals with the treatment of  prisoners of  war (“POWs”).  In 
general terms, all POWs must “at all times be humanely treated.”168  No killing of  POWs is allowed, 
and no reprisals against them are allowed.169  POWs are entitled to protection and must be evacuated 
from combat areas as soon as practicable and cared for in a way that respects individual concerns 
such as hygiene, mental health, and religion.170  The detaining state may put POWs to work, but 
Convention III places restrictions on the type of  labor that they may be compelled to do.171  
Convention IV (1949).  Convention IV grants protection to civilians during war but these 
protections are not as extensive as those granted to combatants in Conventions I-III.172  Convention 
IV restrictions apply only to the treatment of  civilians by enemy forces, not to the treatment of  a 
civilians by its own state’s forces.  Further, the restrictions of  Convention IV do not seek to “protect 
civilians from the dangers of  warfare – such as aerial bombardment.”173
Common Article 3 to Conventions I-IV* (1949).  Each of  the four Geneva Conventions described 
above shares an identical provision, known as the Common Article 3, that covers the minimum 
rules that must apply in cases of  internal armed conflicts (as opposed to the rest of  the articles of  
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Conventions I-IV that apply only in cases of  international armed conflicts). 
Those persons who take no active part in the fighting, including any combatants who have 
surrendered their weapons and those who have been taken out of  the fighting by sickness, wounds, 
or capture, must be treated humanely at all times without discrimination on the basis of  race, color, 
religion, sex, birth, wealth, or similar criteria.174  Common Article 3 states that this requirement 
forbids the following acts:  “(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of  all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of  hostages; (c) outrages against personal dignity, 
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of  sentences and the carrying out 
of  executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”175  All wounded 
and sick also must be collected and cared for, although how humanitarian assistance is to be provided 
is not explained in practical terms.176  Most noticeably, there are no provisions in Common Article 3 
regarding the treatment of  POWs.177
Application of  Common Article 3 has certain limitations.  First, armed opposition groups cannot 
be parties to the Convention.  Thus, these groups are not bound by Common Article 3; although, 
as a practical matter, it might be helpful both internally and externally for these groups to comply.178  
Second, sovereignty concerns render states extremely reluctant to recognize an opposition party in 
any capacity.179  Common Article 3 therefore is rarely invoked.  Nonetheless, all parties regardless 
of  their status are called upon to follow and make special formal agreements concerning the full 
application of  the Conventions I-IV, and these types of  agreements have been reached in various 
conflicts in cooperation with the International Committee for the Red Cross.180 
In addition, the Geneva Conventions require States Parties to penalize and prosecute “grave 
breaches.” The four Geneva Conventions plus Additional Protocol I provide definitions of  these 
grave breaches. Under Geneva Convention IV, grave breaches include: “wilful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of  a protected 
person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of  a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving 
a protected person of  the rights of  fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, 
taking of  hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of  property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”181 Additional Protocol I defines grave 
breaches as, “[a]ny wilful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental health 
or integrity of  any person who is in the power of  a Party other than the one on which he depends 
and which either violates any of  the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 or fails to comply with the 
requirements of  paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach of  this Protocol,” as well as, inter alia, “making 
the civilian population or individual civilians the object of  attack” and “launching an indiscriminate 
attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause excessive loss of  life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects” which, when committed 
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willfully, causes death or serious injury to body or health.182 Liberia ratified the four Geneva 
Conventions on March 29, 1954. 
Additional Protocol I (1977).  A large portion of  the Additional Protocol I (a Protocol that applies 
only in cases of  international armed conflict) is the codification of  pre-existing rules of  customary 
international law.183  Major provisions of  this protocol discuss combatant and POW status, methods 
and means of  warfare, protection of  and humanitarian assistance to civilian populations, treatment 
of  the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, and treatment of  those persons “in the power of  a party to 
the conflict.”184 Liberia ratified Additional Protocol I on June 30, 1988.
Additional Protocol II* (1977).  This protocol supplements Common Article 3.185  As compared 
to the extensive Additional Protocol I, this protocol establishes a limited set of  rules that apply to 
internal armed conflicts.  As defined in Article 1, internal armed conflict does not include “situations 
of  internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of  violence and other 
acts of  a similar nature.”186  This vague definition means that characterization of  a given conflict “has 
largely been left to the discretion and the good faith of  the state concerned . . . [m]uch will therefore 
depend on the good will of  the authorities in the state concerned and, as the case may be, on such 
pressure as the outside world may be able to exert.”187  In answer to state sovereignty fears inherent 
in recognizing an opposition group, this protocol makes no mention of  “parties to a conflict,” and 
instead speaks in terms of  “military operations” and situations involving “hostilities.”188 
This protocol applies to “all persons affected by an armed conflict” and it must be applied without 
any discrimination based upon race, color, sex, language, religion, ethnicity, wealth, or other similar 
criteria.189  Any person who is not taking part in or who is no longer taking part in hostilities 
must be treated humanely.190  Article 4 repeats the prohibition of  acts forbidden by the Common 
Article 3, and forbids the following acts:  corporal punishment, acts of  terrorism, outrages upon 
personal dignity (including rape, forced prostitution, and any form of  indecent assault), slavery 
and the slave trade, pillaging, and threats to commit any of  these forbidden acts.191  Specifically 
dealing with the problem of  child soldiers, this protocol provides that no one under the age of  
15 may be recruited or allowed to take part in the armed conflict.192  Article 6 places due process 
requirements on the punishment of  criminal offenses.  Echoing Common Article 3, all wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked must be protected and cared for, and special protections are added for medical 
and religious personnel.193  Any attack that would directly target civilians or certain key pieces of  
social infrastructure is prohibited, and starvation or forced displacement of  civilians (except for 
displacements due to security or “imperative military reasons”) is also prohibited.194 Liberia ratified 
Additional Protocol II on June 30, 1988.
iii.  The Post-Geneva Conventions and Protocols
Post-Geneva law includes conventions on the prohibition against or use of  certain weapons. Such 
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treaties include the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols (1980-1996), the 
Convention on Chemical Weapons (1993), and the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of  Anti-
Personnel Mines (1997).  
Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court* (1998). As discuss above, the ICC Statute went 
into effect in July 2002.  The ICC has jurisdiction over individuals who commit “war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and the crime of  aggression.”195  Detailed provisions of  the ICC Statute 
apply to international armed conflicts and less specific portions of  the ICC Statute apply to internal 
armed conflicts. The major acts forbidden by Article 8 of  the ICC Statute are murder, mutilation, 
torture, taking hostages, “committing outrages upon personal dignity,” “intentionally directing attacks 
against the civilian population,” intentionally attacking humanitarian or peacekeeping personnel 
or property, pillaging a town or place, commission of  sexual violence (rape, sexual slavery, forced 
pregnancy, enforced prostitution, etc.), and the conscription of  children under the age of  15 into 
military service.196 These rules, however, do not apply to “situations of  internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of  violence or other acts of  a similar nature.”197 
Liberia ratified the Rome Statute on September 22, 2004. 
CRC Protocol on Armed Conflict* (2000).  In 1989, U.N. member states signed the CRC giving 
specialized human rights protection to a vulnerable sector of  society – children.198  In 2000, an 
Optional Protocol was signed in response to the growing use of  child soldiers in combat.199  The 
optional protocol forbids any compulsory conscription of  persons under age 18, and voluntary 
enlistment of  those under 18 is allowed only if  strict guidelines are met (including parental consent).  
Although only states may be signatories, this instrument also states that “armed groups that are 
distinct from the armed forces of  a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in 
hostilities persons under the age of  18 years” and state parties must take “all feasible measures 
to prevent such recruitment and use.”200  Thus, this Optional Protocol is one of  the few IHL 
instruments that places requirements upon non-state actors engaged in armed conflict. Liberia signed 
only the OP-CRC-AC on September 22, 2004. 
V. Summary of  Instruments Signed or Ratified by Liberia
Significantly, Liberia did not ratify many of  the instruments of  IHRL and IHL until after Charles 
Taylor was exiled in 2003.  Then, after taking no action on certain instruments of  international law 
for as many as 20 years, Liberia formally joined many international treaties in 2004.  Liberia has 
ratified or joined by accession the following treaties and conventions:
•	 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide (1950)201
•	 The Geneva Conventions of  August 12, 1949 (1954)
•	 Convention Relating the Status of  Stateless Persons (1964)
•	 Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees (1964)
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•	 International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (but 
not Declaration Article 14) (1976)
•	 Protocol Relating to the Status of  Refugees (1980)
•	 The Organization of  African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of  Refugee 
Problems in Africa (1971)
•	 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1982)
•	 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of  the Child (2007)
•	 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of  Women in 
Africa (2007)
•	 Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (1984)
•	 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of  
Marriages (2005)
•	 U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2004)
•	 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(2004)
•	 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (but not Declaration 
Article 90) (1988)
•	 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1988)
•	 Convention on the Rights of  the Child (1993)
•	 ILO No. 182 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of  the Worst Forms of  Child Labor (2003)
•	 ILO No. 29 Forced Labour Convention (1931)
•	 ILO No. 105 Abolition of  Forced Labour Convention (1962)
•	 ILO C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1959)
•	 Convention on the Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1999)
•	 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (2004)
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2004) 
•	 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2004)
•	 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2004)
•	 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2005)
•	 U.N. Convention against Corruption (2005)
•	 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2007)
•	 Convention against Discrimination in Education (1962)
•	 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (2004)
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•	 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid 
(1976)
Liberia has signed the following treaties and conventions:
•	 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2004)
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination 
Against Women (2004)
•	 International Convention on the Protection of  the Rights of  All Migrant Workers and 
Members of  Their Families (2004)
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of  the Child on the involvement of  
children in armed conflict (2004)
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of  the Child on the sale of  children, 
child prostitution and child pornography (2004)
•	 Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities (2007)
•	 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities (2007)
•	 Protocol of  the Court of  Justice of  the African Union (2003)
•	 Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of  an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998)
•	 Convention on the Political Rights of  Women (1953)
•	 African Youth Charter (2008)
•	 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2008)
VI. Conclusion
Read together, IHRL and IHL require that the following rights be afforded to Liberians at all times: 
the right to life, the prohibition of  slavery and servitude, the prohibition of  torture and inhumane 
treatment, and the prohibition of  any retroactive application of  the law.  In addition, the specific 
treaties above may provide additional rights to Liberians in certain circumstances.  For example, 
during times of  internal armed conflict, the core provisions of  IHRL apply to Liberia, but other 
provisions of  IHL also apply and can provide greater protection of  individual liberties.  For further 
details on the specific application of  instruments of  IHRL and IHL, the relevant treaty, convention, 
or protocol should be consulted, and international case law, where available, should be used to 
inform the reading of  IHRL and IHL instruments.
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I. International Refugee Protection 
The protection of  the world’s estimated 14 million refugees1 is governed by an international 
system which emerged following the Second World War.2 The Convention relating to the Status of  
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), adopted in 1951 and amended by the 1967 Protocol to the 
Convention, continues to control today, with 144 states party to the Convention and the Protocol.3 
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines who is a “refugee” under international law and sets forth the 
comprehensive set of  protections to which refugees are entitled. Despite this international standard, 
the protection of  refugees varies substantially around the world, as States Parties to the convention 
have implemented domestic procedures for refugee processing and as regional instruments have 
expanded the protection framework. And while the 1951 Refugee Convention can be recognized 
as “saving countless lives and ensuring a means of  escape for people facing imprisonment, torture, 
execution and other human rights abuses for reasons such as their political or religious beliefs, or 
membership in a particular ethnic or social group,”4 the system has also come under criticism both 
for failing to adequately address economic migrants and for serving as a “back door” to migration 
from poor to rich countries.5
a. Well-Founded Fear of  Persecution: The Refugee Definition
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines as a refugee any person who “owing to well-founded fear of  
being persecuted for reasons of  race, religion, nationality, membership of  a particular social group or 
political opinion … is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself  of  the protection of  
that country.”6 
Certain persons are excluded by the 1951 Refugee Convention from refugee protection. Those 
who have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; those who 
have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of  refuge; or those guilty of  
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of  the United Nations are excluded from the refugee 
definition and its attendant protections.7
Refugee status and the protection accorded to refugees may cease under certain conditions. The 
Refugee Convention provides for cessation of  refugee status when a refugee voluntarily re-avails 
himself  of  the protection of  the country of  nationality; when the refugee, having lost his nationality, 
voluntarily re-acquires it; when the refugee acquires a new nationality and enjoys the protection of  
the country of  new nationality; or when an individual “can no longer, because the circumstances in 
connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse 
to avail himself  of  the protection of  the country of  his nationality,” unless that person “is able to 
invoke compelling reasons arising out of  previous persecution for refusing to avail himself  of  the 
protection of  the country of  nationality.”8 
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The Organization of  African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of  Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee Convention) adopts the definition of  refugee from the 1951 
Refugee Convention. In addition, the OAU Refugee Convention holds that an individual fleeing 
generalized violence shall also be considered a refugee, extending protection beyond those subjected 
to targeted persecution identified in the 1951 Refugee Convention: 
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole of  his country of  origin or nationality, is compelled 
to leave his place of  habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of  origin or nationality.9
The U.S. definition of  a refugee is founded upon the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of  
Refugees. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets forth the refugee definition: 
Any person who is outside any country of  such person’s nationality or, in the case 
of  a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person 
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable 
or unwilling to avail himself  or herself  of  the protection of, that country because 
of  persecution or a well-founded fear of  persecution on account of  race, religion, 
nationally, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.10
Amending 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(i), the REAL ID Act adds the following to the law of  asylum: 
“The burden of  proof  is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee, within the 
meaning of  section101(a)(42)(A). To establish that the applicant is a refugee…the applicant must 
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”11 As in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, certain persons are excluded from the refugee definition by U.S. law,12 and refugee and 
asylum status are subject to termination under certain circumstances.13 
b. Prohibition of  Expulsion or Return: Non-refoulement
Essential to refugee protection is the concept of  non-refoulement. Article 33 of  the 1951 Refugee 
Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of  an individual “to the frontiers of  territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of  his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of  a particular social group or political opinion.”14 Refugees unlawfully within a country must be 
afforded the opportunity to present themselves for refugee status determination.15 Refugees lawfully 
within a country may not be expelled except on grounds of  national security or public order, and 
only in accordance with due process of  law.16 The 1951 Refugee Convention allows, however, that 
the benefit of  non-refoulement cannot be claimed by a refugee for “whom there are reasonable grounds 
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for regarding as a danger to the security of  the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of  a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of  that 
country.”17
Under Article 2(3) of  the OAU Refugee Convention, a state is obliged not to return an individual 
from its frontiers to a territory where he or she would be subject to the treatment outlined in Article 
118 (see Section 1, above). Again, relative to other international standards, Article 2(3)’s non-refoulement 
standard is generous to displaced individuals. First, an individual may not be returned if  he or she 
would face treatment encompassed by the expanded generalized violence refugee definition found 
in Article 1. Second, an individual may not be expelled from a country’s “frontiers,” suggesting that 
a State’s obligation extends to those over whom it exercises control, not only those who are within 
its territory.19 The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) also 
maintains an absolute prohibition on the mass expulsion of  non-nationals on account of  their 
membership in “national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.”20 
The United States executes its obligation to avoid refoulement through the concept of  withholding of  
removal.21 The Immigration and Nationality act (INA) prohibits the removal of  an alien to a country 
if  it is determined that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of  
the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.22 
Withholding of  removal is mandatory once the alien establishes a clear probability that his or her 
life or freedom will be threatened on account of  one of  the protected grounds. Withholding of  
removal may also be granted to persons who establish a clear probability of  torture, fulfilling the 
government’s obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).23
c. Durable Solutions
Voluntary repatriation, local integration, and third-country resettlement constitute what are 
commonly referred to as durable solutions to refugee crises.24 These durable solutions relate directly 
to the tension between states’ obligation against refoulement and their sovereign right to determine to 
whom, if  anyone, an offer of  permanent asylum will be granted. While refugees must not be forced 
to return to their country of  origin involuntarily,25 states are under no international legal obligation26 
to offer asylum. 
The durable solutions often may be in conflict with one another. The decision to offer third-country 
resettlement is complex, involving foreign policy, humanitarian, and practical considerations.27 
Designation of  third-country resettlement, for example, can result in a “magnet” effect of  new 
migration and may be resisted by the government of  the country of  first asylum28 or may disrupt 
efforts toward voluntary repatriation – long considered the most preferred solution by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).29 
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d. Asylum from Persecution
The political and legal reality is that states generally have not undertaken, and 
foreseeably will not undertake, an obligation to grant asylum in the sense of  a 
lasting solution. The peremptory norm of  non-refoulement secures admission and, in 
the individual case, may further raise the presumption that a local durable solution 
will be forthcoming. In the case of  large-scale movements, however, no such 
presumption is raised.30
The concept of  asylum relates more to the rights and duties of  states – both to grant asylum and 
to respect asylum that is granted by another sovereign state – rather than to the right of  individual 
refugees seeking protection. States have not accepted an international obligation to grant asylum 
to refugees31 and the 1951 Refugee Convention does not include the affirmative right to asylum.32 
Efforts to recognize a right to asylum in treaty largely have stalled since the adoption of  the 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum in 1967 and the U.N. Conference on Territorial Asylum convened 
a decade later.
Under the OAU Refugee Convention, states “shall use their best endeavours consistent with their 
respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of  those refugees who, for 
well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of  origin or nationality.”33 
A State Party thus must both accept a refugee within its borders and find a longer-term solution for 
settlement. This obligation is tempered in three ways. First, a state is obligated to provide harbor only 
to the extent that they are capable. Second, such harbor need only be provided to the extent that 
domestic legislation does not dictate otherwise. Third, a state is not obligated to provide longer-term 
harbor itself: it need only receive the refugee, but then may find a durable solution for the individual 
in a second state.
The right to asylum is also upheld in the African Charter.34 Under Article 12(3) of  the Charter: 
“Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries 
in accordance with laws of  those countries and international conventions.” The right contained 
within Article 12(3) also should be read within the context of  a State Party’s other treaty-based 
obligations. However, unlike within the OAU Refugee Convention, the African Charter does not 
limit an individual’s right to asylum by a state’s capacity to provide safe harbor. 
While the United States does provide that any person who is physically present in the United 
States or who arrives in the United States may apply for asylum,35 whether to grant asylum remains 
discretionary and numerous exceptions to asylum eligibility exist.36
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ii. rightS of refugeeS 
The 1951 Refugee Convention provides that refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as 
a national in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance;37 elementary 
education;38 public relief  and assistance;39 labor protections and social security;40 and finally, “[w]
here a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general 
distribution of  products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as 
nationals.”41
In addition, refugees are to be accorded “the most favourable treatment accorded to” nationals of  
a foreign country or other aliens under similar circumstances, with regard to acquisition of  movable 
and immovable property,42 right of  association,43 the right to engage in wage earning employment,44 
and self-employment;45 housing rights;46 the right to education beyond elementary education, 
including in the award of  scholarships;47 and freedom of  movement and the right to freely choose 
place of  residence.48
Both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention prohibit discrimination 
between groups of  refugees. Article 3 of  the 1951 Refugee Convention states: “The Contracting 
States shall apply the provisions of  this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, 
religion or country of  origin,” while the OAU Refugee Convention expands the prohibition to 
discrimination based on membership of  a particular social group or political opinions.49 
In addition, major international human rights instruments apply equally to citizens and non-
citizens alike, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, which states: “Everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of  any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”50 The principle of  equality and non-discrimination is reiterated in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,51 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,52 the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination 
Against Women,53 and the Convention on the Rights of  the Child.54 While the Convention on the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination allows for States to distinguish among citizens 
and non-citizens under limited circumstances,55 States may do so only in a manner that avoids 
undermining the basic prohibition of  discrimination.56 
Similarly, under the African Charter, states must ensure that all individuals are equal before the law,57 
and:
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of  the rights and freedoms recognized 
and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of  any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
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origin, fortune, birth or other status.58
States are therefore prohibited from discrimination against refugees in application of  the rights 
afforded by the OAU Refugee Convention, as well as in the application of  the rights afforded by the 
African Charter,59 including the rights to life,60 dignity,61 the prohibition against torture,62 personal 
liberty and security,63 health,64 education,65 and the rights of  the accused and convicted.66 To the 
extent to which states are obligated to provide for these rights to their own citizens, which includes 
the obligation to both “recognize” and “undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give 
[them] effect,”67 states must also provide them to refugees. The African Commission has supported 
this position, holding that Article 2 of  the Charter “imposes an obligation on the contracting state 
to secure the rights protected in the Charter to all persons within their jurisdiction, nationals or non-
nationals.”68
The right to freedom of  movement has been supported by the OAU in a number of  resolutions69 
and in the African Charter, which ensures that: “Every individual shall have the right to leave 
any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to 
restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of  national security, law and order, public health 
or morality.”70 In addition, the OAU Refugee Convention requires a State Party to issue travel 
documents “to refugees lawfully staying” in its territory so that they might travel outside of  that 
territory.71 A Member State “may” issue travel documents to other refugees.72 It is bound, however, 
only to issue travel documents to persons who conform “with its laws and regulations as well as with 
measures taken for the maintenance of  public order” and does not engage in “subversive activities” 
or “any activity likely to cause tension between Member States.”73
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides for compulsory 
and free primary education. Additionally it provides for secondary and higher education “generally 
available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of  free education.”74 
The 2002 Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the right to education noted, “[e]xpansion 
of  jurisprudence on the right to education at the domestic and international levels has been 
supplemented by the work of  national human rights institutions.”75 The report commented: 
In its resolution 2001/29, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated 
the necessity to progressively ensure that primary education is compulsory, 
accessible and available free to all and identified those often denied 
education: girls (including pregnant girls and child-mothers); children in 
rural areas; minority, indigenous, migrant and refugee children; internally 
displaced children, children affected by armed conflicts, children with 
disabilities, children affected by HIV/AIDS and children deprived of  
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their liberty. . . The Commission’s listing of  categories often denied 
education illustrates how the initially simple and neat legal categorizations 
of  prohibited grounds and types of  discrimination have gradually become 
complex.76 (emphasis added)
The African Commission has “underline[d]” the importance of  States directing education towards 
the “need[s] of  specific groups,” including refugees.77 
The Office of  the UNHCR, established December 14, 1950, has as its primary purpose, “to 
safeguard the rights and well-being of  refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the 
right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home voluntarily, 
integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.”78
International law recognizes that providing for refugees can be a burden on host countries. The 
Preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention specifically notes, “that the grant of  asylum may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of  a problem of  which 
the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation.”79 
The UNHCR engaged states in a new dialogue about protecting refugees in 2000 which resulted in 
a non-binding pledge, the “Agenda for Protection.” After reaffirming a commitment to the 1951 
Convention, States committed “to providing, within the framework of  international solidarity and 
burden-sharing, better refugee protection through comprehensive strategies, notably regionally and 
internationally, in order to build capacity, in particular in developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition, especially those which are hosting large-scale influxes or protracted refugee 
situations, and to strengthening response mechanisms, so as to ensure that refugees have access to 
safer and better conditions of  stay and timely solutions to their problems.”80
Unfortunately budget cuts have hindered UNHCR and other international organizations’ abilities to 
provide for refugees. “In 2001, UNHCR reported that relief  programmes assisting over 2.5 million 
refugees in West, East and Central Africa were severely under-funded leading to food shortages, 
unreliable drinking water, bare medical clinics, overcrowded schools, and other cuts in basic 
services to refugee populations throughout these regions.”81 The World Food Program (WFP) has 
continuously had to reduce food rations.82 These reductions can be linked not only to poorer health 
and malnutrition, but also to sexual exploitation and lower school attendance rates.83
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1979
Liberia enters into a treaty of  mutual defense with Guinea.
April 14, 1979 – President Tolbert’s proposal to increase the price of  rice provokes the Rice Riots. 
Later, Tolbert grants general amnesty to those charged with instigating the events of  April 14.
July 1970- Liberia hosts the 16th annual Organization of  African Unity summit meeting.
1980
 
April 12, 1980 – Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe launches a bloody coup with a group of  other 
noncommissioned officers, executing President Tolbert in the Executive Mansion.  
 
April 22, 1980 – A firing squad publicly strips and executes 13 government officials at a beachside 
military base in Monrovia. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, along with other members of  the educated elite, 
flee the country.
1985
 
October 15, 1985 – Amid claims that the voting was rigged, the Doe government holds and wins 
multi-party general elections.  
 
November 12, 1985 – General Thomas Quiwonkpa stages a failed coup, invading Monrovia and 
securing the national radio station before being overtaken by Doe’s military reinforcements. Within 
days, Quiwonkpa is executed, his corpse is mutiliated by Doe’s soldiers, and his body is paraded 
around Monrovia amid celebrations by loyalist soldiers.  
 
January 6, 1986 – Samuel Doe becomes the president of  the Second Republic, inaugurating a new 
constitution.  
 
December 24, 1989 – Charles Taylor, leading the National Patriotic Front of  Liberia (NPFL), 
instigates a civil war upon launching an invasion from Cote d’Ivoire into Liberia’s northeastern 
Nimba County, supported by guerrilla fighters trained in Libya.
1990
 
May 30, 1990 – The Economic Community of  West African States Monitoring Group (ECOWAS) 
heads of  state convene in Banjul, Gambia on the Liberian civil war and institute a five-member 
Appendix D
568
Standing Mediation Committee to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict.  
 
June 1990 – Clashes in Monrovia between the NPFL and Doe’s forces result in indiscriminate 
killings and mass displacement.  
 
July 1990 – Roughly 600 men, women, and children who sought refuge from the violence are 
massacred at a Lutheran church in Monrovia by government soldiers.  
 
July 6, 1990 – ECOWAS leaders gather in Banjul and approve sending a multinational peacekeeping 
force into Monrovia.  
 
July 1990 – The Independent National Patriotic Front of  Liberia (INPFL) forms under Prince 
Johnson after breaking from Charles Taylor and enters Monrovia.  
 
August 7, 1990 – ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee establishes a Military Observer Group 
(ECOMOG) and gives it the power of  collective military action for the purposes of  restoring peace 
in Liberia.  
 
August 8, 1990 – The NPFL enters the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, killing those taking refuge 
inside.  
 
August 24, 1990 – 4,000 ECOMOG peacekeepers from Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, led by 
Ghana and Nigeria, land in Monrovia amidst shellfire from the NPFL.  
 
September 9, 1990 – President Samuel Doe is abducted from ECOWAS headquarters and tortured 
to death by Prince Johnson and the INPFL, who then publicly display his corpse in Monrovia. A film 
is made of  these events and then distributed around Monrovia.
November 27-28, 1990 – ECOWAS-organized peace talks are held in Bamako, Mali, with Professor 
Amos Sawyer being sworn in as Liberia’s first interim head of  state. The NPFL and Doe’s soldiers 
sign Liberia’s first ceasefire agreement.  
 
January 1991 – In defiance of  a ceasefire, Charles Taylor forms a parallel government based out of  
the central Liberian town of  Gbarnga. At this point in the conflict, NPFL is in control of  90 percent 
of  the country.  
 
April 1991 – The United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) is created by former 
Doe loyalists in Guinea and Sierra Leone committed to opposing Taylor’s NPFL. Alhaji Kromah, 
formerly a member of  Doe’s administration, becomes ULIMO’s leader.  
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October 15, 1992 – Charles Taylor launches Operation Octopus, leading to clashes between the 
NPFL and ECOMOG forces in Monrovia.
December 21, 1994 – The now five warring parties meet in Accra, Ghana for ECOWAS-sponsored 
peace talks and agree to a five-member Transitional Ruling Council.  
1995
 
September 1995 – Leaders of  fighting groups Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, and George Boley 
are sworn in with three civilian representatives as part of  a collective presidency that will head up a 
transitional government.  
 
April 6, 1996 – The NPFL and ULIMO forces under Alhaji Kromah battle in Monrovia against a 
splinter ULIMO group led by Roosevelt Johnson, leading to 2,000 deaths and extensive looting.  
 
August 17, 1996 – Another ECOWAS-brokered peace deal is signed in Abuja, Nigeria with 
representatives from civil society. Ruth Sando Perry is selected as chair for a new transitional 
government charged with organizing elections for May 1997.  
 
November 22, 1996 – With help from the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, ECOMOG 
begins disarmament of  armed groups.  
 
July 19, 1997 – Charles Taylor wins ECOWAS-supervised presidential elections, in which Taylor 
garners an overwhelming majority of  the approximate 80 percent of  the population that turn out to 
vote. A song sung by young NPFL supporters goes: “He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, I’ll vote for 
him!”  
 
August 4, 1997 – Charles Taylor is sworn in for a six-year term as President in Monrovia before 
other West African heads of  state.
September 18-17, 1998 – Taylor’s government forces clash with Roosevelt Johnson’s ULIMO 
faction.  
 
July 1999 – In Freetown, Sierra Leone, a group of  Liberians form the rebel faction Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in opposition to the Taylor regime.
2000
 
September 2000 – LURD launches an insurgency from inside Guinea, raiding Liberian villages in 
Lofa County.
Appendix D
570
May 2001 – U.N. Security Council renews an arms embargo on Liberia as punishment for Taylor’s 
trading of  weapons for diamonds with rebels in Sierra Leone.  
 
February 5, 2002 – Charles Taylor declares a state of  emergency when it appears that LURD rebels 
may be gaining on Monrovia.  
 
June 4, 2003 – In Accra, Ghana, Liberian peace talks commence while the U.N.-mandated Special 
Court in Sierra Leone indicts Charles Taylor’s on 17 counts of  war crimes committed in support of  
rebels in Sierra Leone.  
 
June 6, 2003 – First offensive by LURD rebels on Monrovia. 
June 17, 2003 – In Accra, Ghana, representatives from LURD and another rebel group, the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), sign a ceasefire agreement with the Taylor 
government.  
 
June 21-22, 2003 – Breaking the ceasefire, LURD and Taylor’s government forces continue fighting 
in Monrovia.  
June 27, 2003 – Another ceasefire is signed in Accra, Ghana. 
 
July 4, 2003 – ECOWAS approves sending 3,000 regional peacekeepers into Liberia in order to 
restore peace.
July 19, 2003 – LURD launches their final attack on Monrovia, leaving 1,000 dead and nearly 
600,000 displaced.  
 
August 4, 2003 – The first group of  Nigerian peacekeepers under an ECOWAS mandate arrive in 
Liberia.  
 
August 11, 2003 – Charles Taylor steps down from the presidency and leaves for asylum in Nigeria. 
 
August 18, 2003 – Representatives from LURD, MODEL, and the Liberian government sign the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana.  
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
This Memorandum of  Understanding (“MOU”) is this 17 day of  February, A.D. 2007 entered 
into between the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia (“TRC”) of  the City of  Robertsport, 
Republic of  Liberia, represented by its Chairperson, Jerome J Verdier, Sr and Minnesota Advocates 
for Human Rights (“Minnesota Advocates”), a nongovernmental organization operating and existing 
under the laws of  the State of  Minnesota, United States of  America, represented by its Executive 
Director, Robin Phillips, for the purposes herein stated;
WITNESSETH
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS, the TRC is an Independent Commission of  the Government of  Liberia established to 
redress years of  human rights violations resulting from nearly two decades of  protracted conflict in 
Liberia which displaced nearly half  a million of  its 3 million inhabitants in the west African sub-region, 
Europe and the USA; and 
WHEREAS, the TRC plans to expand its program activities to incorporate the experiences and 
participation of  Liberians in the Diasporas, including the State of  Minnesota, USA, which is host to 
the largest Liberian refugee population in North America; and
WHEREAS, Minnesota Advocates is a nongovernmental human rights advocacy organization with vast 
experience in working with Liberian refugee and asylum communities in Minnesota and is interested 
in assisting the TRC with fostering its mandates and achieving its goals of  reaching out to Liberians in 
the Diaspora, especially in the State of  Minnesota; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the foregoing, the TRC and Minnesota Advocates have agreed to work 
together to implement TRC programs in the USA, thereby enhancing its outreach objectives for the 
benefit of  Liberian communities in the USA, especially in the State of  Minnesota.
THEREFORE, and in consideration of  the foregoing, the PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
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1. Background to the TRC
2. Designation The TRC Designates Minnesota Advocates as the representative institution to 
represent the interest of  the TRC in working and coordinating with Liberians and Liberian 
community organizations in the implementation of  the TRC programs in the USA, beginning 
in the State of  Minnesota.
3. Contractual Rights This Memorandum is not intended to create contractual rights in any 
party, with the sole exception of  the mutual releases and indemnities set forth herein, which are 
contractual. This Memorandum simply documents the mutual understandings and intentions 
of  the parties so that a consistent approach to the issues and challenges of  this project are 
adopted as it proceeds.
4. Scope of  Minnesota Advocates Work Minnesota Advocates is responsible for the overall 
supervision and direction of  the programmatic, administrative and operational implementation 
of  the project; will work with the National Advisory Committee and Local/State or 
Community Advisory Committees, in the overall design and implementation of  the project; 
recruit volunteer and other staff  as and when necessary; solicit funding, whether jointly or 
separately with the TRC for the implementation of  the project or other TRC programs; and 
work with local Liberian community organizations, groups, professionals and individuals to 
ensure the maximum feasible participation of  Liberians in the project. 
Minnesota Advocates is dependent for its funding and operations on donations and volunteers. 
Its ability to perform in this matter is dependent on, among other things, the scale of  the 
operation and the amount of  donated and volunteer resources that prove to be available.
5. The Project Subject of  this memorandum, the Project involves sensitization, education, 
mobilization and participation of  Liberians in the work of  the TRC, in the following areas of  
the USA, namely New England, Minnesota, Staten Island & New York, DC and Maryland, 
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Pennsylvania and elsewhere as Minnesota Advocates may determine appropriate and feasible. 
The Project also entails the taking of  voluntary statements from Liberians now resident in 
the United States of  America; the compilation of  such statements in a data base; the analysis 
of  such statements; the holding of  public and confidential hearings; community hearings and 
town hall discussions, workshops, seminars, etc on TRC thematic issues—women, children, 
human rights violations, prosecution, institutional reforms, economic crimes and corruption; 
and preparation of  a Report to be submitted to the TRC responsive to the mandate of  the 
TRC and that addresses the subjects set forth herein above. 
The Project is piloted in Minnesota and will be extended to other parts of  the USA, as 
envisaged, depending on the financial, material and human resource capacity of  the parties.
6. Project Logistics The TRC bears ultimate responsibility for the leadership and implementation 
of  the project, while Minnesota Advocates is at liberty to mobilize any amount of  resources 
including logistics it deems appropriate or needed for the implementation of  the project. 
Already, Minnesota Advocates have secured the services of  a consortium of  pro bono lawyers 
to work on the project as volunteers; Minnesota Advocates will establish a structure to provide 
project leadership at the global national level while the local community advisory committees 
will provide project leadership a the state/community level. Other resources already mobilized 
by Minnesota Advocates include the Law Firm of  Fredrikson & Byron which have agreed to 
provide the technological support necessary to create and house the statement and thematic 
hearings data base for the project; the law firm of  Faegre & Benson have agreed to provide 
meeting space for the Project training sessions and to take a first chair role in administering 
the Project.
Minnesota Advocates has, in conjunction with the TRC, facilitated training programs and 
will continue to do so as the project progresses and as needed. Working with the Community 
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Advisory Committee resources, Minnesota Advocates will also identify volunteers with 
professional knowledge and experience related to counseling victims of  trauma, and other 
professional services to be available at the sites where statements will be taken. Minnesota 
Advocates will make available to statement takers a list of  referrals to providers of  legal, 
immigration and mental and public health services, for distribution to potential statement 
givers as may appear advisable. In conjunction with community resources, Minnesota 
Advocates will identify sites for statement taking that will be of  optimal convenience for 
the Liberian community, such as in churches, schools and community centers. Sites will 
be staffed, on designated days and times, with statement takers and, if  possible, with one 
counseling volunteer per site. Statement givers will be given opportunities both to sign up for 
appointments in advance, and to appear at the sites on a walk-in basis; Ensure that statements 
will be recorded in such a manner as to facilitate their input into the TRC data base and their 
subsequent analysis; Minnesota Advocates will identify a team of  volunteers to analyze the 
data and draft the comprehensive project Report, reflecting analysis of  statements, project 
recommendations and inputs from both the national and community advisory committees 
for submission to the TRC.
7. Project Liaisons The TRC will identify to Minnesota Advocates a single individual to act 
as a point of  contact and liaison between the Parties with respect to the Project. Minnesota 
Advocates identifies its Deputy Director Jennifer Prestholdt as Minnesota Advocates point of  
contact and liaison with the TRC. Either organization may change its point of  contact/liaison 
at will, by written notice to the other organization. The points of  contact will endeavor to 
communicate regularly, and no less than weekly, on the status of  their organizations’ respective 
operations.
8. Taking Statements Statements will be taken using, as nearly as possible, the TRC Statement 
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Form with variations approved by the TRC when deemed appropriate to the uniqueness of  
the project. Project statements will be taken from individuals currently residing in the United 
States. 
At the beginning of  a statement session, the statement takers will read to statement givers a 
disclosure to be agreed upon between the TRC and Minnesota Advocates. It will inform the 
statement givers that the statement takers are not acting as their lawyers or representatives; that 
the giving of  statements is entirely voluntary and must be truthful and will be confidential to 
the limits of  US laws when applicable; statements may be given anonymously, but anonymous 
statements will be treated separately in the data base and if  statement givers are anonymous, 
identifying information as to alleged perpetrators will be regarded with lesser probity unless 
supported by other leads. 
9. Confidentiality The TRC will share with Minnesota Advocates any provisions it may put 
in place in Liberia to preserve confidentiality as to all or part of  the statements taken there. 
Minnesota Advocates will, to the extent possible, adopt confidentiality procedures consistent 
with those of  the TRC and applicable under US laws. Statement takers will record the names 
and other identifying information of  statement givers and such information will be maintained 
in the Project data base. It will be maintained in such a way that names and addresses may be 
readily redacted for purposes of  distributing statements without such identifying information. 
However, all information will be made accessible to the TRC which will be fully responsible 
for decisions and actions as to use of  data. 
As part of  the project, statement takers and all staff  connected to/with the project are under 
obligations of  confidentiality not to disclose the identities or contents of  statements to 
persons or institutions not connected or privy to the project unless otherwise required by 
law. Minnesota Advocates will make reasonable efforts to preserve and defend confidentiality 
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as stated herein, consistent with the expressed goals of  the Project. Statements may be given 
anonymously and in which case they will be distinguishable in the report and recorded to 
preserve the identity of  the anonymous statement giver from public disclosure.
10. Professional Responsibility The majority of  the volunteer statement takers for the Project, 
and of  the professional staff  at Minnesota Advocates, are lawyers or paralegals. These 
individuals are providing their services to the Project as a matter of  public service, and 
are not acting as attorneys for any particular individuals or entities in connection with this 
Project. In particular, none of  the statement givers are the clients of  any of  the statement 
takers, and the statement givers will be so informed. If  the statement givers have a need for 
legal services, the statement takers may refer them to appropriate resources. The statement 
takers will agree, as a condition to going forward on the Project, that they will not accept the 
representation of  any statement giver as a result of  the statement taking process. In addition, 
neither Minnesota Advocates, nor the law firms contributing resources to the Project, nor the 
individual statement takers and other volunteers, are acting as attorneys for the TRC or any 
of  its members. The Project is undertaken entirely as a service to the public and to the people 
of  Liberia.
11. Liability Neither party to this Memorandum intends that the other party shall incur any 
liability as a result of  its participation in the Project. To the maximum extent allowed by law, 
the TRC and Minnesota Advocates mutually release and forever discharge each other, and the 
Project volunteers and their law firms, of  and from any and all claims and lawsuits arising from 
or in any way connected to their activities connected with the Project. The mutual releases set 
forth in this paragraph specifically apply to claims that one entity was negligent or otherwise 
at fault, to the maximum extent allowed by applicable law. The mutual indemnifications 
shall be applicable to claims by either party that one party is negligent or otherwise at fault. 
581
Responsibilities to third parties, if  any, shall be assessed according to applicable law. If  any 
portion of  this paragraph is deemed unenforceable as a matter of  law or public policy, the 
remainder of  the obligations hereunder shall remain in full force and effect. This paragraph 
11 of  this Memorandum of  Understanding shall be interpreted in accordance with the law of  
the State of  Minnesota.
12. Funding The TRC and Minnesota Advocates will each be responsible for the funding of  its 
own activities contemplated in this Memorandum, and neither will have any responsibility to 
fund the other, absent subsequent agreement.
13. Data Base The data base generated or created by the project is solely for the benefit of  the 
TRC and shall be owned by it. Minnesota Advocates will not share it or distribute it to third 
parties without the prior consent of  the TRC. Best efforts will be made to make the data base 
compatible with the corresponding data base used by the TRC for statements taken in Liberia, 
including consistency of  coding to the extent possible. Upon submission of  the Report, the 
data base will be provided in its entirety to TRC, with a copy retained by Minnesota Advocates 
under such terms and conditions as the parties may further agree, provided however that 
Minnesota Advocates will always preserve the confidentiality of  the identifying information 
in the data base, to the best of  its ability under applicable law. 
14. Reports Regular reports including quarterly reports on the project performance will be made 
to TRC at least one week prior to the end of  any particular quarter. The Final Report on the 
Project shall address the following:
A. Description of  Project processes and activities;
B. Factual findings, based on thematic and public hearings, community seminars, 
recommendations and analysis of  witness statements, concerning occurrences of  and 
responsibilities for human rights abuses within the scope of  the TRC’s work;
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C. Recommendations, if  appropriate, for further investigation and possible prosecutions of  
perpetrators;
D. Recommendations concerning societal, legal and political factors contributing to the 
nation’s vulnerability to human rights abuses;
E. Recommendations for traditional, societal, legal or political initiatives to contribute to 
reconciliation, help victims of  human rights abuses and assist in the building of  a strong, 
stable and peaceful nation;
F. Recommendations concerning possible reparations for victims;
G. Other issues that may be requested by TRC or initiated by Minnesota Advocates.
15. Timeline The ability of  Minnesota Advocates to adhere to any particular timeline will 
depend in part on factors beyond its control, such as the availability of  volunteered resources 
and the ability of  the LTRC to meet its own schedule and provide requested information 
and feedback. It is currently contemplated that Minnesota Advocates will train its volunteer 
statement takers through the fall of  2006, and will conduct a pilot program during that season, 
in which a limited number of  statements will be taken by members of  the Pro Bono Advisory 
Committee for purposes of  trying out contemplated procedures. 
It is expected that the full scale statement-taking program will begin in January of  2007, and 
will continue through the end of  June, 2007. It is expected that a first draft of  the Project 
Report will be provided for comment to the TRC by October 31, 2007, and that the final 
Report will be submitted to the TRC, along with the statement data base, thereafter. All of  
these deadlines are aspirational and subject to revision as necessary. Minnesota Advocates will 
continue to communicate regularly with TRC concerning its progress in accomplishing its 
tasks and its expectations for meeting the deadlines. 
WHEREFORE, this Memorandum of  Understanding is entered into effective this 17th day of  
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February, 2007.
FOR : TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF LIBERIA
Jerome J Verdier, Sr. (Cllr)
Chairman
__________________
WITNESS
FOR: MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Robin Phillips
Executive Director
______________
WITNESS
APPENDIX:
1. constitution and qualification for membership of  the National and State/Community 
Advisory Committees
2. functions, duties and roles of  national and community advisory committees
3. functions, duties and roles of  staff, volunteers generally and Liberian community 
associations. 
4. statement/oath of  confidentiality by all associated with the project.
Appendix E
584
585
Appendix F
Listing of  Pro Bono Management 
and Advisory Committee Members
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Members of  the Pro Bono Management Team
Dulce Foster, Fredrikson & Byron, Minneapolis 
Dianne Heins, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis
Mark Kalla, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis
Jeff  Keyes, Briggs & Morgan, Minneapolis
Jim O’Neal, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis
Members of  the Community Advisory Committee
Anderson, Yende
Badio, Harriett 
Beh, Ada
Ben, Irvinton
Brewer, Yeamah 
Brownell, John N.
Dakinah, Catherine
Diahn, Kamaty
Doe, Wayne Douglas
Dolo, Emmanuel
Dukule, Abdoulaye W.
Elliot, Michael
Garsinii, Dennis
Gaye, Artemus
Gbojueh, Beatrice
George, Jackson
Gray, Georgette
Hayes, Marie
Jabbeh Wesley, Patricia
Kaine, Demenia
Kiatamba, Abdullah
Kugmeh, Patrick
Minikon, Patricia
Nyanwleh, Seyon 
Nyenie-Wea, Writhers
Parker, Doris
Qualah, James
Russell, Wynfred
Saydee, Williametta
Sesay, Mamadee
Sherif, Muhammad
Sinoe, Martha
Sirleaf, Ahmed
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Sensitization and Outreach
1. Outreach and sensitization required more resources than anticipated.  Coverage of  
the TRC in the diaspora press was minimal before the opening of  the public hearings. There 
was also confusion about the process based on prior knowledge of  how other TRC processes 
had worked elsewhere, such as in South Africa where amnesty was an important component 
of  the process. This created a need for intensive outreach and education about the role of  
the TRC. In Minnesota, staff  and volunteer resources were available to conduct widespread 
outreach and education, but outreach was a challenge in other cities where there was less 
capacity to do extensive outreach.
2. Immigration policy, particularly in the United States, imposed an additional need for 
outreach and sensitization. Perhaps the largest unforeseen obstacle to the TRC project was 
the U.S. government’s decision to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Liberians in 
October of  2006. Thousands of  Liberians who were on TPS faced potential deportation by 
October of  2007. Even Liberians with pending asylum claims and legal permanent resident 
status were nervous about their status in the United States, and this anxiety had a chilling 
effect on participation. 
3. Implementation of  the TRC process in some communities had important reconciliatory 
effects. The TRC diaspora project activities encouraged the participation of  Liberians from 
all walks of  life. As a consequence, major Liberian diaspora communities in the United States 
benefited from these non-discriminatory interactions. For example, when the TRC process 
began, the Liberian community association of  Staten Island, New York was in political 
disarray. Contentious community election results were in dispute, with lawsuits threatened 
and bitter disagreement on all sides.  A similar situation was happening in Providence, Rhode 
Island. In these communities, although certain individuals were not on speaking terms, the 
Advocates encouraged them all to participate in the TRC process. This message resonated. As 
a result, Liberians who would not speak to each other, let alone work together, came together. 
During a TRC Rhode Island launching event, a Liberian cleric remarked that he saw many 
Liberians together in the same room who had not spoken in a long time. In Staten Island, 
previously opposing political groups were able to put their differences aside and work on 
outreach projects. These interactions led to the election of  new community leadership, with 
many former “enemies” serving together on the board or as executive officers.
Statement Taking
1. Modeling the statement taking protocol too closely on the in-country process misses 
important components of  the diaspora experience. Although certain modifications 
were made to the statement taking protocols in the diaspora, little change was made to the 
substantive nature of  the questions asked of  interviewees.  It became clear later in the process 
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that rich information about the diaspora experience was being left out.  This necessitated 
adjustment to the substantive questions asked during interviews. Extensive background 
interviews and group interviews also helped fill in the gap.  This data collection focused on 
examining diaspora community dynamics and the interaction of  Liberians in the diaspora with 
systems and communities where they had settled.  This information, which proved important 
in conceptualizing recommendations for reconciliation within the diaspora itself, was not 
captured through the initial statement taking process. 
2. Multiple logistical models for statement taking were required to meet the varying 
needs of  Liberian communities in the diaspora. The Advocates adopted three main 
logistical models for statement taking that were used as appropriate in the different project 
locations. First, a legal clinic model, in which statement givers could walk in for appointments 
to meet with statement takers at certain designated times, was piloted in Minnesota. Although 
it met with limited success in Minnesota, the model worked well in Ghana, where word spread 
quickly through a small, dense community. The clinic model was also successful in Philadelphia 
and other cities where a clinic was set up for a one-time statement taking opportunity. Second, 
an individual appointment model was more successful in communities where Liberians lived 
at further distances from each other, such as in the United Kingdom or Washington, DC/
Maryland. Finally, a door-to-door model operated well in communities where there was a 
large concentration of  Liberians living in a single apartment complex, neighborhood, or other 
discrete area. In these areas, as in Liberia, volunteers went door-to-door explaining the process 
and offering to document experiences for the TRC that very day.
3. Multiple process models for offering statement taking were required to meet the 
varying needs of  statement givers in the Diaspora. While the individual, signed statement 
of  experiences and recommendations to the TRC was the staple method of  gathering 
information for the Liberian TRC, several other processes were employed to reach out 
to those who were not comfortable presenting their individual statements as part of  the 
official historical record of  the TRC. Offering anonymous statements was an important 
part of  getting many individuals who had safety or immigration concerns in the diaspora 
to participate. Group discussions were held around the United States and in Ghana, and the 
comments from Liberians were documented as part of  the TRC record. This process allowed 
for information to be documented while at the same time minimizing the individual focus and 
allowing participants to support each other through discussion. Finally, The Advocates’ staff  
and volunteers conducted background interviews with Liberians around the United States 
and the United Kingdom to fill in gaps in information gathered during the statement taking 
process.
4. Liberians in the diaspora were sensitive to questions about their tribe/ethnicity and 
about the status of  their children. The process of  interviewing Liberians to document 
their statements was first tested in Minnesota with members of  the advisory committee and 
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with others who volunteered to participate. The forms initially used mirrored very closely 
the forms used in Liberia. During the pilot testing, it became clear that diaspora Liberians 
viewed questions about their tribal/ethnic identity as a political issue. Although this question 
was included in the final statement taking forms, statement takers made clear to statement 
givers that they could choose not to respond if  they wished. Moreover, pilot testing revealed 
that Liberians in the United States had concerns about discussing the number and status of  
their children, possibly owing to immigration concerns. After much negative feedback, this 
question was deleted from the final forms used in the diaspora.
 
5. Combatants who remained in refugee camps were more willing to participate in 
the statement giving process than were combatants who had been resettled in the 
United States. Almost no former combatants came forward to provide statements to the 
TRC in the United States or in the United Kingdom. In contrast, former combatants made 
up an important part of  the statement giver pool in the Buduburam refugee settlement. 
Given the immigration policy climate in the United States in particular, this discrepancy is 
not surprising. Admitted participation in an armed rebel group is an admission that can have 
serious immigration consequences for resettled refugees and other non-citizens. Admitted 
participation as a combatant can have consequences for refugees in the West African sub-
region as well; thus, immigration consequences alone cannot explain this difference. Former 
combatants in the United States and United Kingdom chose not to take advantage of  the 
anonymous statement option. Ultimately, this difference may be attributable to the feasibility 
of  targeted outreach. Whereas in Ghana, former combatants – child soldiers in particular – 
have formed their own support organization and are a readily identifiable group, no similar 
support network has been established in the United States. When community members were 
asked to assist with identifying former combatants who might want to participate in the TRC 
process, there was extreme reluctance to do so. 
Public Hearings
1. Witnesses who participated in the public hearings process reported it as a positive 
experience. While retraumatization is a major concern in TRC public hearings, witnesses who 
participated in the Diaspora Public Hearings did not report such retraumatization. Telephone 
follow-up was conducted with each witness in the weeks following the public hearings, and 
feedback was unexpectedly positive. Some witnesses did, however, express concern that they 
were unable to fully discuss all the topics they would have liked because of  a lack of  time. 
Others expressed frustration that certain questions were not explored with other witnesses.
Using Pro bono Resources to Support the TRC in the Diaspora
2. Leveraging pro bono resources was a largely successful model to create a labor force 
for a TRC in the diaspora, in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Non 
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governmental organizations, law firms, religious organizations, and academic institutions were 
extremely interested in volunteering on the project. The project has also created collaborations 
across professions and cultures as representatives from Liberian community organizations 
worked in coalition with large law firms and academic institutions toward the goal of  engaging 
Liberians in the United States in the TRC process.  One immediate and unanticipated benefit 
of  this collaboration in every city has been to connect Liberians to existing legal and social 
services that many members of  the Liberian community needed and were eligible for, but of  
which they were not aware.
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Table 1. Number of  Statement Givers by Project Area
Project Area Statements % of  Total
United States 237 15.3%
Atlanta, GA 21 1.2%
Chicago, IL    8 < 1%
Minnesota 70 4.3%
Staten Island, NY 61 3.7%
Philadelphia, PA 30 1.8%
Providence, RI 23 1.4%
Washington, DC/
Maryland 
 9 < 1%
Other US – Southeast 15 < 1%
United Kingdom 15 < 1%
Buduburam, Ghana1 1379 84.6%
Total Diaspora Statements 1631
Table 2. Participation of  Statement Givers by Sex1
Project Area Women Men 
United States 99 (42%) 138 (58%)
United Kingdom 7 (47%) 8 (53%)
Ghana  819 (59%) 559 (41%)
Project Total 925 (57%) 705 (43%)
1  Additional statements were gathered in Ghana but were not included in The Advocates diaspora 
dataset. 
2  One statement record did not have a sex entry, and sex could not be determined from the narrative.
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Table 3. Participation of  Statement Givers by Self-Reported County of  Origin2
Project Area
County of  Origin United 
States
United 
Kingdom
Ghana % of  Total
Bomi 10 - 28 2.3%
Bong 22 2 100 7.6%
Gbarpolu - - 3 < 1%
Grand Bassa 21 3 126 9.2%
Grand Cape Mount 6 - 58 3.9%
Grand Gedeh 10 2 364 23.1%
Grand Kru 1 - 64 4.0%
Lofa 19 3 100 7.5%
Margibi 6 - 25 1.9%
Maryland 11 1 120 8.1%
Montserrado 50 - 80 8.0%
Nimba 39 1 121 9.9%
River Cess 3 1 18 1.3%
River Gee 1 - 12 < 1%
Sinoe 9 2 131 8.7%
Not Liberian 1 - 2 < 1%
Did Not Respond 3 - 1 < 1%
3  County data is missing for 24 records.
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Table 4. Participation of  Statement Givers by Ethnicity3
Project Area 
Tribe/Ethnicity
United 
States
United 
Kingdom
Ghana % of  Total
Bassa 36 2 154 11.8%
Belleh - - 11 < 1%
Congo/Americo-Liberian 20 1 13 2.1%
Dei 1 - 3 < 1%
Gbandi 5 - 15 1.2%
Gio 10 - 27 2.3%
Gola 6 - 22 1.7%
Grebo 15 1 164 11%
Kissi 4 1 18 1.4%
Kpele 19 2 131 9.3%
Krahn 16 2 414 26.5%
Kru 11 1 156 10.3%
Lorma 6 2 50 3.5%
Mano 11 1 22 2.1%
Mandingo 22 - 19 2.5%
Mende 1 - 1 < 1%
Sarpo 2 1 31 2.1%
Vai 6 - 56 3.8%
Multiple Tribes 14 1 28 2.6%
Other 3 - 11 < 1%
Did not wish to answer 7 - 4 < 1%
4  Tribe/ethnicity data is missing for 20 records.
Appendix H
602
603
Appendix I
Public Hearings Witnesses 
by U.S. State of  Residence
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Minnesota
1. Samuel Kalongo Luo
2. Wilhelmina Tolbert Holder
3. Alfred K. Zeon
4. Marie Hayes
5. Miatta Adotey
6. Marie Vah
7. Doris Parker
8. Kerper Dwanyen
9. Miamen Wopea
10. Georgette Gray
11. Aicha Cooper
12. Harriette Badio
13. Tetee Cole
14. Lynette Murray-Gibson
15. In camera witness
16. In camera witness
Georgia
17. Dr. Augustine Konneh
18. Hassan Kiawu
19. Rev. William B.G.K. Harris
Oklahoma
20. Bishop Bennie D. Warner 
North Carolina
21. James Y. Hunder
Pennsylvania
22. Sackor Zahnee
23. Bai Gbala
24. Ali Sylla
25. Dr. Patricia Jabbeh Wesley
26. Sam Slewion
Illinois
27. Garswah Blacktom
New Jersey
28. Jane Samukai
New York
29. Telee Brown
Rhode Island
30. Pajibo Kyne
 
Washington, D.C.
31. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen
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Photo Legend
Chapter One
Page 1:  TRC billboard in Monrovia. 
Page 4:  A wooden sign depicting hope for Liberia. 
Page 7:  Ministry of  Information billboard in Monrovia. 
Page 13: Fishermen off  the Liberian coast.
Page 15: A billboard urging Liberians to vote in elections. 
Page 16: Monrovia cityscape in 2006.
Chapter Two
Page 21: Liberian boy looks over Liberia’s Atlantic coast.
Page 27: Member of  the Liberian community in Minnesota asks a question during Diaspora Public 
Hearings of  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 29: TRC Diaspora Project volunteer greets Liberian man in Monrovia.  
Chapter Three
Page 33: Signing of  the Robertsport Accord, the Memorandum of  Understanding between the TRC 
of  Liberia and The Advocates for Human Rights.
Page 35: Volunteers at a statement taker training in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Page 38: TRC Diaspora Project volunteer speaks with Commissioner Coleman in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. 
Page 41: Liberian Minnesota resident speaks with Commissioner Washington at a statement taker 
training in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Page 43: Commissioners Brown Bull and Konneh confer during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Chapter Four
Page 49: Traditional chief  in Gweatamue, Bong County, Liberia.
Page 54: Beach in Robertsport, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia.
Page 57: HIV/AIDS billboard in Monrovia.
Page 60: Chairman Verdier and The Advocates’ staffperson during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 64: Village hut in Gbarpolu County, Liberia.
Page 67: Ghana’s Atlantic coastline.
Chapter Five
Page 81: Woman and young boy in Monrovia.
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Page 89: Commissioner Stewart during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A.
Page 92: Woman walking along Liberia’s coast.
Chapter Six
Page 109: Young girl carrying a baby through the streets of  Monrovia.
Page 113: Village hut in Bong County, Liberia.
Page 117: United Nations Development Programme t-shirt.
Page 119: Petty vendors along a street in Accra, Ghana. 
Chapter Seven
Page 127: Performer at a TRC event in Monrovia.
Page 133: Partially constructed buildings in Monrovia. 
Page 145: Petty traders in Monrovia. 
Page 160: Beach in Robertsport, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia.
Page 163: Beach in Robertsport, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia.
Chapter Eight
Page 181: Liberian cemetery.
Page 188: TRC Diaspora Project staff  and volunteers with TRC commissioners and staff  in Liberia 
in 2006.
Chapter Nine
Page 201: A banner for the Veteran Child Soldiers Association of  Liberia (VECSAOL) in 
Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana. 
Page 205: A U.N. vehicle in Liberia.
Page 209: Village scene in Gbarpolu County, Liberia.
Chapter Ten
Page 225: Dancers at a TRC event in Monrovia.
Page 227: Commissioners Washington and Sylla during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 243: Palava hut in Gbarpolu County, Liberia. 
Page 246: A billboard to combat violence against women. 
Page 249: A Liberian mother and baby. 
Page 251: Classroom building used by community-based women’s empowerment and training group 
in Buduburam Refugee Settlement.
Chapter Eleven
Page 263: Street in front of  a mosque in Sinkor, Monrovia, Liberia.
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Page 266: Ghana’s Atlantic coast.
Page 269: Monrovia street scene.
Page 272: Beach slum in Monrovia.
Chapter Twelve
Page 283: Member of  Minnesota’s Liberian Ministers Association attending The Advocates’ “Healing 
through Faith” conference hosted by Luther Seminary in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
Page 287: Witness testifies during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 288: Audience members listen during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 291: Liberian flags flying above streets of  Monrovia.
Chapter Thirteen
Page 301: TRC Diaspora Project staff  and Advisory Committee members after a meeting with TRC 
Chairman Verdier.
Page 308: Main vehicle entrance to Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 314: A poster encouraging people to give a statement to the TRC. 
Page 319: Fisherman in traditional dugout canoe.
Page 322: Beach in Robertsport, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia.
Page 327: Sign encouraging repatriation posted in Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 331: Truck carrying bagged water for sale in Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 335: Petty trader on bicycle in Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 336: TRC Diaspora Project staff  and volunteers with refugee statement takers in Buduburam 
Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 342: TRC Diaspora Project Advisory Committee members at Diaspora Statement Taking Kick-
off  Celebration in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota.
Page 345: TRC Diaspora Project staff  and volunteers with Commissioner Gerald Coleman and 
members of  the Liberian Organization of  the Piedmont during a statement-taking 
weekend in North Carolina.
Page 350: A public hearings witness is sworn in at the Diaspora Public Hearings of  the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 356: Liberian pop star Juli Endee at the Diaspora Statement Taking Kick-off  Celebration in 
Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. 
Page 359: Community members and TRC Diaspora Project staff  sing the Liberian National Anthem 
at the Diaspora Statement Taking Kick-off  Celebration in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. 
Page 361: Commissioners of  the TRC listen to testimony during the Diaspora Public Hearings of  
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Liberia in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Page 365: Community members sing the Liberian National Anthem at the Diaspora Statement 
Taking Kick-off  Celebration in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota.
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Page 371: TRC Chairman Verdier at a TRC Diaspora Project volunteer training. 
Page 373: Sign encouraging repatriation posted in Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Appendices
Page 513: The official logo of  the TRC of  Liberia. 
Page 519: The Liberian flag.
Page 551: School building in Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana.
Page 565: A statue of  Joseph Roberts, Liberia’s first president. 
Page 573: Signing of  the Robertsport Accord, the Memorandum of  Understanding between the 
TRC of  Liberia and The Advocates for Human Rights.
Page 585: Official launch of  the Liberia TRC Diaspora Project at the state capitol in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, June 2006.
Page 589: TRC Diaspora Project staff  and volunteers with the TRC Commissioners in Monrovia. 
Page 597: Community members at the Diaspora Statement Taking Kick-off  Celebration in Brooklyn 
Park, Minnesota. 
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